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Abstract
Research on thorium as an energy source began in 1940 under the direction of
Glenn Seaborg at the University of California, Berkeley. Following the discovery
of plutonium-239 and its fissile qualities, similar experiments demonstrated that
uranium-233 bred from thorium was also fissile. Seaborg viewed uranium-233 as
a potential backup to plutonium-239, whose production was one of the Manhattan
Project’s primary efforts. The central appeal of U-233 was that the chemistry of
uranium was well understood, unlike plutonium, but plutonium-239 had the potential
to be produced from natural uranium in a critical nuclear reactor. Natural thorium
lacked fissile isotopes and so a critical nuclear reactor (to produce U-233) from thorium
alone was not possible. Not until the X-10 graphite reactor was constructed at Oak
Ridge in 1943 was sufficient U-233 created to conclusively assess its nuclear properties,
which were found to be superior to Pu-239 in a thermal-spectrum reactor. Early
production of plutonium at X-10 showed significant contamination by Pu-240, which
made plutonium unsuitable for simple ”gun-type” nuclear weapons. Researchers
in the ”Metallurgical Laboratory” at the University of Chicago, which included
Seaborg’s chemistry group, suggested that the plutonium produced be used as a fuel
in a special reactor to convert thorium to uranium-233 for weapons. This effort
encountered many severe difficulties in fuel fabrication and dissolution. Seaborg
also recognized the severe issue that uranium-232 contamination would play in
any effort to use uranium-233 for weapons. Through tremendous effort, weapons
designers at Los Alamos were able to design workable weapons using the implosion
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principle, which accommodated for the impure plutonium produced. Interest in U233 for weapons effectively disappeared by 1945, but the Metallurgical Laboratory
continued to investigate the potential of a thorium-U-233 ”breeder” reactor, based
on a homogeneous mixture of uranium salts in heavy water. This effort also came
to an end in early 1945. With the end of World War II, the United States was fully
focused on growing its nuclear weapons stockpile, and thorium/uranium-233 lacked
relevance to that mission as the Manhattan Project concluded at the end of calendar
year 1946.
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Preface
Historians may one day lament that the discovery of nuclear fission in 1939 by Otto
Hahn in Germany and the initiation of World War II by Hitler’s Nazi regime took place
in such close spatial and temporal proximity. Because of these proximities, the process
of nuclear fission was immediately seen as a military threat against the United States
by European refugee scientists, many of whom were Jewish or had Jewish relatives.
They urged a national response that led to the development of nuclear weapons on
an industrial scale without modern precedent. The discovery of fission, along with
the advent of powerful particle accelerators in the United States, also made possible
the discovery of new elements and new isotopes of existing elements. Their existence
and potential was immediately viewed through the prism of war and destruction.
This paper is an attempt to understand the early history of thorium as a source of
nuclear energy. In discussing thorium, I often refer to the isotope thorium-232 and its
fissile daughter product uranium-233 as if they were one material. I realize that they
are distinct and the manufacture of uranium-233 depends on neutron absorption in
thorium from a source such as a nuclear reactor, but it is also true that thorium-232
is the only significant source of uranium-233, and that energy from uranium-233 is
energy from thorium, abstracted by the step of neutron bombardment.
There have been scores of accounts written about the early history of the nuclear
age, specifically the wartime program code-named the ”Manhattan Project” which
led to the development of nuclear weapons. These histories focus on the two strands of
effort that led to successful nuclear weapons, namely the isotopic separation of U-235
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from natural uranium and the creation of plutonium in dedicated production reactors
fueled by natural uranium. One could easily wonder when the story of thorium as an
energy source really began. The official history of the Atomic Energy Commission
that covered this era, The New World 1939-1946 (Hewlett and Anderson (1962)),
gives scant mention of thorium and its potential, and no details as to the discovery
of uranium-233, its fissile nature, nor the potential of thorium as an energy source.
Other important works chronicling this time, including Richard Rhodes’ PulitzerPrize-winning work The Making of the Atomic Bomb, also give little mention to
thorium. This can easily be forgiven, for thorium and uranium-233 did not lead to
the production of nuclear weapons, but the question of why they did not is a subject
that has persistent historical relevance. Today we consider whether thorium is a
natural energy source of sufficient magnitude and merit to power human civilization
for many hundreds of thousands of years, and it is necessary to understand why
decisions were made long ago, and what lessons those decisions could have for us
today.
This thesis began originally as an attempt to tell the story of the thorium-fueled
molten-salt reactor effort at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, strongly motivated by
the discovery of a series of books (Seaborg and Loeb (1981), Seaborg and Loeb
(1987), Seaborg and Loeb (1993)) written by Glenn Seaborg and Benjamin Loeb
covering Seaborg’s years as the chairman of the US Atomic Energy Committee. In
the last of these, The Atomic Energy Commission Under Nixon (Seaborg and Loeb
(1993)), Seaborg describes budget cuts early in the Nixon Administration that led the
AEC to curtail research into breeder reactors. He describes how Alvin Weinberg, head
of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and ardent proponent of the thoriumfueled molten-salt breeder reactor (MSBR), argued for the continuation of that line of
research. Seaborg goes on to describe how the MSBR program was cancelled in favor
of the plutonium-fueled, liquid-metal fast-breeder reactor (LMFBR) but concedes
later that that may have been a mistake. (Seaborg and Loeb, 1993, pg.179)
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This significant admission led me to probe deeper into the earlier histories of both
the fast-breeder and the molten-salt reactor. At the time of the molten-salt reactor’s
cancellation, the fast-breeder reactor effort was at a far greater stage of maturity.
A commercial fast-breeder reactor called ”Fermi-1” had been built near Detroit,
Michigan, and had operated briefly in 1966 before suffering a partial core meltdown.
(Alexanderson and Wagner (1979)) Fermi-1 had been built using the private funds of
a large industrial consortium that included some of the most prominent utilities and
nuclear suppliers of the time. In today’s funds, it had cost hundreds of millions of
dollars. The AEC had facilitated its construction and operation through fee waivers
on nuclear fuel and a generous approach to siting and licensing. Several other smaller
test reactors, such the Experimental Breeder Reactors -1 and -2 (EBR-1 and -2) and
the Southwest Experimental Fast Oxide Reactor (SEFOR) had also been built and
operated, with varying degrees of success. There was also a large international effort
underway to develop the sodium-cooled fast breeder reactor.
In contrast, the effort to develop the molten-salt reactor was much smaller and
almost entirely confined to ORNL. Why had there been so much more industrial and
governmental interest in the fast breeder than the molten-salt reactor? That search
took me further back in history, to the early 1950s when the Fermi project began
as a commercial effort under the leadership of Walker Cisler of the Detroit Edison
Company. Commercial nuclear reactors were being considered for the first time, and
with the advent of Soviet nuclear testing and the Korean War, the Atomic Energy
Commission was under great pressure to produce more and more fissile material
for nuclear weapons. There were also stronger calls for the use of nuclear energy
to produce electricity for civilian use. The technology decisions made for Fermi-1
were motivated in large part by the desire of the US Atomic Energy Commission
to produce a high-quality form of plutonium, which was uniquely produced by fast
breeder reactors. They were willing to incentivize industry to produce this material
for them in civilian reactors. The AEC had a huge effort to produce highly-enriched
uranium and high-isotopic-quality plutonium for nuclear weapons, and the Fermi
ix

project was seen as a contributor to that effort. The chairman of the AEC at that
time, Gordon Dean, had no interest in thorium or uranium-233 as materials for a
nuclear weapons effort.
Why was uranium/plutonium useful for weapons and thorium/U-233 wasn’t?
The search for that answer took me back to where this story begins, in the fervent
atmosphere of the wartime program to develop nuclear weapons. It was in this era
that discoveries were first made and the broad lines of reactor development were laid
out.
In the search for referenceable descriptions of early research on thorium, I found
to my disappointment that there was nearly no discussion in historical texts such as
The New World of the early efforts on thorium and uranium-233. But to my delight, I
discovered the wartime journals of Dr. Glenn Seaborg and the first-hand account they
told of the discoveries surrounding thorium. Dr. Seaborg led a small research team
that discovered uranium-233, and his curiosity about nuclear decay chains, along with
his proximity to a powerful cyclotron at the University of California, Berkeley, led to
this historic accomplishment. Seaborg’s pre-war and wartime journals were primary
sources that had never been ”mined” along the direction of thorium and uranium-233,
and the remarkable story of these materials merited a new perspective on the entire
Manhattan Project.
Dr. Seaborg compiled his pre-war and wartime journals and records in the late
1970s in a series of documents published by the University of California. The first,
Early History of Heavy Isotope Research at Berkeley (Seaborg (1976)), covered a
period from August 1940 to April 1942, when Seaborg left Berkeley to join the
”Metallurgical Laboratory” at the University of Chicago. The Met Lab, as it was
called, was a branch of the Manhattan Project whose divisions were charged with
some of the greatest challenges of the Project, including the design of plutoniumproducing chain-reacting ”piles” and the chemical separation processes that would
isolate the plutonium from the remaining fuel and fission products.
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In the Early History, Seaborg describes the discovery of plutonium-239 and
uranium-233 using the large 60-inch cyclotron at Berkeley. He also describes the
processes by which their fissile natures were discovered through precision chemistry.
Plutonium-239 was discovered about a year earlier than uranium-233, and this gave it
an important head start in the effort to develop materials for the Manhattan Project.
Seaborg’s later efforts at the Met Lab are chronicled in four volumes, titled History
of Met Lab Section C-I (Seaborg (1977), Seaborg (1978), Seaborg (1979), Seaborg
(1980)), each covering approximately a year of history. Events related to thorium
and uranium-233 are mentioned tangentially in the first two volumes, but in volume
3 new data on the properties of U-233, which became available from the X-10 graphite
reactor at Oak Ridge, led to extensive discussion about the potential of uranium-233
and the most concentrated efforts on its development. For a period it was even
considered as a replacement for plutonium-239. But in this same period some of its
persistent flaws as a weapons material were also uncovered.
The Early History, published in June 1976, is approximately 150 pages in length.
The History of the Met Lab volumes, which cover shorter spaces of time, were
published in February 1977, May 1978, 1979, and May 1980, respectively. The
volumes range from 560 to 690 pages each in length, and represent a tremendous
amount of source material from which to follow the thread of development of the
thorium story.
Beginning in December 2012 and continuing until March 2013 I combed through
the five volumes of Seaborg’s history and extracted all of the relevant passages about
the development of thorium and uranium-233. Volumes 1, 2, and 4 were in electronic
form and this greatly facilitated scans on keywords like ”thorium”, ”233”, and
”protactinium”. Volume 3 was not available in electronic form, much to my dismay,
but through the assistance of Dr. Jess Gehin at Oak Ridge National Laboratory I
obtained access to a paper copy. Personally scanning through the pages and finding
the relevant passages was tedious but volume 3 ended up having the majority of the
source material that made its way into the final work. My goal was to find the precise
xi

moments in history when the understanding of the potential of thorium as an energy
source began to distill upon the parties involved, and also the moments that made
clear that thorium and uranium-233 would not have useful application in nuclear
weapons. I believe that I have succeeded in this effort and can now tell the story,
from primary sources, of how thorium as a weapons material didn’t happen, and why
that has persistent significance in the later development of nuclear energy.
The official history of the Manhattan Project, The New World, 1939-1946, served
as an excellent ”big-picture” view of the Manhattan Project and as a contrast to
Seaborg’s rather narrow focus on his chemistry group’s effort to purify plutonium.
But Seaborg’s diaries remain the primary source material for this entire paper. A
supplemental source was Alvin Weinberg’s 1994 autobiography The First Nuclear
Era (Weinberg (1994)). Weinberg also served in the Met Lab, but in the reactor
design division rather than Seaborg’s chemistry division. His insights into the period
are limited to a single short chapter of his autobiography, but they offer a different
perspective on some of the same events. Often, he is able to describe, from the
perspective of many decades later, the ramifications of work that was pursued at the
Met Lab and discarded as a failure.
But it is Glenn Seaborg that is the central character of this story for reasons that
go beyond his authorship of the history volumes. In my opinion, Seaborg is one of
history’s truly great scientists. He had a vision that saw beyond the years, and it was
his penetrating insights that gave clear guidance to the people that served under him.
Some of them also showed great talent and insight; some were disappointingly shortsighted and dull. But his was the animating spark that led so many to accomplish
greatness. Although he later went on to serve as the Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission from 1961 to 1971, I do not think anything he ever did matched the
significance of his work from 1939 to 1945 in the era of the Manhattan Project.
Although I cannot claim to have read every work that covers this subject and
this period of time, I have studied this era extensively and have not been able to
find anything that covers the topic of the discovery, development, and discarding of
xii

thorium during the Manhattan Project era to the degree these sources do. This thesis
is a unique addition to the body of work on this era covering a subject that I believe
will be of great importance to us as we seek to develop a lasting energy source for the
twenty-first century and beyond.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
On August 8, 1967, Dr. Glenn Seaborg, chairman of the United States Atomic Energy
Commission, sat at the controls of an experimental reactor in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
The reactor was about to become the first to operate on uranium-233, an isotope
of uranium that no longer occurs naturally on the Earth. Uranium-233 had been
created from thorium, a natural material that was three to four times more common
in the Earth’s crust than uranium.
In the early 1940s, when Dr. Seaborg was a young professor at the University
of California, Berkeley, he had suspected that thorium could be converted from
its natural form into a nuclear fuel. The process of nuclear fission itself had only
been discovered the previous year by scientists in Germany. Seaborg’s suspicion was
correct, and he was the first to realize that thorium could become one of the world’s
greatest energy resources.
But Seaborg’s discoveries about thorium and its daughter product uranium-233
were overshadowed by his previous discovery of plutonium. Plutonium’s relationship
to natural isotopes of uranium positioned it to become the material of choice for
nuclear explosives.

Soon after the discovery of plutonium Seaborg and tens of

thousands of other scientists, engineers, soldiers, and workers were part of a wartime

1

Figure 1.1: Dr. Glenn Seaborg, head of the Atomic Energy Commission, at
the controls of the Molten-Salt Reactor Experiment guiding the reactor to achieve
criticality for the first time using uranium-233 as its fuel. Image courtesy of Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy.

2

project known as the Manhattan Project whose goal was to develop nuclear weapons
to end the war against Germany and Japan.
But what of thorium? For a variety of reasons, it had not shown the promise
for nuclear weapons that plutonium did, and research on thorium and uranium-233
received far less attention during the Manhattan Project than research on plutonium
and the natural isotopes of uranium. To understand why, we must follow the thorium
story from its discovery up through the Manhattan Project, its success, and its
dissolution into the civilian US Atomic Energy Commission at the end of 1946.

3

Chapter 2
Before the Manhattan Project
2.1

Radioactivity and the Stability of Matter

From its discovery in 1828 in Scandinavia until 1898, there was little to distinguish
thorium from the other eighty or so elements that had been discovered. It was about
as common as lead in the Earth’s crust, accounting for roughly six parts per million
on average. A cubic meter of average crustal material contained about two cubic
centimeters of thorium, if refined to metallic form. A ceramic compound of thorium,
thorium dioxide, attained a degree of commercial usefulness in the mantles of gas
lanterns beginning in 1890, when Carl Auer von Welsbach showed how thorium
dioxide gave off a glorious white light.
In 1896, Henri Becquerel discovered that uranium was emitting rays that caused
a photographic plate to darken, even when it was kept from exposure in a drawer.
His discovery intrigued 28-year old Marie Sklodowska Curie, a Polish physicist and
chemist who worked with Becquerel along with her husband Pierre. Curie and her
husband began a campaign to examine all materials to discover if they also displayed
the ”radioactivity” that Becquerel had seen in uranium. In 1898 she noted: (Curie
(2001))
I examined a large number of metals, salts, oxides, and minerals.
4

All the uranium compounds studied are active, and are, in general, more
active to the extent that they contain more uranium.
The compounds of thorium are very active. Thorium oxide surpasses even
metallic uranium in activity.
It is remarkable that the two most active elements, uranium and thorium,
are the ones which possess the greatest atomic weight.
Her discovery that thorium was also radioactive, and the penetrating insight that
thorium and uranium were the two elements with the greatest atomic masses, was
one of the key intellectual steps that would lead to a revolution in our understanding
of atomic structure.
Within a few decades, the notion of an atom as an impenetrable, unchangeable
sphere of particular composition had given way to our current understanding of the
atom—a positively charged nucleus composed of protons and neutrons, surrounding
by tiny orbiting electrons in a variety of orbital configurations.
Furthermore, there were further forces acting at the scale of the nucleus that made
the structure of matter possible. They had previously been indetectable due to their
very short ranges, but without them there would be no reasonable explanation for
the structure of matter or the order of the universe.
The most basic of these was the nuclear force, or the strong nuclear force as
it is known today.

The nucleus is composed of positively-charged protons and

neutrons that have no electrical charge. Based on an understanding of electromagnetic
forces (which was correct) these positively-charged protons should be continuously
attempting to rip the nucleus apart, since electric charges of the same sign repel one
another. This repulsion grows stronger and stronger the closer the particles are to
one another, and by all indications, the protons were very very close together.
The neutrons should be no help at all in this situation, since they had no charge.
But the nuclear force, as postulated, was a force that strongly bound nucleons (protons
and neutrons) together. It had the ability, somehow, to overcome these forces of
5

electric repulsion and to make nuclear structure possible. Now we understand these
forces come from interactions of subatomic particles, quarks and gluons, which form
the structure of nucleons.
The strong nuclear force also helped uncover the mystery of radiation, and why
various nuclear configurations, particularly those associated with very heavy nuclear
masses, were unstable and radioactive.

2.2

Three Decay Chains, One Missing

Long before the nature of radioactivity was understood, Marie Curie and those who
extended her research studied what radioactivity did.
The first radioactive decay identified was the alpha decay, where an alpha-particle
is emitted from the nucleus. The alpha particle was identical to a nucleus of helium-4,
containing two protons and two neutrons. It is the most stable nuclear arrangement.
Through emission of an alpha particle, a nucleus loses four units of atomic mass
and changes into another element, two locations lower on the periodic table. Thus
uranium upon alpha emission immediately becomes thorium, radium becomes radon,
radon becomes polonium, and so forth.
The second radioactive decay process was the beta decay, where a beta-particle
(an electron) is emitted from the nucleus and a neutron transforms into a proton.
Unlike alpha decay, the nucleus retains essentially the same atomic mass, since the
proton has nearly the same mass as the neutron. However, the chemical nature of the
nucleus changes. There are two types of beta decay: in beta-minus decay the nucleus
moves up one step on the periodic table and in beta-plus decay it moves down one
step. But atomic mass remains essentially constant.
The third type of radioactive decay process was the gamma decay, where a nucleus
in an excited state emits a high-energy photon. These photons are distinguished from
most others by their point of origin—rather than being emitted by changes in the
electron configuration, they are emitted from the nucleus. The nucleus is typically
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left in an excited state after the emission of alpha or beta radiation, and gamma
emission is a way for an atomic nucleus to radiate that excess energy out as a photon.
Like beta emissions, gamma emissions do not change the atomic mass of the nucleus
by any significant amount. Unlike beta emissions, they do not change the chemical
identity of the nucleus.
Thus the three common forms of radioactive emission have a variety of effects on
the nucleus. Both alpha and beta emission change the chemical identity of the nucleus,
but only alpha decay changes the atomic mass. Gamma emission changes neither
atomic mass nor elemental identity. Since only one form of radioactive emission
changed atomic mass, and since it always changed it by exactly four atomic mass
units, an invariant relationship was soon discovered in the decay of heavy radioactive
elements like uranium and thorium. When they lost atomic mass through alpha
emission, it was always by four atomic mass units. Beta emission changed their
elemental identity, but not their atomic mass. Thus if one knew what that atomic
mass of a radionuclide was in an integer number of atomic mass units—for example,
238 atomic masses in a nucleus of uranium-238—then one could divide by four and
examine the remainder.
It would always be the same, no matter how many times the nuclide decayed.
So it stood to reason that there would be four natural ”chains” along which a
radionuclide would decay, each characterized with a different remainder when their
atomic mass was divided by four. The first one of these chains that was elucidated
was the ”uranium” chain, which began with common uranium-238 and ended on
stable lead-206. Between U-238 and Pb-206 there were many intermediate steps,
such as radium-226, radon-222, and polonium-210, but each of these radionuclides
had a common basis. Their atomic masses, when divided by four, had a remainder
of two.
Another decay chain began with common thorium-232 and terminated on stable
lead-208. This decay chain was called the ”thorium” decay chain and its atomic
masses, when divided by four, had a remainder of zero.
7

The final natural decay chain began with rare uranium-235 and included notable
isotopes of protactinium (Pa-231) and francium (Fr-223), and astatine (At-219),
terminating on stable lead-207. This decay chain was called the ”actinium” decay
chain and its atomic masses, when divided by four, had a remainder of three.
Three decay chains, but four possible remainders when a number is divided by
four. One appeared to be missing. The only hint left to its possible existence was
bismuth, which consisted of a single isotope, bismuth-209. Bismuth-209, when its
atomic mass was divided by four, had a remainder of one, the same as the missing
decay chain. Where was it? Had it ever existed? Which radionuclides laid on that
decay chain, and did they have any value to humanity?
Like an abandoned ruin, bismuth-209 was the only indication that another path
of radioactive decay had once existed, perhaps billions of years ago when the solar
system was young and its elements were fresh. And there was no way to recreate it,
until insight and determination produced a powerful new tool to rearrange matter at
the nuclear level.

2.3

Ernest Lawrence and the Sixty-Inch Cyclotron

Ernest Orlando Lawrence was 27 years old when he arrived at Berkeley in the summer
of 1928 to begin a campaign of physics research that would have the most profound
consequences. Lawrence had been inspired by a paper from a Norwegian engineer
to develop a unique circular particle accelerator, which he referred to as his ”proton
merry-go-round,” but which became better known as the cyclotron. The earliest
cyclotron was not much to look at, just a handful of glass and bronze, but the concept
could be adapted to larger and larger units. Fundamentally, a cyclotron accelerated
charged particle beams using a high frequency alternating voltage which is applied
between two electrodes. Because it was based on accelerating charged particles, only
particles like protons, deuterons, and helium-4 nuclei were suitable for use.
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Figure 2.1: Three natural decay chains, but was one missing?
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Figure 2.2: Ernest Lawrence in 1939. Photo courtesy of Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory.
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Figure 2.3: The 60-inch cyclotron where uranium-233 was first synthesized in 1941.
Photo courtesy of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.
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The first cyclotron of significant size was built in 1932 and was capable of boosting
protons to energies of 80 keV. Soon a cyclotron 11 inches in diameter was attaining
proton energies of over 1 MeV. It was followed by a 27-inch cyclotron that achieved
5 MeV, and by 1936 even that had been replaced by a 37-inch cyclotron which could
accelerate deuterons to 8 MeV and alpha particles to 16 MeV.
But the machine that would make history was the seemingly colossal 60-inch
cyclotron, which began operations in 1939. Its magnet weighed 220 tons, and it could
generate a stream of 16 MeV deuterons. New innovations came when the chemists
and physicists of Berkeley began to point that high energy stream of deuterons at
various elements.
Initially physicists pointed the deuteron beam of the cyclotron directly at various
materials to look for interactions at the nuclear scale. Despite the great power of
the cyclotron, the high energy deuterons that it produced were still charged particles,
and the positively charged nucleus of the atom repelled them, leading to relatively
few events where a nuclear reaction took place.
High-energy deuteron bombardment was a difficult way to alter the configuration
of a nucleus, yet it led to the discovery of both neptunium and plutonium, when
abundant uranium-238 was exposed to the power of the cyclotron.
An uncharged particle, the recently discovered neutron, had the potential to bring
about greater changes in the nucleus than the charged particles of the cyclotron. But
how could neutrons be produced? There was no such thing as a neutron beam nor
any real prospect of making one. But some materials tended to eject neutrons when
bombarded by deuterons. One of these was phosphorus, which consists entirely of a
single stable isotope, phosphorus-31. When phosphorus-31 is struck by a high-energy
deuteron, it can absorb the deuteron and eject a neutron, in the process becoming
sulfur-32. Thus deuteron bombardment of phosphorus was one of a very few ways
known at the time to make a relatively large flux of neutrons, far more than had been
produced ever before.
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These neutrons were ejected from the phosphorus target at high energies, and at
these high energies they had less potential to be absorbed in other atomic nuclei.
By slowing neutrons down, it was found that the probability they would be absorbed
increased. Neutrons could be slowed down through collisions with other atomic nuclei
that had about the same mass they did. The best nucleus for the job was one that
had a single proton—common hydrogen—and so materials that contained a great
deal of hydrogen, like water or paraffin, were well suited to the task of slowing down
the neutrons generated by the deuteron bombardment of phosphorus.
The recipe was coming together: a mighty cyclotron capable of accelerating
deuterons to very high energies, impinging on a target of phosphorus, adjacent to
a block of paraffin that would slow down the neutrons that were produced in the
collision. The last ingredient was at the discretion of the researchers—what material
should be placed in this flux of slow neutrons?
For young professor Glenn Seaborg, the ability to make neutrons, albeit indirectly,
from the 60-inch cyclotron was an opportunity to recreate the missing decay chain
and see what wonders it might hold.

2.4

Glenn Seaborg Begins to Use the Cyclotron

Glenn Theodore Seaborg was born in Ishpeming, Michigan on April 19, 1912 to
Herman Theodore Seaborg and Selma Olivia Erickson Seaborg. While he was still
a boy, the family moved from Michigan to an unincorporated area of Los Angeles
County, California. Inspired by a high school chemistry teacher, Seaborg graduated
high school at the top of his class and went on to study chemistry at the University
of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), where he graduated in 1933. He went on to earn
a Ph.D in chemistry from the University of California, Berkeley in 1937.
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Figure 2.4: Glenn Seaborg in 1938. Photo courtesy of Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory.
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He remained at Berkeley after graduation and became an instructor in chemistry
on July 1, 1939 and was fascinated by the recent discoveries by Otto Hahn and
Lise Meitner in Germany of nuclear fission.

Otto Hahn was a radiochemist as

Seaborg aspired to be, and so it was natural that Seaborg would take an interest
in using chemical techniques to ascertain whether nuclear processes such as fission
or transmutation had occured in a sample. With the powerful 60-inch cyclotron at
his disposal, Seaborg began to bombard a variety of material samples with neutrons,
then to chemically ”dissect” the resulting products in his lab looking for the results
he expected, and occasionally, for some surprises.
Working with his friend and research partner Joseph Kennedy, Seaborg began to
bombard samples of uranium with neutrons produced from the 60-inch cyclotron in
late August 1940. He already knew that neptunium-239 would quickly form from
that reaction, but since the Np-239 had a short half-life, he anticipated that it would
decay into a new element—element 94—which at that time had no name. We now
know element 94 as plutonium, and Seaborg, Kennedy, and several other colleagues
are credited with its isolation and discovery on February 23, 1941. By March 28, 1941,
they had ascertained that plutonium-239 undergoes fission by slow neutrons. This
would have profound implications for the world, but the story of this paper follows
another thread. Seaborg had shown that he could use the neutrons from the 60-inch
cyclotron to turn uranium into a new element. His penetrating curiosity made him
wonder what would happen if he repeated the attempt with thorium.

2.5

Gofman Begins Thorium Research

Two new graduate students arrived at Berkeley to begin the fall semester of 1940, and
both elected to study under Seaborg. One of them, John W. Gofman, had previously
studied at Oberlin College, a private liberal arts college about 35 miles southwest
of Cleveland, Ohio, where he had earned a bachelor of arts degree. Seaborg saw in
Gofman an opportunity to investigate the missing 4n+1 decay chain of the elements,
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Figure 2.5: Dr. Glenn Seaborg visiting Room 307 of Gilman Hall at the University of
California, Berkeley. This was the room where on March 28, 1941 it was demonstrated
that plutonium-239 was fissile. Photo courtesy of Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory.
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using the sixty-inch cyclotron to bombard the most suitable representative of the
4n decay chain, thorium-232. Seaborg anticipated that radionuclides from the 4n+1
decay chain would represent an entirely new family of radioactive isotopes, whose
properties and half-lives would have unknown benefits. Seaborg was already aware
of the existence of short-lived thorium-233 produced by neutron bombardment of
natural thorium-232. Thorium-233 was the first representative of this 4n+1 decay
chain, and it was already known to decay to protactinium-233. There were hints
from the work of Hahn and Strassmann that a fissile nuclide might be produced. But
what happened beyond the decay of Pa-233 was a new frontier of science. (Seaborg,
1976, pg.2)
Gofman arrived on September 23, 1940 and spent several weeks familiarizing
himself with the chemistry of thorium, protactinium, and uranium. He gathered
the chemical equipment that would be required as well as the radioactive decay event
counting equipment that would be necessary to determine the rate of radioactive decay
and whether it was based on alpha or beta emissions. His work began in earnest on
November 4 (Seaborg, 1976, pg.3), and on Sunday, November 10 he undertook his first
bombardment of thorium (in the form of thorium nitrate) by neutrons produced from
the bombardment of phosphorus by deuterons accelerated by the sixty-inch cyclotron.
The neutrons were slowed to thermal energies by a block of paraffin surrounding the
thorium nitrate target, thus maximizing the likelihood that the neutrons would be
absorbed by the thorium. The sample was exposed for only 75 minutes.
After the exposure of the thorium sample to neutrons Gofman took the sample
to his chemistry lab. It was now far more radioactive than before, since some of
the thorium-232 nuclei had absorbed neutrons to become thorium-233. The parent
material, thorium-232, has a half-life of 14 billion years, meaning that an individual
decay event happened very rarely. But thorium-233 had a half-life of only 22 minutes,
so despite there being very little thorium-233 in the sample, it was easily detectable.
Two weeks later, on November 24, Gofman repeated the experiment with 15 grams
of thorium nitrate exposed for an hour (Seaborg, 1976, pg.4), and again on December
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Figure 2.6: Synthesis of uranium-233 from thorium.
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Figure 2.7: Dr. John Gofman in 1962. Photo courtesy of Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory.
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8 with 50 grams of thorium nitrate and an exposure time of several hours. (Seaborg,
1976, pg.5) A longer exposure was necessary to build up more protactinium in the
target, so that chemical separation techniques could be attempted. After a few days
for the thorium-233 to decay away, Gofman judged the sample ready for an attempt
to separate protactinium from thorium using chemical separation techniques that had
previously been noted to concentrate protactinium.
The next step would take a bit longer. There was only one report of the half-life
of protactinium-233, done the previous year by the pioneering discoverers of nuclear
fission, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann. They indicated that Pa-233 had a 25day half-life, which meant that if Gofman was to find uranium-233 in his irradiated
sample, he would have to wait several months for it to ”grow in” and then wait even
longer to determine what characteristics it might have. By January 14 of the new
year of 1941, he had indeed confirmed the half-life of Pa-233 was 25 days, for he was
seeing the radioactivity of his sample falling by half every 25 days. But the properties
of uranium-233 were going to require further patience.
Seaborg sent a letter to The Physical Review on February 1 called ”Radioactive
Properties of Protoactinium” where they described their experiments and the
chemical techniques they had used to isolate protactinium. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.21) As
part of the wait for uranium-233, they began irradiating other samples of thorium,
so that they would begin their decay process even as they waited for results from
their first experiment. Fifty grams of thorium nitrate were exposed in the cyclotron
previously on December 8, and then 1000 grams of thorium nitrate from February 21
through March 4. Gofman began to extract the protactinium from this much larger
sample on March 28. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.37-38)
Seaborg left the Berkeley lab on April 6 to travel to New York to interview
with a prospective employer, American Cyanamid Corporation. (Seaborg et al., 1994,
pg.37) It was the first time Seaborg had flown in an airplane. While he was gone,
Gofman completed the extraction of the protactinium inventory from the large 1000
gram sample on April 10. Seaborg returned to Berkeley on April 16, having been
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offered the job with American Cyanamid but having chosen to decline it. The magic
he and Gofman had been hoping for was beginning to take shape in their isolated
protactinium sample.
On April 23, Seaborg noted that there was ”a small but discerable quantity of
alpha activity” in their protactinium sample. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.38-39) The fact that
they were discerning alpha radiation from the sample rather than beta radiation
indicated that the source of the radiation was definitely not Pa-233. It was the new
uranium-233 that was being generated as Pa-233 decayed away. The fact that its
alpha radioactivity was growing even as the beta radioactivity was diminishing was a
sure sign that the decay of the Pa-233 was the origin of the uranium-233, and more
and more of it would be present as the isolated protactinium sample continued to
decay.
No one knew what the half-life of uranium-233 was, but by counting the alpha
particles from the sample they could make a rough estimate of 100,000 years. This
was a radically different half-life than Pa-233. This meant that uranium-233 might
decay slowly enough to be useful as a nuclear fuel, provided it had suitable nuclear
characteristics. Seaborg made a prophetic statement in his journal that day:
Of special importance is our demonstration through these results that
U-233 is sufficiently long-lived to be a practical source of nuclear energy
should it be found to be fissionable with slow neutrons and should methods
for its large scale production be developed. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.38-39)
On March 28, the same day Gofman began his chemical extraction, Seaborg and
another part of his research group had discovered that plutonium-239, which was
formed from neutron absorption in abundant natural uranium-238, would fission
with slowed-down (thermal) neutrons.

This was a tremendous discovery since

previously only naturally rare uranium-235 was known to fission with thermal
neutrons. Seaborg’s mind must have been fresh to the possibility that his newlydiscovered uranium-233 might possess the same potential as well, and using the
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techniques that had led to the demonstration of fission in plutonium-239, he might
be able to find out.

2.6

Elevating the Priority

Through the rest of the spring semester Gofman continued to refine his chemical
techniques for isolating protactinium from irradiated thorium samples, but when the
summer came Seaborg didn’t have sufficient funding to continue his research and sent
him home to his family in Cleveland until the fall semester started. (Seaborg, 1976,
pg.47)
During the summer Seaborg reported the results of the discovery of uranium233 to Dr. Lyman Briggs and Professor Lawrence. Briggs was the head of the
National Bureau of Standards and was chairman of the committee whose purpose
was to investigate the use of atomic energy in warfare. (Seaborg et al., 1994, pg.23)
Behind the scenes, Seaborg’s discovery that plutonium was fissile had attracted
a great deal of attention from the men who were secretly leading the American
investigation of nuclear warfare. Seaborg had communicated his results to Ernest
Lawrence on May 19th, who in turn passed the message on to Arthur Compton,
the chairman of the National Academy of the Sciences Review Committee and to
Vannevar Bush, the chairman of the National Defense Research Committee. Compton
told Bush that the demonstration of the fissile nature of plutonium-239 (or ”element
94” as it was then known) increases the importance of uranium by over 100 times,
since now the previously worthless uranium-238 might be converted into a nuclear
weapon material.
Up until this point, Seaborg’s investigations of plutonium, thorium and uranium233 had been reflections of his scientific curiosity. But that began to change in June
1941 when Seaborg was brought ”into the fold” of the national effort to develop
a nuclear weapon.

On June 16, Seaborg received a letter from Vannevar Bush

appointing him an official investigator in connection with a contract between the
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University of California and the National Defense Research Committee. Seaborg took
a Pledge of Secrecy and an Oath of Allegiance before an authorized official. (Seaborg
et al., 1994, pg.46) Plutonium work had become military work.
On June 28, 1941, President Roosevelt established by executive order the Office
of Scientific Research and Development, located within the Office for Emergency
Management. Vannevar Bush would be its first director and he would report directly
to the President. OSRD was to mobilize the nation’s scientists and apply the latest
research to national defense. The NDRC would continue but would operate within
the OSRD. (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962, pg.41)
Rare uranium-235 had been the entire focus of the military effort to develop a
nuclear weapon. It was an exceptionally difficult task to separate uranium-235, which
constituted only 7 parts in a thousand of a natural uranium sample, from common
uranium-238. Separating two isotopes of an element is always challenging because
they have identical chemical properties. But plutonium was an entirely new element,
and that meant that if it was created it must be possible to separate chemically—
indeed, the act of discovery of plutonium was made possible by a chemical separation.
If plutonium-239 was fissile, and if it was made from abundant and common uranium238, and if natural uranium also contained rare but fissile uranium-235, then an
entirely new option was now available.

A nuclear reactor could be built where

uranium-235 fission led to the production of neutrons that would be absorbed in the
far-more-common uranium-238, producing plutonium-239. Then it was theoretically
a straightforward step to extract the plutonium chemically.
This approach was extremely appealing and interesting to the infant nuclear
weapons program in the United States. Rather than difficult isotopic separation
techniques to pull U-235 out of uranium, they could use the U-235 to make something
like it (Pu-239) but chemically extractable! Briggs, Lawrence, and Bush could see
the challenges that must lie ahead but were intrigued at the possibilities.
It is important to consider that previous to the discovery of the fission of
plutonium-239, the notion of building a reactor and the notion of building a nuclear
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weapon seemed like completely separate potential uses of nuclear energy. If one
built a nuclear reactor to make power, then that reactor would be consuming scarce
uranium-235 that could otherwise be isotopically separated and used in a weapon. It
was an either/or proposition, and if one had nuclear weapons as a top priority, then
the investigation of nuclear reactors for power was an expensive diversion that did
nothing more than consume scarce uranium-235. But the discovery that plutonium
was fissile changed all that. It was the bridge between reactors and weapons. Now one
could imagine why building a uranium-fueled nuclear reactor would be an essential
step in producing the plutonium that could be used in a weapon. Enrico Fermi,
working at Columbia University, began to consider the practical difficulties of building
a uranium-graphite pile. (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962, pg.42)
For Seaborg, the summer of 1941 brought something far more practical to his
research: funding. Seaborg flew to Washington D.C. on August 3 to meet with
Briggs and other officials at the National Bureau of Standards. While he was there,
Berkeley was notified that his new project had been assigned ”A-1-a” priority by the
Priorities Division of the Office of Production Management. That meant that they
would have top priority in purchasing key items for their project in competition with
other national demands for needed items.

2.7

Does Uranium-233 Fission?

One of the important acquisitions that Seaborg made with his new funding was a
young post-doctoral chemist named Raymond Stoughton, who had recently graduated
from Berkeley. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.56) Stoughton was born in 1916 and had grown
up in California where he had attended Berkeley as a chemistry student, obtaining
his bachelor’s degree in 1937 and his doctorate in 1940. He had gone on to teach
chemistry for a year at Texas A&M University before returning to Berkeley to join
Seaborg’s group. (Seaborg et al., 1994, pg.54)
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Figure 2.8: Dr. Raymond Stoughton, chemist and co-discoverer of the fissile
properties of uranium-233. Photo courtesy of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S.
Department of Energy.
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Seaborg intended for Stoughton to improve the chemical separation techniques for
protactinium and uranium from thorium. If they could discover that uranium-233 was
fissile, much like plutonium-239 was fissile, then Seaborg could add the potential of
thorium to the national effort to build an atomic weapon. The thorium/uranium-233
effort was dwarfed by the rapidly growing effort in plutonium chemical separation,
but it was, for the time, partaking of the bounty of funding and interest that the
plutonium discovery had generated.
Stoughton, with Gofman supporting him, continued the work of isolating
protactinium chemically from an irradiated thorium sample. By September, they had
found promise in a technique where protactinium is co-precipitated with manganese
dioxide. They also intended to apply electrolysis techniques that would prepare thin
samples of Pa-233. Their intent was to bombard a much larger sample of thorium
with neutrons from the cyclotron in order to produce enough U-233 to test for its
fissionability by slow neutrons. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.59)
Using previously-exposed thorium samples, they also tested separation techniques
using zirconium phosphate. Stoughton’s chemical expertise was helping the U-233
project to move along much more rapidly than when Gofman had to act alone. By
October they felt confident in their chemical techniques and began to bombard a
5000 gram thorium sample in the cyclotron beginning on October 30. This time the
thorium would already be dissolved as a nitrate salt in water.
After 12 days and 14,250 microampere-hours of deuteron bombardment on
beryllium to produce the neutrons needed for their thorium sample, they removed
the sample on November 10, 1941 and immediately began their chemical extraction
procedure. It took a week of chemical effort, using nitric acid, manganous chloride,
and potassium permanganate to effect various chemical shifts in the tiny amount of
protactinium present in the sample. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.69)
The next day they began looking for the alpha radiation that would tell them
that uranium-233 was forming in their protactinium sample (from the decay of Pa233) and it immediately showed an alpha-particle count. It was too early for U-233
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to have formed in sufficient quantities, and they realized that another isotope of
protactinium, Pa-231, had formed in the sample from the action of fast neutrons on
thorium. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.70-71) Pa-231 was an alpha emitter but Pa-233 was a
beta emitter. The reaction that formed the Pa-231 is shown in Figure 2.9.
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Figure 2.9: Formation of protactinium-231 from fast neutrons on thorium-232
Pa-231 is the only natural form of protactinium. It has a half-life of 32,000 years
and had been independently discovered in 1917-18 by two groups of scientists, Otto
Hahn and Lise Meitner of Germany and Frederick Soddy and John Cranston of Great
Britain. Since it was an alpha-emitter like U-233 it would confuse the measurement
they were trying to make. But fortunately, its long half-life and the very short halflife of Pa-233 meant that the uranium-233 they desired could be separated chemically
from their protactinium sample if they would simply wait for a period of time.
And so the generation of U-233 became a waiting game, whose rules were set
by the roughly one-month half-life of Pa-233. Throughout the winter of 1941-42,
while most of Seaborg’s lab worked with haste on the new plutonium, Stoughton and
Gofman waited for their ever-so-tiny amount of protactinium to gradually decay into
uranium-233.
While they patiently waited, things were changing. Fermi was making experimental measurements of how neutrons would be multiplied in a pile of graphite and
natural uranium, which would be the form a plutonium production reactor might take.
Eugene Wigner of Princeton was also thinking about how a graphite-uranium reactor
could make plutonium, and later he would design the machine that would. Results
of US and British studies were being disseminated in government channels indicating
that a nuclear weapon using uranium-235 or plutonium-239 could be feasible and likely
would be small enough to be carried by an aircraft. And then the world changed.
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On December 7th, 1941, the Japanese attacked the US Navy base at Pearl Harbor,
Hawaii with 353 aircraft launched from six aircraft carriers. 2402 Americans were
killed in the attack and 1282 were wounded. Four battleships were sunk and four
more damaged. The Japanese also sank or destroyed other ships and 188 aircraft.
The United States was shocked. The next day war was declared on Japan, and
later on Germany. The effort to build a nuclear weapon took on added priority.
Seaborg wrote in his diary:
A greatly expanded effort is getting underway at many places on
the overall project of the preparation of fissionable material for
use in a nuclear weapon. This now has a high national priority and a
large contract ($405,000 for six months) in the name of Lawrence is going
into effect here at the University of California, Berkeley. This covers all of
the work that I am doing, other than a couple of my specific contracts, as
well as Lawrence’s ambitious program for the separation of U-235 by the
electromagnetic process, to which Kennedy and Segre are shifting their
efforts. Similarly, a large program is getting underway at the University
of Chicago under Arthur H. Compton concerned with the production of
the isotope [plutonium]-239 from the nuclear chain reaction with natural
uranium; this will be the center for this research program which has been
given the code name Metallurgical Project, with the main component
of this, at the University of Chicago, to be known as the Metallurgical
Laboratory... I am assuming leave status from my position as Assistant
Professor of Chemistry in order to devote full time to this high priority
research program. My group is being substantially expanded in order to
broaden the scope of my work. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.82-83)
Seaborg now realized that it was only a matter of time before he would be leaving
Berkeley to join the growing group of researchers being gathered from around the
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country to join the ”Metallurgical Laboratory” in Chicago, one of the obliquely codenamed branches of the effort we now know as the Manhattan Project. All of the
key plutonium researchers would be relocating from Berkeley to Chicago. Would
uranium-233 be of sufficient importance to bring that small group as well?

Figure 2.10: John Gofman, Glenn Seaborg, and Raymond Stoughton hold a plaque
commemorating the 25th anniversary of the discovery of the fissile nature of uranium233, in 1967. Photo courtesy of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.
The answer drew nearer as Stoughton and Gofman began the first chemical
separations of uranium from protactinium in January 1942. Near the end of the
month their pace of work accelerated considerably, with Gofman working nearly day
and night to complete chemical separations. He could sense that the goal was near
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and was almost feverish in his pursuit. On February 2nd, with a freshly purified
sample of uranium that he had finished only the night before, he began to bombard
the sample with neutrons produced from a radium-beryllium source.
And there it was—at 9:44pm he found 39 counts per hour that could be attributed
to the slow neutron fission of uranium-233. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.100) It was a rough
realization, since there was still no knowledge of exactly how much uranium-233 they
had laid down on the sample, nor the relative probability of U-233 fission to other
isotopes, but the broad conclusion was obvious. Uranium-233 underwent fission in
slow neutrons, just like uranium-235, just like plutonium-239. Thorium, a material
three to four times more common than uranium, could be made into a nuclear fuel
through neutron absorption. It was an epic discovery with profound implications for
the future of mankind, but its significance was overshadowed by the haste of war
and the focus on plutonium. The manufacture of plutonium in nuclear reactors and
its chemical extraction and purification were already the central objectives of the
”Metallurgical Laboratory”. Seaborg assumed that the creation of uranium-233 and
its extraction from thorium would attain equal priority and significance. But that
did not happen, for a variety of reasons.

2.8

Preparing to Move to Chicago

Within just a few days from February 2, Gofman and Stoughton had confirmed
that uranium-233’s properties in fission came exclusively from neutrons. When they
removed the neutron source (the radium-beryllium neutron generator) the fission
counts stopped, and when they returned it, the fission counts started again. This is
an important consideration for potential weapons use, since spontaneous fission was
a very undesirable property in fissile material used in a weapon.
Seaborg’s mind was largely occupied with his impending move to Chicago and
the dawning realization of the magnitude of the challenge that plutonium production
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and separation would be. On February 3 he had left for a meeting in Chicago, and
on February 7 he wrote in his journal:
As a result of this meeting I now fully realize the magnitude of the
project being planned around our new element [plutonium] and the
enormity of the chemical separation problem of isolating [plutonium]-239
from large amounts of uranium and almost fantastic intensities of fission
products. When Compton asked me if I thought I could devise very soon a
chemical process for separating [plutonium] from such uranium and fission
products—a process that could be successfully scaled up for actual use in
a chemical extraction plant—I indicated that I thought I could, but I must
confess to some misgivings. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.104)
In order to determine the fissile properties of uranium-233, it was necessary to
determine just how much there was in the samples they were measuring. This was
a very difficult task, and Stoughton labored mightily to coordinate the decays he
was seeing in the original protactinium sample back to an estimate of just how much
there was in the first place. From these estimates, along with a knowledge of just how
long they had waited to make an extraction of the uranium, they could estimate the
amount of uranium present on the sample. And with this estimate and the counting
rates they were seeing from fission, they could make an intelligent guess at the actual
behavior of uranium-233 relative to its fissile cousins, uranium-235 and plutonium239. This required precision calibration of electroscopes, even accounting for known
measurement errors that particular units had experienced in the past. It must have
been very tedious and frustrating work. Gofman in particular was still searching
for spontaneous fission, and was so bothered by electrical interference in his lab at
Berkeley that he relocated the uranium-233, the radium-beryllium neutron source,
and the ionization chamber to his apartment. Perhaps he was finally able to get some
sleep as he waited for the single count that might indicate that uranium-233 had some
measure of spontaneous fission. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.113)
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By March 16, Stoughton had an estimation of the mass of uranium-233 on their
samples, and from that difficult extrapolation he produced a half-life estimate for
the material of 120,000 years, much closer to the modern calculation of 159,200
years. Stoughton estimated that the mass of uranium-233 in their tiny sample was
about 0.8 micrograms, about the mass of a single particle of baking powder. One
of the remarkable aspects of radioactive material is that this incredibly tiny sample
of uranium-233 was still sufficient to begin to tease its secrets from nature. Their
estimates for the half-life of Pa-233 were improving as well. Based on their latest
work they calculated a half-life of 27.4 days.∗ (Seaborg, 1976, pg.121-123)
On March 18, 1942, Seaborg dictated a paper where he first suggested the
name ”plutonium” be assigned to element 94, after the planet Pluto that had been
discovered in 1930 and named after the Roman god of the underworld. This continued
the pattern established by naming uranium after the planet Uranus, and element 93
neptunium after the planet Neptune.†
Calculating the mass of U-233 in one sample also allowed them to calculate masses
in other samples they had extracted, by using the ratio of their alpha-particle emission
activity. Another sample, which they called ”Sample J”, had a mass of 3.8 micrograms
by their estimation. Gofman had been studying Sample J in his apartment for several
weeks, searching for any sign that it was undergoing spontaneous fission. By March
30 he had recorded about 175 hours of effective counting and had not observed any
spontaneous fission events. This meant that if uranium-233 had spontaneous fission,
the half-life of that fission must be greater than 100 trillion years, and far beyond any
level that would be of concern to the weapons program. Uranium-233 was looking
more and more appealing to Seaborg.
∗

The modern accepted value of the half-life of protactinium-233 is 26.275 days.
In 1942 Pluto was considered a planet, but the discovery of the dwarf planet Eris in January
2005 led to a crisis in the planetary science community that led to a formalized definition of a
planet, which had previously not been explicitly defined. In 2006 Pluto was demoted to the status
of a ”dwarf planet” along with several other solar system bodies. Eris was named after the Greek
goddess of discord but ”erisium” rather than ”plutonium” might have been an appropriate name for
element 94, which has caused a great deal of discord.
†
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On March 31, Seaborg composed a letter to Dr. Compton where he proposed
”Investigations Which Might Be Considered in Case A Very Large Chemical Program
Were Undertaken” in his absence at Berkeley.

One of those investigations was

”The development of chemical methods for separating kilograms of U-233 from large
amounts of thorium and fission products in case U-233 should prove to be a useful
isotope.”
Meanwhile, in his much larger plutonium group, two of his students, Spofford
English and Arthur Wahl, were investigating a promising technique called ”fluoride
volatility” in an attempt to separate plutonium from uranium and fission products.
Fluorine is the most electronegative element on the periodic table, and nearly all other
elements would convert to a fluoride chemical state in preference to all others. This
made fluorination of materials an interesting option for chemical separation. Uranium
tetrafluoride (UF4 ) was one form of fluorinated uranium, but there was another,
uranium hexafluoride (UF6 ) that was a gas at mildly elevated temperatures. What
English and Wahl were attempting to uncover was whether plutonium had fluoride
states that were less volatile than UF6 . If there were chemical forms of plutonium
that were less volatile than UF6 then perhaps it could be a separation technique.
But their early experiments were not terribly promising. Later the techniques of
fluorination and fluoride volatility would play an important role in the development
of the thorium-fueled molten-salt reactor.
By April 2, Gofman had given up the search for spontaneous fission and turned
his attention back to neutron fission measurements of uranium-233. With his 3.8
microgram Sample J, he used the radium-beryllium neutron source to stimulate fission
in the tiny U-233 sample. As he measured the counts, the picture that began to emerge
was that uranium-233 was even better than uranium-235 in slow fission. It had about
1.3 times the ”effective slow neutron cross section” than its natural cousin. (Seaborg,
1976, pg.139) This was another promising development for the use of uranium-233
in nuclear reactors. But nuclear weapons do not use slow neutrons for fission—
they use fast neutrons, and the same measurement would need to be made for fast
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neutrons. Gofman began working on the fast-neutron-cross-section problem on April
9 but ran into problems immediately. Radon gas in his neutron source began to leak,
contaminating the ionization chamber. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.142) Within a few days he
got the leak fixed and resumed his experiments, but time was running out for Seaborg
at Berkeley. He was in the final stages of his departure and was attempting to write
up his results in a series of reports. One of those would be ”Properties of U-233”‡
which would report that with a 3.8 microgram sample of U-233 they determined that
U-233 had a slow neutron cross section 1.25 times greater than U-235, that it had a
spontaneous fission half-life greater than 100 trillion years, and that it decayed by the
emission of alpha particles with a half-life of 120,000 years. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.144)
Each of these important numbers had been discovered through countless hours
of hard work by Gofman and Stoughton under the leadership of Seaborg. Each
represented an incredible amount of planning, calculation, and experimentation.
Fundamentally, they had been made possible in the first place by Lawrence’s farsighted decision to build larger and larger cyclotrons at Berkeley. No where else in
the world would it have been possible to smash deuterons on a target with enough
energy and intensity to produce such a flux of neutrons. And without that flux of
neutrons it would have been impossible to make enough uranium-233 from thorium
to determine its emission properties, its long half-life, and its superior slow neutron
properties. It was an amazing accomplishment, achieved at almost the first moment
in human history when it would have been possible.
On April 17, Seaborg and his colleague Isadore Perlman boarded the steamliner
”City of San Francisco” and set out for the University of Chicago to join the new
”Metallurgical Laboratory”. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.148-149) There they would determine
how to separate plutonium produced in a nuclear reactor from uranium and fission
‡

The paper ”Properties of U-233” (abstract) was issued by the S-1 Committee in Washington as
report number A-153 dated April 13, 1942 with authors G. T. Seaborg, J. W. Gofman and R. W.
Stoughton. After the war it was published under the changed title ”Nuclear Propertics of U-233:
A New Fissionable Isotope of Uranium” by G. T. Seaborq, J. W. Gofman and R. W. Stoughton in
Phys. Rev. 71, 378 (1947).
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products. That plutonium would go on to be detonated in the first nuclear explosion
in New Mexico in July 1945 and over the city of Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. Their
efforts would change the world.

2.9

Alvin Weinberg at the University of Chicago

Alvin Weinberg was born on April 20, 1915 in Chicago and had grown up in its
Albany Park district. His father abandoned his family (Weinberg, 1994, pg.1-2) when
Alvin was 15 just as the Depression was beginning and Alvin saw little of him in the
years to come. When he was 16 he began studying at the University of Chicago, first
in chemistry, and later in physics. He credited the breadth of his education there
to a new plan implemented by the university president, Robert Hutchins, to expose
each student to elements of humanities, the social, biological, and physical sciences
to much of his later success as a scientific adminstrator.
Although he claimed that he found physics to be a difficult subject, Weinberg
showed quite an aptitude for it, and stayed at the University of Chicago to study
under Professor Carl Eckart. Weinberg’s research concerned mathematical biophysics,
an ambitious attempt to model biological performance based on mathematical models
of nerves and cellular metabolism. As part of his research Weinberg became adept at
using a family of challenging mathematical functions called Bessel functions. Bessel
functions were used to model electrical conduction along a long nerve ending.
Weinberg was awarded his Ph.D in the winter of 1939 on almost exactly the
same day when German scientists were announcing their discovery of nuclear fission.
Weinberg was awarded a National Research Council fellowship to work on nerve
biology with one of the nation’s top biophysicists at Columbia University, but
that professor ended up coming to the University of Chicago to work on the new
Manhattan Project. Eckart knew of Weinberg’s capabilities and began to enlist him
to make calculations for various aspects of neutron-multiplying ”piles” of uranium
and graphite or beryllium. These calculations made special use of Weinberg’s skill
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Figure 2.11: Young Alvin Weinberg in his Manhattan Project-era days. Photo
courtesy of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy.
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with Bessel functions that he had acquired from his modeling of nerve endings. By
the fall of 1941 as he was reporting his results, Eckart announced that he would be
leaving Chicago for war-related work at the Undersea Naval Laboratory in La Jolla,
California. Weinberg protested that he would not be able to continue his work without
Eckart’s guidance. Eckart simply said, ”Don’t worry. Eugene Wigner is coming to
Chicago.” (Weinberg, 1994, pg.10)
Eugene Paul Wigner had been born in Budapest, Hungary on November 17, 1902
to middle class Jewish parents. Wigner began studying at the Technische Hochschule
in Berlin in 1921 at the age of 19, where he met such luminaries as Max Planck,
Werner Heisenberg, Wolfgang Pauli, and Albert Einstein. He also met Leo Szilard
who became his closest friend. In 1930 he was recruited to Princeton and emigrated to
America, becoming a naturalized citizen in January 1937. His friend Leo Szilard had
become very concerned about German activities in nuclear energy and at Szilard’s
prompting, Wigner drove him to a meeting with Albert Einstein. Szilard crafted a
letter for President Roosevelt which Einstein signed. That letter is considered the
origin of the Manhattan Project.
Weinberg met Wigner in February of 1942, around the same time that Gofman
and Stoughton were discovering that U-233 was fissile. Wigner was commuting from
Princeton every month and had been working loosely with Enrico Fermi on the
problem on neutron multiplication in a pile of uranium and graphite. The cyclotron
at Berkeley had been able to produce individual neutrons from accelerated deuterons,
but even the most magnificent cyclotron in the world could only produce a few
micrograms of plutonium or uranium-233. But with the multiplication of neutrons
from fission, it could be possible to produce much more. If uranium piles could
achieve the state of ”criticality”, where each fission led to exactly one more fission,
then truly impressive production rates might be possible. This was the heart of
Wigner’s research. Weinberg had not known the purpose of the research when he
began work in Eckart’s group in Chicago, but it was whispered to him by a younger
colleague one day in an unguarded moment.
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Wigner had experienced Nazism in Germany and Hungary and was convinced
that the Nazis would prevail over the free world unless the Metallurgical Laboratory
could achieve its goals in the shortest possible time. (Weinberg, 1994, pg.23) He and
Szilard had been pushing the government to action since 1939, and in 1942 they were
convinced that precious years had been wasted because the project had not been
moving fast enough. Weinberg said ”Wigner after all counted each day until a bomb
was made as an unnecessary gift to the Nazis.” (Weinberg, 1994, pg.30)
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Chapter 3
Relevant Aspects of a Sustained
Chain Reaction
3.1

Plutonium’s Advantage in a Production Reactor

Although Seaborg’s small U-233 team had shown that uranium-233 had many of
the same advantages that plutonium-239 did as a fissile material, plutonium had
a surpassing advantage over uranium-233 as a material for a nuclear weapons
program. It was simply this: uranium, the parent material of plutonium,
already contained the fissile isotope needed to enable a reactor to achieve
criticality.
Thorium, the parent material of uranium-233, contained no such fissile isotope.
A pile of natural thorium could never achieve criticality, no matter what its size,
no matter what moderator material was used, because there was no fissile material
present. This meant that any thorium pile would have to be supplied with fissile
material∗ in order to achieve criticality and begin operation. But the entire objective
of the Metallurgical Laboratory was to create fissile material in a pure and chemically
∗

Either uranium-235, plutonium-239, or uranium-233.
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separable form. Creating pure fissile material and then utilizing it to start a thorium
pile made no sense whatsoever. The very material that would be used to start the
pile would be the material whose creation would be the goal of the pile!
The fact that uranium was composed predominantly of the parent material of
plutonium-239 with just a small amount of fissile material meant that a production
reactor to make plutonium could be achieved from the outset of the nuclear
endeavour, using natural uranium. A chain-reacting pile need not depend on any
uranium enrichment, only on the proper choice of moderator material and geometric
arrangement.
But any pile with thorium as a fuel would have no fissile material and no potential
for multiplication, to say nothing of actually achieving a chain reaction. Thus, no
matter what properties Seaborg and his clever chemists would find in
uranium-233, there was no way that a thorium production reactor would
ever achieve the same significance as a uranium production reactor.
Why didn’t natural thorium have any fissile isotopes? Well, several thorium
isotopes have appreciable fission cross-sections in thermal neutrons. Further research
would show that thorium-227 and thorium-231 had a fissile cross-sections about 38%
and 21% those of uranium-235. But thorium-231 had a half-life of only one day,
and thorium-227 only 19 years. In the eons of time that had passed since the heavy
elements were formed in the cores of stars neither of these thorium isotopes existed
on Earth in any appreciable amount. Only thorium-232, with its 14 billion year
half-life, about the age of the universe, persisted to the present day.
Uranium also had other interesting isotopes, such as the uranium-233 that Seaborg
and his group had discovered. But the only isotopes of uranium with truly long halflives were uranium-238 and uranium-235, with half-lives of 4.5 billion and 700 million
years, respectively. Only U-238 and U-235 persisted to the present day, and of all
fissile isotopes since discovered, U-235 by far has the longest half-life. Thus natural
uranium was the only material in 1942 that could be the basis of a chain-reacting pile.
Since the difficult isotopic separation of uranium was the goal of another branch of
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the Manhattan Project, it was left to the physicists and chemists of the Metallurgical
Laboratory to construct a chain-reacting pile based on uranium, and that pile would
only make one chemically-separable fissile isotope in any quantity: plutonium-239.
This fundamental fact about the nature of uranium and thorium has consequences
that persist to this day. If a nation or organization wishes to build the simplest nuclear
reactor to produce chemically-separable fissile material, they will undoubtedly choose
uranium as the reactor fuel and plutonium as the product. This is a basic reason
why thorium and uranium-233 were of diminished consequence to the Metallurgical
Laboratory and have been of little interest to nations or groups who have desired to
develop nuclear weapons ever since.

3.2

The Priorities of the Metallurgical Laboratory

The priorities of the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago in 1942 had nothing to do
with the eventual use of nuclear energy to produce safe and efficient civilian electrical
power. They were entirely focused around the creation and purification of material
for nuclear weapons. To this end, each group had particular objectives. Eugene
Wigner and his group, including Alvin Weinberg, were attempting to design the large
plutonium-producing reactors that would eventually be built in Hanford, Washington.
Glenn Seaborg and his chemists were attempting to design techniques to remove
plutonium from uranium and fission products in a chemically pure form. And Enrico
Fermi and his team were attempting to achieve the first controlled chain reaction in
a pile of graphite and natural uranium there in Chicago. If Fermi was successful, it
would aid Wigner’s group in confirming the nuclear calculations that they were using
as the basis of their designs. And without Seaborg’s success, none of it would be
useful.
Seaborg continued to correspond with his former Berkeley colleagues Raymond
Stoughton and John Gofman after his arrival in Chicago.

He also promoted

uranium-233 as an alternative fissile material to plutonium-239, should the need
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arise. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.8) Since chemical separation would be an important part
of any uranium-233 production scheme, by June Seaborg was corresponding with
Stoughton about the potential of fluorination as a separation technique.
Fluorination was a clever chemical technique that took advantage of a basic
chemical difference between thorium and uranium. Each element has a variety of
”valence states” which describe how many bonds they will make with other elements.
Thorium has a very simple valence structure, called ”+4”. This means that thorium
will share four electrons to form four chemical bonds with other elements. Some
elements typically form more than one bond, like oxygen. Oxygen will usually share
two electrons to form two bonds with other elements, and with thorium two oxygen
atoms will form a very chemically stable configuration: thorium dioxide (ThO2 ),
which is the chemical form thorium is usually found in nature.
Fluorine forms just one bond with other elements, so it requires four fluorine atoms
to form a stable molecule with thorium. That molecule is called thorium tetrafluoride
(ThF4 ).
Uranium has two main valence states, +4 and +6. Depending on the conditions,
uranium will share either four or six electrons with other atoms. This means that an
atom of uranium could chemically bond with two or three atoms of oxygen (UO2 and
UO3 ), or with four or six atoms of fluorine (UF4 and UF6 ). When uranium bonds
with six atoms of fluorine it forms uranium hexafluoride, and this compound turns
to a gas at relatively low temperatures.
The theory behind fluorination as a chemical separation technique is that a
mixture of thorium and uranium tetrafluorides (ThF4 and UF4 ) can be separated
from one another by adding more fluorine to the mixture. Two fluorine atoms will
bond with each atom of uranium, causing uranium tetrafluoride to become uranium
hexafluoride, which is typically gaseous at the temperatures of interest. Uranium
hexafluoride, as a gas, will bubble out of a liquid mixture of ThF4 and UF4 . Thorium
does not form a gaseous hexafluoride like uranium does, so it is left behind in a
fluorination process.
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Seaborg’s interest in fluorination as a separation technique came from the fact that
thorium, exposed to neutrons in a reactor, would absorb some of those neutrons and
form small amounts of uranium-233. If the thorium and uranium were chemically
converted to tetrafluorides, which was a rather simple chemical step, and if that
mixture was further fluorinated to convert the uranium to a hexafluoride, then it
would be rather easy to separate uranium from thorium.
In late June Seaborg and Stoughton exchanged samples of thorium tetrafluoride
that had been exposed to neutrons in the 60-inch cyclotron. Stoughton irradiated the
thorium tetrafluoride in the cyclotron, then sent it to Seaborg in Chicago. Seaborg’s
chemists fluorinated it and then sent the resulting material back to Stoughton for
his analysis.

By July 17, Stoughton reported that he had recovered 25-35% of

the uranium-233 through fluorination. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.125) The basic idea of
fluorination seemed sound. Later work would improve its efficiency considerably.
Despite his interest in thorium and uranium-233, Seaborg’s overwhelming priority
was the chemical separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products in the
production reactors that would be built in Hanford. Fluorination was not a very
effective technique for separating uranium from plutonium, because plutonium had
a variety of valence states and could also form a gaseous hexafluoride. If plutonium
hexafluoride formed in preference to uranium hexafluoride then there might have been
interest, but just the opposite took place. During fluorination all of the uranium would
react with the fluorine (forming gaseous UF6 ) before the plutonium would, meaning
that an entire volume of uranium parent material would need to be fluorinated to UF6
before the plutonium would begin to fluorinate to PuF6 . This was undesirable, since
they estimated that the Hanford reactors would have a million grams of uranium in
their exposed fuel for every thirty grams of plutonium.
The fact that uranium would fluorinate to an easily-separable gas and thorium
wouldn’t made fluorination an attractive chemical separation technique for a thoriumuranium-233 reactor, but not attractive for a uranium-plutonium reactor. Since
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the priority of the Metallurgical Laboratory was chemical separation of plutonium,
fluorination assumed a role of lesser importance over time.

3.3

The Significance of Achieving Criticality

Seaborg and his team at the University of California, Berkeley had originally begun
their research into plutonium and uranium-233 using neutrons generated from a
cyclotron. Why then was there such a strong interest in building a critical nuclear
reactor when they had cyclotrons?
It was simply this—with the cyclotron there was a substantial cost associated
with producing a neutron but with a critical nuclear reactor that cost dropped by
orders-of-magnitude.
To produce kilograms of plutonium for a nuclear weapon it would be necessary to
bombard natural uranium-238 with neutrons to form plutonium-239. To produce one
kilogram of plutonium-239 from one kilogram of uranium-238 would require 2.5 trillion
trillion neutrons (2.5 ×1024 neutrons). The 60-inch cyclotron that Seaborg and his
students had used at Berkeley was the most powerful in the world and could generate
high-energy deuteron beams that would smash into phosphorus, causing the ejection
of neutrons. At the beam currents that had been used in previous experiments at the
cyclotron (˜35 micro-amperes) the cyclotron was only producing 200 trillion neutrons
per second. At that rate, it would have taken 400 years to produce a single kilogram
of plutonium-239. Since the Manhattan Project estimated that they would need
tens of kilograms of plutonium for their mission, even a fleet of cyclotrons operating
continuously would take far too long to produce the amounts of material needed.
Each neutron produced in a cyclotron represented a cost in terms of energy. It took
energy to accelerate the deuteron to sufficient speeds to smash it into the phosphorus
target, producing a neutron. The relationship between the cost in energy and the
number of neutrons needed was direct and rather immutable.
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Fission was another way to obtain the trillions of trillions of neutrons needed to
make plutonium. Each fission reaction released two or three neutrons and about 200
MeV of energy. The leadership of the Manhattan Project wasn’t interested in the
energies that would be released in fission (unless they were in an explosive); rather
they were interested in the neutrons, which could then be used to create plutonium239 from uranium-238. If each neutron could be ”multiplied” to produce another and
yet another, the cost of those additional neutrons would be reduced. And if a neutron
could be multiplied an infinite number of times, then its cost plummeted relative to
the cyclotron.
A critical reactor was a compelling option for producing large numbers of neutrons
that held much more promise than cyclotron technology.

The basic idea was

that neutrons could be multiplied if you assembled fissile material, with the right
moderator, in the right configuration. There was only one option at that time for
the fissile material—uranium. It alone contained a fissile isotope (uranium-235)
although U-235 was a tiny fraction of natural uranium. Only one uranium atom
in 137 was uranium-235. The other 136 were neutron-absorbing uranium-238 atoms,
which would not fission nor would they help to multiply neutrons significantly.
Enrico Fermi had been one of the pioneers in assembling piles of material that
would multiply neutrons. Since 1939 he had been researching the notion of the
”exponential pile”, an arrangement of uranium and graphite that would try to
demonstrate that each fission event could lead to another and yet another.
This notion of a neutron causing a fission reaction, which would lead to the
emission of more neutrons, which would lead to more fission reactions, was very
compelling because it promised to provide far more neutrons for the conversion of
uranium to plutonium than external techniques like the cyclotron. But the basic
challenge was the fact that uranium-235 was such a rare component of natural
uranium.
The physicists expressed their accomplishment in terms of a single, non-dimensional
number which they called ”k”, or the multiplication constant. The inverse of (1 − k)
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was the number of additional fission events that would be triggered, including the
original. If k was 0.5, then each fission event would lead to another. A k of 0.8 meant
a fission event would lead to four more. A multiplication constant of 0.95 meant a
fission event would lead to a total of twenty before the process ended. At k = 0.99 a
hundred fissions would result. And at k = 1.0 something amazing happened. A fission
would be multiplied an infinite number of times and the reactions would continue and
continue without end. That magic number, k = 1.0, was called ”criticality”; a value of
k less than one was called ”subcritical”; and a value of k greater than one was called
”supercritical”. All of the exponential piles that had been built had been subcritical,
but they were getting closer and closer to a critical pile. Arranging a pile of uranium
and graphite to achieve criticality was the goal of Fermi’s group, first at Columbia
University and later at the Met Lab in Chicago. In a supercritical pile each fission
would lead to more than one additional fission and theoretically the power level would
grow without bound.
Of course, the physicists couldn’t simply wish for the multiplication constant to
equal one and thus it was so. They had to arrange material carefully, studying the
parameters of uranium and the graphite that surrounded it, to see which changes
improved k and which reduced it.
Alvin Weinberg recalled his skepticism that criticality could actually be achieved:
Fermi had performed the first exponential experiment in August 1941.
From his second experiment, in the fall, Fermi found a value k = 0.87—
some 0.13 short of the magical k = 1. To increase k, three improvements
were available: optimizing the dimensions of the lattice; shifting from
uranium oxide to uranium metal; and ridding the graphite and uranium
of tramp elements, such as boron, that absorbed neutrons. Thus Fermi
brought to Chicago a program of successive exponential experiments, each
embodying one or another improvement—purer graphite and uranium;
uranium metal instead of oxide; and more optimal lattice spacing...in
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those early days I was skeptical. The idea of a nuclear chain reaction
simply seemed too miraculous, too unbelievable. The distance
from k = 0.87 to k ¿ 1 struck me as a God-given barrier that could not be
overcome. Even Johnny Wheeler’s patient tabulation of the improvements
in k provided by increased purity, optimized lattices, and the shift from
oxide to metal failed to convince me. (Weinberg, 1994, pg.15-16)
An analogy might be made between the multiplication constant and skipping a
stone on a pond. A skilled stone-skipper can cause a flat stone to skip many times
before it falls into the water. This could be likened to a fission reaction in a subcritical
multiplying pile, with each skip of the stone representing a fission reaction. But if
one could imagine skipping a stone that keeps skipping forever, never slowing down
or falling into the water, then that could be likened unto a fission reaction in a
multiplying pile that has achieved criticality. Of course, in the real world, a stone
cannot skip across a lake forever. But criticality can be achieved in a pile of natural
uranium and graphite; with great care, high-purity materials, and a penetrating
insight into the problem. These are the gifts that Enrico Fermi and his team brought
to the challenge of building the world’s first critical assembly of material.

3.4

Criticality and Power Level Relationship

By March 1942, experiments with the first exponential pile in Chicago were yielding
a multiplication constant of 0.94, with a margin of error of plus-or-minus 0.02. That
meant that a fission reaction was leading to roughly twenty others before it was
quenched in that pile. By mid-May Fermi was reporting that he had achieved k
= 0.995 in an improved pile, meaning that each fission was being multiplied about
200 times before the reaction stopped. Confidence was growing that criticality was
actually possible.
The implications of a critical pile of material were significant.

To produce

plutonium for weapons in kilogram-scale quantities require trillions of trillions of
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neutrons. In a critical nuclear reactor, each fission would lead to another fission
indefinitely. But would it produce enough neutrons?
One of the remarkable aspects about criticality, as a physical principle of a nuclear
reactor, is it is very different than the power level of the reactor. Criticality can be
achieved even when the thermal power generation of the reactor is at a billionth, or
even a trillionth of a watt. Explained another way, stating that a reactor has achieved
criticality tells you nothing at all about how many nuclear reactions are taking place
at a given moment inside the reactor. All that it explains is that each fission reaction
is leading to another one. It is not difficult to imagine a nuclear reactor critical on a
single neutron, so long as that neutron is causing a fission that leads to another fission,
that state of affairs is correctly described as a reactor that has achieved criticality.
But in such a reactor, the power that would be generated from the fission reaction
would be far, far too small to measure.
What is important, then, is that a sufficiently large number of fission reactions are
taking place at a given moment. The reactors that Wigner’s group at the Met Lab
were designing were intended to produce plutonium, and for that mission that they
needed a great number of fission reactions. Wigner’s original design for the Hanford
reactors intended for each of them to operate at 500 megawatts of thermal power.
Assuming that each fission releases about 200 MeV of energy, that implies that each
of those reactors needed to be producing 16 billion billion (16 ×1018 ) fission reactions
each second. If each of those fission reactions also led to the formation of a plutonium
atom, then a 500-MW Hanford reactor could produce a kilogram of plutonium-239
in less than two days.
In principle, there was no difference between a reactor that was critical on 16 billion
billion fission reactions per second or a reactor that was critical on a single reaction
per second. Both were perfectly valid expressions of the principle of criticality. But
from a practical standpoint there was a world of difference between a reactor that
could make the material needed at a rate of half-a-kilogram per day and one that
took hundreds of thousands of years.
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So if there is no relationship between criticality and power level, why was there
so much interest in developing the first critical assembly of materials? It was this—if
a reactor could achieve criticality then it could likely achieve a very small degree of
supercriticality (k > 1), and if a reactor was operated at a supercritical state its power
level would increase. One fission would lead to more than one fission. In this manner,
a reactor that was originally critical at a vanishing small power level (perhaps as
low as a trillionth of a watt) could be increased in power until it reached the desired
level. Then by adjusting the multiplication of the pile, through the insertion or
removal of neutron-absorbing material, it would be possible to ”level off” the reactor
(from supercriticality back to criticality) at the power level desired. That was one of
the responsibilities of the reactor operator—to take a reactor from subcriticality to
criticality at some very low power level, then to take the reactor slightly supercritical
to increase its power, then to return to criticality to hold the power steady at the
desired level for production of plutonium.
An analogy might be made between an airplane flight and a reactor moving
from subcriticality to supercriticality. The airplane rolling down the runway and
accelerating could be likened to a subcritical reactor whose multiplication constant is
increasing from zero to one. When the airplane first lifts off the runway, that could
be likened to the reactor achieving criticality. As the airplane climbs in altitude, that
could be likened to a supercritical state, where the reactor is increasing in power level.
When the airplane reaches the desired altitude, it levels off and maintains altitude.
That would be analogous to a reactor returning to criticality from supercriticality at
the desired power level.
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3.5

The Important Role of the Moderator in a
Reactor

When a fission reaction takes place, two fission products and several neutrons are
released. Each of these has a large amount of kinetic energy. Although it might seem
that a high-speed neutron would be more likely to cause another fission reaction than
a low-speed neutron, just the opposite is true. Neutrons that have been slowed down
are much more likely to cause a fission reaction in a suitable nucleus.
The process of slowing neutrons down, or ”thermalizing” them, falls to a class of
material that is just as important in a nuclear reactor as the fuel. This material is
called the ”moderator” and its role is to slow down neutrons through collisions with
the nuclei of the moderator material without absorbing them.
Since neutrons are slowed down by colliding with atomic nuclei, the most effective
moderator for slowing down neutrons is a single proton. The proton and neutron are
almost exactly the same size and there is no electric repulsion between them because
the neutron has no electric charge. In theory, a neutron can lose all of its kinetic
energy in a single collision with a proton, provided it strikes at precisely the right
angle. But in reality, since the angle of impact is random, each collision between a
high-energy neutron and a low-energy proton only results in about 63% of the kinetic
energy of the neutron being lost.
An atomic nucleus with only a single proton is not difficult to find, in fact it is
the most common type in the universe. A single proton is the description of the most
common isotope of hydrogen, hydrogen-1. Hydrogen is the only element where each
of its isotopes have been assigned their own distinct names. Hydrogen-1 is called
”protium”, hydrogen-2 is called ”deuterium”, and hydrogen-3 is called ”tritium”.
Each has a single proton and zero, one, or two neutrons.
Protium is the most effective material for slowing-down neutrons, but it has a
serious flaw as a moderator. Protium has a significant appetite for absorbing the
neutron rather than simply letting it bounce off in a collision. In an ideal moderator
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material there would be no neutron absorption at all by the moderator. A material
that comes much closer to that ideal is protium’s rare sister isotope deuterium,
sometimes called ”heavy hydrogen”. A deuterium atom is only present in one out of
6400 atoms of protium in a sample of hydrogen, so while it is naturally-occurring it
is very dilute.
Deuterium is not as effective as protium in slowing down a neutron, removing only
52% of the kinetic energy of a high-energy neutron in each collision, but it makes up
for that disadvantage by its almost complete lack of neutron absorption, far less than
protium.
Any material that contains hydrogen then can potentially serve as a moderator
to slow down neutrons. Water, paraffin, and polyethylene are all compounds that
contain large amounts of hydrogen that have been used as moderating materials.
Although each of these compounds contain other elements, like oxygen or carbon,
it is the hydrogen they contain that is responsible for the vast majority of their
ability to slow down neutrons. In each case, if the hydrogen in these compounds is
replaced by hydrogen where the deuterium content has been increased considerably,
the compound is referred to as ”heavy”, while the same compound using a natural
mixture of hydrogen isotopes is called ”light”. Thus water with unaltered hydrogen is
called ”light water” and water with highly-enriched hydrogen is called ”heavy water”.
Light water is very effective at slowing down neutrons in a short distance but it
consumes some of them. Heavy water is somewhat less effective at slowing down
neutrons in a short distance but will hardly absorb any neutrons.
Atomic nuclei heavier than a single proton become less and less effective at slowing
down neutrons through collisions, but other materials have been used successfully as
moderators because they have low neutron absorption potential. Beryllium is an
element that consists of a single isotope, beryllium-9, with four protons and five
neutrons. Each collision with beryllium-9 only slows a high-energy neutron by 19%,
but beryllium also has a very low propensity to absorb neutrons, and it is an effective
moderator in high-temperature applications where water or another hydrogeneous
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compound is unsuitable. Natural carbon has two main isotopes, carbon-12 which
comprises 99% of natural carbon and carbon-13 which comprises nearly all of the rest.
Carbon-12 is less effective than hydrogen or beryllium at slowing down neutrons, and
each collision between a high-energy neutron and a carbon-12 nucleus only removes
15% of the energy of the neutron. But carbon-12, like deuterium, has a very very low
propensity to absorb the neutron, and carbon in the form of graphite can be used at
high temperatures.
Table 3.1: Moderator Performance of Suitable Isotopes
isotope

energy removed from a neutron absorption
high-energy neutron per (relative
to
collision
deuterium)

hydrogen-1
hydrogen-2
beryllium-9
carbon-12
nitrogen-14
oxygen-16
fluorine-19

63.2%
51.6%
18.7%
14.6%
12.7%
11.3%
9.7%

604
1
17
6
3458
0.4
17

Beyond carbon, few materials are considered as moderators since their effectiveness falls off rapidly with increasing mass.

Other light elements are rarely

considered as moderators for other reasons. Helium-4 is light and has almost no
neutron absorption, but as a low-density gas it is not an effective moderator since
it is very difficult to confine enough helium nuclei in a given volume to appreciably
slow neutrons. Lithium has a common isotope (lithium-6) that is a strong neutron
absorber, as does boron (boron-11).

Nitrogen also has two isotopes, but the

common one (nitrogen-14) is quite absorptive of neutrons. Oxygen has little neutron
absorption but it is difficult to form compounds with a high density of oxygen. Thus
in the first eight elements of the periodic table only three (hydrogen, beryllium, and
carbon) are realistically considered as moderators, with the two natural isotopes of
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hydrogen generally considered separately, leading to the description of ”light” and
”heavy” compounds of materials that contain hydrogen.
For Fermi’s efforts to achieve criticality in an exponential pile with natural
uranium, neutron absorption by the moderator had to minimized to the maximum
degree possible. In large part this was due to the fact that natural uranium consisted
mostly of absorptive material (uranium-238) with very little fissile material (uranium235). This swiftly ruled out normal hydrogen as a moderator material—protium
was simply too absorptive of neutrons. Beryllium was too expensive and rare. The
remaining credible options were highly enriched hydrogen in the form of heavy water
and carbon in the form of graphite. Graphite was cheap and effective and it was chosen
for the exponential pile experiments, even though heavy water was more effective. The
cost and scarcity of heavy water ruled it out for early consideration, although Eugene
Wigner investigated heavy-water moderators reactors shortly after Fermi achieved
success with his first critical assembly.
Early descriptions of nuclear reactors as ”piles” came about because Fermi’s early
experiment literally involved stacking bricks of graphite and cylinders or spheres of
uranium in piles under the west stands of the former stadium at the University of
Chicago. Later as reactors used liquid water as a moderator the description of a
reactor as a ”pile” fell into disuse.

53

Chapter 4
The Metallurgical Laboratory at
the University of Chicago
4.1

Achieving Criticality for the First Time

Wigner’s group continued to make progress on the design of the plutonium-producing
reactors for Hanford, considering all manner of coolant options and core geometries.
In July 1942 Fermi’s most recent calculations predicted that one of his geometries
could achieve k = 1.007. There was light at the end of the tunnel, particularly for
young Weinberg, who had wondered whether k < 1 was some sort of cosmic barrier
preventing the creation of reactors. Weinberg was electrified. (Weinberg, 1994, pg.16)
Those were heady times for the young physicist, working on the most challenging
and important projects in the world.
We were writing on a tabula rasa. Everything was new and untried.
Discoveries came easily. Since graphite was the moderator of choice for
the plutonium-producing reactor, most of our computations were devoted
to combinations of graphite and uranium, or uranium oxide. In Fermi’s
exponential pile the uranium oxide was disposed as roughly spherical
lumps about 6 centimeters in diameter. But in a high-power reactor,
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which required a coolant such as swiftly-flowing helium, or air, or even
water, such an arrangement was awkward since each uranium lump was
separated from its neighbor by several inches of graphite. Much better was
an arrangement in which the uranium was disposed as long rods bathed
in flowing coolant that traversed the entire pile. The rods were regularly
spaced to form a two-dimensional lattice. To calculate the multiplying
properties of such a two-dimensional cylindrical lattice required some
familiarity with Bessel functions. I had encountered these in my work
... (since nerves are long, very thin cylinders), and so I became a sort of
minor expert on Bessel functions for Wigner’s group.
Under Wigner’s guidance we examined lattices moderated by heavy water,
light water, and beryllium, as well as by graphite. We quickly realized
that the k in an optimal lattice moderated by heavy water was at least
10% higher than one moderated by the purest graphite. Indeed, as we
learned in 1945, the German uranium project focused entirely on heavywater-moderated piles. But heavy water required an isotopic separation
of deuterium (heavy hydrogen) from ordinary hydrogen. This separation
was much easier than separation of uranium isotopes, but it was still
formidable. Although plants for producing heavy water were built as
insurance in both Canada and the U.S. in case graphite moderation proved
infeasible, heavy water played no role in the production of plutonium
during the war.
Life for Wigner’s band of theorists was filled with great excitement and
seven-day work weeks. (Weinberg, 1994, pg.18-19)
Fermi’s group was getting closer and closer to being able to build a chain-reacting
pile, meanwhile Wigner’s group was designing the plutonium production reactors for
Hanford as if they were certain that Fermi would succeed. Weinberg reported that
both groups got along well.
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Success for Fermi’s group came on December 2, 1942, when their graphite piles,
fueled by lumps of natural uranium, first achieved criticality. Seaborg recorded in his
journal:
The first committee member I saw today was Greenewalt. We met late
this afternoon in the corridor of Eckhart Hall. As he approached me, I
could see from his demeanor he was bursting with good news. The aura of
cheerfulness and excitement that he carried with him and the way he held
out his hand in greeting told me that this signified more than just taking
pleasure in seeing me again. Then when I heard him say he had just come
from the West Stands, I understood the reason for his jubilation. Fermi
has produced a chain reaction—the pile is a success! Greenewalt
said that Fermi, Whitaker, Zinn and their crew started the experiment this
morning. As the control rods were cautiously withdrawn throughout the
day a few inches at a time, Fermi would take the new meter readings, and
using his slide rule, would calculate the multiplication factor. Greenewalt
said that he and Compton stood on the balcony, alongside Fermi and most
of his crew, watching the proceedings. Then at 3:20 p.m., Fermi called for
a few more centimeters. The pile became self-sustaining; in a few minutes
the output of the chain reaction rose to one watt. Fermi ordered the
reaction stopped, and everyone was tremendously relieved to see that the
activity could be extinguished by shoving the rods back into place. The
reaction took place without requiring as much material as Fermi earlier
anticipated (and thus he was two weeks ahead of schedule), and it was not
necessary to use the balloon to exclude air from the pile. However, he did
use almost six tons of uranium metal, 50 tons of uranium oxide, and 400
tons of graphite, nearly as much as predicted. (I learned later that Zinn,
Anderson and their pile builders reached a point where they knew the pile
would be self-sustaining very early this morning but did not proceed to
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this historic point, leaving this dramatic act for a more convenient time
later in the day.)
Of course we have no way of knowing if this is the first time a
sustained chain reaction has been achieved. The Germans may
have beaten us to it. I wonder, are they aware that U-233 can be made
from Th232 and [plutonium]-239 from U-238 in a chain-reacting pile and
that either of these isotopes can be used in a fission bomb? And if they
have a pile that chain-reacts, would they use it to generate power or to
produce vast amounts of radioactivity as a military weapon? One thing
is certain; although Fermi has demonstrated that we now have a means of
manufacturing [plutonium]-239 in copious amounts, it is the responsibility
of chemists to show that the [plutonium] can be extracted and purified to
the degree required for a working bomb. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.390-391)
Fermi had achieved the goal of the first controlled nuclear reactor. But Seaborg
was wise enough to wonder if they had actually been the first. In the final days of the
war, the Alsos Mission was an Allied team deployed to Germany to find any evidence
of a nuclear weapons program. In the small town of Haigerloch, in the basement of
a castle, they discovered an odd arrangement of uranium metal cubes suspended by
wires in heavy water. It was never even close to successful operation and certainly
not comparable to Fermi’s achievement in Chicago.

4.2

Oak Ridge and the X-10 Reactor

Although the reactor group under Wigner and the chemical separation group under
Seaborg labored in the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago, the
headquarters for the Manhattan Project was located in northeastern Tennessee, not
far from Knoxville. It was here that the Army established a secret city, now called
Oak Ridge, where the primary efforts of isotopic separation of uranium would be
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concentrated. Another aspect to their efforts was to construct a much larger pile of
graphite and natural uranium than the rather small one that Fermi had briefly built
in Chicago. This pile is known today in Oak Ridge simply as the ”Graphite Reactor”
but during the war was referred to by the code-name of its coordinates, X-10.
The X-10 pile was intended to operate at a power level vastly greater than Fermi’s
pile, and to operate for an extended period of time. It was meant to produce enough
plutonium in its uranium fuel in order to test Seaborg’s ideas about plutonium
separation. The land that would host the reactor had been acquired by the Army in
the fall of 1942 through condemnation and eviction of the farmers who lived there.
Construction began shortly thereafter. In late September 1942, Seaborg took his wife
Helen on a vacation in eastern Tennessee and as part of that trip they toured the
land that would soon host ”Pile Number 2”, or the X-10 reactor. In correspondence
on October 26, Seaborg instructed that space be made available in the new pile
to irradiate samples of thorium to produce uranium-233. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.314)
He anticipated that the uranium-233 produced would be on the order of milligrams
rather than the micrograms that they could produce in the Berkeley cyclotron, a
thousand-fold improvement, but still a miniscule amount of material. To produce
these small amounts of uranium-233 would require exposing several tons of thorium
to the neutrons of the pile.
In early November, Seaborg had grown very worried about the purification levels
that would be required in the new plutonium that they would be producing for the war
effort. Impurities in the plutonium, particularly among the light elements like boron
or beryllium, could lead to neutron emission as alpha particles from plutonium decay
smashed into the impurity nuclei. He was so concerned that he wrote to Robert
Oppenheimer. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.325-326) A week later Oppenheimer wrote back,
and his words were not particularly reassuring. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.337-338) Due to
the far greater radioactivity of plutonium-239 relative to uranium-235, the tolerance
to impurities would be orders of magnitude lower than in uranium-235. Oppenheimer
asked ”how bad is 23?” referring to uranium-233 by its code name. It is doubtful
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Figure 4.1: The X-10 ”Graphite Reactor” under construction at Oak Ridge in 1943.
This reactor would produce the first milligram-level quantities of uranium-233 that
allowed understanding of its nuclear characteristics, and the realization that thermal
breeding—and the nearly complete utilization of thorium as an energy resource—was
possible. Photo courtesy of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of
Energy.
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that uranium-233 would have offered much improvement over plutonium-239 in this
situation, since its half-life was only about six times less. What wasn’t mentioned
then, but would later be discovered, is that the U-232 contaminant of U-233 would
shower any sample with far more alpha particles than plutonium-239 did.
By December 9, 1942, Seaborg was still excited from Fermi’s recent accomplishments in building the first chain-reacting pile and wrote to Stoughton in anticipation
of producing larger quantities of uranium-233 by loading thorium in the periphery of
the X-10 graphite pile. The production rate would be orders of magnitude greater
than they had achieved heretofore from the cyclotron, but still only a tiny fraction of
the production rate of plutonium in the pile. Seaborg continued to view uranium-233
production as a credible alternative to plutonium-239 production, despite its lower
production rates. The main advantage of U-233 in his mind was that, as uranium, its
chemistry and metallurgy were well understood whereas those properties in plutonium
remained a great mystery. He was also far more confident that uranium could be
extracted from a pile at high purity than plutonium. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.405)
By early February, Stoughton had left Berkeley to join Seaborg’s Metallurgical
Laboratory team in Chicago. Seaborg had hopes that Stoughton would carry on his
U-233 research, but noted in his diary that plutonium work would likely take priority
initially. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.512)
On Febrary 16, 1943, Seaborg sent another memorandum to Oak Ridge that space
be left in the new pile for ”50-100 pounds of thorium salt, which would produce enough
U-233 to make possible further studies of its nuclear properties.” (Seaborg, 1977,
pg.527) Despite Stoughton’s addition to the small U-233 effort in Chicago, progress
slowed even as it was accelerating on plutonium. Most of the chemical group’s effort
consisted of preparing thorium slugs for irradiation in the new ”Pile number 2” that
was being built in Oak Ridge (the X-10 reactor).
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4.3

Wigner Accelerates his Effort

As the new year of 1943 dawned, Wigner’s reactor group was finishing their design
for a 500-megawatt water-cooled reactor that could be built at the Hanford site in
Washington (”Site W”) and would produce half-a-kilogram of plutonium per day.
Their design report was called CE-407, ”Preliminary Process Design of Liquid-Cooled
Power Plant Producing 500,000kw” and it was issued on January 9, 1943. After
that point, the design was essentially handed-off to the DuPont Company for the
actual detailed design, construction, and operation of the new plutonium-producing
reactors. (Weinberg, 1994, pg.26)
Seaborg noted on May 26 that Wigner had called the group’s attention to articles
in the scientific literature that indicated that the Germans were ”running neck and
neck with us in 1941 and 1942” in the investigation of neutronic behavior in various
materials—a definite precursor to any work on nuclear reactors. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.32)
Wigner would simply not allow himself to entertain the possibility that Germany was
doing anything less than proceeding at maximum effort towards a nuclear weapon,
and he was driven by the unrelenting need to protect the free world by achieving the
technology first. As Weinberg recorded:
In the summer of 1942, Compton called Fermi, Wigner, and me to his
office. The issue: when could we expect the German atomic bomb?
Wigner went to the board and figured about six months to build the
reactor, three months to extract the plutonium, two months to build the
bomb, and maybe a few months for slippage. We might receive the
German bomb sometime in 1943! Wigner’s error was to assume
the German project to be manned entirely by Wigners. (Weinberg, 1994,
pg.30-31)
Wigner was very frustrated by DuPont and what he perceived as their sloth and
indifference in implementing his design for the new reactors. Having largely completed
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his design of the Hanford plutonium-production reactors, Wigner turned his attention
to other ways he could accelerate the war effort through new reactors. Natural
uranium was their only feasible reactor fuel; with this restriction the feasible choices
for moderating material were small and one had already been used for Fermi’s pile and
for the Hanford reactors—graphite. The other option was heavy water. Heavy water
was exceptionally expensive but it was a more efficient moderator than graphite, and
plutonium production piles using heavy water could be much smaller than similar
graphite piles. Furthermore, there would not be a need to physically segregate the
uranium from the moderator, as was done in graphite. Heavy water was such a good
moderator that a uranium compound that was soluble in water could be dissolved in
the heavy water and used directly. This had profound advantages over the current
techniques that they had proposed, where uranium metal would be welded in an
aluminum can and physically pushed through the structure of the Hanford reactor
graphite block.
This was the origin of the ”aqueous homogeneous reactor” which was the first idea
for a reactor with fluid fuel rather than with solid fuel. Weinberg enthused about the
potential of such a reactor:
We calculated the k and the critical size of both homogeneous and
heterogeneous (lattice) piles moderated by [heavy water]. Since heavy
water is a much better moderator than graphite, many fewer neutrons are
lost by capture in
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U while slowing down in [heavy water] than are lost

in graphite. It is therefore unnecessary in a [heavy water] pile to remove
the neutrons during their moderation away from the uranium fuel—that
is, it is unnecessary to arrange the uranium in a lattice. The uranium
can be mixed homogeneously with the heavy water. We estimated that a
homogeneous mixture of [heavy water] and natural uranium would have
a k of about 1.08, compared to a k of about 1.2 in an optimized lattice.
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Both Urey and Wigner were intrigued by the possibility of a plutoniumproducing pile consisting merely of a solution or slurry of uranium in heavy
water. Gone would be the thousands of carefully machined uranium slugs;
gone, too, the intricate system of piping required to feed water into each
process tube. Experiments were therefore undertaken at Chicago during
1943 and 1944 to find either a stable solution or a slurry of uranium in
water. Alas, this was not easy, although aqueous homogeneous piles based
on uranyl sulfate, on uranyl nitrate, and on stable uranium dioxide slurries
were developed several years later.

I myself became bitten with

the ”homogeneous” bug, a fixation I have never fully recovered
from! (Weinberg, 1994, pg.32-33)
The project to develop a heavy-water plutonium production reactor, code-named
”P-9”, began in early 1943 but did not reach a conclusion during the war years.
Nevertheless, it was the beginning of thought by Wigner about fluid-fueled reactors
and their advantages over solid-fueled reactors. Later these thoughts, when coupled
with Seaborg’s discoveries about uranium-233 and his research with Stoughton on the
fluorination of thorium, would form the basis for the invention of the thorium-fueled
molten-salt reactor.

4.4

The X-10 Reactor Achieves Criticality

Even as the first criticality of the X-10 reactor drew near, Dr. Compton, the leader of
the Metallurgical Laboratory, was reducing the already-small emphasis on uranium233. He felt it was not a significant priority because there was no way to make
militarily-significant quantities of uranium-233 before 1947. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.134)
This was because the only way to make any amount of uranium-233 would be to
expose thorium to neutrons in one of the plutonium-producing piles. The amount of
”spare” neutrons available in these piles was incredible compared to the tiny amount
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that had been produced by the Berkeley cyclotron, but very small compared to
the amount that would be producing plutonium. There was simply no comparison
between the rates of production. If thorium had had a naturally-fissile isotope, akin
to uranium-235 in natural uranium, then dedicated thorium piles producing U-233
might have been possible. But this was simply not the case, and thorium/U-233
research by necessity took a back seat to the development of plutonium.
On November 4, criticality was achieved for the first time in the X-10 reactor
at Oak Ridge. It had a far greater thermal power than Fermi’s Chicago pile a year
before, and the X-10 reactor would be the first to make gram-scale quantities of
plutonium. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.234) Within the month, thorium carbonate slugs had
been loaded into various locations in the X-10 reactor and were projected to produce
about one milligram of uranium-233, vastly more than had ever been previously
available. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.254) But even on the edge of this exciting development,
the Metallurgical Lab was pulling back even further from uranium-233. Dr. Compton
addressed the group on November 17, commending their achievement in getting the X10 reactor operational, but emphasizing the need to conserve manpower throughout
the program. He said that due to the cancellation of Wigner’s heavy-water ”P-9”
project, there would be no way to get useful quantities of uranium-233 and so the
research work would be discontinued. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.258)
Seaborg was not pleased with this development. He wrote a memo to a colleague
at the Clinton (Oak Ridge) Labs where he speculated that Germany was developing
weapons based on U-233 rather than on plutonium. The German interest in heavy
water was part of the reason he believed this was taking place.
Even as he was worrying about German uranium-233, Seaborg was worried
about the myriad ways that the Chicago project’s emphasis on plutonium could
run aground. On November 25, he ran into Leo Szilard and mentioned his concern
that not every interaction between plutonium-239 and a neutron would result in
fission. Sometimes, he anticipated, the plutonium-239 nucleus would simply absorb
the nucleus and form plutonium-240, and this nucleus, with its even number of
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nucleons, would have a greater probability of spontaneous fission. Spontaneous fission
released neutrons that could cause nuclear weapons to ”fizzle” before achieving the
ideal geometry for detonation. Szilard expressed doubt that the Pu-240 potentiality
was a problem. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.266-267) It turned out that he was very wrong,
for Seaborg was correctly anticipating the most severe issue that would face the
Metallurgical Laboratory project, and the new X-10 reactor would soon uncover it.
Seaborg may have seen uranium-233 as a back-up plan to the plutonium effort,
but the leaders of the Met Lab did not share his view. By December 15, Compton
had informed Seaborg that General Groves had directed that the Met Lab halt until
further notice all work directed toward the development of a uranium-233 process and
discontinue all work on its chemical separation. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.289) There was
some worry about the thorium carbonate cans that were in the X-10 reactor—should
they be removed? But it was decided to leave them in the neutron flux until April,
when they anticipated that approximately 15 milligrams of uranium-233 would have
been produced. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.301)
Seaborg tried once again to persuade Manhattan Project leadership that a
secondary effort in uranium-233 to receive serious consideration. On January 27,
1944, he wrote an extended memo to Dr. Compton giving his reasons why he thought
that the Germans might produce a nuclear weapon from uranium-233 in the near
future, and suggested that these reasons be communicated to the highest levels of
command in the Allied powers. He reasoned that (1) the Germans were continuing
to procure heavy water from a manufacturing facility in Norway; (2) the chemical
separation of uranium from thorium was easier to research and accomplish than
the separation of plutonium from uranium; (3) uranium-233 would have a greater
tolerance for impurities due to lower alpha activity than Pu-239; and (4) thorium raw
materials were likely available to the Germans. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.398-399)
One might ask, why was Seaborg pushing so hard for a material development
program based on uranium-233? There were several reasons. The first was that the
chemistry of uranium was well-understood. Seaborg realized that there would be no
65

difference between the chemistry of inexpensive natural uranium and scarce uranium233, therefore he could develop all of his chemical separations processes with natural
uranium at low cost and with great confidence. At this time, only a few months
after the X-10 reactor achieved criticality, plutonium was an exceedingly scarce
commodity, available only in the microgram quantity from the Berkeley cyclotron.
Surely this availability of plutonium must have been a dominant concern to a chemist
like Seaborg, even if the potential for manufacturing multi-kilogram quantities of
plutonium was far better than for uranium-233.
Another concern was the purity that would be required of the plutonium, both
chemically and isotopically. It was terribly difficult to assess the performance of a
chemical separations process when one was dealing with micrograms of a substance
versus kilograms. Opening another chemical ”front”, so to speak, with uranium-233
meant that Seaborg’s group could immediately begin developing separations processes
between thorium and uranium without having to wait for any products to emerge from
the X-10 reactor.
Finally, Seaborg saw in the German attempt to obtain heavy-water supplies an
echo of Wigner’s P-9 experiments, and a way to make a much more compact reactor
than with graphite and natural uranium. He knew that a P-9 style pile would
be almost necessary in order to produce any meaningful quantity of uranium-233
from thorium. But the same advantages of P-9 style pile would also accrue to
plutonium development, and indeed, many years later the United States produced
considerable quantities of plutonium from the heavy-water-moderated production
reactors at Savannah River in South Carolina.
By February 29, Compton had written back to Seaborg, indicating that he had
communicated the contents of the memo on potential German U-233 production to
General Leslie Groves, the head of the Manhattan Project, as well as others in the
Army command. But Compton also added his opinion that any U-233 production
effort by the Germans would probably require more time and effort than a Pu-239
production attempt, and that he saw no strong reasons to believe that the Germans
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were at that time actually engaged in a program of U-233 production. (Seaborg, 1978,
pg.456) In this case, Compton’s suppositions were entirely correct. The Germans had
no effort to develop U-233 as a weapons material. They were trying to procure heavy
water, but it was for their own low-scale effort to create a critical assembly of uranium
and heavy water in order to produce plutonium.
This rare misstep by Seaborg may be explained by considering his approach to the
problem. As a chemist, he was tackling the challenge of separating a newly-discovered
element from scores of others at high purity. The prospect of shifting that challenge to
an already-understood element like uranium, available in large quantities, must have
been tempting. But others like Wigner and perhaps even Compton would have seen it
differently. To them, the challenge of producing fissile material from natural uranium,
which contained both the fissile material to sustain the reaction (uranium-235) and
the fertile material to create the product (plutonium-239) they desired (uranium-238)
would have seemed much more feasible than to attempt the same feat with thorium,
which had no fissile isotope. Any attempt to create significant quantities of uranium233 would have to rely on neutrons created from the fission of uranium-235, and these
neutrons would be far more likely to create plutonium-239 than uranium-233 in any
practical pile arrangement using natural uranium as a fuel.
Nonetheless, Compton did encourage Seaborg to continue to interact with another
group of researchers in Canada that were looking at uranium-233 as a fissile
material. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.456)
Seaborg’s concerns about plutonium were not without a basis; in fact, one
could argue that the plutonium situation that actually developed was far worse
than Seaborg feared at the time. But the challenge from plutonium that actually
materialized was far more fundamental than extreme chemical purification, and could
not be addressed by Seaborg’s considerable talent in chemistry.
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4.5

Conceiving the Breeder Reactor

In the spring of 1944, Alvin Weinberg remembered that the mood in Wigner’s reactor
design group was expansive because they had completed their primary responsibility
of designing the plutonium production reactors at Hanford. They began to speculate
about ”new piles” and formed an informal group which they called the ”New Piles
Committee.” (Weinberg, 1994, pg.39)
A particularly notable meeting of this group took place on the morning of April 26,
1944, when Enrico Fermi began to describe his ideas for a nuclear reactor that would
produce more nuclear fuel than it consumed. (Ohlinger, a, pg.1) His argument was
centered in the nuclear properties of plutonium-239 and uranium-235 as they were
then known. Through a mathematical derivation, Fermi indicated that he thought it
possible to build a reactor using plutonium where enough neutrons would be produced
through fission to not only replace the fuel consumed, but to generate additional fuel.
Fermi referred to ”mother plants” that would produce excess plutonium in order to
feed a series of smaller plants. He indicated that there might be a concern that during
the shipment of plutonium it might fall into the wrong hands, but those concerns were
beyond the scope of their discussion.
All of the reactors that Fermi and Wigner’s group had worked on up to that point
had been reactors where moderating materials such as graphite or water had been
used to slow down neutrons so as to maximize the probability that fission would take
place. Reactors that used moderators to intentionally slow neutrons are now called
”thermal-spectrum” reactors, because the energies of their neutrons follow a spectrum
of values that correspond to thermal equilibrium in the reactor. Put another way, the
neutrons are at the same temperature as the materials around them, bouncing about
until they are consumed through absorption.
Another reason why a thermal-spectrum reactor was the only option for the
Manhattan Project was the use of natural uranium as a nuclear fuel. Its very low fissile
content (only one atom out of 137 in uranium is fissile) meant that every attempt had
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to be made to maximize the probability of fission, and that dictated that neutrons
be slowed-down, or ”thermalized,” for in this condition the probability of fission was
maximized.
Fermi imagined two large departures from the current state of reactor design. The
first was that he proposed to use pure plutonium as the fuel in the reactor. This would
necessitate a significant diversion of material from the weapons program in order to
simply start the reactor. The other departure he hoped would make it worth the cost.
The reactor would not slow down the neutrons produced in fission; instead, it would
make every effort to keep them at the high speeds with which they are created. This
concept would come to be known as a ”fast-spectrum” reactor, and the reason to take
this approach would be that when plutonium is struck by fast neutrons, it fissions
nearly every time. Non-productive creation of plutonium-240 would be drastically
reduced, and the fact that each plutonium fission produces nearly three neutrons
would enable the fast reactor to make twice as much plutonium as it consumed.
In this way, through the use of plutonium fuel and intentionally fast neutrons,
Fermi hoped to build a reactor that would double the inventory of plutonium inside
it on a regular basis. This interval of time that would be necessary to double its
plutonium inventory was called the ”doubling time,” and Fermi and others hoped it
would be as short as two years.
Admittedly, the engineering challenges of creating a fast-spectrum reactor were
far greater than the thermal-spectrum reactors at X-10 or Hanford. Any coolant that
might slow down the neutrons significantly could not be used. That ruled out water
as a coolant. Instead, early attention turned to metallic bismuth as a coolant, or
possibly, molten metallic sodium. Liquid sodium metal had a number of advantages
over bismuth, but like other pure alkali metals∗ it was very dangerous to work with
since it would burst into fire upon contact with air or water. Its advantages were that
∗

Metallic lithium, sodium, potassium, rubidium, and cesium are all highly chemically reactive
with air and water, with the reactivity increasing from lithium to cesium, as the outermost electron
is more loosely bound.
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it was highly thermally conductive and could operate at temperatures high enough
to drive a steam turbine yet stay at low pressure.
A sodium-cooled fast reactor could therefore be a power-generating reactor, unlike
the huge reactors under construction at Hanford. These mighty machines, despite
their impressive thermal output of 250 megawatts, used water coolant that was
circulated at such a rate that its temperature at discharge was far too low to raise
steam. Thus all of the thermal power produced was wasted, and no fraction of it
could be turned to electricity.
The sodium-cooled fast reactor might be able to make power at the same time it
was doubling its plutonium inventory. Fermi doubted that such a reactor would be
an economically competitive source of power, although he said that he looked upon
the use of nuclear power to heat cities with sympathy. Producing more plutonium
was a far more compelling objective.
Fast reactors had a basic disadvantage over thermal reactors, however. The crosssections of nuclides were far smaller to fast neutrons than thermal neutrons; achieving
the same rate of power generation would require far more atoms of fissile plutonium
in a fast-spectrum reactor than in a thermal-spectrum reactor. A graphical depiction
of this disparity is shown in figure 4.2, where the thermal fission cross section of a
single atom of Pu-239 (1303 barns) is compared to 698 atoms of Pu-239 with their
fast fission cross sections of 1.87 barns each.
That evening, Fermi continued to expound his ideas about fast-breeder reactors,
as Alvin Weinberg remembered:
Although the idea of the breeder was in the air almost from the beginning,
it was ”officially” recognized in an evening lecture Fermi gave to the
entire staff in the Eckhart Hall auditorium. Fermi explained the principle
of breeding and noted that breeding was more likely if it was based on
fast neutrons, as in a bomb, because the number of neutrons per fission
exceeded 2 by a very comfortable 0.5 or more if the fissions were induced
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Figure 4.2: A single plutonium-239 atom has the same fission cross section to a
thermal neutron as nearly 700 plutonium-239 atoms to a fast neutron.
by fast neutrons. None of this was really new to Wigner’s group, but as
usual Fermi held his audience with his lucid exposition. (Weinberg, 1994,
pg.39)
Soon this innovative reactor concept received the name by which it has come to
be known:
[Szilard], Wigner, and I were discussing Fermi’s lecture while walking
along the sidewalk that ran from Eckhart Hall to Jones Laboratory. I
can’t remember who said that we needed a name for a pile that produced
more fissile material than it burned; it was probably Wigner. Szilard
thought for a moment and said something like, ”Let’s call it a breeder.”
And ”breeder” it has been ever since. (Weinberg, 1994, pg.39)
Two days later, on April 28, the New Piles Committee met again to discuss the
availability of uranium and thorium, and how the prospect of a ”breeder” reactor
might affect the prospects for future utilization of energy. (Ohlinger, b, pg.1) Morrison
felt that a fission reactor merely as a source of ”unspecialized energy” would have
great difficulty competing economically against existing sources of energy, particularly
inexpensive hydropower and coal.
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The crust of the Earth had about 4 parts-per-million (ppm) uranium and three
times as much thorium, which represented a huge yet diffuse resource. Seawater
contained dissolved uranium but no thorium of significance, due to a difference in their
chemical properties and solubilities. A breeder reactor would make it economical to
recover uranium or thorium from the crust of the Earth and consume it for energy at
a net gain. Morrison used a comparison with the costs involved in gold mining, a far
more scarce resource. Several countries contained good uranium resources, including
the Congo, Czechoslovakia, Canada, the United States, and likely Russia. Thorium
was practically everywhere.
But if only the rare uranium-235 was used for energy, as was the case for thermalspectrum nuclear reactors fueled by natural or enriched uranium, then the uranium
inventories of the US and Canada would only provide enough energy for nine months
of demand. The group came to the inescapable conclusion that only breeder reactors
would enable nuclear energy to be a sustained option as an energy source.
Although the excitement about breeder reactors was significant, much of it was
premature. Physicists were still deciphering the important nuclear properties of each
of these materials, particularly their propensity to absorb a neutron rather than
fission, to such a degree that committing to any path was premature. At that
time, the idea that only a fast-spectrum reactor would be able to consume all of the
energy of uranium or thorium was strongly believed, and time would bear that out
to some degree. But a remarkable property of thorium—one that would substantially
distinguish it from uranium—still awaited discovery, and this discovery would open
up opportunities for the realization of energy from thorium that simply were not
possible with uranium.

4.6

The Plutonium-240 Scare

On January 1, 1944, Glenn Seaborg recorded some of his feelings about the status of
his work and its prospects for the future:
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The beginning of 1944 finds our Project deep in the problems of
plutonium production, extraction, and purification. This vast involvement
with a secret, synthetic element unheard of not much longer than
two years ago and unseen until sixteen months ago in August 1942,
would seem incredible to the outside world. Moreover, the means of
producing plutonium in copious quantities—the chain-reacting pile—
became operational just one year ago. I thought about these matters
today when we received our first shipment of plutonium from Clinton
Laboratories—1,500 micrograms! It equals almost the total amount of
plutonium produced by all previous cyclotron bombardments. It is hard
for me to remain nonchalant when I realize that before the end of February,
production of plutonium will increase more than a thousandfold and gram
quantities will then become available. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.326)
The X-10 reactor had the ability to make roughly a million times more plutonium,
over a given time, than the Berkeley cyclotrons, and by early 1944 there was enough
chemically-extracted plutonium for chemists at Los Alamos to extract it and to assess
its nuclear properties. To their horror, they discovered that Seaborg’s previous fears
about plutonium-240 had been well-justified. The first concrete evidence of the
problem was reported by Enrico Fermi in a meeting held on May 19. Fermi had
been measuring the nuclear cross-sections of U-235 and Pu-239. He now had one
gram of plutonium dioxide that had been produced by the X-10 reactor. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.25-26)
The basic issue concerned a quantity called the ”branching ratio” by the Chicago
group, which dealt with the fact that a fission reaction was not always the outcome
when a neutron struck a fissile nucleus, depicted in Figure 4.3. Sometimes the fissile
nucleus simply absorbed the neutron and grew by one atomic mass. Fermi had
wanted to know how often this happened in plutonium-239, and the answer was
very troubling. In the environment of the X-10 reactor, or in the reactors that were
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Figure 4.3: U-238 absorbs slow neutrons to form plutonium-239, which sometimes
undergoes fission and sometimes absorbs the neutron.
under construction at Hanford that would produce the plutonium needed for weapons,
the plutonium-239 would simply absorb a neutron in roughly one out of every three
neutron interactions. Plutonium-239 would become plutonium-240, which is not fissile
and likely had a relatively high rate of spontaneous fission due to its even atomic mass
number.
Ironically, within just a few weeks of this meeting Seaborg and his colleague
John Willard traveled to Hanford, Washington, and toured the areas where the huge
plutonium-producing reactors were under construction. Seaborg reported:
It is an awe-inspiring experience to see the thousands of workmen busily
engaged in the building of these complicated edifices. These are located in
a vast expanse of area (almost 500,000 acres in all) with the piles near the
Columbia River for cooling purposes and the extraction plants somewhat
removed. To reach these areas we drove over some of the flattest, most
lonesome territory I have ever seen.
For lunch we were taken into the Hanford Camp where the construction
workers live in rows of barracks, tents, and trailers stretched out in all
directions. We ate in the largest mess hall I have ever been in—a sea of
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faces all being well-fed in shifts. We were told that there are some 40,000
residing at Hanford... (Seaborg, 1979, pg.41)
The success of this titanic construction effort was now in jeopardy based on the
results of Fermi’s measurements of the properties of plutonium.
While Seaborg and the other Met Lab personnel continued to wait for further
results from Fermi’s team, a small amount of research continued on uranium-233,
sustained to some degree by continuing Canadian interest in the topic. A delegation
of Canadian nuclear scientists visited Chicago in early June and General Groves had
determined that Met Lab personnel would be permitted to discuss the properties
and possibilities of uranium-233 with them, although any discussion of plutonium
and its manufacture, properties, and purification was still forbidden. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.286) The Canadian group, code-named ”Evergreen”, was particularly interested in
obtaining slugs of thorium carbonate that were currently being irradiated in the X-10
reactor in Oak Ridge. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.8) They intended to attempt the extraction
of either protactinium or uranium from these unique samples.
In early July, General Groves issued a directive to the Metallurgical Project
to freeze their current level of personnel and to consider ways to reduce personnel
requirements. This directive threatened any attempt by Seaborg to open up another
line of chemical investigation into uranium-233 extraction and purification. Groves
informed the Chicago group that personnel reductions would begin in September and
would be completed by January. Even as these directives were being communicated to
the group, Groves sent another letter specifically asking for recommendations about
the use of uranium-233. At that time, about sixty ”slugs” of thorium carbonate
were in the X-10 reactor undergoing exposure to neutrons. Fermi wanted extracted
uranium-233 so that he could conduct similar measurements on it to those that he
had been doing with plutonium-239. There was discussion as to where the chemical
extraction would take place—at the chemical facilities in Oak Ridge, or would it be
done by the Evergreen research team in Canada? (Seaborg, 1979, pg.124-125)
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Seaborg’s tiny team for uranium-233 research had been decimated by the cuts
that Compton had specified at Christmas 1943, and now consisted only a single man,
Leonard Katzin. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.296) But on July 10, Katzin began preparing
for the chemical extraction of the uranium-233 that they anticipated had been
accumulating in the thorium slugs being irradiated in the X-10 reactor. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.128) Katzin planned to extract the uranium directly, without any attempt
to remove the protactinium precursor. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.136) There was a potential
concern with this plan. Despite their best attempts, the thorium that had been loaded
into the reactor had not been completely purified of any natural uranium. Whatever
tiny quantity of natural uranium had been present in the thorium slugs would be
removed with the uranium-233 that had accumulated during the time in the reactor.
Assessing how much of the uranium was uranium-233 (from natural thorium) and
how much was uranium-238 (from natural uranium) would be important.
Construction progressed at the Hanford site, with the anticipation that each ton
of uranium would yield between 5 and 50 grams of plutonium. They anticipated that
the first production reactor at Hanford would go into operation in September, and
that it would not take long for the reactors to achieve their full rated power levels.
On July 17, an evening meeting of the Metallurgical Project brought devastating
news for all the personnel involved. Seaborg reported:
The meeting, however, concentrated on something that came up which
was much more immediate. Robert Oppenheimer, who was attending
the Board Meeting from Los Alamos, announced that E. Segre, O.
Chamberlain, and G. W. Farwell have found strong evidence for the
existence of the plutonium isotope Pu-240, which undergoes decay by
spontaneous fission! This was found in the neutron-irradiated Pu-239
from the Clinton pile that we had purified for them.
It should be noted that this disclosure came as a great shock to everyone.
However, over a year ago in my ”Report of Month Ending March 15, 1943,
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Special Chemistry of 94,” (CK-514), I had written about the possibility
of an n, γ reaction on Pu-239 giving the isotope Pu-240. I had said that a
possible spontaneous fission decay of this isotope would seriously impinge
upon our ability to use Pu-239 as intended. Now it was learned that
indeed this reaction takes place; and that since the neutron flux in the
Hanford piles would be so high, Pu-240 would be produced in so great
a relative abundance that the neutrons resulting from its spontaneous
fission would overshadow those from any α, n reactions on impurities that
might be present in Pu-239.
Because of this new development, Site Y [Los Alamos] will now have
to rethink how it will proceed in the design of a plutonium bomb.
Furthermore, it was decided at this Board Meeting to demobilize Thomas’s
staff which is handling the coordination and general direction of the
chemistry, purification, and final metallurgy of Pu-239 because the
planned extreme purification of plutonium would be futile—this could not
prevent the emission of the unwanted neutrons. This meant that there
would be no further monthly meetings at the Met Lab on this aspect of
the chemical program. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.145)
Alvin Weinberg also remembered the events of this time:
240

Pu undergoes fission spontaneously and therefore emits neutrons. Thus,

the plutonium produced at W was bathed in a background of stray
neutrons. A ”gun-type” bomb in which the separate parts of plutonium
were brought together rather slowly would likely be triggered by a neutron
from the 240 Pu before it reached the compact state needed for a maximum
explosion. A plutonium bomb would therefore always predetonate! The
whole approach to a bomb based on plutonium was imperiled by the
spontaneous fission in

240

Pu. (Weinberg, 1994, pg.37)
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This was precisely what Seaborg had feared, and the actual situation was far worse
than his previous fears about plutonium purification. In that instance, in November
1942, he had been concerned that light elements impurities with the plutonium would
emit neutrons under alpha-particle bombardment from plutonium decay. Hopefully,
an effective strategy of plutonium purification would address this concern. But the
discovery of plutonium-240 was far more troubling. Here was a contaminant that
could never be eliminated, for it had precisely the same chemical composition as the
desired plutonium-239. Seaborg and his group despaired that the central effort of the
Met Lab had been in vain, and that the output of the future Hanford reactors would
be unusable.
None of the efforts of the Met Lab could salvage the situation, but an innovation
in weapon design at Los Alamos was the only hope. In 1943, Seth Neddermeyer,
a physicist from Caltech, had proposed using an implosion technique to detonate
a nuclear weapon rather than the technique which was being pursued at the time,
which was to bring two subcritical pieces of fissile material together rapidly to form
a critical mass. This latter technique was called the ”gun-type” method and was
considered to be suitable for both highly-enriched uranium and plutonium. Fermi’s
results on plutonium-240 contamination indicated that there was little chance that
the plutonium that would be produced by the Hanford reactors would be suitable for
the gun-type technique.
The implosion technique used shaped explosive charges surrounding a spherical
mass of fissile material to compress it extremely rapidly into a supercritical
configuration that would detonate. It was challenging, but it offered the promise of
being far less susceptible to difficulties from plutonium-240 contamination. Another
important advantage was that it required far less fissile material for a given yield. It
would require the Los Alamos weapons design team to become experts in the precision
arrangement and detonation of shaped explosive charges. (Hewlett and Anderson,
1962, pg.245-247)
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But for Seaborg’s chemical purification team, there was little to be done. On
July 19th, he was approached by two of the leaders of the Met Lab and told that his
purification program was no longer needed.
I was standing in the hall in front of my office as they approached.
They said that Compton had agreed I should be given the reason but
that I was not to tell others. I said they didn’t need to tell me the
reason—I assumed the spontaneous fission rate of Pu-240 has
been found to be so high as to overshadow the neutrons from
the α, n reaction. I went on to say that, since no one has given me this
information, I feel free to pass my interpretation on to my men. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.147)
On July 28th, the director of the Met Lab, Samuel Allison, sent a memo to
Compton reviewing the situation on the Met Lab and its personnel:
”Probably next highest priority will be accorded studies of the basic
chemistry of plutonium and to methods of extraction of 23 studied
on a laboratory scale. The recent abandonment of attempts to
reach high purity in our product has, in my opinion, increased
somewhat the interest in 23. [uranium-233] This is because we
are now committed to only one method of final assembly; and if this
should fail, the military usefulness of our product is doubtful. Under
these conditions we would immediately give consideration to
the conversion of our product to 23. Work on extraction of a few
milligrams of 23 to be tested at the Argonne Laboratory will probably
carry over into the post-October period. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.163)
The ”failure” of the plutonium-manufacturing project, as then seen by the Met
Lab personnel, was increasing interest in uranium-233 as a possible fall-back position.
Met Lab personnel had little insight into the techniques for implosion-type weapons
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that were being developed at Los Alamos, and they could not foresee that the
successful development of this approach would lead to successful use of the plutonium
that they had helped produce.
Seaborg confided to his collegue Roy Post the futility of the plutonium situation
as seen from the Chicago perspective on February 28, 1945:
...as to how much Pu-240 could be tolerated in purified plutonium for Los
Alamos, I said they have no choice in the matter; whatever is produced
must be tolerated. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.521)

4.7

Realizing the Unlimited Potential of Thorium

Leonard Katzin and his very small team of chemists begain working after hours on
August 2, 1944, to extract the small amount of uranium-233 from the thorium carbonate slugs that had been irradiated in the X-10 reactor for many months. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.169) By August 9th they were nearly finished. They anticipated recovering
about 5 milligrams of uranium, which despite its seemingly tiny mass represented
a thousand-fold increase in the amount of uranium-233 that could be produced in
the Berkeley cyclotron. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.181) On August 12th Katzin’s team had
completed their extraction and had six milligrams of uranium. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.189)
There was a degree of uncertainty associated with just how much uranium-233
they had extracted from the pile, since their technique for assessing the mass was
based on an assumption that the half-life of uranium-233 was 120,000 years, when in
reality it is 159,000 years. W. C. Johnson pointed out to them that there was an initial
natural uranium impurity in the thorium that was loaded into the reactor of 0.05 parts
per million. Despite this incredibly tiny value, the amount of uranium-233 that had
formed in the thorium during its residence in the reactor was also incredibly tiny.
The result was that when all of the uranium, both the natural isotopes and the 233
isotope, was chemically extracted from the thorium, the natural uranium composed
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about 10% of the uranium in the sample. This was throwing off their calculations of
mass, half-life, and nearly every other nuclear property that they meant to measure.
As they factored this correction into their calculations, they came up with a new
half-life of 153,000 years for uranium-233, much closer to the actual value of 159,000
years. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.209)
By September 9th, a mass spectrographic analysis of the uranium extracted from
the thorium nailed down its relative proportions: uranium-233 was 85±1.5% of the
total uranium in the sample. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.232)
Seaborg took another trip to Montreal in late September 1944 to visit with the
Canadian ”Evergreen” group that was interested in uranium-233. They discussed
the proper chemical forms to produce uranium-233 in an X-10 type reactor and the
chemical processes that could be used to extract uranium, including a technique that
used fluorine as an extraction method.
On November 1st, 1944, sufficient work had been done on the measurements of the
cross-sections of uranium-233 to allow Seaborg to ponder some of their implications.
To the best of our knowledge, he was the first to realize the profound potential of
thorium as an energy source:
I reviewed recent results on the physical constants of U-233 it appears
that the fission cross section is about the same as for U-235 (550 barns);
the total neutron absorption is only around 620 barns, giving a favorably
small value for the parameter alpha (0.12). The number of neutrons per
fission is 1.07 times the U-235 value. The number of neutrons given off
per neutron absorbed is 1.13 times the U-235 value. These values are
within the range to enable U-233 to be made from thorium by a
chain reaction on the U-233 (i.e., to make breeding possible)—
extremely important because it may make it possible to be
independent of uranium once a supply of U-233 for starting
purposes is on hand. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.320)
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Figure 4.4: Glenn Seaborg’s diligent research of the properties of uranium-233 led to
the discovery that it had the capability of sustaining the nearly complete consumption
of thorium as an energy resource. This realization transformed thorium into perhaps
the world’s greatest practical energy resource. Photo courtesy of Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory.
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Starting with Seaborg’s first musings about thorium in 1940, and culminating with
the realization of this day, Seaborg had come to a conclusion of lasting importance,
whose ramifications echo even to the present day and likely far beyond. He had
discovered that thorium could be made into a fuel; he had discovered that fuel could
be made to fission, and now he had discovered something of surpassing importance
about that fuel, something that distinguished it from all others.
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Figure 4.5: Th-232 also absorbs slow neutrons to form uranium-233, which has a
more favorable branching ratio than plutonium-239 in the thermal spectrum.
Uranium-233 had a high propensity to fission when it was struck by thermal
neutrons, far more than plutonium-239. This difference is depicted by comparing
Figures 4.3 and 4.5. And after it fissioned, it gave off sufficient neutrons to continue
the chain reaction (which would require that one neutron find another fissile nucleus)
and to create new fuel (which would require that another neutron be absorbed in
thorium). There was even margin for the loss of neutrons from any sort of practical
reactor.
This was the first realization of the potential of a breeder reactor—a reactor that
could make as much, if not more, fuel than it consumed. A breeder reactor based on
thorium, which would later go on to dominate the thoughts of young Alvin Weinberg,
was born that day in the mind of Glenn Seaborg, as he studied the relative cross
section values of uranium-233 and realized that inexpensive, abundant thorium could
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be an essentially inexhaustible energy source. Seaborg is said to have remarked many
years later that this was a ”fifty-quadrillion-dollar discovery”. (Gofman (1994))

4.8

Xenon-135 and the Dramatic Hanford Startup

In the fall of 1944, the titanic construction effort that was taking place at the
Hanford site in the western deserts of Washington state was bearing its first fruit—the
completion of the first reactor, called the ”B-reactor”. Several other reactors were
also under construction and would soon follow B-reactor into operation. Uranium
slugs were first loaded into B-reactor on September 13, and on September 27, at a
few minutes after midnight, the reactor achieved criticality for the first time. Within
two hours, the B-reactor at Hanford was producing more thermal power than any
reactor before it ever had, and it still had a long way to go to reach its rated capacity.
Once again, Enrico Fermi was supervising the startup of B-reactor, just as he had
done at the first pile in Chicago nearly two years before. But B was an absolutely
huge reactor, intended to produce 500 megawatts of thermal power, over a billion
times more powerful than the pile in the squash court in Chicago, and hundreds of
times more powerful than the X-10 reactor at Oak Ridge.
Within three hours of startup, something unexpected happened to the B-reactor.
Its power level began to fall slightly. Reactor operators had made no change in the
controls, yet the power level of the reactor continued to fall. For hours the decline in
power continued, dropping faster and faster as time went on, until by six-thirty the
reactor had shut off completely. This strange behavior had never been observed in a
reactor before, and Fermi’s group had prided itself on how well they had predicted
the behavior of reactors in the past. On the B-reactor they had predicted the amount
of uranium needed to achieve criticality within 1%. What could possibly be going on
with the reactor?
A variety of hypotheses were put forward. Perhaps coolant tubes were leaking,
or something was coming off the fuel to ”poison” the reaction. But early Thursday
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morning, a little more than a day after the reactor had first been brought to power,
the counters showed that the reactivity of the core was increasing again. The reactor
slowly began to rise in power, just as inexplicably as it had lost power before, faster
and faster. By seven am on Thursday the reactor was at half-power, and twelve hours
later it had attained the same power rating it had achieved on the first startup. But
then it began to decline in power again, falling and falling until it shut down once
more.
This was the clue that the physicists needed to begin to deduce the problem.
Something was happening in the fission reaction that was causing the reactor to shut
down. Then, after it shut down, that same something was going away. Once it had
gone away, the reactor would start again, but the operation of the reactor must be
creating that same something yet again, which would lead to its shutdown. The most
logical conclusion was that there was a fission product—one of the scores of different
isotopes created in fission and decay—that was highly absorptive of neutrons. Yet
this same fission product must be radioactive as well, because its effect diminished
over time.
By Friday morning they had accumulated enough data on the rise and fall of power
in the reactor to make some educated guesses about this isotope and its properties.
From the rise of reactor power they deduced that it had a half-life of about nine
hours, and from the fall in reactivity they concluded that it must have a gargantual
appetite for neutrons—something vastly more absorptive than any isotope previously
encountered. The data was pointing to an isotope of the noble gas xenon, with a
mass number of 135. The neutron absorption cross section of xenon-135 relative to
uranium-235 is depicted in Figure 4.6.
To be sure, the group at Hanford enlisted the help of Walter Zinn’s reactor group
at Argonne. Using their heavy-water pile CP-3, they ran the reactor at high power
to see if they could duplicate the effect that was seen at the B-reactor at Hanford. It
didn’t take long, once they knew what to look for, and within twelve hours Zinn was
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135Xe

235U

thermal

Figure 4.6: The relative sizes of the thermal cross-sections of xenon-135 and
uranium-235. Xe-135, with a total thermal neutron absorption cross-section of 3.085
million barns, dwarfs U-235, with a total thermal absorption neutron cross-section of
630 barns, by a ratio of roughly 4900 to one.
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reporting back that he was highly confident that xenon-135 was the culprit behind
the strange behavior at Hanford.
To understand how xenon forms in a reactor, it is necessary to understand a
little more about the actual process of nuclear fission. Fission is the process whereby
a neutron strikes an atomic nucleus and causes it to split into two pieces. It is
tempting but erroneous to think that these two pieces are the same size, and the
reason why they are not is enlightening. Recall that the stability of the nucleus is a
constant struggle between the nuclear force, which tends to bind protons and neutrons
together, and the electromagnetic force, which is repelling protons from one another
and trying to rip the nucleus apart. This is why some atomic nuclei are radioactive—
they do not have a stable configuration of protons and neutrons to keep these forces
from changing them. In an atomic nucleus that is about to fission, the nuclear force
and the electromagnetic force are again fighting one another.
As the nucleus begins to pull apart in fission, the size of the smaller piece is
determined by the interplay between the two forces. A small piece, below about 10%
of the mass of the original, simply doesn’t form because the nuclear force is too strong
to let a piece that small be ejected by the electromagnetic force. The largest piece
that could form in fission would have 50% of the mass of the original nucleus, but in
real fission reactions that rarely happens, because the electromagnetic force rips the
two pieces apart before a fragment of that size can form. So what happens in reality
is that two pieces form, and that the smaller piece has about 35-44% of the mass of
the original. If the smaller piece is this size, then it stands to reason that the larger
piece is about 56-65% the size of the original nucleus, and that is indeed the case.
Real fission reactions—and there are many possible ways for a nucleus to fission—
result in two fission products whose mass follows a double-humped distribution, when
production is plotted by atomic mass. For the smaller fission product, the peak of the
hump is centered around zirconium on the periodic table, and for the larger fission
product, the peak is roughly centered around xenon.
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Figure 4.7: The mass distribution of products from the fission of uranium-235, with
mass number 135 highlighted for clarity. Xenon-135 was part of the radioactive decay
of this chain, and it had a tremendous propensity to absorb neutrons.
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The fission product distribution shows the creation of xenon-135 from fission and
subsequent decay is not a rare outcome—rather it is one of the most common. And
a fission fragment with 135 atomic masses is very close to the second peak of the
fission product distribution, as shown in Figure 4.7. So fission makes a relatively
large amount of fission products with mass number 135, and in the course of their
decay they pass through a stage where they become highly absorptive xenon-135.
This causes problems in the operation of nuclear reactors, as the team at Hanford
was discovering in late September 1944.
This discovery was conveyed to General Groves on October 3, and he was not
pleased. He had ordered the CP-3 reactor at Hanford run around the clock to detect
problems like this. Now they were showing up in the big plutonium production
reactor at Hanford—the reactor that really had to work for the Manhattan Project
to be successful. All of the other reactors had been but preludes to this moment, yet
fundamental problems were being discovered at Hanford instead of the test reactors.
By mid-October, researchers were generally satisfied that xenon-135 was indeed
the cause of the behavior of the Hanford reactor, and the issues associated with
startup were eventually resolved by loading more fuel into extra channels that had
been built into the design. This extra uranium increased the multiplication constant
sufficiently to overcome the effects of xenon poisoning, and allowed the B-reactor to
achieve full power by mid-December. As 1945 dawned, the Hanford reactors were
now producing plutonium through fission that would be chemically removed using
the steps that Seaborg and his Met Lab team had carefully worked out. After being
separated, it would be sent to Los Alamos to be fabricated into the first nuclear
explosive device.
There was another important lesson from the xenon scare at Hanford. Xenon was
a noble gas. It did not have any propensity to chemically bond to other materials.
In the solid fuel slugs that fed the Hanford reactors, it was trapped and could not
escape. But in a reactor that used liquid fuel, there was every reason to believe that
xenon would bubble out of the fuel mixture and be removed. Since all fission reactions
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created sizeable amounts of xenon-135, a fluid-fueled reactor could be a way to get
around the thorny problem of xenon in future designs.

4.9

The Plutonium-to-Uranium-233 Converter Reactor

In the fall of 1944, the mood of the scientists at the Metallurgical Laboratory in
Chicago was sour. There was great uncertainty about the value of the work they had
done, and some even went so far as to consider their efforts to develop plutonium
for nuclear weapons a failure. Plutonium-239 could not be produced at high purity
despite their best chemical efforts, and it was still unknown whether what could be
made was actually good enough for weapons use.
On October 10, Charles Cooper presented a discussion on ”New Goals for the
Metallurgical Project” where he pointed out the possibility that the Met Lab’s
primary responsibility might already be complete, and that there would be a need to
find a new role and responsibility for the talented group of researchers to pursue. He
summarized the current state of the project in less-than-enthusiastic terms:
By some two years of great effort under emergency conditions we have
arrived at a situation which may be summarized thus. A process has been
developed which very certainly will produce quantities of 49 [plutonium239] adequate for experimental purposes and probably sufficient to meet
situations immediately foreseen. The present process is very complicated
and unduly expensive, both as to manpower requirements and the
materials which are involved. The present approach is not adaptable
to generation of power nor is it designed to manufacture or
recover effectively possible byproducts of operation. The product
will be contaminated with undesired isotopes which could possibly be
eliminated if other methods, as yet only sketchily developed, were to be
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employed. We cannot be entirely certain until final trials have been made
that the product will be as useful as anticipated, and it may well develop
that other elements or isotopes will turn out in the end to be much more
useful than the one we have prepared to manufacture.
Cooper could see that the efforts of Wigner and others to build production reactors
had led them in a direction that was not compatible with the eventual goal of power
production from nuclear reactors. The central reason for this was because production
reactors viewed nuclear heating as an undesirable byproduct of reactor operation.
Their only goal was to produce fissile plutonium from natural uranium, not to produce
thermal power suitable for operating a power conversion system like a steam turbine.
To that end, the reactors at Hanford and at Oak Ridge simply threw thermal energy
away, putting it to no use at all. Nor was there any prospect of redesigning those
reactors to produce a useful form of thermal power. They were too large to be
pressurized, which at any rate would involve putting thick metal channels in them
that would absorb too many neutrons to allow criticality. They were doomed to
being low-pressure machines that could not raise steam or make electrical power.
They could only make plutonium.
A reactor that could make useful electrical power would be an attractive goal,
and Cooper pressed for that goal, which he thought ”poses a problem much more
difficult technically than the one which we have had to solve in connection with our
present manufacturing objectives.” Seaborg also noted that power reactors would
have additional problems in the areas of high temperatures, corrosion resistance,
the need for new materials and alloys for fuel fabrication, structural purposes, and
shielding. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.277-278)
A power-generating reactor would be a noble goal, but Eugene Wigner was still
as determined as ever to deliver useful fissile material to defeat the Nazis. Despite
his focus on that goal, his group was about to propose ideas that would one day lead
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to power-generating nuclear reactors, as well as advanced nuclear reactors using fluid
fuels.
It began with the proposal to design a new reactor that would consume the
plutonium that would be produced in fission, and use the neutrons from that fission to
convert thorium to uranium-233 that would be used in weapons. The reactor had the
potential to be cooled and moderated by normal (light) water, since the plutonium
would have a high fissile content (unlike natural uranium).
Weinberg described the proposed ”converter” reactor:
Wigner’s converter consisted of two concentric regions. In the central
region were a large number of parallel aluminum plates each containing
plutonium. Surrounding the central region was a ring of aluminum plates
each containing thorium. The entire array of plates was moderated and
cooled by swiftly flowing water. The chain reaction occurred in the central,
plutonium-containing region. About half of the neutrons produced by
fissioning plutonium leaked into the thorium and converted the thorium
into

233

U. (Weinberg, 1994, pg.38)

This reactor would take plutonium that would be produced by the Hanford
reactors and form it into solid-fuel elements. These would be immersed in ordinary
(light) water, which was a feasible moderator in this case because the plutonium
contained a high fraction of fissile material, unlike natural uranium. By surrounding
the plutonium fuel elements with thorium, uranium-233 would be generated which
could be chemically extracted and hopefully incorporated into the wartime effort.
This general direction was sustained in a November 22 meeting that Seaborg
attended:
Compton asked that those present consider whether the work from here on
should continue to be organized around the immediate future or whether
some other objective should be followed. In the discussion of possible
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objectives that followed, Jeffries pointed out that the objective of
Chicago has been achieved only in part since plutonium does
not have all the desirable properties that had been anticipated.
The same apparently holds for U-235. Perhaps, then, the only
way to provide adequate insurance that the objective really be
achieved would be to be ready to convert Pu-239 over to U-233.
This could provide a clear-cut objective. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.352)
The theory of a plutonium-uranium-233 converter reactor was much more
straightforward than a production reactor that had to operate on natural uranium
since the fissile content of plutonium was hundreds of times greater than natural
uranium, but the bulk of the problem fell on Seaborg’s chemical research group. In
this respect the ”fuel” of the proposed converter reactor was vastly more expensive
than the natural uranium used to fuel Hanford. They would not be able to afford
to waste it as they were at Hanford. They would have to figure out how to dissolve
the solid plutonium fuel elements, separate plutonium from fission products, and
reconstitute new plutonium fuel elements, all the while minimizing the loss of valuable
plutonium at each step. Laying out the core design of the reactor with plutonium
and thorium (Wigner’s task) was doable; figuring out the nearly-perfect chemical
processing scheme (Seaborg’s task) was nearly impossible.
Despite the challenges, a reactor development task of significance was seen as
something that would be necessary to hold the Met Lab team together for the
months until the war was won. The Met Lab’s report for November 1944 stated
in its summary:
It is assumed that by June 30, 1945, the purpose for which this Laboratory
was established—namely, that of aiding the Hanford Engineering Works
to establish production—will have been fulfilled. The work from now
until June 30, will be divided into three parts...during all this time
a competent staff of personnel must be maintained which is qualified
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and willing at a moment’s notice to devote its entire attention to any
unforeseen problems which may arise at the Hanford Engineer Works or
Y. To maintain such a staff intact with a sufficient degree of
morale, it is necessary that they work on some forward-thinking
problem. Most promising of the problems at the present time
seems to be in the field of (1) ’converter’ piles and ’breeder’
piles... (Seaborg, 1979, pg.368-369)
On December 19, the leadership group over Seaborg’s work met and considered the
probability that the converter pile could be made to work effectively. They knew that
only 7 times out of 10 would plutonium-239 fission with thermal neutrons, so there was
a built-in 30% loss of fuel from the outset. From there, things got progressively worse
depending on the frequency at which the fuel elements would need to be processed
and the anticipated loss of plutonium material at each step of processing. Processing
recovery factors of 100% (perfect recovery) down to 90% were considered, and the
overall results were very poor. Essentially, a chemical process would be needed that
achieved a 99.9% recovery factor, and Seaborg said ”an efficiency of 99.9% for
a decontamination by a factor of some 107 followed by refabrication of
an aluminum sandwich is totally impossible by any known process and
probably also by any conceivable process.” (Seaborg, 1979, pg.406)
The problem that Seaborg was describing was not unique to the converter reactor
that they were attempting to design. In fact, it is a problem that persists in every
nuclear reactor design to this day, particularly those that would attempt to recycle
plutonium fuel in a thermal-spectrum reactor. Every single time the solid fuel is
dissolved, there are inevitable losses of fissile material, and every single time the
liquefied fuel is refabricated, there are more losses. It would be analogous to going to
a currency exchange that takes some fraction of your money each time you convert
from one currency to another. The percentage might seem low, but given frequent
conversions, a large fraction of the value of your money can quickly be lost.
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Seaborg put forward some hope for the bleak situation in the form of a reactor that
used liquid fuel. This was not the first time such a reactor had been considered—in
fact, it had been considered off and on for many months by the reactor design team at
the Met Lab—but in this scenario it was being put forward as a potential solution to
the fundamental issue of material losses each time solid fuel was converted to liquid
for processing and separation, and then converted back again.
I also mention, as an alternative possibility, a homogeneous reactor with
ordinary water that would require a minimum of decontamination (only
to remove fission product poisons) and would avoid the hold-up due to
fuel fabrication operations; however, little is known about this approach,
and hence this could require the most research work.
At a meeting the next day, Wigner was disappointed but unsurprised to find
out that a solid-fueled plutonium-uranium-233 converter reactor would have very
low yields due to losses in chemical transitions. As the meeting progressed, the
group generally began to believe that a converter reactor based on fluid fuel, with a
reasonable approach to chemical processing, could produce fissile uranium-233 with
a 50% yield, and that they should orient their efforts around making a case for this
reactor to project leadership in an upcoming meeting. If they were able to obtain a
go-ahead, then it would give the Met Lab a new goal and a new focus, and would put
them back in the business of directly contributing to the war effort.
A 50% yield was a disappointing objective however. The notion that plutonium
would be produced at extraordinary cost from the Hanford reactors, only to be
immediately introduced into yet another reactor where it would be consumed to
generate uranium-233, was not a satisfying prospect. It added more layers, more
costs, and more time to a project that was already struggling to meet its overall goal.
As 1944 ended, Seaborg reported that the main effort of the Met Lab had been
to prepare ”a report to the Project Office on the feasibility of a conversion of 49
[plutonium-239] into 23 [uranium-233] as a war-time insurance measure;” and the
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”preparation of a report to the Project Office making recommendations for a research
and development program for the Laboratory from June 30, 1945, to the end of the
war.” (Seaborg, 1979, pg.430-431)
On January 3, 1945, Seaborg noted another problem with the idea of a converter
reactor:
A further problem, not solvable by chemical processes, I went on, is that
for every 140 grams of Pu-239 present there are 40 g of Pu-240 formed in
addition to 100 g of fission products. If Pu-240 will not fission with slow
neutrons, the result will be that in successive decontaminations the dead
isotope will be carried along, taking up valuable space, and contributing
nothing.
This issue continues to be a problem for thermal-spectrum reactors that intend to
use recycled plutonium as a fuel.
Stacking up, one by one, each of these issues contributed to the eventual cessation
of effort on the development of a plutonium-uranium-233 converter reactor. On
January 15, Seaborg records:
Compton wrote to Stearns to thank him for sending the report on the
feasibility of the 23 converter pile. The matter has been placed in the
hands of the Army with the statement that further active steps along this
line will await a request from them. Compton also mentioned that in
discussing the problem with Colonel Nichols, the impression has
been gained that it is unlikely that we shall receive a request to
proceed further with the 23 converter pile. Nichols has expressed
himself, however, as actively interested in a research and development
program that would lead to the more efficient use of uranium and thorium
in producing a useful product. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.453)
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Although Wigner’s notion of a solid-fueled plutonium-uranium-233 converter
reactor came to an end after only a few months of examination, Alvin Weinberg
noted that it had far-reaching implications for the future of nuclear energy:
Wigner’s converter was never taken much beyond rough conceptual
design, but in a way it has had enormous influence on the development
of nuclear energy.

For this was the first detailed description of a

heterogeneous, plate-type, highly enriched reactor, cooled and moderated
by water...most research reactors, almost all naval reactors, and
most commercial nuclear reactors have been water-moderated
and cooled, more or less along the lines of Wigner’s converter. (Weinberg, 1994, pg.38)
Although Wigner’s converter reactor was never built, it still represented a great
leap forward in reactor development. It is worth considering that the pressurizedwater, uranium-fueled reactors that dominate nuclear energy around the world today
did not evolve from the gas-cooled X-10 reactor at Oak Ridge, nor did they evolve
from the huge graphite-moderated, water-cooled reactors at Hanford. They evolved
from Wigner’s efforts to convert plutonium-239 into uranium-233 in the fall and winter
of 1944.

4.10

Uranium-232, the Fatal Flaw for Weapons

On December 28, 1944, Seaborg completed a ten-page report entitled ”Conversion
of Pu-239 to U-233” and sent it to project leadership. He gave a more detailed
description of the problems that any converter reactor would face as it attempted
to consume plutonium-239 to generate uranium-233. But for the first time it also
detailed a much more insidious problem that would eventually close the book on the
practical consideration of uranium-233 as a material for nuclear weapons.
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Seaborg was acutely aware of the problems that had been caused by the
Manhattan Project’s failure to appreciate the real behavior of plutonium-239 in
reactors. It didn’t always fission, and when it did not fission it formed plutonium240 which had a significant probability of spontaneous fission. Spontaneous fission
produced neutrons that could cause a nuclear weapon to pre-detonate, and it made
plutonium unsuitable for use in the simple ”gun-type” weapon that was the baseline
design of the Manhattan Project.
If uranium-233 was to be considered as a material for weapons, Seaborg did not
want a repeat of the issues with plutonium, and he was on the hunt for other sidereactions that might also cause trouble. U-233 was much more likely to fission than
plutonium-239, with only one reaction in ten leading to the formation of uranium-234.
Uranium-234 was not nearly the problem that plutonium-240 was, but uranium-233
had a different problem. In the production techniques they envisioned, there were
several different ways that a new isotope, uranium-232, could form. Uranium-232 had
a relatively short half life (less than 70 years) and its rapid decay would produce a
background of alpha particles.
Uranium-232 formed in several different ways. One of them was when uranium233 was struck by a high-energy neutron. Sometimes rather than fissioning it knocked
loose a neutron in addition to the one that struck it. This caused uranium-233 to
turn directly into uranium-232, depicted in Figure 4.8. This process required highenergy neutrons,† but each fission neutron begins its existence with a great deal of
kinetic energy (before it is moderated) and so this process is possible in either fast or
thermal-spectrum reactors.
Another was the uranium-232 that formed when protactinium-231 absorbed a
neutron, depicted in Figure 4.9. High purity thorium could minimize the presence of
Pa-231, but it couldn’t be eliminated because there were two ways in which it could
be formed in thorium itself.
†

In the reactions depicted in the graphics, fast neutron reactions are indicated by n∗ (such as
n , 2n) while thermal neutron reactions are simply indicated by n (such as n, γ). Cross-sections for
fast-neutron reactions are generally very small, measured in millibarns (mb) rather than barns (b).
∗
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Figure 4.8: Formation of uranium-232 from fast neutrons on uranium-233
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Figure 4.9: Formation of uranium-232 from neutron absorption in protactinium-231
followed by decay.
One of them was when the rare but natural isotope thorium-230 (also sometimes
called ”ionium”) would absorb a neutron, forming Pa-231 which absorbed another
neutron to form U-232, depicted in Figure 4.10. Th-230 was a natural decay product
of abundant uranium-238 and was chemically identical to thorium-232, so any thorium
deposit that was found near uranium (which was common) tended to pick some up.
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Figure 4.10: Formation of uranium-232 from multiple neutron absorptions and
decays, starting with thorium-230.
Another formation process came from thorium-232 itself, depicted in Figure 4.11.
Sometimes when it was struck by a high-energy neutron it also kicked out a neutron
in addition to the one that struck it, forming Th-231 which rapidly decayed to Pa-231.
Then the Pa-231 absorbed another neutron and formed U-232.
These three formation pathways (Figures 4.8, 4.10, 4.11) made it extremely
difficult to make uranium-233 that was completely free of uranium-232 contamination,
and Seaborg was determined to raise these issues as early as possible with project
leadership. Describing his memo, he said:
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Figure 4.11: Formation of uranium-232 from multiple neutron absorptions and
decays, starting with thorium-232.
I begin by revealing the complications that will be introduced
by the nuclear side-reactions in relation to the problem of final
chemical purification of U-233. I point out that if care is not taken
to control small amounts of heavy isotope impurities, the final material
may have the same limitations as the material (plutonium)
whose deficiencies are being remedied. At the time the material
is worked up the thorium will contain elements 90, 91, 92, and in some
cases, 93 and 94. In addition to U-233, there will be produced as relatively
stable long-lived isotopes, Pa-231, U-232, U-234, and, in the case where 94
is present, U-235, Pu-239, Pu-240, and Pu-241. Of particular concern
is the presence of U-232 that has four short-lived (hence longrange) alpha-particle decay products, which means that the
problem of purifying the material from light element impurities
assumes importance again as it originally did in the case of Pu239. There is also the yet unanswered question of spontaneous fission in
U-232 or one of its daughters. All of these factors make it seem extremely
important that the factor of possible fast neutron reaction (the source of
U-232) in the thorium mass be minimized, including the possible necessity
of processing the thorium at shorter intervals than other considerations
might dictate. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.426-427)
Seaborg then described the prospects that he saw for success in a converter reactor.
He estimated that it would take 100 men and at least 6 months to develop a process
that could achieve 98% recovery of plutonium and thus 50% conversion efficiency of
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plutonium-239 to uranium-233. Such resources were not forthcoming in the Met Lab
as currently constituted. After detailing the formation pathways for uranium-232, he
issued a negative view on the value of proceeding with such an effort:
U-232 has a short half-life (approximately 50 years) giving off alpha rays
and producing decay elements which fit into the natural thorium decay
series. This series includes several short-lived alpha-emitters. Among
these alpha-emitters is ThC’ which gives off alpha-rays of exceedingly high
energy. This fact introduces complications, in that the tolerance limits
for some of the lighter elements may have to be made more exacting
for the ultimate use. U-233 appears to be better than Pu-239
and purification from light elements would seem to be less
exacting by a factor of ten or so.

However, this advantage

may be completely nullified and, in fact, the situation may be
worse if appreciable amounts of U-232 are present in the U233. The possibility of high spontaneous fission rates for U-232 and its
decay products must also be taken into account. These possibilities must
be considered in designing piles for converting plutonium into U-233. It
seems likely that the formation of U-232 can be sufficiently minimized by
placing the thorium only at the outside of the pile where there are no
fast neutrons and by reducing the length of exposure before the U-233 is
extracted from the thorium.” (Seaborg, 1979, pg.429)
Plutonium-239 had been a disappointment to the Met Lab chemical researchers
because of its propensity to form plutonium-240. But given the formation of uranium232 in converter reactors, Seaborg was of the opinion that uranium-233 might be an
even worse material for nuclear weapons. He was right, and Alvin Weinberg recalled
that Seaborg’s foresight probably saved a great deal of otherwise wasted time and
effort:
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At the time, however, there was no assurance that the implosion would
work; and if it didn’t work, the whole Chicago project was a failure! What
to do, what to do? Arthur Compton convened a staff meeting to discuss
possible ways to retrieve the situation.
by Wigner. He proposed that the

240

Pu-contaminated plutonium from

W be converted into the fissile isotope
reactor.”

233

233

U in a special ”converter

U is produced from thorium-232 when the latter absorbs

a neutron, much as
233

The meeting was dominated

239

Pu is produced when

238

U absorbs a neutron.

U is fissile, and could possibly be used in a bomb with little chance

of predetonation.

(Glenn Seaborg, however, pointed out that

233

U manufactured in Wigner’s converter was contaminated with

232

U, which probably fissioned spontaneously and also emitted

many alpha particles. A bomb made of

233
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have to be carefully cleansed of any tramp light elements such
as beryllium, since alpha particles interacting with beryllium
would produce neutrons; and if spontaneous fission of
sufficiently probable, the

233

232
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U gun-type weapon was unworkable.

I was greatly impressed by Glenn’s insight into this difficulty, since at the
time little was known about either

233

U or

232

U.) (Weinberg, 1994, pg.37-

38)
By the spring of 1945, serious consideration of uranium-233 as a material for
nuclear weapons had essentially come to an end. It was much more difficult to make
a unit of uranium-233 than plutonium-239, and the uranium-233 was contaminated
with uranium-232 that could not be separated chemically from uranium-233, much
like plutonium-239 was contaminated with plutonium-240. The chemists and reactor
designers of the Met Lab were far more excited about the prospects of using uranium233 in a breeder reactor.
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4.11

Fluid-Fueled Thorium Breeder Reactors

On January 17, 1945, within two days of his decision to stop working on the
plutonium-uranium-233 converter, Arthur Compton and Colonel Nichols were speaking optimistically about the prospect of turning the attention of the Met Lab to
thorium breeder reactors instead. Seaborg notes:
With regard to [research and development], Compton said that he was
interested to find that three different laboratories have proposed breeder
piles for U-233. He stated that while we have not been authorized to carry
out the program activities as proposed, the indications are that the level
of support will be relatively constant and we will have a wide range for
making decisions about their priority.
Compton reported on a discussion with [Colonel] Nichols at Clinton on
the possibilities of a U-233 converter, based on the report prepared early
this month which describes the feasibility of such a converter. Compton
said that he told Nichols we prefer the breeder, whereupon Nichols said
he thinks it is more important that we go ahead on the [thorium-U-233]
breeder than on the [plutonium-uranium-233] converter and to lay our
plans along this line. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.457)
Chemistry Division director Farrington Daniels had solicited ideas about ”breeder”
reactors, and the consensus was emerging of a reactor that would be fueled by a
solution of a uranium compound dissolved in heavy water. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.488)
This would eliminate the considerable difficulty of fabricating solid fueled elements
and dissolving them to remove fission products.

Several uranium compounds

appeared suitable for dissolution in water, mostly notably uranium nitrate and
uranium sulfate. Some of Seaborg’s chemist colleagues, particularly Davidson and
Katzin, pointed out the challenges that could be expected in a ”homogeneous” reactor
with fuel dissolved in water. One of them would be the formation of hydrogen and
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oxygen gas as radiation split apart the water molecule. Unless the hydrogen and
oxygen was ”recombined” back into water, it might form an explosive gaseous mixture
somewhere in the reactor. Another challenge was the chemical stability of nitrate
compounds. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.492) This seemed to favor using sulfates rather than
nitrates, but much of the chemical processing techniques were based on the use of
nitrates. A chemical shift from sulfate to nitrate might be necessary to process the
fuel regularly, and that would be undesirable.
Seaborg noted in his summary of the activities of the Met Lab for February 1945
that (Seaborg, 1979, pg.518)
...most of the research and development work of the Laboratory is
exploratory work in connection with breeder piles.

Consideration is

being given to the homogeneous thermal breeder and the heterogeneous
resonance and high energy breeder type of pile.
Alvin Weinberg and Eugene Wigner were also looking at the ”aqueous homogeneous” reactor concept, but considering it more from the neutronic angle rather than
the chemical perspective of Seaborg’s group. They recognized that for each absorption
of a neutron in uranium-233, it would produce more than 2 neutrons. This was the
key to its ability to operate as a breeder reactor. But how much more than two?
It mattered because it gave them a sense of the ”margin” they might enjoy in an
actual, practical reactor. How many neutrons could they afford to lose to xenon, or
to neutron absorption in other fission products? How much would be lost to leakage?
The answer to that question would have a great deal to do with the minimum size
such a reactor could assume.
Weinberg and Wigner knew that a small fraction of the neutrons from fission were
delayed. In a reactor with circulating fuel, some of these would be emitted outside
of the core. With uranium-233 as the fuel, there was also a different grouping and
number of delayed neutrons than in uranium-235. And although uranium-233 had
better performance in a thermal reactor than uranium-235 or plutonium-239, about
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10% of the time it would simply absorb a neutron too, forming uranium-234. Was
uranium-234 fissile, or would it simply absorb neutrons? How much fissile material
would be lost in chemical processing?
Each of these questions needed answers if a realistic aqueous homogeneous
”breeder” reactor was to be built, and in many cases Weinberg and Wigner could
do little more than pose the question and frame the experiments that would need to
be done to find the answer. Each one of these mechanisms of neutron loss would eat
away at the ”margin” that uranium-233 had as a breeder fuel, and for an organization
obsessed with producing and increasing the supply of separated fissile material, these
were very important questions.
Weinberg and Wigner made the first detailed description of their aqueous
homogeneous thorium breeder reactor ideas in an internal report titled ”Preliminary
Calculations on a Breeder with Circulating Fuel,” issued in Chicago on May 17,
1945. (Weinberg, 1994, pg.116) In the paper, they painstakingly calculated, to the
best of their knowledge and computational abilities at the time, the neutronic losses
that such a reactor design would undergo, and concluded that they were confident
that the losses could be held within the ”margin” of neutrons that their breeder design
would allow.
While it appeared that an aqueous thorium breeder might be possible and feasible,
it was fairly clear that such a reactor would only breed enough new fissile U-233 to
make up for the amount consumed. It would not be a ”net” breeder, producting
significantly more fissile but rather an ”isobreeder”, producing just enough for its
needs. In such a design the reactor would be able to consume thorium at high
efficiency, but the fissile material that started the reactor would have to come from
somewhere else. The search was still on for a breeder reactor that would have
significant breeding gain, in other words, would produce substantially more fissile
material than it consumed.
There was also the issue of relative value of uranium-233 versus plutonium-239.
Interest in U-233 for weapons had dropped off considerably from the excitement of just
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Figure 4.12: A recent adaptation of the thorium breeder reactor concept described
in the Wigner-Weinberg report of May 17, 1945. The original caption states: ”The
degassing method is only illustrative.”
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a few months before. But would the impure plutonium that Hanford was producing
be suitable for the first nuclear weapons? Few at the Met Lab in Chicago had insight
into what was going on at Los Alamos that would conclusively answer that question.
Even if a thorium breeder reactor would not have significant breeding gain, its
feasibility transformed the potential value of natural thorium from worthless to
potentially the planet’s greatest natural energy source. General Groves realized this
could have profound geopolitical consequences. To that end, he directed that the
entire supply of uranium-233 that the Met Lab had generated and separated be sent to
Argonne for experiments to conclusively determine how many neutrons were produced
in fission from each neutron absorbed in U-233. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.556) In late March,
the Met Lab sent 60 milligrams to Argonne for further testing. Within a few days
General Groves demanded to know why they had not sent the entire 100 milligrams
in their possession for testing, and they scrambled to placate him. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.556) Groves was insistent that that ”eta”, the Greek letter that the physicists had
chosen to denote the number of neutrons produced in fission per neutron absorbed,
be known to high accuracy for uranium-233. If eta was greater than two, a breeder
was theoretically possible. If it was modestly greater than two, such as 2.3 to 2.5,
then a practical breeder was possible from an engineering perspective. It was very
important to know the value of eta for uranium-233.
Seaborg and his team realized that they could get more U-233 to Argonne for
measurement if they processed more of the thorium carbonate cans that had been
exposed in the X-10 reactor at Oak Ridge. To that end, they entered into a ”massproduction” effort culminating in a total of 200 milligrams of U-233 that they made
available for analysis by April 12. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.580) Their success came just
as they received disheartening news: President Roosevelt had died in Warm Springs,
Georgia.
Using the 200 mg of U-233 from the Met Lab, the value for eta for U-233 was
reported to General Groves on April 17 as being 2.35. A thermal breeder reactor
using thorium, started by U-233, was possible. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.586) By June 27,
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all data relating to the eta of U-233 was deemed ”top secret”. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.79)
Only the United States would possess the knowledge that uranium-233 could, for all
practical purposes, ”catalyze” energy release from a supply of thorium indefinitely.
For Alvin Weinberg, his time at the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago had come
to an end. On a hot May weekend in 1945, Weinberg, his wife Marge and 2-year-old
son David, boarded a train for Knoxville and from there on to the secret city of Oak
Ridge, Tennessee, where Weinberg would spend the rest of his life, until his death in
2006. (Weinberg, 1994, pg.45-46)
Weinberg viewed his move from Chicago to Oak Ridge not as the end of his
work on fluid-fueled thorium reactors, but rather as the beginning. He described his
migration to Oak Ridge in these terms: (Weinberg, 1994, pg.116-117)
The aqueous homogeneous circulating-fuel power breeder based on the
232

Th-233 U cycle became a kind of obsession for me. I came to Oak

Ridge convinced that the laboratory, with its many chemists and chemical
engineers, was the ideal place to develop Wigner’s aqueous homogeneous
power breeder.
Indeed, in the years to come after the war, Weinberg would supervise the successful
construction and operation of two aqueous homogeneous reactors, intended to lead to
thermal-spectrum thorium breeder reactors. He would also oversee the development,
construction, and operation of two molten-salt reactors, another fluid-fueled reactor
that overcame many of the limitations of the aqueous homogeneous reactor, and which
many consider to be the ideal implementation of the thorium breeder reactor.
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Chapter 5
Ending the War with Nuclear
Weapons
5.1

Technical Triumph at Trinity

By design, General Groves had structured the Manhattan Project so that information
did not flow readily from one part of the project to the others. He and a few
others kept the larger view of their objectives closely guarded. For this reason, the
Metallurgical Laboratory group in Chicago only had snippets of information about
what was going on at Los Alamos amongst the group of researchers who were receiving
the plutonium from Hanford and trying to make it into a workable nuclear device.
As had been previously mentioned, there was a feeling among some of the Chicago
Met Lab team that their efforts had been a failure. Despite their attempts to provide
pure plutonium to the group at Los Alamos, they discovered that the plutonium
was contaminated with an undesirable isotope—plutonium-240—that might make it
unusable. They had worked to design a reactor to convert plutonium to uranium233 only to discover that they could not build a solid-fueled reactor that would be
sufficiently effective for this task. Furthermore, they discovered that any uranium-233
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they might make would be contaminated with uranium-232, and would likely be an
even worse material for a nuclear weapon than the plutonium from Hanford.
All of these setbacks make what was accomplished at Los Alamos all the more
remarkable. Quietly and with tremendous determination, they had developed an
entirely new approach to a nuclear weapon based on the technique of implosion,
and throughout the winter of 1944 and 1945 they had been systematically testing
the implosion technique. If it could work, it would be a much more effective use of
plutonium than the previous idea for a gun-type bomb. Because of its efficiency it
would require far less fissile material for a given explosive yield. It would also work
even with the plutonium contaminated by plutonium-240. But it was a technologically
difficult challenge, and there was no fallback position if it failed.

Without the

development of implosion technology all of the efforts of Fermi, Wigner, Seaborg,
and their teams would have been for naught.
At the center of Los Alamos was J. Robert Oppenheimer, who effected a sweeping
reorganization of the lab in the summer of 1944 to focus on the scientific issues
associated with developing practical weapons. To lead efforts on implosion he chose
Robert Bacher and George Kistiakowsky. (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962, pg.311) For
implosion to work, the secret would be shaped high-explosive charge, called ”explosive
lenses” which had to detonate at precisely the same time, forcing the plutonium ”pit”
inside them to be compressed tremendously and quickly. Supercritical multiplication
of the neutrons in the pit would cause it to explode like nothing the world had ever
seen.
To test the implosion technique, Bacher’s team used radioactive lanthanum-140
that had been produced in the X-10 graphite reactor and shipped to Los Alamos by
truck. Since the La-140 only had a half-life of 40 hours, it was imperative that it
be produced, separated, and transported quickly for use. La-140 decayed to stable
cerium-140 and did not pose any long-term radiohazard, but while it was present it
emitted high-energy gamma rays. By placing radioactive lanthanum in the center of
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devices meant to test the implosion principle, various configurations could be tested
and assessed.
The first preliminary tests were conducted in the summer of 1944 but it wasn’t
until December 14 that one of Bacher’s group leaders, Bruno Rossi, saw definite
evidence of successful implosion. Time was running out and General Groves was
getting very nervous about the prospects for the entire reactor-plutonium-implosion
branch of the Manhattan Project.

The effort connected with uranium isotope

separation and a gun-type bomb seemed far more likely to succeed, but it came with
a different cost. The gun-type bomb required roughly ten times the fissile material
that the implosion-type bomb needed for the same explosive yield. Nevertheless,
Groves committed the entire output of highly-enriched uranium, worth nearly a billion
dollars, to the gun-type weapon design.
Further implosion tests in early 1945 were promising, and the arrival of Samuel
Allison from the Metallurgical Lab in Chicago sped and focused the work at Los
Alamos. Soon there was a focus on having an implosion device ready for test with
real plutonium by July 4. It would be called ”Project Trinity” and it would be
the world’s first nuclear detonation. The decision to use precious plutonium in a
test was controversial. Some thought that all material should be committed to an
actual wartime weapon, but Oppenheimer and most of his division considered the test
essential. They felt that the step from theory to reality was too great to risk without
a test first, and that the prospect of dropping a plutonium weapon on enemy territory
that failed to detonate would give the enemy the chance to collect the plutonium and
make their own weapon, without going to the trouble of building expensive production
reactors and chemical purification facilities.
The test site for Project Trinity was the Jornada del Muerto (Journey of Death)
Valley in the northwest corner of the Alamogordo Bombing Range about 100 miles
south of Albuquerque, New Mexico.
On February 5, 1945, the first delivery of plutonium to Los Alamos from Hanford
was made, and the second plutonium-producing reactor (D-reactor) reached its rated
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power level. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.488) On February 16, the third Hanford plutonium
production reactor (F-reactor) was charged with uranium slugs, (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.501) and achieved criticality on February 25. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.515) On March
9, F-reactor also reached its rated power level. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.534) These two
reactors and the original B-reactor would produce the plutonium used in the Trinity
test and later in the weapon used on Nagasaki.
Fabricating the plutonium nitrate that was delivered from Hanford into plutonium
metal for the weapons was challenging. Plutonium was very toxic and great care
had to be taken against inhalation. It also had a bewildering number of different
metallic states, each with a different density and varying properties. By April 1945 the
prospects for successful implosion continued to improve as the radioactive lanthanum
experiments continued.
One of the final prepartions for the Project Trinity test came on May 7, when
Kenneth Bainbridge’s task force detonated 100 tons of high explosive on a tower
similar to the one that would be used for the actual weapon test. The explosives were
spiked with 1000 curies of fission products from Hanford. The explosion was seen
sixty miles away.
General Groves had ordered a bit of insurance against failure in the Trinity test
by having a giant steel canister called ”Jumbo” constructed that would be fitted
around the weapon. If the high explosives detonated but failed to trigger the nuclear
detonation, then it was thought that Jumbo would contain the fragments of the device
and allow the valuable plutonium to be recovered. If the test was successful, however,
Jumbo would be incinerated.
As the July 4 test date drew closer, it was clear that the date would slip, first to
July 13, and then to July 16. On the morning of July 16, very early, a crucial weather
report indicated that the test could proceed. Scientists, engineers, and military
officials were watching the test from a site about five miles away. A twenty-minute
countdown began, and at 5:29am the nuclear device exploded with an explosive
equivalent of about 20 kilotons of TNT. The scientists had become confident that
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Jumbo would not be needed, and had it installed on a tower 800 yards away from the
tower that held the device, nicknamed ”the Gadget”. The explosive force destroyed
Jumbo’s tower, but Jumbo survived.
The explosive shock wave took 40 seconds to reach the observers five miles away
and was ultimately felt for a hundred miles. Oppenheimer later said that as he
watched the test he was reminded of a Hindu scripture, ”Now I am become Death,
the destroyer of worlds.”
The next day, Tuesday, July 17, the Chicago Sun dutifully reported the cover
story issued by the Army on page 3 of their newspaper:
SHELL DUMP EXPLODES
Alamogordo, New Mexico, July 16 - (UP) - A magazine containing high
explosives, gas and other shells blew up at the Army base here today with a
pyrotechnic display visible 200 miles away. No one was injured. (Seaborg,
1980, pg.112)
The remoteness of the Jornada del Muerto Valley had successfully hidden
America’s secret. Implosion had worked. Through incredible work and determination,
Los Alamos had rescued the efforts of Hanford and the Met Lab in Chicago and now
stood ready to deliver a nuclear weapon based on plutonium to the Japanese.

5.2

Scientists Concerns about Nuclear Energy

For many months, the scientists and engineers of the Met Lab had been worrying
about how the world would respond to the first use of a nuclear weapon.
Leo Szilard, the original worrier who had drafted the letter to President Roosevelt
that he had convinced Albert Einstein to sign, was ahead of the rest in his list of
concerns for a future world with nuclear weapons. In an afternoon meeting on March
10, 1945, Seaborg recorded:
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Szilard spoke about his concern that the first bomb that we detonate
may start a race in atomic armaments between us and other nations, in
particular, Russia. He believes that for the safety of this nation it is
necessary for us, within the next couple of years, to produce ten times as
much fissionable material as is now planned (i.e., ten tons instead of one
ton) in order to insure an agreement with Russia to prevent its future use
in war. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.536)
A few days later, Szilard prepared a draft memorandum where he proposed that
the United States produce ”ten tons of heavy elements within the next few years” in
order to convince the Russians that they would have no hope of catching up to US
technology in this area. He believed that by convincing the Russians of overwhelming
US superiority that they would agree to a system of international control on the
manufacture of ”heavy elements” anywhere in the world. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.536537) Farrington Daniels, an advocate for high-temperature, gas-cooled, pebble-bed
reactors, agreed with Szilard and called for substantial expansion of fissile production
capability. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.537)
On May 29, James Nickson, an M.D. with the Met Lab who was part of the Met
Lab’s Committee of Social and Political Implications, wrote a memo to his section
chief, Leon Jacobson, in which he stated:
Therefore it seems to me that one of the most important functions at hand
is the education of the general public to the fact that the era of atomic
power is at hand. Further, the implications of this fact must become
general knowledge. If the public, as a whole, is not entirely conversant
with the broad implications of the field of nuclear physics, it seems
reasonably certain that the public will not accept any organization which
attempts to take into account the implications of these facts. (Seaborg,
1980, pg.38)
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Seaborg was also a member of this committee, and on June 6 he asked the opinions
of the men in his group about possible alternatives in the use of the bomb.
(1) not use the weapon in this war but simply announce at the end of the
war that we have it; (2) tell the world immediately that we have it and
give a demonstration at which representatives of all countries, including
Japan, are invited to see it; (3) make bombs as fast as possible and use
them on Japan. I added that the committee’s opinion is to follow the
second procedure.
In the discussion which followed, one man said he would like to see no. 3
used on the basis that we should treat it as just another weapon. I asked
if there was not a certain moral aspect that we must consider. If we are
the first to use the weapon and then want to build up a world
organization that would never allow its use again, our position
would be very much weakened. I also mentioned that it might be
important to give a demonstration from the point of view of keeping our
allies’ good will; this would be particularly important in the case of Russia
who is our most likely future antagonist in view of Russia’s great future
potentialities as an industrial power.
The division of opinion of the people present was mostly between
the possibilities of no.

2 and no.

3.

Most people agreed that a

strong international organization is necessary but that some precaution
must be taken to prevent capturing the whole available supply of
fissionable material by that organization. Some expressed pessimism to
the possibility of forming a sufficiently strong organization to control
the problem, but everyone agreed that it was essential to make the
effort. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.51-52)
Their committee issued a report on June 11, and its summary stated:
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The development of nuclear power not only constitutes an important
addition to the technological and military power of the United States
but also creates grave political and economic problems for the future of
this country.
Nuclear bombs cannot possibly remain a ”secret weapon” at the
exclusive disposal of this country for more than a few years. The
scientific facts on which their construction is based are well known to
scientists of other countries. Unless an effective international control of
nuclear explosives is instituted, a race for nuclear armaments is certain to
ensue following the first revelation of our possession of nuclear weapons
to the world. Within ten years other countries may have bombs, each
of which, weighing less than a ton, could destroy an urban area of more
than ten square miles. In the war to such an armaments race is likely to
lead, the United States, with its agglomeration of population and industry
in comparatively few metropolitan districts, will be at a disadvantage
compared to nations whose population and industry are scattered over
large areas.
We believe that these considerations make the use of nuclear
bombs for an early unannounced attack on Japan inadvisable.
If the United States were to be the first to release this new means
of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, she would sacrifice public
support throughout the world, precipitate the race for armaments, and
prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the
future control of such weapons.
Much more favorable conditions for the eventual achievement of such an
agreement could be created if nuclear bombs were first revealed to the
world by a demonstration in an appropriately selected uninhabited area.
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In case chances for the establishment of an effective international control of
nuclear weapons should have to be considered slight at the present time,
then not only the use of these weapons against Japan, but even their
early demonstration, may be contrary to the interests of this country. A
postponement of such a demonstration will have in this case the advantage
of delaying the beginning of the nuclear armaments race as long as
possible. If, during the time gained, ample support can be made available
for further development of the field in this country, the postponement
will substantially increase the lead which we have established during the
present war, and our position in an armament race or in any later attempt
at international agreement would thus be strengthened.
On the other hand, if no adequate public support for the development of
nucleonics will be available without a demonstration, the postponement of
the latter may be deemed inadvisable, because enough information might
leak out to cause other nations to start the armament race, in which
we would then be at a disadvantage. There is also the possibility that
the distrust of other nations may be aroused if they know that we are
conducting a development under cover of secrecy, and that this will make
it more difficult eventually to reach an agreement with them.
If the government should decide in favor of an early demonstration of
nuclear weapons, it will then have the possibility of taking into account
the public opinion of this country and of the other nations before deciding
whether these weapons should be used in the war against Japan. In this
way, other nations may assume a share of responsibility for such a fateful
decision.
To sum up, we urge that the use of nuclear bombs in this war be
considered as a problem of long-range national policy rather than of
military expediency, and that this policy be directed primarily to the
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achievement of an agreement permitting an effective international control
of the means of nuclear warfare.
The vital importance of such a control for our country is obvious from
the fact that the only effective alternative method of protecting this
country appears to be a dispersal of our major cities and essential
industries. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.57-59)
On June 13, Seaborg sent Ernest Lawrence his opinions and suggestions on the
course to be taken for nuclear weapons in the immediate future and on the question of
the postwar future. He indicated that the opinions he expressed were shared almost
unanimously by the people associated with him in his division of the Met Lab.
(1) The basic facts concerning the successful release of nuclear energy and
its immense destructive possibilities should be made public very soon,
both to the general public and to scientific channels. I propose withholding
only information with respect to the actual detailed designs of the major
manufacturing installations.
(2) With respect to use in the present war, we propose not to use the
weapon on Japan without warning but to demonstrate the weapon in the
presence of all leading countries including Japan.
(3) On postwar control, I indicate we favor free research in nucleonics
throughout the world and control through an international organization.
Probably the best method of control lies in the control of the raw
materials. Perhaps the only method of maintaining these controls would
involve world-wide pooling to form a stockpile of fissionable material to be
used by the international organization for policing purposes. I mention
that, as suggested by Szilard, perhaps control could be effected
by denaturization, i.e., by mixing it with suitable isotopes
to spoil its use for explosive purposes without interfering too
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much with its use for research purposes such as power pile
developments.
(4) With respect to the organization of postwar research in nucleonics
in this country, I state that it would be a good idea to establish, with
government aid, about four large research laboratories at four of the major
universities. These laboratories should form a sort of a foundation for the
country’s research program and should include men who are able and
willing to advise outlying laboratories as to the research program. The
outlying laboratories might consist of government laboratories working
on the more practical aspects of the field, and also regular university and
industrial laboratories supported by government contracts or grants-inaid. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.62)
On June 16, another committee on which Seaborg served, devoted to a consideration of future research, reported out to program management, and they struck a more
hopeful tone about the future. They notably describe how the current approach to
plutonium production was highly wasteful of uranium resources and was unsustainable
in the future. They also pointed out the importance of moving to ”breeder” reactors
to consume most of the uranium-238 and thorium in order to bolster the long-term
argument for nuclear energy.
The field of nucleonics has reached the stage where it is fairly clear as
to what should be the next immediate steps. The section of this report
dealing with the social and political problems indicates several choices
which face the nation concerning the future of this field. It is believed
that irrespective of the choice made and irrespective of whether or not
the point of view is one which envisages an armament race or is one which
happily contemplates a peaceful development, the immediate problem is
unaltered. The time scale, however, on which the work is carried out will
be very much affected by the realities of international policies.
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The quantity production of fissionable isotope is now realized
only at the expense of a raw material which is not at all abundant
in our country and exists in rather limited quantities in the world
as a whole. At the present rate of destruction of this material it
cannot be imagined that a wide-spread use of fissionable isotope
will be permitted. The wasteful utilization of this raw material is
forced upon us by the necessities of war, but the advisability of continuing
present methods of production far into the future even for military needs
can be doubted. It follows that research directed towards a more efficient
utilization of the primary material is the main problem of the nucleonics
program.
If a sizeable percentage of the isotope uranium-238 could be
burned and if, in addition, useful fissionable isotope could be
realized from thorium, then the whole future of the development
would be on much more secure grounds. It is of paramount interest,
therefore, that the fundamental research necessary to the design and
construction of ”breeder” piles be undertaken vigorously.

It is only

by demonstrating the practicability of the ”breeder” principle that a
sufficiently ample supply of fissionable material can be produced to permit
the nucleonics program to proceed on the scale indicated by the benefits
to be derived. It is also necessary that research and development leading
to the useful utilization of the power from nuclear burning be vigorously
supported. The ultimate goal here would be to operate machines which
produce useful power and which at the same time produce as much or
more fissionable isotope than is consumed. Under these circumstances no
real limit could exist to the application of nucleonics to all phases of our
scientific and industrial life.
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The accomplishment of the goal set in the previous paragraph is not
possible without an extensive program for basic research in physics,
chemistry, and metallurgy. The present state of the art is such that
new designs of reactor units invariably suggest situations about which
no information is available. For the long term development of the field
the research in the basic sciences will be of more importance than any
immediate pile design or engineering. It is possible that the real future of
atomic power does not involve the burning of uranium but rather other
elements at the light end of the periodic table. Progress in this direction
can only come if all possible freedom and support is given for investigations
concerning the nucleus.” (Seaborg, 1980, pg.65-66)

5.3

The World’s Terrifying Introduction to Nuclear Energy

President Truman and the wartime allies, including Josef Stalin and Winston
Churchill, were attending a conference in Potsdam, Germany, when Truman’s War
Secretary, Henry Stimson, received the message that the Trinity test had been
successful on July 18. (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962, pg.386) Elated by the news,
Stimson informed the President, who later that afternoon passed the information
on to Churchill. Both men felt confident that nuclear weapons—now proven to
work—would force Japan into unconditional surrender. Churchill considered the
weapon ”a miracle of deliverance,” which was fitting considering that both men were
contemplating hundreds of thousands of Allied deaths, along with millions of Japanese
soldiers and civilians, that would accompany an invasion of Japanese home islands,
which at that time was contemplated for November 1945.
Truman and Churchill hesitated to divulge to Stalin the success at Trinity, but
they realized that some attempt must be made to appraise Stalin of the nature of
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what was soon to come. On July 24, after a plenary meeting had adjourned, Truman
strolled over casually to Stalin and without his interpreter present informed Stalin
that the United States had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. Stalin showed
no special interest, but said only that he was glad that the US was in possession
of such a device and that he hoped America would make good use of it against the
Japanese. Truman felt relieved that he had taken the minimum step necessary to
inform Stalin of what was to come. (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962, pg.394)
The notion of using one of the weapons in a public demonstration intended
to frighten the Japanese to surrender had been considered and rejected. Several
scientists thought that no demonstration would be sufficiently dramatic to convince
the Japanese. Further objections emerged. The weapon might fail to detonate,
allowing an enemy to collect the fissile material, produced at such staggering expense,
and fabricate a weapon of their own. Another possibility would be that the Japanese
would place American prisoners-of-war in the area where such a public demonstration
had been announced.

Yet another possibility was that the Japanese would do

everything possible to shoot down the plane carrying the demonstration weapon.
Thus the war leaders concluded there would be no warning beyond the ultimatum
they planned to issue. Its use in combat would be the world’s introduction to the
nuclear weapon. (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962, pg.358)
The same day that Truman inferred the existence of nuclear weapons to Stalin,
War Secretary Stimson authorized the 509th Composite Group to prepare for attack
on Japan as soon as August 3rd. The 509th Composite Group had been specially
created to train for and execute nuclear bombing on Japan. Several cities had been
held back from attack by conventional bombing campaigns so that they might be
attacked by nuclear weapons. These were Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki.
Each was now cleared for attack by the planes of the 509th, and the powerful weapons
they would carry. (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962, pg.394)
On July 27, the Allied leaders in Potsdam issued their ultimatum to Japan for
its unconditional surrender, known as the Potsdam Proclamation. (Seaborg, 1980,
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pg.128) It demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities by the Japanese, the
disarmament of their military, and a restriction of their sovereignty to the Japanese
home islands. It made clear that the Allies did not intend the destruction of Japan as
a race or a nation. Three days later, Japanese Premier Suzuki rejected the ultimatum,
deeming it unworthy of official notice. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.131) Japan had exhausted
the patience of the Allies, who now would end the war with the ”terrible swift sword”
of nuclear weapons.
On the island of Tinian in the Pacific, Colonel Paul Tibbets of the 509th Composite
Group supervised the loading of the first nuclear weapon, nicknamed ”Little Boy”,
into the weapons bay of his B-29 bomber, which he had named after his mother:
”Enola Gay.” ”Little Boy” was a gun-type weapon using highly-enriched uranium.
This type had never been tested before—the Trinity test had been a test of the
plutonium-implosion-type weapon.

Nevertheless there was high confidence that

”Little Boy” would work successfully. It was 120 inches long and weighed nearly
10,000 pounds.
On the morning of August 6, at 8:15am local time over Hiroshima, Japan, Tibbets’
B-29 dropped ”Little Boy” from an altitude of 31,000 feet onto the central region of
the city of Hiroshima. After falling for 45 seconds and at an altitude of about 2000
feet, the weapon detonated with an explosive force estimated at 13,000 tons of TNT
equivalent. The force of the blast killed 66,000 people in Hiroshima and injured
69,000 more. Almost everything within a one mile radius of the blast was completely
destroyed, except for some highly reinforced concrete structures. The blast ignited a
firestorm roughly two miles in diameter, which continued burning outward so long as
fuel in the form of wood and flammable materials were available. Accurate casualty
figures were impossible to determine, since many of the victims of the blast were
cremated by the firestorm. The altitude of the detonation limited the radioactive
fallout that was generated and no bomb crater was formed. Many were likely close
enough to the blast to be harmed by neutron and gamma radiation, but they were
killed in the firestorm before radiation effects would have been apparent.
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Secretary of War Stimson was awakened at 7:45 Eastern time to a report that the
Hiroshima bombing mission had been successful. It was now time to tell the world
about nuclear weapons. Stimson authorized the notification of President Truman and
the release of prepared remarks that would accompany the successful use of nuclear
weapons in combat. (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962, pg.402)

5.4

”A Rain of Ruin from the Air”

At eleven a.m. on August 6, 1945, radio stations around the United States began
broadcasting a message from President Truman: (Seaborg, 1980, pg.143-145)
Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima,
an important Japanese army base. That bomb had more power than
20,000 tons of T.N.T. It had more than two thousand times the blast
power of the British ”Grand Slam” which is the largest bomb ever yet
used in the history of warfare.
The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have
been repaid many fold. And the end is not yet. With this bomb we have
now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to supplement
the growing of our armed forces. In their present form these bombs are
now in production and even more powerful forms are in development.
It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe.
The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against
those who brought war to the Far East.
Before 1939, it was the accepted belief of scientists that it was theoretically
possible to release atomic energy. But no one knew any practical method
of doing it. By 1942, however, we knew that the Germans were working
feverishly to find a new way to add atomic energy to the other engines
of war with which they hoped to enslave the world. But they failed. We
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may be grateful to Providence that the Germans got the V-1’s and the
V-2’s late and in limited quantities and even more grateful that they did
not get the atomic bomb at all.
The battle of the laboratories held fateful risks for us as well as the
battles of the air, land, and sea, and we have now won the battle of
the laboratories as we have won the other battles.
Beginning in 1940, before Pearl Harbor, scientific knowledge useful in
war was pooled between the United States and Great Britain, and many
priceless helps to our victories have come from that arrangement. Under
that general policy the research on the atomic bomb was begun. With
American and British scientists working together we entered the race of
discovery against the Germans.
The United States had available the large number of scientists of
distinction in the many needed areas of knowledge. It has the tremendous
industrial and financial resources necessary for the project and they could
be devoted to it without undue impairment of other vital war work. In the
United States the laboratory work and the production plants, on which a
substantial start had already been made, would be out of reach of enemy
bombing, while at that time Britain was exposed to constant air attack
and was still threatened with the possibility of invasion. For these reasons
Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt agreed that it was wise
to carry on the project here. We now have two great plants and many
lesser works devoted to the production of atomic power. Employment
during peak construction numbered 125,000 and over 65,000 individuals
are even now engaged in operating the plants. Many have worked there
for two and a half years. Few know what they have been producing. They
see great quantities of material going in and they see nothing coming out
of these plants, for the physical size of the explosive charge is exceedingly
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small. We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble
in history—and won.
But the greatest marvel is not the size of the enterprise, its secrecy, nor its
cost, but the achievement of scientific brains in putting together infinitely
complex pieces of knowledge held by many men in different fields of
science into a workable plan. And hardly less marvelous has been the
capacity of industry to design, and of labor to operate, the machines and
methods to do things never done before so that the brain child of many
minds came forth in physical shape and performed as it was supposed to
do. Both science and industry worked under the direction of the United
States Army, which achieved a unique success in managing so diverse a
problem in the advancement of knowledge in an amazingly short time. It
is doubtful if such another combination could be got together in the world.
What has been done is the greatest achievement of organized science in
history. It was done under high pressure and without failure.
We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely
every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in
any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their
communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely
destroy Japan’s power to make war.
It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the
ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly
rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they
may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has
never been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will follow sea
and land forces in such numbers and power as they have not yet seen and
with the fighting skill of which they are already well aware.

126

The Secretary of War, who has kept in personal touch with all phases
of the project, will immediately make public a statement giving further
details.
His statement will give facts concerning the sites at Oak Ridge near
Knoxville, Tennessee, and at Richland near Pasco, Washington, and an
installation near Santa Fe, New Mexico, Although the workers at the
sites have been making materials to be used in producing the greatest
destructive force in history they have not themselves been in danger
beyond that of many other occupations, for the utmost care has been
taken of their safety.
The fact that we can release atomic energy ushers in a new era in
man’s understanding of nature’s forces. Atomic energy may in the future
supplement the power that now comes from coal, oil, and falling water,
but at present it cannot be produced on a basis to compete with them
commercially. Before that comes there must be a long period of intensive
research.
It has never been the habit of the scientists of this country or the policy
of this Government to withhold from the world scientific knowledge.
Normally, therefore, everything about the work with atomic energy would
be made public.
But under present circumstances it is not intended to divulge the technical
processes of production or all the military applications, pending further
examination of possible methods of protecting us and the rest of the world
from the danger of sudden destruction.
I shall recommend that the Congress of the United States consider
promptly the establishment of an appropriate commission to control the
production and use of atomic power within the United States. I shall give
further consideration and make further recommendations to the Congress
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as to how atomic power can become a powerful and forceful influence
towards the maintenance of world peace.
Truman’s terrifying message to the world had surprisingly little effect on
the Japanese deliberations about surrender.

The attack on Hiroshima severed

communication with Tokyo, and it was not until the evening of August 6th when
the Japanese High Command received word that a small number of planes had
wrought appalling damage on the city. It was not until the next day when they
learned that a single plane had destroyed the entire city. Military planners could
scarcely believe what they had heard, and many did not. Several high ranking
officials sought an audience with the Emperor that they might advise him to accept
the Potsdam Proclamation.

Truman’s radio broadcasts were dismissed as scare

propaganda. (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962, pg.403)
Japanese Ambassador Sato to the Soviet Union sought their intervention to
mediate a cease-fire between the Allies and Japan. His request was rejected by the
Soviet diplomat Molotov, who tersely informed Sato that by rejecting the Potsdam
Proclamation the USSR would declare war on Japan, and that a state of war would
exist between the two nations by August 9th. (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962, pg.403)

5.5

Seaborg’s Plutonium Ends the War

The declaration of war by the Soviets was a staggering blow to the Japanese, and
strengthened the position of those leaders who were pushing for the unconditional
surrender demanded by the Allies. As they met on the morning of August 9th, they
argued about specific points of the surrender, and the meeting ended in deadlock even
as news came of the destruction of another city, Nagasaki, by nuclear weapons.
Another B-29 from the 509th Composite Group, this one called ”Bockscar” and
commanded by Major Charles Sweeney, had taken off from Tinian for an attack
on the Japanese city of Kokura. Clouds obscured the city, and Sweeney turned to
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his alternate target, the city of Nagasaki. On his B-29 was a plutonium-implosion
weapon called ”Fat Man”, very similar to the weapon that had been tested in the
Trinity Project. ”Fat Man” was dropped and fell for 43 seconds before detonating at
an altitude of 1650 feet above a military factory in Nagasaki. Forty thousand people
were killed and 25,000 more were injured, which was the third highest fatality rate
of any military attack in World War II, after the nuclear strike in Hiroshima and the
firebombing of Tokyo on March 9th and 10th, which killed over 100,000 people.
The Japanese High Command reconvened shortly after midnight and deliberated
for two hours. Views were stated, and Premier Suzuki rose and asked Emperor
Hirohito to indicate his wishes. Hirohito made a short speech and declared that he
agreed that the war should end. The imperial decree was accepted by all present
and the Cabinet met at once and ratified the decision. By the morning of August
10th, Japanese radio was broadcasting the acceptance of the Potsdam declaration and
Japan’s intention to unconditionally surrender. Truman swiftly notified the 509th to
suspend any efforts to drop a third nuclear weapon on the Japanese unless expressly
ordered to do so. The war was over. (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962, pg.404-405)
An element that did not even exist on Earth five years earlier had been fashioned
into a weapon that had ended the greatest military conflict in human history. Glenn
Seaborg’s penetrating curiosity, coupled with Ernest Lawrence’s mighty cyclotron,
had led to its discovery. An industrial effort of staggering complexity and cost had
brought it to fruition. And its awesome power had finally convinced the Japanese
warlords to abandon their belligerence.
Uncharacteristically, Seaborg said almost nothing in his journal about his thoughts
or feelings on the day that plutonium was used to destroy Nagasaki and end the war.
Did he feel pride that his hard work had brought the war to a close and saved millions
of lives? Or did he think of the tens of thousands who were incinerated that day in
”the rain of ruin from the air”?
Much has been said over the years about the guilt that nuclear scientists felt
about the creation of nuclear weapons, but in the final analysis, are they really
129

any different than the hundreds of thousands who labored to produce conventional
chemical munitions? Were not more killed in the firebombings of Tokyo or Dresden by
chemical weapons than were killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki by nuclear weapons?
Is the morality of war in any way related to the rate or ease at which adversaries
destroy one another? The distinguishing factor of the nuclear weapon was that it
represented a quantum leap in man’s ability to inflict death and destruction against
an enemy.
War is cruel, hateful, bitter, and irredeemable.

And sometimes it is also

unavoidable. But history has shown that since that fateful day of August 9, 1945,
the mighty nations of the world have never lifted up arms against one another in
the style of world war that had twice ravaged the planet in the first half of the
twentieth century. Perhaps Seaborg’s plutonium wasn’t just a weapon; perhaps it
was an antidote, forcing the leaders of the earth to confront the inevitable results of
their actions before hostilities began. If such a thing is true than few things have
saved so many lives as the invention of nuclear weapons.∗

∗

Author’s note: I once spoke with Dr. Kazuo Furukawa, who has since passed away, about the
events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He described to me how he felt, as a sickly youth of seventeen,
when he was told that he would be defending the Japanese home islands against an American
invasion. He was expected to give his life repelling the invaders, and he was thoroughly resigned
to the idea that he would soon die. When he learned of the nuclear bombings, he realized his
government would capitulate and that he would live. He told me that he decided that he would
learn all he could about nuclear technology and how to turn it into a source of peace and prosperity.
His career as a nuclear technologist and advocate is an example of one of the lives saved by the
events of early August 1945. Without the swift surrender of the Japanese government, millions of
Japanese and hundreds of thousands of Americans would have certainly died.
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Chapter 6
The Postwar Environment
6.1

Exploring New Possibilities

The exigencies of war had consumed the intellectual capabilities of some of the most
brilliant scientists of the world since the discovery of nuclear fission in 1938. With the
news of the Japanese surrender, an opportunity finally existed to investigate so many
other branches of the tree of possibilities that had been planted by the tremendous
wartime investment in reactors, chemical processing, and neutronic applications.
Several of these would have direct bearing on future efforts to utilize thorium as
a nuclear fuel.
1. There was great anticipation that new political and scientific organizations
would be formed to deal with matters of nuclear research and implementation.
In years to come, these were formed across the world, and many of them began
investigations into thorium as a source of energy. The most extensive was the
Atomic Energy Commission in the United States, which funded several efforts
into the development of thorium-based nuclear reactors.
2. Naval officers had been thinking about the application of a nuclear reactor
to power a submarine that would never need to surface for air and would have
unique military capabilities. They would succeed in 1954, and many years later,
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one of the reactors that descended from this effort would become the first to be
completely powered by thorium and uranium-233, conclusively demonstrating
that thermal breeding was possible.
3. Air Force officers, having heard of the triumphs of the Manhattan Project, began
to think about using nuclear reactors to power aircraft. This would later lead to
a program that would develop a high-temperature nuclear reactor using a fluid
fuel composed of fluoride salts. Later this technology would be combined with
the thorium fuel cycle to form what many believe to be the most compelling
implementation of a thorium-fueled reactor.
4. The scarcity of fissile material and the proven value of plutonium for nuclear
weapons would lead efforts on a breeder reactor away from the fluid-fueled
thorium breeder that Wigner and his team envisioned to a solid-fueled, liquidmetal-cooled, fast-spectrum reactor that would be designed to produce much
more plutonium than it consumed. The appeal of plutonium for the weapons
program would lead to further emphasis on fast-breeder reactors, which would
lead them to be chosen over thorium reactors as the focus of breeder reactor
research.
5. Nuclear testing, which was truncated to a single event (Trinity) to maximize
options against Japan, would resume and continue for many decades. Other
nations would join the race to develop larger and more terrifying nuclear
weapons. Above-ground detonation of nuclear explosives would release fission
products that would make their way into the bodies of all organisms on Earth.
Although largely harmless, this potent fact would lead to public revulsion
against nuclear weapons testing which would catalyse general anti-nuclear
sentiment.

Even after testing was ended, anti-nuclear organizations would

regroup around the opposition to civilian nuclear power stations, which would
lead to a tremendous reduction in the growth of nuclear energy. This in turn
would reduce the compelling need to realize thorium as a new form of energy.
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6. Glenn Seaborg originally created uranium-233 in order to explore a nuclear
decay chain that no longer existed on Earth. With larger amounts of uranium233 created in reactors, this decay chain was fully explored and found to possess
unique attributes that differentiated it from the other three decay chains. It
also contained radioactive isotopes of compelling value for science and medicine.
But one branch of the tree of possibilities that might have seemed so obvious in
August 1945 never came to pass: uranium-233 did not enter into the nuclear
stockpiles of the world. Although improvements in the production rate of uranium233 and a reduction of the contamination from uranium-232 might have been realized
through concerted effort, further research on uranium-233 as a material for weapons
did not take place, and the tens of thousands of nuclear weapons that were built in the
decades to come were based exclusively on highly-enriched uranium and plutonium.
There was only one known test of an explosive containing uranium-233 in 1954, and
its result was dubious∗ .

6.2

Understanding and Recognition at Last

Shortly after word of the Japanese surrender reached the personnel of the Met Lab,
director Farrington Daniels had to warn the employees of the Met Lab that they
were still working on nuclear research and that they could say no more than the
information that had been publicly released. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.157-158)
But there was no doubt that a great burden had been lifted from the whole nation.
The secret work in Chicago, which had brought together some of the brightest minds
in the world to design nuclear reactors, separate new elements using chemistry, and
develop material for weapons that would end a world war, had been a resounding
∗

As a part of Operation Teapot on April 15, 1955, a composite plutonium-239/uranium-233
bomb core was tested in a Mark 7 HE assembly. The shot was called the ”Military Effects Test”
and its purpose was to evaluate the destructive effects of nuclear explosions for military purposes.
Specifications called for a device whose yield was calibrated to ±10%, but the composite core used
in the MET had only 2/3 the yield predicted, a tremendous disappointment.
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success. Nevertheless, tight wartime secrecy prevented Seaborg and others from
saying very much about what they had done. The extent of the information they
could reveal was bounded by a report issued by the Manhattan Project, written by
Henry Smyth, called General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic
Energy for Military Purposes, now generally called the ”Smyth Report”. (Hewlett and
Anderson, 1962, pg.407)
This caused some discontent among Met Lab personnel.

Some thought the

Smyth report said too much about their work, others thought it said far too little.
Speculation was flying throughout the media about the nature of nuclear energy and
its implications, and those who knew most could say least. Walter Zinn grumbled,
”It’s more important than who gets the credit and who does not. If people are
going to get the correct information they have to get it from the right people.
Washington is really cutting off the right source of information which would educate
the public.” (Seaborg, 1980, pg.166-167)
Work continued on a variety of esoteric subjects related to the chemistry of
plutonium and other actinides, but there was a definite sense that the wartime
intensity had dropped off. In September 1945, Seaborg pursued a lead from a company
in Monterey, California, that said the black sand beaches of Monterey contained up
to 60% thorium dioxide in some areas. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.186) Seaborg felt this was
important to relay back to the military leadership of the Manhattan Project. (Seaborg,
1980, pg.206) He also prepared for his return to Berkeley after over three years in
Chicago.
Seaborg was now in demand as a public figure. His youth, intelligence, and
photogenic appeal led to requests for him to appear on national radio and television
programs. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.331-334) As the discoverer of plutonium, there was
intense public interest in this material and the man who had found it and helped to
end the war. He was also asked to contribute articles to the Encyclopedia Brittanica
on the subjects of uranium, thorium, artificial radioactivity, protactinium, plutonium,
neptunium, and actinium for their 1946 edition. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.352)
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6.3

Legislation for a New Organization

Public realization of the power and import of nuclear weapons led to pronounced
debate on who should control the new weapons, and under whose authority they
should be developed.

On one side were those who felt that the US Army had

shown their capability in administering the Manhattan Project, and that they should
continue to lead any effort to develop weapons. On the other side were many of the
scientists of the Manhattan Project who felt that a power so vast should come under
civilian control. This dispute materialized into legislation in the fall of 1945.
The first piece of legislation put forward came from the US House of Representatives. Andrew Jackson May, chairman of the House committee, presented a bill that
had been drafted by two experienced lawyers that worked for the War Department,
Kenneth Royall and William Marbury. (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962, pg.428) The
bill called for a new organization to oversee nuclear development. It would consist
of a nine-man commission, consisting of five civilians, two representatives from the
Army, and two from the Navy. (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962, pg.412) These men
would serve indefinite terms and would be insulated from political pressures and the
President’s powers of removal. The commission they envisioned would have custody
of all raw materials and deposits, all plants, facilities, equipment, and materials, all
technical information and patents, and all contracts and agreements related to the
production of fissionable materials. To accomplish this, the commission would have
virtually unlimited powers of condemnation and eminent domain. These sweeping
powers would give the commission the power to undertake nearly any effort related
to the development of nuclear weapons.
The scientists of the Metallurgical Laboratory and other Manhattan Project sites
were horrified with the proposed legislation, and felt highly restricted in their ability
to speak out by wartime secrecy orders.
Freshman senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut put forward a very different
alternative in the US Senate: an Atomic Energy Commission that consisted entirely
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of civilians, from which military personnel were specifically excluded. McMahon’s bill
won the support of the scientists and the public at large. It was unanimously passed
by the US Senate on a voice vote on Saturday, June 1, 1946. (Hewlett and Anderson,
1962, pg.516)
In conference with the House of Representatives, and Congressman May, it was
clear that amendments would be added to the bill. These were appended to the bill
before it passed the House on Saturday, July 20, with a vote of 265 to 79. (Hewlett
and Anderson, 1962, pg.529) In conference, the differences between the Senate and
House versions of the bill were worked out, usually to the favor of the Senate version,
before the bill cleared both chambers and was signed into law by President Truman
on Thursday, August 1, 1946. (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962, pg.530) It was known as
”The Atomic Energy Act of 1946”, and it created the Atomic Energy Commission,
which would relieve the Manhattan Project of their responsibilities to develop nuclear
weapons and other activities.

6.4

Dissolution of the Manhattan Project

In July 1946, the Manhattan Project conducted the public tests of nuclear weapons
that had only been contemplated before the end of the war. The location of the tests
was a remote island called Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. There an armada
of captured Japanese and German warships had been assembled in the harbor. The
testing sequence was called ”Operation Crossroads” and it would include two weapons
tests. The first would be done by bombing the fleet anchored in the center of the atoll
by a single bomb dropped from an aircraft. The other test would involve a weapon
detonated underwater.
The first test detonation, code-named ”Able”, took place on July 1, 1946, when a
B-29 dropped an implosion bomb on the ghost fleet at Bikini. (Hewlett and Anderson,
1962, pg.580) On dozens of Navy ships about thirty miles away, military experts,
congressmen, scientists, foreign observers, and an entire shipload of journalists were
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witnessing the test. The contrast between this test and the handful of of men who saw
Project Trinity could not have been more pronounced. For the first time the public
was ”present” at the detonation of a nuclear device, as the test itself was reported
live on the radio to listeners in the United States on CBS radio. On July 24, the
underwater detonation, code-named ”Baker”, took place.
Controversy surrounded the testing at Bikini. Many argued that the tests had
little military value, and that they were nothing more than a stunt intended to impress
or frighten the world. For the Manhattan Project, Operation Crossroads represented
nearly the end of the line. With the signing of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and
the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission, civilian control of nuclear weapons
and development would soon be a reality. The Manhattan Project worked to transfer
facilities, personnel, and information to the new civilian agency before dissolving as
an organization at the end of calendar year 1946.
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Figure 6.1: The four decay chains, including the neptunium (+1) chain that was
realized through the discovery of uranium-233. This new decay chain was unique in
several respects. 1) It did not have an isotope of radon in its decay chain, and 2) it
ended on bismuth rather than an isotope of lead.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
By the end of the Manhattan Project, uranium-233 derived from thorium had been
produced, evaluated, and rejected as a nuclear weapons material. Plutonium had also
been produced, in far greater quantities, and despite difficulties with production and
isotopic purity, it had been made to operate in nuclear weapons. In large part, success
with plutonium was due to the development of the implosion method of nuclear
detonation. This method also reduced the amount of fissile material needed for a given
yield, and was thereafter applied to both plutonium and highly-enriched uranium
weapons.
Uranium-233 had superior properties as a nuclear fuel over uranium-235 and
plutonium-239 in a thermal spectrum reactor.

A fluid-fueled reactor, based on

uranium salts dissolved in heavy water, was seriously considered as a thermal
breeder reactor. But this concept never got beyond the conceptual stage during
the Manhattan Project and it did not offer a significant breeding gain. It was quickly
overtaken by an effort to build a fast-spectrum breeder reactor using plutonium and
uranium-238 as the fertile material. The fast-breeder held the promise of a significant
breeding gain, which was an important consideration in an era when every gram of
fissile material was of tremendous worth, and when any diversion of fissile material
away from weapons had to be justified as having eventual military value.
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The thermal-spectrum, thorium-uranium-233 breeder reactor concept could not
promise high breeding gains like a fast-spectrum plutonium reactor could, but it
had the great merit of being able to operate in the thermal spectrum and with
moderated neutrons. Interest in this reactor later continued at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, where two experimental aqueous homogeneous reactors were built to test
the principles that had been sketched out in the final days of the Manhattan Project.
An effort to develop a converter reactor, that would consume plutonium and
generate uranium-233, later led to ideas for a pressurized light-water reactor. This
reactor type, proposed by Alvin Weinberg, would later power submarines and a decade
later would be adapted for civilian use in the United States. It would go on to become
the predominant reactor type in the world as of 2013.
Uranium-233 was never developed into an operational nuclear weapon material.
One test took place in 1955 of an experimental composite plutonium-uranium-233
core as part of the Teapot series of nuclear tests, but the test had a substandard yield
and no further experiments with uranium-233 were continued. The details of the test,
along with the relative amounts and arrangements of the plutonium and uranium-233
in the device, remain classified to this day.
Glenn Seaborg, leader of the technical group that discovered and characterized
uranium-233, went on to serve as the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
from 1961 to 1971, serving under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. He was
also at the controls of a molten-salt reactor experiment in 1967 where uranium-233
was first used to power a nuclear reactor, which went on to operate for thousands of
hours successfully on this fuel.
The development of thorium as an energy source remains in its infancy in 2013,
having progressed relatively little since the era of the Manhattan Project. In large part
this is due to an early emphasis on nuclear weapons in the United States, Soviet Union,
Great Britain, and France that led to early characterization of uranium and plutonium
in reactors and chemical processing plants. Plutonium was a suitable nuclear weapons
material and could be produced in reactors that used natural (unenriched) uranium,
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and it could be separated chemically. Uranium-233 could not be produced in reactors
based only on natural thorium, since thorium did not multiply neutrons. Any effort
to produce uranium-233 in reactors using uranium simply diminished the potential
production rate of plutonium, and was undesirable.
The origins of uranium-233 in the days before the Manhattan Project, and its
investigation and consideration during the wartime era, laid the foundations for how
thorium and uranium-233 would be considered today, and have lasting relevance.
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Appendix A
Extracts from Early History of
Heavy Isotope Research at
Berkeley
1940-09-23 John W. Gofman and Spofford G. English, two graduate students who
are starting at Berkeley this fall, have elected to carry out their graduate
work under my direction. English has decided that he will not be very active
in research during the first semester, but Gofman has elected to begin his
research program immediately. Gofman will work in room 307. (In addition
to supervision of graduate student research, my teaching assignment consists of
teaching two freshman chemistry laboratory sections.)
Gofman has accepted my suggestion that for his thesis problem he undertake
the search for the missing 4n+1 heavy nuclei and the measurement of their
radioactive properties.

He will start with an investigation of Pa233, the

protoactinium daughter of the 26-min. Th233 which is produced by neutron
capture in thorium.
Hahn and Strassmann (O. Hahn and F. Strassmann, Naturwiss 28, 543 [1940])
have recently pointed out that the radioactivity of 25 days half-life assigned to
147

Pa233, originally reported by Meitner, Strassmann and Hahn (L. Meitner, F.
Strassmann and O. Hahn, Zeits f. Physik 109, 538 [1938]) to be the daughter of
the 26-minute Th233 produced by neutron capture in thorium, might actually
be due to an isotope of zirconium. There is a 25-day zirconium formed in the
fission of uranium by neutrons, and hence probably also in the fission of thorium
by neutrons. Since Meitner, Strassmann and Hahn used zirconium as the carrier
material for their radioactive substance, the question arises as to whether their
25-day radioactivity from thorium plus neutrons might be due to an isotope of
zirconium rather than protoactinium.
Gofman will begin by attempting to demonstrate whether this 25-day activity
is indeed due to Pa233. Kennedy is collaborating with us in this research,
making his main contribution in developing the counting equipment that will
be required. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.2-3)
1940-11-04 After becoming familiar with the chemistry of thorium, protoactinium
and uranium, gathering his required chemical equipment and learning about
the various relevant counting apparatus, Gofman is getting underway with his
Pa233 problem. He is working in room 307, Gilman Hall, the same room in
which Wahl and Friedlander are situated. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.3)
1940-11-10 Gofman made his first bombardment of thorium nitrate today using
neutrons produced by the bombardment of phosphorus with deuterons at the
60-inch cyclotron. (The phosphorus target was for another experiment and
advantage was taken of the by-product neutrons.) The thorium nitrate was
surrounded by paraffin and the bombardment took place from 10:45 a.m. to
noon.
Gofman brought the thorium to room 307, dissolved it in water, then added
H2 O2 to precipitate insoluble thorium peroxyhydroxide which he washed with
water and alcohol several times. He followed the decay of this using electroscope
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no. 3 with my help, and we found that the Th233 in this sample decays with a
half-life of approximately 26 minutes as expected. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.3-4)
1940-11-24 Gofman bombarded about 15 gm of thorium nitrate encased in a
large paraffin block for about an hour with the neutrons produced during the
bombardment of phosphorus with 100 microamperes of deuterons in the 60-inch
cyclotron. The thorium was dissolved and precipitated from acid solution as the
iodate after the addition of appropriate carriers for the fission products. After
redissolving the thorium iodate in concentrated hydrochloric acid, successive
precipitations of zirconium phosphate were performed. If the 25-day activity
formed by the slow-neutron bombardment of thorium is due to Pa233 resulting
from the beta decay of Th233, then the successive zirconium phosphate
precipitates (which coprecipitate the protoactinium) should have decreasing
amounts of Pa233 beta radiation. Measurements using electroscope no. 3
do show that the intensities are less for the successive precipitates, consistent
with the Pa233 growing from a parent of approximately 26 minutes halflife,
presumably Th233. It remains to be demonstrated that beta radioactivity in
the zirconium phosphate precipitates will decay with the expected 25-day halflife. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.4)
1940-12-08 Gofman bombarded 50 gm of thorium nitrate for several hours with
the neutrons produced from the bombardment of phosphorus with deuterons
at the 60-inch cyclotron in order to produce a stronger sample of the 25day activity to be used to establish by chemical experiments that it is due
to protoactinium. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.5)
1940-12-13 Gofman began his chemical identification of the 25-day beta activity
using material produced in last Sunday’s bombardment. He plans to dissolve the
thorium nitrate, precipitate zirconium phosphate to carry the 25-day activity,
convert this to zirconium oxychloride, and then subject this to fractional
crystallization from hydrochloric acid solution. Experiments by Grosse and
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Booth (A. V. Grosse and E. T. Booth, Phys. Rev. 57, 664 [1940]) have shown
that in such a fractional crystallization the protoactinium concentrates in the
mother liquor. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.6)
1940-12-17 Gofman has completed his zirconium oxychloride experiments started
last Friday and finds that the specific activities (activity per decigram ZrO2 ) of
the first fractions are of the order of 5% of the specific activity of the overall
sample, showing an accumulation of the activity in the mother liquor as should
be the case for protoactinium. This is further evidence that the 25-day activity
is due to Pa233. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.7-8)
1940-12-19 Today Gofman extracted a purified uranium fraction through the
precipitation and reprecipitation of sodium uranyl acetate from a solution of
thorium nitrate made up of neutron-bombarded thorium. The purpose is to
see whether there is any beta-emitting U233 daughter in the Th233 -¿ Pa233 -¿
U233 decay sequence. He found no beta particles in the uranium fraction that
could be attributed to U233. It is, of course, to be expected that U233 will
decay by the emission of alpha particles and we intend to conduct experiments
to look for these. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.8)
1941-01-14 Gofman has followed the decay of the radioactivity in the zirconium
phosphate precipitates extracted from the solution containing Th233 on November 24, 1940 and has found in each case a half-life of about 25 days, indicating
that Th233 decays to a beta emitter of 25-days half-life, which therefore must
be Pa233.
We prepared a letter to the editor describing our work on the identification of the
25-day entitled ”Radioactive Isotopes of Protoactinium” under the authorship
of G. T. Seaborg, J. W. Gofman and J. W. Kennedy. We are today sending
this letter for publication in The Physical Review. In this letter we describe
our experiments concerning the genetic relationship of the 25-day activity to
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its parent Th233, its chemical identification as protoactinium by the fractional
crystallization of zirconium oxychloride, the absence of daughter U233 beta
activity, and the measurement of the upper energy limit of beta particles as 0.4
MeV. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.15-16)
1941-02-01 Our letter to the editor entitled ”Radioactive Isotopes of Protoactinium”
under the authorship of Seaborg, Gofman and Kennedy, appeared in today’s
issue of The Physical Review (Phys. Rev. 59, 321 [1941]). As a neighboring
article in the same issue there is an article by Grosse, Booth and Dunning
announcing similar results (Phys. Rev. 59, 322 [1941]). (Seaborg, 1976, pg.21)
1941-02-21 Today we began the bombardment of 1 kg of thorium nitrate, imbedded
in a box containing paraffin, with neutrons at the 60-inch cyclotron with
the aim of preparing out largest sample of Pa-233 through an intensive
bombardment. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.23)
1941-03-04 We concluded our bombardment of 1 kg of thorium nitrate, started on
February 21, with neutrons at the 60-inch cyclotron. The material in a box filled
with paraffin has been in various positions near the target (usually beryllium)
bombarded with deuterons, sometimes in the best position and sometimes
in a less advantageous position, depending on the competition for neutrons.
Exposure corresponds to 9700 microampere-hours of deuterons. (Seaborg, 1976,
pg.27)
1941-03-28 (date of Pu-239 fissionability discovery) During the last month Gofman
has carried out a number of experiments to develop his method for the extraction
of from the bombardment of our 1 kg of thorium nitrate with neutrons at
the 60-inch cyclotron between February 21 and March 4. Starting today he
will make his initial extraction by precipitating zirconium phosphate to carry
the and then will separate the from the zirconium by precipitating it with
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lanthanum oxalate under conditions which leave more than 90% of the zirconium
in solution, presumably as an oxalate complex. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.35)
1941-04-10 Gofman has completed the extraction, which he started on March 28,
of Pa233 from the 1 kg of neutron-bombarded thorium nitrate. He dissolved
the thorium nitrate in water, precipitated zirconium phosphate to carry the
Pa233 dissolved this in HF, converted to the hydroxide, dissolved this in HCl,
and precipitated lanthanum oxalate which carried the Pa233 while leaving the
zirconium in solution.

He had to handle numerous fractions and combine

precipitates in order to carry out in practice this separation and concentration
procedure, which is so simple in principle but difficult in execution; a number of
cycles were carried out. He wound up with the final Pa233 in several fractions
which he mounted in order to test for the growth of daughter U233 alpha
particles. Two of these fractions have intensities of Pa233 beta radiation of
27 and 40 microcuries, as measured with our FP-54 ionization chamber and
using Wahl’s calibration of January 11, 1941. Wahl’s calibration, 3.1 x 104
mm galvanometer deflection per microcurie, with the standard resistance and
shunt setting R2S1, is for 93-239 beta radiation and hence its application to
beta radiation can give only approximate results, but these are sufficient for our
purposes. Gofman will attempt to measure the growth of alpha particles in these
Pa233 samples using our screen-windowed ionization chamber setup. (Seaborg,
1976, pg.37-38)
1941-04-23 A small but discernible quantity of alpha activity has grown into the
beta-emitting Pa233 samples isolated by Gofman on April 10. Measurements
with our screen-windowed ionization chamber indicate that the 40 microcurie
sample shows an alpha counting rate of 2 per minute, and our 27 microcurie
sample shows an alpha counting rate of 1.2 per minute. Assuming that the
alpha particles are due to daughter U233 (which needs to be proved), taking into
account that the 25-day Pa233 has decayed for 13 days, and correcting for the
152

geometrical efficiency of the alpha counting ionization chamber, we can calculate
the half-life for the daughter U233, as an average of the two determinations, to
be of the order of 100,000 years.
This, of course, is a very rough determination, and should perhaps be regarded
as a lower limit. However, it may indicate that we should be able to produce,
with more intense neutron bombardments of larger amounts of thorium,
sufficient U233 to not only determine its alpha half-life, but also its cross section
for fission with slow neutrons. Of special importance is our demonstration
through these results that U233 is sufficiently long-lived to be a
practical source of nuclear energy should it be found to be fissionable
with slow neutrons and should methods for its large scale production
be developed. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.38-39)
1941-06-25 During the last couple of months Gofman has been experimenting with
methods to prepare by electrolysis thin samples of Pa233 suitable for measuring
the growth of daughter U233 alpha activity. He has prepared two samples of
strength 6 microcuries and 10 microcuries as measured with our calibrated FP54 ionization chamber. It is necessary for Gofman to return to his home in
Cleveland, Ohio because of our inability to find funds to support him for the
summer. He has been supported during the school year on his small stipend as
a teaching assistant which is insufficient to take care of his subsistence needs
for the remainder of the summer. He is asking Wahl and English to make
alpha particle measurements on his electrolyzed 6 microcurie and 10 microcurie
samples to look for the growth of daughter U233 during his absence. (Seaborg,
1976, pg.47)
1941-06-29 Gofman left today to return to his home in Cleveland, Ohio to spend the
remainder of the summer before the fall semester opens in August. (Seaborg,
1976, pg.47)
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1941-07-10 Today I wrote to Dr.

Lyman J. Briggs at Professor Lawrence’s

suggestion to propose some additional work that might be done on the
measurement of fission cross sections in the uranium and transuranium regions
under a research contract for which I might act as Official Investigator. I
suggested that the proposed work might be divided into three groups: (1)
the measurement of the slow neutron fission cross section of 93-239; ( 2 ) the
measurement of the slow neutron fission cross section and the fast neutron
fission cross section of 93-237 (on the assumption that we can isolate this as the
daughter of 7-day beta-decaying U237); (3) the measurement of the slow neutron
fission cross section and the fast neutron fission cross section of U233 (the
expected daughter, formed by the beta decay of Pa233 and Th233 which results
from the capture of slow neutrons by ordinary stable Th232). I indicated that
the first two of these projects could probably be handled without any additional
paid help, but the U233 project could best be done with the additional help
of a paid chemist Ph.D. assistant. All the projects would need some funds for
equipment, materials and supplies, and to pay for the time of use of the 60-inch
cyclotron. I suggested a total budget of $21,000. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.49)
1941-07-16 Measurements by Wahl and English on Gofman’s electrolyzed 6 and
10 microcurie Pa233 samples have not been able to establish the growth of
any daughter U233 alpha particles, undoubtedly due to the small intensity
of the samples and the long half-life of U233. This is consistent with the
measurements of April 23 which suggest that the half-life of U233 is 100,000
years or longer. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.50)
1941-08-22 Gofman returned from his home in Cleveland, Ohio to resume his graduate research program, courses and teaching assistantship at Berkeley. (Seaborg,
1976, pg.54)
1941-09-02 Dr. Raymond W. Stoughton, a Berkeley Ph.D. of last year, started to
work with me today in a postdoctoral capacity supported by the funds from
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my new contract no. OEMsr-206 which includes a provision of $2,500 to pay
for a postdoctoral chemist for one year; he will work in room 311, Gilman Hall,
which has been made available to my group. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.56)
1941-09-03 Stoughton began work today to try to improve the methods for the
extraction of Pa233 from neutron bombarded thorium nitrate. He and Gofman
plan to establish the best conditions for the carrying of Pa233 by zirconium
phosphate and other carriers and will also attempt to perfect the conditions for
electroplating the final samples of Pa233 which we plan to isolate in order to
allow its growth to daughter U233. The aim is to develop an overall procedure
that can be used to isolate as large as possible samples of U233 from large
quantities of thorium nitrate subjected to long neutron bombardments at the
60-inch cyclotron. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.56)
1941-09-09 Stoughton today tested the carrying of Pa233 by MnO2 , formed by
the oxidation of Mn++ by ClO3 -, and found good results. This method for
coprecipitating protoactinium was developed by A. V. Grosse and B. Agruss (J.
An. Chem. Soc. 57, 438 [1935]). (Seaborg, 1976, pg.57)
1941-09-17 Gofman has resumed his electrolysis experiments in order to develop
methods for preparing thin samples of Pa233. This is preparatory to the production of a large sample of Pa233 through the extensive neutron bombardment
of a large quantity of thorium nitrate, which we plan to carry out as soon as
the chemical extraction methods have been perfected. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.59)
1941-09-26 We ordered 25 pounds of thorium nitrate from the Fairmont Chemical
Co. for use in our planned neutron bombardments to produce a large sample
of U233. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.61)
1941-10-04 Stoughton has performed numerous experiments during the last month
to establish the best conditions for the carrying of Pa233 by zirconium phosphate
out of thorium nitrate solutions. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.61)
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1941-10-09 Today Stoughton verified that a precipitate of zirconium phosphate
incorporating tracer Pa233 can be dissolved in HF with good recovery of the
Pa233 in the solution and negligible loss on a concurrent precipitate of thorium
fluoride. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.62)
1941-10-20 Stoughton is commencing experiments to develop an improved procedure for the removal of Pa233 from large quantities of neutron-bombarded
thorium nitrate through the initial use as carrier of manganese dioxide, produced
by the reaction of Mn++ with permanganate ions. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.64)
1941-10-30 Today Gofman and Stoughton began the bombardment of 5 kg of
dissolved thorium nitrate with neutrons from the deuteron bombardment of
beryllium at the 60-inch cyclotron. The thorium nitrate is surrounded by 35 inches of paraffin (except between the sample and the beryllium target).
It has been completely purified from any content of natural Pa231 by three
separate manganese dioxide precipitations. It is planned to measure the growth
of U233 alpha particles from the chemically isolated Pa233 parent, which is the
reason for the removal of the natural 30,000-year alpha emitting Pa231 from
the thorium nitrate. The isolation procedure also contemplates the removal of
natural uranium as well as thorium from the Pa233 so that it may decay to
pure daughter U233. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.65)
1941-11-07 Gofman and Stoughton have developed a method for extracting Pa233
from a large volume of thorium nitrate solution through coprecipitation on
manganese dioxide formed by the reaction of manganous chloride with potassium permanganate in hot solutions. This can then be followed by dissolving
the manganese dioxide and further concentrating the Pa233 by coprecipitation
with zirconium phosphate and dissolving the zirconium phosphate in HF. They
developed their procedure for reducing the volume of carrier by repetitions of
this cycle and then finally isolating the Pa233 by electrolysis. Thus, they are
ready to perform the chemical extraction of the Pa233 from the 5 kg of thorium
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nitrate whose bombardment with neutrons at the 60-inch cyclotron started on
October 30. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.66)
1941-11-10 The neutron bombardment of 5 kg of thorium nitrate (in saturated
aqueous solution) which commenced on October 30 was terminated today after
a total of 14,250 microampere-hours of deuterons on beryllium at the 60inch cyclotron. Gofman and Stoughton immediately started their extraction
procedure. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.66)
1941-11-17 Gofman and Stoughton completed today their extraction of Pa233 from
the 5 kg of neutron-bombarded thorium nitrate. This procedure, begun last
Monday, started by dissolving thorium nitrate in 26 liters of water which was
adjusted to a nitric acid concentration of 0.5 M. To this solution about 400 gm
of manganous chloride was added. This was precipitated from the hot solution
in three separate portions by the addition of potassium permanganate to the
solution. Each precipitate of manganese dioxide was centrifuged out separately.
The protactinium is carried down with the manganese dioxide, more or less
quantitatively, under these conditions.
The combined manganese dioxide precipitates were dissolved in a mixture of
hydrogen peroxide and hydrochloric acid. After decomposing the hydrogen
peroxide by boiling, about 200 mg of zirconium oxychloride was added to
this solution, the zirconium was precipitated as zirconium phosphate by the
addition of phosphoric acid, and the precipitate was centrifuged out. Several
further precipitations of zirconium phosphate were performed by adding furthur
100-mg portions of zirconium oxychloride, each precipitate being centrifuged
out separately. Zirconium phosphate carries doen the protactinium essentially
quantitatively.
It was then necessary to remove the Pa233 from the rather large amount of
zirconium with which it was present and to purify it from uranium and thorium.
The zirconium and protactinium phosphates were brought into solution by
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treatment with dilute hydrofluoric acid. This step also gave a further separation
from thorium which was precipitated as the insoluble fluoride at this point. This
solution was cooled with ice water, and zirconium and protactinium hydroxides
were precipitated by adding dilute sodium hydroxide solution; the solution must
be kept cold in this precipitation or difficulty will be experienced in redissolving
the precipitated hydroxides. The hydroxide precipitate was then dissolved in
nitric acid, and the protactinium was carried away from most of the zirconium by
another series of manganese dioxide precipitations. Some of the zirconium came
along with the manganese dioxide precipitate in this procedure so that a further
removal of the zirconium, as well as the manganese, from the protactinium was
necessary. This involved going through the above described cycle two more
times, finally ending up with a small zirconium phosphate precipitate containing
the protactinium.
This zirconium phosphate precipitate, which now contained only about 10 mg
of zirconium, was dissolved in hydrofluoric acid and, after precipitation of the
hydroxide as described above, was converted to the nitrate by dissolving the
hydroxide in nitric acid. Another precipitation of the zirconium phosphate was
then made in order to be sure that all the uranium and thorium in amounts
less than a microgram were removed. The final zirconium phosphate precipitate
was made at 11:59 p.m. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.69)
1941-11-18 Continuing their work, Gofman and Stoughton converted last night’s
final zirconium phosphate precipitate (containing all of the Pa233 recovered
from their large bombardment) to zirconium sulfate and dissolved this in 0.33 M
ammonium fluoride solution preparatory to isolation of the Pa233 by electrolysis
onto copper plates. The first electrolysis began at 11:00 am and continued
until 8:15 pm. This sample, which is labeled Th+n-I-Pa-I, should contain the
majority of the Pa233. They then started their second electrolysis at 8:30 pm
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and continued until 9:45 pm, labeling this sample Th+n-I-Pa-II; this should
give a small sample convenient for some of the measurements.
They started their third electrolysis at 10:00 pm with the intention of running
it overnight.
Measurements of the alpha activity of sample Th+n-I-Pa-II, using the ionization
chamber-linear amplifier-magnetic field setup (W-1), commenced at 11:00 pm
and will continue over the next several months to observe the growth of daughter
U233. It is planned to measure concurrently the alpha counting rate of a
standard sample in order to monitor the sensitivity of the apparatus. The
measurement showed a counting rate of 22 alphas per minute, even though the
sample has just been purified, indicating the presence of a Pa alpha emitter; this
is undoubtedly due to the 30,000-year Pa231 produced during the bombardment
via the reactions:

25hr

Th232 (n, 2n)Th231 −−→ Pa231
β

(Seaborg, 1976, pg.70)
1941-11-19 Gofman and Stoughton completed a third electrolysis of Pa233 as the
end product from their large neutron bombardment of thorium nitrate at
11:00 am and labeled this sample Th+n-I-Pa-III; this should yield a sample
of intermediate intensity. They then started a fourth electrolysis at 12 noon
which ran until 9:00 pm; they labeled this sample Th+n-I-Pa-IV. Very rough
order of magnitude measurements of the intensities of the beta emission from
these Pa233 samples using our ionization chamber FP-54 electrometer setup
with absorbers (to help deal with the high intensities of radioactivity) give the
following results: for sample Th+n-I-Pa-I, 300 millicuries; for Th+n-I-Pa-II, 6
millicuries; for Th+n-I-Pa-III, 30 millicuries; for Th+n-I-Pa-IV, 1/2 millicurie.
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The sample Th+n-I-Pa-I will be allowed to decay until the major portion has
been converted into daughter U233, after which the U233 will be separated
from the undecayed Pa233. The plan is to use samples Th+n-I-Pa-II and III to measure the decay and make absorption measurements on the Pa233
radiations using the ionization chamber FP-54 setup, and to determine the
half-life of daughter U233 by measuring the growth of its alpha particles using
the ionization chamber-linear amplifier-magnetic field setup (W-1). The beta
radiation from the Pa233 will be measured with Lauritsen electroscopes and
with our ionization chamber connected to a FP-54 electrometer tube, depending
upon the intensity of the samples. Our Lauritsen electroscopes have aluminum
windows of thickness about 3 mg/cm2 and the FP-54 ionization chamber has
an aluminum window of thickness about 0.1 mg/cm2. In order to determine the
half-life of daughter U233, these instruments must be calibrated in an absolute
manner for the radiations of Pa233 and Th233 which will be done with the help
of our Geiger-Mueller counters whose geometrical efficiency is being established.
Since the radiation contains a large number of conversion electrons, it will be
necessary to determine the percentage of these; this will be done through GeigerMueller counter measurements of the beta particles of the 25-minute Th233
and its daughter Pa233. In addition, since the Pa233 samples are mounted
on copper, it will also be necessary to correct for backscattering of the beta
particles.
The measurement of the beta intensity of samples Th+n-I-Pa-III and -II on
the ionization chamber FP-54 electrometer setup will be carried out on step 2
under ”standard conditions” by observing the deflection, using or converting
the reading to standard resistance and shunt settings R5S5. The plan also is to
make observations on the deflections produced by our beta standards RaE-St.-I
and UX2-St.-4 at the time of each measurement in order to check the sensitivity.
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Measurements of the alpha activity of sample Th+n-I-Pa-III using the ionization
chamber-linear amplifier-magnetic field setup (W-1) commenced at 12:30 pm
(also to be monitored with concurrent measurements on our standard Pa231
sample). The measurement showed a counting rate of 116 alpha counts per
minute, even though the sample has just been purified, indicating the presence
of a Pa alpha emitter; as with sample Th+n-I-Pa-II, this is undoubtedly due to
the 30,000-year Pa231 produced during the bombardment via the reactions

25hr

Th232 (n, 2n)Th231 −−→ Pa231
β

(Seaborg, 1976, pg.70-71)
1941-11-25 Gofman conducted absorption measurements in aluminum, usinq the
ionization chamber FP-54 outfit, on the Pa233 radiations in sanple Th+nI-Pa-II. He found an end point fior the beta radiation of 165 mg Al/cm2,
corresponding to an energy of 0.5 MeV using the Varder & Eddy relationship.
There is evidence of soft radiation (the initial portion of the absorption curve
shows a half thickness of 11.5 mg/cm2) suggesting the presence of an appreciable
number of conversion electrons; the observed value of 700 for the ratio of betaparticle to gamma-ray ionization is consistent with this conclusion. (Seaborg,
1976, pg.71-72)
1941-12-04 Using our air-filled ionization chamber FP-54 electrometer setup, Gofman is making beta decay measurements on samples Th+n-I-Pa-III and Th+nI-Pa-II. Corrected back to the time of last separation from daughter U233 the
initial Pa233 beta intensities (for the resistance and shunt setting R5S5 and with
the samples on step 2) correspond to a galvanometer reading of 1795 mm for
sample Th+n-I-Pa-III and 340 mm for sample Th+n-I-Pa-II. The measurements
on sample Th+n-I-Pa-III are being made through 30 mg/cm2 of Al absorber in
order to be manageable for so intense a source and the 1795 mm reading is a
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corrected one that allows for the attenuating effect of the absorber. (Seaborg,
1976, pg.74)
1941-12-07 The Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor today. I heard the news on my
radio while I was listening to the Chicago Bears-Chicago Cards football game
in my room at the Faculty Club. The Bears had to win to tie Green Bay for
the Division title; they won 34-24. The news of the Japanese attack reached
the press box at halftime. There were only 18,000 fans at Comiskey Park in
Chicago. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.75)
1941-12-10 Stoughton began to work on the problem of separating uranium from
protoactinium in order to develop a procedure for isolating the daughter U233
from the undecayed Pa233 in sample Th+n-I-Pa-I. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.75)
1941-12-14 Today Gofman began a new series of experiments in connection with
the development of an efficient process for the separation of uranium from
protoactinium to be used for the separation of U233 from undecayed Pa233
in sample Th+n-I-Pa-I. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.77)
1941-12-19 Gofman and Stoughton completed today a bombardment of 5 kg of
thorium nitrate (in concentrated aqueous solution) with the neutrons produced
from the irradiation of beryllium with 3,000 microampere-hours of deuterons
in the 60-inch cyclotron (bombardment no. Th+n-II). They commenced their
procedure for the extraction of Pa233 at 8:00 pm. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.78)
1941-12-22 Gofman took one of the later electrolytically deposited plates of Pa233
(sample Th+n-I-Pa-IV from bombardment Th+n-I which was prepared last
month) in order to practice the recovery of daughter U233. By comparison of the
intensity of Pa233 beta radiation in this sample with that of sample Th+n-I-PaIII and the growth of daughter U233 in the latter, we can estimate the number
of U233 alphas that should be present in this sample as corresponding to a decay
rate of 100 per minute. He scraped the sample from the copper backing plate,
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dissolved it in acid, removed the dissolved copper by precipitation of CuS, and
then removed the undecayed Pa233 by numerous precipitations with zirconium
phosphate. The final filtrate from these was then evaporated to a small volume
and subjected to electrolysis beginning at 6:15 pm. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.79)
1941-12-23 Gofman and Stoughton completed the isolation of the Pa233 from
bombardment Th+n-II by the chemical procedure started last Friday. They
used a procedure like that used on sample Th+n-I-Pa-I. The Pa233 was
extracted from the dissolved 5 kg of thorium nitrate by coprecipitation with
manganese dioxide, followed by the reduction of carrier by several alternate
precipitations of zirconium phosphate and manganese dioxide. The last small
zirconium phosphate precipitate containing the Pa233 was dissolved and the
Pa233 separated by electrolysis onto copper, leading to a Pa233 sample
with beta radiation of about 40 millicuries as determined very roughly by
measurement with the ionization chamber FP-54 setup. This Pa233 sample
will be divided into a number of fractions and used for the calibration of our
ionization chamber FP-54 setup and Lauritsen electroscopes for the absolute
measurement of the beta radiation from Pa233.
Gofman completed the electrolysis started yesterday and measured the resultant
alpha activity on our alpha ionization chamber G-2. He found an intensity of
about 15 alphas per minute and although the yield is lower than expected, this
sample is notable in that it represents an actual isolation of the long-sought
daughter U233 from its parent Pa233. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.80)
1942-01-02 A greatly expanded effort is getting underway at many places
on the overall project of the preparation of fissionable material for
use in a nuclear weapon. This now has a high national priority and a
large contract ($405,000 for six months) in the name of Lawrence is going into
effect here at the University of California, Berkeley. This covers all of the
work that I am doing, other than a couple of my specific contracts, as well as
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Lawrence’s ambitious program for the separation of U235 by the electromagnetic
process, to which Kennedy and Segre are shifting their efforts. Similarly, a
large program is getting underway at the University of Chicago under Arthur
H. Compton concerned with the production of the isotope 94-239 from the
nuclear chain reaction with natural uranium; this will be the center for this
research program which has been given the code name Metallurgical Project,
with the main component of this, at the University of Chicago, to be known
as the Metallurgical Laboratory. The overall organization of Section S-1 has
been changed. In Section S-1, still under the chairmanship of Dr. Lyman J.
Briggs and remaining in the Office of Scientific Research and Development, the
responsibility for the scientific aspect is divided between the Program Chiefs, E.
O. Lawrence, A. H. Compton and H. C. Urey, working with Dr. J. B. Conant,
Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee. In addition, also with
OSRD, there will be a Planning Board of distinguished chemical engineers with
Mr. E. V. Murphree of the Standard Oil Development Company of New York
as its chief.
I am assuming leave status from my position as Assistant Professor of Chemistry
in order to devote full time to this high priority research program. My group
is being substantially expanded in order to broaden the scope of my work. My
graduate students, Arthur Wahl (who has essentially completed his graduate
work), Jack Gofman, Spofford English and John Hamaker, are continuing on
their programs: Wahl on the investigation of the chemical properties of elements
93 and 94, the identification of 93-237 and the measurement of the radioactive
and fission properties of 94-239 and 93-237 and the radioactive properties of
the 50-year 94 and its 2.0-day 93 parent; English is collaborating with Wahl on
the measurement of the radioactive and fission properties of the two isotopes
of element 94; Gofman is continuing his work on the search for U233 and the
measurement of its radioactive and fission properties in collaboration with Dr.
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Raymond W. Stoughton (who is working as a postdoctorate under my contract
OEMsr-206 supporting this work); Hamaker is working to set up the apparatus
for eventual ultra microchemical investigations of the chemical properties of 94239. Morris Perlman is continuing his work on the search for elements 93 and 94
in uranium ores. In addition, Robert B. Duffield, a graduate student working
with Professor Melvin Calvin, is shifting to participation in our program in view
of its urgency. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.82-83)
1942-01-08 Gofman dissolved the Pa233 of sample Th+n-I-Pa-IV (prepared on
November 19) in acid in order to make a practice run to recover the daughter
U233. He removed the dissolved copper by precipitation of copper sulfide,
then precipitated a number of zirconium phosphate precipitates to remove the
undecayed Pa233, finally added acetic acid and electrolyzed the solution to
recover the U233. He calculates from the estimated amount of U233 in the
sample at this date that he achieved a recovery of 75%. This is a pretty good
test of the procedure to separate uranium from protoactinium which is under
development in order to recover our large sample of U233 from sample Th+nI-Pa-I. The Pa233 content could be estimated by comparison with the growth
of U233 alpha activity into sample Th+n-I-Pa-II as of this date using the ratio
of beta intensities of samples Th+n-I-Pa-IV and -II.
This is also notable in that it represents an actual isolation of the daughter
U233 from its parent Pa233.
Today Stoughton completed his measurements on the backscattering of Pa233
beta particles from copper using part of the Pa233 sample isolated on December
23 from bombardment Th+n-II. The purpose is to calibrate our ionization
chamber FP-54 setup so that we can convert our readings on samples Th+nI-Pa-II and -III to absolute intensities of beta radiation. His measurements
show that a sample of mounted on copper leads to 49% greater deflection on
the recording system than does an identical sample mounted on cellophane;
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this corresponds to a correction factor of 1/1.49 = 0.67. The small effect
of backscattering from cellophane can also be corrected for by comparing
the Geiger-Mueller counting rate of a sample mounted on cellophane in the
upright position but covered by an identical sheet of cellophane with that of
the sample in the inverted position. The average of several such determinations
of this comparison for Pa233 radiation has shown that the counting rate for
the covered sample measured upright is 1.03 times that of the counting rate
for the uncovered sample measured inverted. Thus, there is a 3% increase
due to backscattering due to cellophane, and the correction factor is 1/1.03 =
0.97. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.86-87)
1942-01-12 Gofman took a sample of U233 and added a couple of micrograms of
natural uranium to test further the separation of uranium from protoactinium.
From acid solution he precipitated the dissolved copper as copper sulfide, made
a number of precipitations of zirconium phosphate to remove the Pa233, added
acetic acid to the remaining solution, and electrolyzed to obtain a yield of 75%.
This indicates that there is no great difference in yield between microgram and
submicrogram amounts of uranium in their evolving procedure. (Seaborg, 1976,
pg.89)
1942-01-17 Gofman took some of the Pa233 isolated on December 23 from
bombardment Th+n-II in order to prepare a U233 stock solution for use in
subsequent experiments. He removed the Pa233 very completely by repeated
precipitations with zirconium phosphate. This stock solution now contains a
concentration of U233 corresponding to about 143 alpha counts per minute (on
ionization chamber W-3) per cc, or about 300 alpha disintegrations per minute
per cc. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.90)
1942-01-19 Gofman and Stoughton have completed their experiments for separating
uranium from protoactinium and have established a procedure for separating
the daughter U233 from undecayed Pa233 in sample no. Th+n-I-Pa-I. The
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thin film containing the Pa233 and U233 will be dissolved in acid, the small
amount of copper dissolved from the backing plate will be removed by H2S
precipitation from acid solution. From this solution zirconium phosphate will
be precipitated; a large number of zirconium phosphate precipitations will
be performed in order to remove more than 99.9% of the undecayed Pa233.
The volume of this solution will then be reduced to about 5 cc and after the
adjustment of the acidity, including the addition of acetic acid, the electrolysis
onto a platinum plate will be carried out. By this procedure Gofman and
Stoughton have demonstrated that more than 90% of the uranium is plated
out in a well-adhering film, probably platinum from the electrodes, of entirely
negligible weight (about 0.2 mg/cm2).
Today Gofman used the U233 tracer prepared last Saturday to make a careful
study of the electrolytic deposition of U. He used what he now thinks is the
optimum concentration of acetic acid and the best conditions for electrolysis,
and succeeded in obtaining a recovery of about 97%.
He then went on to test his procedure in practice by beginning with a portion
of the Pa233-U233 plate on copper from bombardment Th+n-II. He dissolved
this in acid, removed the copper by precipitation of copper sulfide, removed
the Pa233 by two precipitations of zirconium phosphate, and then set up
the conditions for electrolysis. He succeeded in producing a good electrolytic
deposition of U233 on platinum with a yield of about 93%. (Seaborg, 1976,
pg.90-91)
1942-01-28 Preparatory toward taking the big step of dissolving sample Th+n-IPa-I (prepared on November 18) in order to produce our large sample of U233,
Gofman today carefully compared its beta radioactivity with that of Th+n-I-PaIII which has been carefully measured with our calibrated ionization chamber
FP-54 setup. In order to measure samples of such a high intensity, he used our
thick-windowed ionization chamber filled with freon (window thickness 130 mg
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Al/cm2) and filtered the radiation through 225 mg Al/cm2. He measured a
deflection of 216 mm compared to 29 mm for sample Th+n-I-Pa-III, indicating
that the former has 7.5 times as much Pa233 (plus U233) as the latter.
Gofman then took the plunge. Under the assumption that he and Stoughton
have now developed an adequate procedure for the separation of the daughter
U233 from the undecayed Pa233, he scraped the material of sample Th+n-IPa-I off the copper plate, then washed the plate with 12 M HCl until it showed
less than 0.1% of the original gamma activity. He added a few drops of HNO3 ,
then evaporated to a small volume. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.96)
1942-01-29 Proceeding with his work started yesterday, Gofman continued evaporation of his volume until 2 cc were left, passed in H2S to precipitate copper
sulfide. The filtrate was then made 8 M in HCl of total volume 10 cc, zirconium
oxychloride added and the zirconium precipitated as zirconium phosphate by the
addition of phosphoric acid. He then precipitated a second zirconium phosphate
to further remove the Pa233 after which he reduced the volume by evaporation
to 2 cc and went home for the night. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.97)
1942-01-30 Gofman spent the entire day carefully carrying out eight successive zirconium phosphate precipitations, to continue to remove Pa233 (in continuance
of his work of yesterday) from the U233 in solution. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.97)
1942-01-31 Working all day in continuance of his isolation of U233 from sample
Th+n-I-Pa-I, Gofman removed successively eight more zirconium phosphate
precipitates in his effort to eliminate undecayed Pa233 to as great an extent as
possible.
This afternoon Stoughton made another bombardment (no.

Th+n-IV) of

thorium with neutrons with the aim of measuring the Th233 -¿ Pa233 decay to
determine the conversion electrons of Pa233. The thorium nitrate was cleansed
of natural decay products through the precipitation of lead and bismuth
168

sulfide and lead and barium sulfate immediately before the bombardment.
He bombarded one gram of thorium nitrate with neutrons produced by the
irradiation of a beryllium target with 50 microamperes of 16 MeV deuterons
from 5:00 to 5:55 pm. He has modified the chemistry in order to produce a
cleaner sample of Th233. His procedure in this case was to first precipitate
the dissolved thorium as the iodate, then dissolve this in concentrated HCl
with the addition of a number of fission product carriers. From this solution
zirconium phosphate was precipitated twice and from the filtrate the thorium
was precipitated as the fluoride at 6:43 pm. A portion of this was then mounted
on cellophane and the radiations of Th233 measured with electroscope no. 9
with the sample placed on step 2, the measurements beginning at 7:20 pm.
He used another portion of the sample to determine the efficiency of Lauritsen
electroscope no. 9 for the beta radiation of Th233 by making measurements with
the electroscope and effecting his absolute calibration through the use of GeigerMueller counter no. Z-32 (counting efficiency, 29%). He finds a sensitivity for
Th233 beta radiation of 2.03 divisions per second per microcurie on step 2 and,
from the known relationship of step 1 to step 2, a sensitivity of 5.3 divisions per
second per microcurie for step 1.
By 8:30 pm the main sample had decayed sufficiently so that he could continue
the measurements on Geiger-Mueller counter no. Z-32. He continued to follow
the decay until a little past midnight. The plan is to continue to follow the
decay on Geiger-Mueller counter no. Z-32 until all of the Th231 has decayed
and the intensity of the Pa233 daughter of Th233 can be established. (Seaborg,
1976, pg.98-99)
1942-02-01 Gofman took out his 17th zirconium phosphate precipitate, then
evaporated the remaining solution, containing the daughter U233, to a volume
of approximately 0.15 cc. He then added 5 cc of water, 0.02 cc of glacial acetic
acid, warmed the solution to insure that everything was dissolved, poured it
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into his electrolytic cell, and began electrolysis onto a platinum plate at 4:15
pm.
Today I sat down and wrote a summary of the status of the work of my group,
for use in a report to be sent by Lawrence to J. B. Conant, Chairman NDRC,
as follows:
”Chemical procedures are being developed for the isolation of U233, which is
the end product formed after a chain beta-decay when thorium is bombarded
with slow neutrons. About 12 pounds of thorium nitrate have already been
subjected to an intense neutron bombardment, and it is planned soon to isolate
several micrograms of U233 to be used for the measurement of its neutron fission
cross sections and spontaneous fission rate.” (Seaborg, 1976, pg.99)
1942-02-02 Working past midnight, Gofman terminated his electrolysis at 1:15 am
this morning, removed the sample and gave it the formal sample no. Th+nI-Pa-I-U-I, which we decided to name more colloquially Sample J. This avoids
the use of the designation Sample I, the next letter in the line of designation of
our major samples, to eliminate confusion with the Roman numeral I.
Gofman is beginning to use room 234 in the Old Chemistry Building, which
has been assigned to us to help us meet our expanding space requirements; this
has served until this semester as a laboratory for the undergraduate course in
quantitative chemical analysis (Chemistry 5). He will use this room for the
measurement of the slow and fast neutron fission cross sections of U233 with
neutrons from our 300 mg Ra-Be source, as well as the spontaneous fission rate
of U233.
After going home for some sleep Gofman came back this evening to make the
initial test on whether U233 undergoes fission with slow neutrons using Sample
J. He used our 300 mg Ra-Be neutron source and placed Sample J on one
electrode of an ionization chamber connected to a linear amplifier adjusted to
discriminate against the high alpha particle emission rate in passing spontaneous
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fission signals to the recording system. Our Uranium Standard No. 6 (U-St-6),
containing 200 micrograms of natural uranium and hence 1.4 micrograms of
U235, will be used as a comparison standard. Measurements on Sample J were
made with and without a cadmium shield in order to determine the effect of
slow neutrons.
Beginning his counting at 9:44 pm, Gofman found 39 counts per hour which
could be attributed to the slow neutron fission of U233 in our Sample J.
This, then, represents the first demonstration of the slow neutron
fissionability of U233, but quantitative results will await the determination
of the weight of the U233 by measurements of its alpha counting rate and the use
of the half-life of U233 as determined from our U233 alpha growth experiments
from the decay of Pa233 in samples Th+n-I-Pa-II and -III. (Seaborg, 1976,
pg.100)
1942-02-03 Continuing his work of yesterday, Gofman determined in the early
morning hours that the slow neutron fission counting rate of U-St-6 is about 17
counts per hour. This, then, gives us a very preliminary measure of the slow
neutron fission ratio
Sample J
39
=
= 2.3
U-St-6
17
Our determination of the relative cross sections of U233 and U235 will await
determination of the weight of U233 in Sample J.
It is clear that the use of our 300 mg Ra-Be source makes the determination
of the slow neutron fissionability of U233 a much simpler task than our
determination of the slow neutron fissionability of 94-239 last May using
neutrons from the 37-inch cyclotron.
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After going home for some sleep, Gofman returned this afternoon to continue
his measurement of the comparative slow neutron fission in Sample J and USt-6 (containing 1.4 microgram of U235), using our 300 mg Ra-Be source. He
found a ratio for slow neutron fission of
Sample J
48
=
=4
U-St-6
12
Gofman then decided to make a preliminary look for spontaneous fission in
Sample J starting the counting at 11:08 pm.
Using a number of Pa233 samples (from bombardment Th+n-II of last December) yesterday and today Stoughton calibrated our Lauritsen electroscopes no.
5 and no. 9 for the detection of the beta radiation from Pa233. He counted the
samples on our Geiger-Mueller counter no. Z-32 (of known counting efficiency,
29%) and on the electroscopes. Correcting for the absorption of the radiation
in the thin windows of the counter and electroscopes (using the known half
thickness of 11.5 mg/cm2), he finds for electroscope no. 5 a sensitivity of
6.25 divisions per second per microcurie when the sample is placed on step
1, 2.53 divisions per second per microcurie (step 2); and for electroscope no.
9, a sensitivity of 7.85 divisions per second per microcurie (step 1), and 3.00
divisions per second per microcurie (step 2). (The unit ”microcurie” here refers
to the total radiation consisting of conversion electrons as well as nuclear beta
particles.)
Late this evening Stoughton made an hour’s bombardment of 1 gm of thorium
nitrate with neutrons at the 60-inch cyclotron (bombardment no. Th+n-V),
then isolated chemically a purified thorium fraction using the same procedure
he used on Saturday; he will use this fraction to make another determination
of the efficiency of electroscope no. 9 for Th233 beta radiation using GeigerMueller counter no. Z-32 for absolute counting. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.101)
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1942-02-04 Continuing his work on yesterday’s bombardment (Th+n-V) early this
morning, Stoughton made measurements on the Th233 beta radiation in his
thorium fraction with Lauritsen electroscope no. 9 and Geiger-Mueller counter
no. Z-32 and found a value for the sensitivity of electroscope no. 9 for the beta
radiation of Th233 in good agreement with the value he found in his similar
experiment of January 31.
Returning this morning, Gofman found that at 11:25 am Sample J has not
produced any spontaneous fission counts during the interval of 12 hours and 17
minutes since last night. He changed the ”A” battery of the amplifier and then
started another spontaneous fission count experiment at 8:40 pm.
Stoughton completed his measurements on the Pa233 formed as the daughter
of Th233 in the continuance of the experiment that began on January 21
(bombardment no. Th+n-III) to study the Th233 -¿ Pa233 decay sequence.
Using his calibration of Lauritsen electroscope no. 9, he finds the disintegration
rate of the parent Th233 to be 205,000 per minute when extrapolated back
to the time of its separation from daughter Pa233. The disintegration rate of
the Pa233 extrapolated back to the time of the beginning of its decay (which
requires a correction for the contribution of the 24.5-hour Th231) is 180 per
minute. Using a correction factor of 1.26 for the absorption of the soft Pa233
electrons (absorption half thickness of 11.5 mg/cm2) in the window (3.9 mg
mica/cm2) of our Geiger-Mueller counter no. Z-32, we can calculate the ratio
of daughter Pa233 electrons to parent Th233 electrons as
180 × 27 × 24 × 60 × 1.26
= 1.69
205000 × 25.5
using 25.5 minutes as the half-life of Th233 and 27 days as the half-life of Pa233.
Analysis of the Th233 -¿ Th231 -¿ Pa233 decay complex indicates a half-life of
25.5 minutes for Th233. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.102)

173

1942-02-05 Gofman returned and found no spontaneous fission from Sample J at
12:35 pm, representing an interval of 15 hours and 55 minutes. (Seaborg, 1976,
pg.103)
1942-02-06 Continuing his measurements on the slow neutron fission of the U233 in
Sample J with the 300 mg Ra-Be neutron source, Gofman found a counting rate
of 40 fissions per hour with Sample J and 14 fissions per hour for comparison
sample U-St.-6, corresponding to a ratio between the two of 2.9. (Seaborg, 1976,
pg.105)
1942-02-07 As the result of a telegram from Arthur Compton, I met in Ryerson Hall
at the University of Chicago yesterday and today with a group to discuss the
general problem of the production of 94-239 using the chain reaction in natural
uranium and its subsequent separation from the uranium and fission products.
Present during the meetings at various times were Arthur H. Compton, Enrico
Fermi, Franklin A. Long, Norman Hilberry, Gregory Breit, John A. Wheeler,
Herbert N. McCoy, Herman I. Schlesinger, Morris S. Kharasch, Herbert C.
Brown, R. S. Archer, and B. L. Benbow.
In the course of the meetings I gave rather complete reports on our work at
Berkeley on the identification of 94-239, including the measurements of its
radioactive properties and slow and fast neutron fission cross sections, our work
on the radioactive properties of 93-239, U237 , the 50-year 94, its parent 2.0-day
93, and our predictions for 93-237 and U233 which I indicated we are in the
process of identifying.
I described our work on the chemical properties of 94 and our procedures for
isolating 94 and 93 from large amounts of UNH and fission products using our
oxidation-reduction procedure with rare earth fluoride as carrier.
As a result of this meeting I now fully realize the magnitude of
the project being planned around our new element 94 and the
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enormity of the chemical separation problem of isolating 94-239 from
large amounts of uranium and almost fantastic intensities of fission
products. When Compton asked me if I thought I could devise very soon a
chemical process for separating 94 from such uranium and fission products—
a process that could be successfully scaled up for actual use in a chemical
extraction plant—I indicated that I thought I could, but I must confess to some
misgivings.
One of the questions that we discussed was the matter of who might head up this
chemical extraction work on 94 at the Metallurgical Laboratory here in Chicago.
Compton is trying to convince Frank Long to undertake this responsibility, but
Frank is doubtful that he should leave the other war work he is doing, which he
regards as very important. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.104)
1942-02-10 Stoughton completed today his measurements on the intensity of
electron radiation from Pa233, which is the follow-up of the experiment that
began on January 31 (bombardment no. Th+n-IV) to study the Th233 -¿ Pa233
decay sequence. He finds the disintegration rate of Pa233 extrapolated back to
the time of the beginning of its decay to be 227 per minute. The intensity of the
parent Th233 beta radiation extrapolated back to the time of separation from
daughter Pa233 is 270,000 per minute, based on the calibration of electroscope
no. 9. Hence, when a correction factor of 1.26 is applied for the absorption of
beta particles in the Geiger-Mueller counter no. Z-32 window, we can calculate
the ratio of daughter Pa233 electrons to parent Th233 electrons as
227 × 27 × 24 × 60 × 1.26
= 1.62
270000 × 25.5
using 25.5 minutes as the half-life of Th233 and 27 days as the half-life of
Pa233. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.106)
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1942-02-11 From continued measurements on the slow neutron fission of the U233 in
Sample J with the 300 mg Ra-Be neutron source, Gofman has found a counting
rate of 45 fissions per hour with Sample J and 14 fissions per hour for comparison
sample U-St-6, corresponding to a ratio between the two of 3.2. (Seaborg, 1976,
pg.106)
1942-02-16 This evening Stoughton bombarded 1.6 gm of thorium nitrate, from
which natural decay products had been previously removed, with neutrons from
the 60-inch cyclotron from 8:15 pm to 10:00 pm (bombardment no. Th+n-VI).
He immediately isolated a pure thorium fraction using a procedure essentially
like that of January 31, and began measurements of the Th233 decay using
electroscope no. 9 at 10:29 pm. He changed over to Geiger-Mueller counter no.
Z-32 at 11:25 pm. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.108)
1942-02-18 Intermittently since his first measurements on the slow neutron fission
rate of U233 started on February 2, Gofman has continued his measurements.
He finds that the ratio of induced fissions, using the slow neutrons from the 300
mg Ra-Be neutron source, with the neutron source and the ionization chamber
surrounded with paraffin, on the basis of measurements made without and with
the cadmium shield, corresponds to a rate for Sample J about three times that
of the standard uranium sample (U-St-6). (Seaborg, 1976, pg.111)
1942-02-19 Yesterday and today Gofman has made a preliminary measurement of
the range of the alpha particles of U233 (Sample J) using our low geometry
ionization chamber-linear amplifier setup no.

W-2.

Making comparative

measurements of the absorption in aluminum foil of U233 and Po210 (sample PoSt-6) alpha articles, he finds the range of Po210 alphas to be longer than those
of U233 by 1.34 mg/cm2 of Al. Converting to range in air (conversion factor of
1.52) this difference corresponds to 0.88 cm of air, indicating the range of U233 is
3.92 (the air range for Po210) minus 0.88 or 3.04 cm of air at standard conditions
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(760 mm and 15 deg C). This should be considered to be a preliminary, rather
rough, value.
Today Gofman is beginning his longer series of measurements to determine the
spontaneous fission rate of U233 using Sample J with his apparatus set up in
room 234 in Old Chemistry Building. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.112)
1942-02-23 Stoughton bombarded a 1 gm sample of thorium nitrate, previously
purified from its natural disintegration products, with neutrons at the 60-inch
cyclotron from 11:00 am to 12 noon (bombardment no. Th+n-VII). He then
isolated a purified thorium fraction by a procedure essentially the same as that
used on January 31 and began measurements on the decay of Th233 using
electroscope no. 9 at 12:35 pm. He divided the sample into four portions, which
he labeled samples no. 1, 2, 3 and 4. He then followed the decay of all four
samples on electroscope no. 9. He shifted samples no. 3 and 4 to Geiger-Mueller
counter no. Z-32 at 2:23 pm. The plan is to follow the decay of these two samples
until the intensity of the the electron radiation from daughter Pa233 can be
established in each case. He also intends to measure the absorption in Al of the
low energy part of the Pa233 beta spectrum in order to obtain better information
to correct for the absorption of the Pa233 beta particles in the Geiger- Mueller
counter’s mica window (approximately 3 mg mica/cm2 thickness). The purpose
is to improve the calibration of our Lauritsen electroscope no. 9 (and hence our
ionization chamber FP-54 setup) for absolute measurement of the intensities
of Pa233 beta radiation, information that is needed in connection with our
experiment to determine the half-life of U233. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.113)
1942-02-24 Stoughton completed his measurements on the decay of daughter Pa233
produced in the decay of parent Th233 isolated from bombardment no. Th+nVI on February 16, 1942. Using his absolute calibrations of electroscope no. 9
for Th233 beta radiation and Geiger-Mueller counter Z-32 results for daughter
Pa233 beta radiation, and correcting for absorption in the Geiger-Mueller
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counter window, he finds a value of 1.65 for the ratio of Pa233 electrons to
Th233 electrons. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.113)
1942-02-25 Gofman’s attempts to measure the spontaneous fission rates of U233
commenced on February 19 with the apparatus set up in room 234, Old
Chemistry Building, has been plagued by spurious counts due to electrical
interference. He is therefore moving his ionization chamber, amplifier and
recorder for the spontaneous fission work to his home (apartment number 106,
1890 Arch Street, Berkeley). (Seaborg, 1976, pg.113)
1942-03-02 Stoughton bombarded 1 gm of thorium nitrate, previously purified of
its natural decay products, with the neutrons from the 60-inch cyclotron from
7:10 pm to 8:15 pm (bombardment no. Th+n-VIII). After the bombardment
he purified the thorium fraction by the usual procedure, finishing his separation
procedure at 8:53 pm. The purpose of this bombardment is to determine the
shape of the absorption curve and the energy of the Th233 beta particles by
absorption with aluminum using electroscope no. 9 with the sample on the
second step. He completed the absorption measurements by 10:23 pm with the
result that he found an end point of about 700 mg/cm2, corresponding to an
upper energy limit of about 1.6 MeV. The initial part of the absorption curve
shows a half thickness of 60 mg per cm2 of Al. The ratio of the ionization
due to the beta particles to that due to the gamma rays is approximately
1,000, indicating that there are essentially no nuclear gamma rays in the
Th233 radiation; the small amount of apparent electromagnetic radiation is
probably to be attributed to bremsstrahlung. This apparently lends weight to
the assumption that there are no conversion electrons present in the radiation
of Th233. The shape of the absorption curve also indicates the absence of
conversion electrons. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.115-116)
1942-03-05 Today Stoughton completed another calibration of our ionization chamber FP-54 electrometer setup for the beta radiation of Pa233. Using a sample
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of Pa233 isolated from bombardment Th+n-II on December 23, he made
measurements using our calibrated electroscope no. 9 and the FP-54 ionization
chamber (step 2). He finds a sensitivity of 0.058 mm of galvanometer deflection
per microcurie of Pa233 total electron radiation (conversion electrons plus
nuclear beta particles) at our standard resistance and shunt setting R5S5. This
is in good agreement with the value of 0.061 mm which he found on January
9. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.117)
1942-03-09 Stoughton completed the measurements on sample nos.

3 and 4

containing daughter Pa233 resulting from the decay of Th233 isolated on
February 23 from bombardment no. Th+n-VII. He calculates that the ratio
of electrons from Pa233 to those of Th233 is 1.82 for sample no. 3, and 1.73 for
sample no. 4. These are probably the best among the five determinations that
have been made of this ratio.
He also measured the absorption of the Pa233 beta radiation in 3 mg/cm2
aluminum using Geiger-Mueller counter no.

Z-32 in order to determine

the equivalent absorption of this radiation in the window of the counter
(approximately 3 mg/cm2 mica thickness); he found that the ratio of the
counting rate with 3 mg/cm2 Al to that without is 1.3, indicating that this
is the correction factor to allow for the absorption of Pa233 beta radiation in
the window of Geiger-Mueller counter no. Z-32. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.118)
1942-03-10 Stoughton calculated a weighted average of the ratio of Pa233 electrons
to Th233 electrons determined in experiments from bombardments Th+n-III, IV, -VI and -VII as 1.75. In the course of these determinations he has concluded
that the best value of the half-life for Th233 is 23.5 minutes, rather than the
25.5 minutes that we have been using. Recalculated on this basis, the ratio
becomes 1.66. Also from his value of the absorption half thickness (60 mg per
cm2 in Al), he has calculated the small correction for the absorption of the
Th233 beta radiation in the Al window of Geiger-Mueller counter no. Z-32 (a
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factor of 0.96), leading to a final corrected value of 1.59 for the ratio. (Seaborg,
1976, pg.119)
1942-03-16 The beta decay of sample Th+n-I-Pa-III as followed on our FP-54
ionization chamber indicates a half-life of 27.4 days for Pa233. The growth of
U233 alpha particles in this sample as measured with the ionization chamberlinear amplifier-magnetic field outfit (W-1) is consistent with a half-life of
27.4 days for the parent beta emitting Pa233 and extrapolates to a total at
infinite time of 428 alpha counts per minute after the constant contribution of
Pa231 alpha particles is subtracted. From this disintegration rate of daughter
U233 alpha particles and the disintegration rate of parent Pa233 beta particles
measured on December 4, 1941, corrected to zero time, it is now possible
to calculate the half-life of U233. Correcting for the geometry factor of the
ionization chamber-linear amplifier-magnetic field setup (W-1), which has been
determined to be 0.019 (by counting a small sample of U233 both in this
ionization chamber and our calibrated ”inside” ionization chamber, W-3), we
can calculate that the total U233 disintegration rate is 375 alpha particles per
second. The Pa233 the galvanometer deflection measured with our ionization
chamber FP-54 electrometer on December 4, 1941, corrected for absorption
and decay, is 1795 mm (standard conditions of R5S5) corresponding to the
time of last separation of Pa233 from daughter U233 (11:59 pm, November 17,
1941). Using this value, the calibration for radiation of March 5, 1942 (0.058
mm of galvanometer deflection per microcurie of Pa233), and correcting for
the backscattering of Pa233 beta particles from copper relative to cellophane
(factor of 0.67) and from cellophane (factor of 0.97), for the absorption of
Pa233 radiation in the mica window of the Geiger-Mueller counter used in
the calibration of the FP-54 ionization chamber (factor of 1.3), and for the
conversion electrons in the radiation (factor of 1.6), we have
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1795 × 0.67 × 0.97 × 1.3 ∼
= 16300 microcuries
0.058 × 1.6
or 16.3 millicuries in sample no Th+n-I-Pa-III. Since one microgram of 27.4-day
Pa233 corresponds to 20.5 millicuries, we can calculate the weight of U233 in
sample Th+n-I-Pa-III after all of the parent Pa233 has decayed as
16.3
= 0.80 micrograms
20.5
From these data we can now calculate the alpha half-life of U233 as
27.4 × 16.3 × 3.7 × 107
= 120, 000 years
365 × 375
The beta decay of sample Th+n-I-Pa-II as followed on our FP-54 ionization
chamber also indicates a half-life for Pa233 of 27.4 days. The growth of U233
alpha particles in this sample as measured with the ionization chamber-linear
amplifier-magnetic field outfit (W-1) also corresponds to a half-life of 27.4 days
for the parent beta-emitting Pa233; the alpha intensity extrapolates to about 75
per second at infinite time. Considerations similar to those for sample Th+nI-Pa-III indicate an initial intensity of Pa233 beta particles of 3.0 millicuries
which, together with the intensity of alphas from daughter U233 (75 per second),
also leads to an alpha half-life of close to 120,000 years for U233. The beta decay
of Pa233 samples isolated on December 23, 1941 from bombardment Th+n-II,
measured with our electroscope no. 9, also show a half-life of 27.4 days; the
error corresponding to an average of all these determinations is ±0.2 days—i.e.,
the half-life of is 27.4±0.2 days. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.121-123)
1942-03-18 This evening I completed my dictation to Helen of the report ”Chemical
Properties of Elements 94 and 93.” Besides the discussion of the tracer chemical
properties, a section on yields of 93-235 or 238 (and thus of 94-235 or 238) from
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deuteron bombardments and of 93-239 (and thus of 94-239) from neutron and
deuteron bombardments is included. This paper, under the authorship
of Wahl and me, also includes for the first time the suggestion that
element 94 be given the name plutonium (symbol Pu) after Pluto,
the second planet beyond Uranus, in line with McMillan’s suggestion
that element 93 be given the name neptunium (symbol Np) after
Neptune, the first planet beyond Uranus, from which uranium derives
its name. We also point out that there is practically no resemblance in chemical
properties between neptunium and plutonium on the one hand and rhenium and
osmium on the other. We indicate that the chemical properties of neptunium
and plutonium are those of a rare-earth-type group of elements starting at
the upper end of the Periodic Table and go on to suggest that the group can
be just as well considered to be starting with actinium or thorium as with
uranium, which has been previously suggested as the starting point. (Seaborg,
1976, pg.124)
1942-03-24 Now that the weight of U233 in sample no. Th+n-I-Pa-III (corrected
for incomplete decay of Pa233) is known, it is possible to determine the weight
of U233 in Sample J by determining the ratio of the alpha activity in the two
samples. Using the ionization chamber-linear amplifier-magnetic field setup (W1) and a screen to cut down the intensity of alphas in order to avoid coincidence
corrections, Gofman and Stoughton measured the alpha count of Sample J as
640 per minute and of sample Th+n-I-Pa-III (corrected to infinite time) as
131 per minute (after subtracting the contribution of Pa231). Thus, Sample
J contains 640/131 = 4.9 as much U233 as does Th+n-I-Pa-III. The weight
of U233 in Sample J is therefore (4.9)(0.8), or actually (4.9)(16)/20.5 = 3.8
micrograms. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.128-129)
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1942-03-30 Today Gofman completed his measurements on the spontaneous fission
of U233 using Sample J with the apparatus set up in his apartment on February
25.
After overcoming a number of difficulties with the stability of his amplifier
circuits, he has managed to conduct 243 hours of meaningful operation during
which he has observed no spontaneous fission counts with the 3.8 micrograms
of U233 in Sample J. In order to determine the efficiency of his ionization
chamber and amplifier outfit for detecting spontaneous fission events, he placed
a sample of natural uranium on the electrode of his ionization chamber and
then measured the variation of the neutron-induced fission rate with amplifier
gain. Also taking into account the geometry of the ionization chamber, he finds
that the overall efficiency of the apparatus for recording spontaneous fissions
amounts to about 72%. Hence, his 243 hours of counting corresponds to 243
x 0.72 = 175 hours of effective counting during which no spontaneous fission
events were recorded. Since the expected average interval between fission counts
for a half-life of 1014 years corresponds to 135 hours, it seems probable that the
half-life for the spontaneous fission of U233 is of the order of, or greater than,
1014 (100 trillion) years. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.130)
1942-03-31 I enclosed in my letter to Compton a summary entitled ”Additional
Investigations Underway by My Group at Berkeley” and a summary of
”Investigations Which Might Be Considered in Case A Very Large Chemical
Program Were Undertaken” as follows:
ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS UNDERWAY BY MY GROUP AT BERKELEY
”1.

Investigation of radioactive and fission properties of U233 (nearing

completion).”
INVESTIGATIONS WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED IN CASE A VERY
LARGE CHEMICAL PROGRAM WERE UNDERTAKEN
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”2. The development of chemical methods for separating kilograms of U233
from large amounts of thorium and fission products in case U233 should prove
to be a useful isotope.”
”7. A search for U232 formed in the deuteron bombardment of uranium from
the reactions Th232(d,2n)Pa232 and Pa232 -¿ U232, in the hope that U232
might be a better tracer for microgram amounts of uranium than are U233 or
U237.” (Seaborg, 1976, pg.133)
1942-04-01 Yesterday and today English and Wahl attempted to develop a fluoride
volatility method for separating 94 from uranium and fission products. They
prepared a solution of uranyl nitrate containing 94 and precipitated the uranium
and 94 from the solution with hydrogen fluoride to obtain uranous tetrafluoride
incorporating 94 fluoride or 94 oxyfluoride. Fluorine was then passed over
the mixture of uranium and 94 in their lower fluoride states in an attempt
to produce the higher fluorides and for the purpose of determining whether the
uranium hexafluoride or the 94 higher fluoride is more volatile. Unfortunately,
the experiment was a failure because uranium hexafluoride was not produced—
perhaps because of an insufficient supply of fluorine or because the apparatus
was not dry. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.136)
1942-04-02 During the last several days Gofman has continued his measurements
on the slow neutron fission of U233 in Sample J and has now accumulated,
including his experiments in February, a total of 453 fission counts in 8.2 hours
of counting time, corresponding to 55.2 counts per hour. When the ionization
chamber was surrounded with the cadmium shield (0.35 gm/cm2 thickness), 161
counts were obtained in 17.6 hours of counting time, corresponding to 9.1 counts
per hour. Therefore, the U233 fission counting rate due to slow (cadmiumabsorbable) neutrons amounts to about 46.1 counts per hour. When Sample J
was replaced by standard sample U-St-6 ( 200 micrograms of natural uranium
containing 1.4 micrograms of U235), 330 fissions were obtained in 15.5 hours
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of counting, amounting to 21.3 counts per hour under the same conditions.
When the ionization chamber was surrounded with the cadmium shield, 168
fission counts were obtained in 20.7 hours of counting time, which amounts
to 8.1 counts per hour. Thus, the slow neutron fission counting rate of the
U235 is 13.2 counts per hour. The ratio of the slow neutron fission counting
rate of Sample J to standard sample U-St-6 is therefore 46.1/13.2 = 3.5 from
which the slow neutron fission cross section of U233 relative to that of U235
can be calculated, using the weight of U233 in Sample J (3.8 micrograms), as
(3.5)(1.4)/3.8 = 1.3. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.137)
1942-04-05 Yesterday and today Gofman made measurements of the slow neutron
fission rate due to the 0.8 microgram of U233 in sample Th+n-I-Pa-III. Again,
he used the 300 mg Ra-Be source and placed the sample on one electrode of
an ionization chamber imbedded in paraffin and made measurements with and
without a cadmium shield. His counting rate of 11.2 counts per hour (21.8
hours of counting time) without the cadmium shield and 1.9 counts per hour
(11.5 hours of counting time) with the cadmium shield indicates 9.3 counts per
hour due to slow neutron fission. This counting rate of about one-fifth of that
obtained with Sample J, with this sample which has about one-fifth as much
U233, again leads to the result that the slow neutron fission cross section of
U233 is about 1.3 times that of U235. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.139)
1942-04-07 Today Gofman measured the range of the alpha particles from U233 by
comparison of the absorption of these in aluminum foils with the absorption of
Po210 alpha particles (sample Po-St-6) measured under the same conditions.
He used our low geometry ionization chamber-linear amplifier-magnetic field
setup (W-1), with the magnetic field turned off. He finds the range of Po210
to be longer than that of U233 by 1.1 mg per cm2 of Al. Differences in range
between the alpha particles can be converted to differences in air range at 760
mm and 15 deg C using the Livingston and Bethe (Livingston and Bethe, Rev.
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Mod. Phys. 9, 276 [1937]) conversion factor of 1.52 mg per cm2 Al per cm of air.
Thus the range in air of U233 alpha particles is 0.72 cm less than that of Po210
(whose range is 3.92 cm), or 3.2 cm of air at standard conditions (760 mm Hg
and 15 deg C. Taking into account his results of February 18-19 (a range of 3.0
cm), the best value for the range is 3.1±0.2 cm, corresponding to an energy of
4.8 MeV. These data for U233 are the first obtained for an alpha emitter of the
missing (4n+1) radioactive series. It is interesting to note that this point falls
near the Geiger-Nuttal curve for the uranium (4n+2) series. (Seaborg, 1976,
pg.140)
1942-04-08 Working in room 234, Old Chemistry Building, Gofman is beginning
his measurements on the fast neutron fission cross section of U233 using our
new 1 gm radium-beryllium source acquired from the Canadian Radium and
Uranium Company in New York. We now have available a sample prepared
by Kennedy from the output of the uranium isotope separation using the 37inch cyclotron magnet. This sample contains 1.3 micrograms of U235 and 5.2
micrograms of U238 (and 0.0014 microgram of U234); thus, it is possible by also
using a sample of natural uranium to make comparative measurements of the
fast neutron cross section of U233 in comparison with those of U235, U238, as
well as 94-239 (using our Sample B) and Pa231 (being isolated by Stoughton).
Gofman has built a fission-detecting ionization chamber, by the use of cadmium
plate and boron carbide, with an optimal arrangement for measuring the cross
sections due to fast neutrons. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.141)
1942-04-09 Gofman has run into trouble with his experiments on measuring fast
neutron cross sections using our new 1 gm Ra-Be neutron source because this
source has sprung a leak resulting in radon contamination of the ionization
chamber. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.142)
1942-04-12 I wrote an abstract of our report ”Properties of U233” authored by
Gofman, Stoughton and me. The exigencies of my schedule in getting ready
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for my move to Chicago prevents me from preparing the whole report at
this time and so I will get to this soon after my arrival at the Metallurgical
Laboratory. We report in the abstract that we have prepared by neutron
bombardment of Th232 a sample of U233 weighing 3.8 micrograms and with
this have demonstrated that this isotope undergoes fission with slow neutrons
with a cross section about 1.25 times that of U235, has a spontaneous fission
”half-life” greater than 1014 years, and decays by the emission of alpha particles
of range 3.1±0.2 cm, with a half-life of 120,000 years. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.144)
1942-04-13 Today there was a briefing by members from the Army Intelligence
Division concerning the importance of secrecy on our project. It took place at
2:00 pm in room 213 LeConte Hall and all members of my group, including
myself, and all members of the project were required to attend. (Seaborg, 1976,
pg.144)
1942-04-14 I wrote to Professor Arthur H. Compton enclosing copies of our reports
”Properties of U233” (an abstract) by Gofman and me, ”Properties Of 93-237
by Wahl and me (both dated April 13, 1942), and ”Production and Properties of
50-Year Element 94” dated March 20, 1942. I also indicated that Dr. Alexander
Langsdorf has bombarded uranium with deuterons for us at St. Louis so that
we can compare the production of 50-year 94 with that produced in Berkeley;
we have found that the yield at St. Louis is of the order of 1/10 as much as
that at Berkeley.
I also wrote to Dr. Briggs in washington enclosing these three reports and
indicating that this represents the work done under my contract OEMsr-206. I
also informed Dr. Briggs that I am transferring a portion of my men and work
to Chicago.
Later Note: The paper ”Properties of U233” (abstract) was issued immediately
by the S-1 Committee in Washington as report number A-153 dated April 13,
1942 with authors G. T. Seaborg, J. W. Gofman and R. W. Stoughton. After
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the war it was published under the changed title ”Nuclear Propertics of U233:
A New Fissionable Isotope of Uranium” by G. T. Seaborq, J. W. Gofman and
R. W. Stoughton in Phys. Rev. 71, 378 (1947). (Seaborg, 1976, pg.146)
1942-04-17 The leak of the 1 gm Ra-Be neutron source has been temporarily fixed
and Gofman and Friedlander are continuing with the measurement of the
comparative fast neutron fission cross sections of U233, U235, U238, 94-239,
and now Pa231.
Today is the day that I am scheduled to leave with Isadore Perlman to take up
my position at the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago.
Perlman will accompany me so as to be at the Met Lab from the very beginning,
and English will join us there within a week or two. With that start we will try
to build up our group by hiring new people.
The remainder of my group will stay at Berkeley to carry on the research
program and I hope to interest Dean Wendell M. Latimer to take an interest
in, and serve as a leader for, this continued program.
Gofman, working with Friedlander, will finish the measurements on the relative
fast neutron fission cross sections of U233, U235, U238, 94-239 and Pa231. He
will also work on other aspects of induced radioactivity in thorium, such as
the products of deuteron bombardment. He will, however, put an increasing
amount of his time on the development of chemical procedures for the isolation
of 94-239 from uranium and fission products.
Stoughton will continue his work on U233 and the development of methods for
its separation from thorium and fission products.
In the late afternoon Isadore Perlman and I boarded the streamliner ”City of
San Francisco” for our move to Chicago.
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This, then, terminates my account of the early Berkeley work. It will be
continued as part of my description of the continuing work at the Metallurgical
Laboratory at Chicago. (Seaborg, 1976, pg.148-149)
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Appendix B
Extracts from History of Met Lab
Section C-I, Volume 1
1942-04-19 This morning at 9:30 a.m. Isadore Perlman and I arrived in Chicago
aboard the City of San Francisco. Although our trip from Berkeley took almost
two full days, we feel that the time has not been wasted. Many lively discussions
ensued in the privacy of our bedroom and, with appropriate care, in the club car
regarding ways to separate element 94 chemically from uranium (that will be
neutron-irradiated in chain-reacting piles) and from the fission by-products that
will be produced concurrently in the neutron-irradiation process. This overall
problem of element 94 isolation will occupy most of our attention for some time
to come.
This day marks my 30th birthday and a transition point in my life, for
tomorrow I will take on the added responsibility of the 94 chemistry group at
the Metallurgical Laboratory on the University of Chicago campus, the central
component of the Metallurgical Project. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.1)
1942-04-20 Iz Perlman and I are now official members of the Metallurgical
Laboratory, University of Chicago campus, and my salary for the time being
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has been set at $360 per month by Dick Doan, who has the title of Laboratory
Director. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.2)
1942-04-21 I also spent a good deal of time continuing my conversations with von
Halban. Halban and I had a talk with Compton about the importance of U233
as an alternate of 94-239.
In my continuing conversation with Compton I raised the question of Ray
Stoughton’s continuing our neon work (code name for thorium-U233 project) in
Berkeley. Compton is very eager that he do so, and with all possible speed, as
it may play an important part in the general program of the future. As part of
our research program at Berkeley, Gofman, Stoughton and I showed that U233
has a slow-neutron fission cross section about 25% greater than that of U235.
(Gofman is doing his Ph.D. research work with me at Berkeley, continuing
there after my departure; he, together with Stoughton, working with me in a
postdoctoral capacity, participated in the discovery and demonstration of the
slow neutron fissionability of U233.) Also, it may turn out that U233 is superior
to 94-239 because more secondary neutrons may be emitted during fission and
it is easier to isolate chemically. I wrote to Ray informing him of this decision,
which I am sure will please him. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.8)
1942-04-28 I dictated to Mrs. Sullivan some of the first draft of the complete
report ”Properties of U233” by G. T. Seaborg, J. W. Gofman and R. W.
Stoughton. This will describe in detail our work at Berkeley on the discovery
and determination of the slow neutron fissionability of U233. (Seaborg, 1977,
pg.19)
1942-05-05 I prepared a letter to Gofman to be used in transmitting the rough
draft of the write-up on U233 as soon as Mrs. Sullivan types it. I asked that
Stoughton as the other co-author have a look at it too. In my talks with Halban
he convinced me that we should be bombarding solid thorium nitrate rather than
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the saturated solution that we used last time. I asked Gofman to convey this
information to Stoughton, who should prepare a solid thorium nitrate sample
of about 75 pounds and use the same geometrical arrangement employed by
Kamen, Wahl and Kennedy in the big neutron bombardment of uranium that
is under way to produce experiinental quantities of 94-239. (Seaborg, 1977,
pg.34)
1942-06-02 Ray Stoughton, who is working in Room 311, and I went over the work
that he has been doing on the Berkeley project. We also had a chance to
talk about our joint paper, co-authored by Gofman, on the properties of U233.
We expect its publication as a Laboratory Report in a week or so. It will
be rather long; it sums up all our investigations on U233, including the various
experiments performed to measure the radioactive and fission properties of U233
and the chemical procedures followed.
We also discussed future experiments on the separation of thorium-232,
protactinium-233 and uranium-233 by the fluorination method. I proposed
that he prepare some thorium fluoride incorporating 7-day U237 tracer and
then send it to us at Chicago for fluorination. We will then return it so that he
can identify the U237 to see whether it will be found in the volatile uranium
hexafluoride fraction as expected. In addition, we discussed the optimum ratio
of hydrogen to thorium for his forthcoming large bombardment of thorium with
neutrons at the 60-inch cyclotron to produce more U233, and parent Pa233, for
experimentation purposes. Ray is a good Ph.D. chemist and enthusiastic about
his participation in the program. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.66)
1942-06-11 Our Report ”Properties of U233” under the authorship of Gofman,
Stoughton and me was issued today as Report CC-126. This covers our work
at Berkeley and was written (dictated to Mrs. Sullivan) soon after my arrival
in Chicago with the help of Gofman and Stoughton through correspondence.
I had previously written an abstract of this report (Report A153) while still
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in Berkeley. In this more complete report we describe the processes for the
production and chemical isolation of our 3.8 microgram sample of U233 (Sample
J) and our measurements of the growth of U233 in chemically isolated samples
of the parent Pa233, one of which led to an additional sample of U233 of 0.8
microgram. We describe our measurements on these two samples with our 300
mg radium-beryllium neutron source which have established the slow neutron
fission cross section of U233 as about 1.3 times that of U235. We also report that
the growth experiments have established a half-life for U233 as 120,000 years
and that our measurements on its alpha particles indicate a range of 3.1±0.2
cm of air (at 15◦ C, 760 mm). We also report that our search for spontaneous
fission in U233 using the 3.8-microgram sample indicates that the ”half-life” for
this process may be greater than 1014 years. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.76)
1942-06-29 Stoughton wrote from Berkeley notifying me that he is sending two
samples of thorium fluoride (containing 7-day U237 as tracer) for use in testing
the U233-thorium fluoride volatility separation process which we discussed
when I was in Berkeley the first of this month. Shortly after receiving the
letter, the samples themselves were delivered and Brown and Hill set to work
fluorinating them. They finished tonight and we airmailed the fractions back
to Stoughton. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.95)
1942-06-30 I replied to Stoughton, informing him that his fluorinated samples are
now on the way back and giving him suggestions on the procedures to follow in
measuring them. I asked that he order another fifty pounds of thorium nitrate
in view of the slow delivery. Also informed him that I am distressed about the
interruption in the bombardment of his thorium sample. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.97)
1942-07-09 I received a letter from Gofman saying he and Duffield are ready to start
the fast neutron fission measurements as soon as the one-gram Ra-Be arrives;
he has worked up the deuteron-bombarded thorium and is now following the
decay of the samples. He reports that there is no hope of producing U233 by
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this method as the yield is too low. Also there appears to be a short-lived Pa232
decaying by beta emission into an alpha-emitting U232 of reasonably short halflife, which he will verify in about a week. He reassures me that the electroplated
samples of U234 that Fontana gave him are truly U234. He has completed a
long spontaneous fission count on the 0.4-microgram sample and stands ready
to write a report on this and on the new Pa232-U232 isotopes. (Seaborg, 1977,
pg.109-110)
1942-07-17 Ray Stoughton’s letter was the bearer of good news. Just as Kamen
has promised, the 60-inch cyclotron at Berkeley is now back in business and our
thorium nitrate sample is receiving a good neutron bombardment. The sample
went in Thursday of last week and soon will be removed for chemistry.
Ray went on to say that he has ordered the additional fifty pounds of thorium
nitrate according to my request of June 30. He described the results of working
up the two neutron-irradiated samples of thorium fluoride he sent us June 29 for
fluorination for his thorium-uranium separation and which we returned the same
day. The distillate from the fluorination yielded 25-35% of the uranium, and
that which remained in the thorium fluoride residue was successfully extracted
by digestion with fuming sulfuric acid. He also reported that 23 micrograms
of Pa231 were obtained from the carnotite ore residue obtained from Morris
Perlman and Bonner. He said that he, Wahl and Duffield would like me to
send them past and future copies of the notes from my course (Tuesday evening
lectures) in nuclear chemistry. These are the notes prepared by Coryell which
are already available individually for a number of the lectures and which will
soon be available as a total package. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.125)
1942-07-18 I also sent a telegram to Stoughton, referring to the thorium nitrate,
”How many microampere hours do you plan to give it?” (Seaborg, 1977, pg.128)
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1942-07-20 Stoughton sent a telegram in response to my inquiry about the thorium
neutron bombardment. He said that it was completed last Wednesday midnight
with 15,000 microampere-hours. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.133)
1942-08-06 Latimer arrived in Chicago this morning. He came to my office and we
had an interesting discussion regarding the work in general at Berkeley and here.
Later my secretary gave me a letter that just arrived from Stoughton in Berkeley.
He was perturbed that their project has no A-1-A priority yet, although their
secretary, Mrs. Moquin, expects the priority in a week or so, and asked for my
help in pushing it through. They are finding it difficult to order equipment and
electronic parts. I responded that I would see that something is done about it
immediately. My letter also stated that I was pleased his U233 separation has
gone so well and noted how the U233 from this run will be used. (1) A sample
of approximately five micrograms will go to Manley here so that he and others
can determine the fast-neutron fission cross section of U233, and (2) as large a
sample as possible will go to Gofman so that he can measure the spontaneous
fission rate of U233. In regard to his problem of separating small amounts of
uranium from large amounts of thorium, I suggested that U232 might serve as
the best tracer in practice experiments with unirradiated thorium. I asked him
to tell Gofman that Fermi extends him his most cordial thanks for the fission
measurements made on UX1 and UY. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.168-169)
1942-09-13 Working in our apartment this afternoon, I dictated to Helen a
memorandum on the position of U233 in our project, something that has been
on my mind for some time. I have the feeling that insufficient attention is being
given to the potential of this isotope as a back-up product should the nuclear
properties of 94-239 and U235 be deficient in some respect. I feel that if I
prepare and circulate a memorandum pointing out this possibility it will attract
the required attention. In my memorandum I describe the production of U233
by the slow neutron bombardment of Th232 and also review its radioactive
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and fission properties. I point out that the U233 will have to be produced
in conjunction with a chain-reacting pile operating on uranium and that the
intensity of fission products can be kept relatively low because Th232 is not
fissionable with slow neutrons. I also describe a number of possible methods
for the chemical separation of U233 from the large masses of thorium, including
the volatility process in which the volatile uranium hexafluoride is separated,
the peroxide process in which the thorium and uranium are precipitated as
peroxides with the subsequent separation of uranium by dissolving its peroxide
in sodium hydroxide solution, and the fluoride method in which the thorium is
precipitated as the fluoride leaving the soluble uranyl in solution. I emphasize
that we have worked on all of these methods and that our research program
on extraction processes for the separation of 94-239 from neutron-bombarded
uranium also gives us a background of relevant experience. (Seaborg et al., 1994,
pg.185)
1942-09-18 My other report, ”Proposal for the Production and Use of U233,” which
I dictated to Helen last Sunday, is being issued as Report CF-268. (Seaborg,
1977, pg.251)
1942-09-19 I was glad to receive a letter from Stoughton today, but the contents
were somewhat disturbing. His draft board in Bryan, Texas, referred him
to Berkeley Local Board #70 for a physical examination, which he took last
Wednesday night. It was announced during the exam that all who passed
would be reclassified into 1A within ten days and then be inducted thereafter.
Hamaker, he said, who had a similar experience a week earlier, received a notice
on Thursday, the day the letter was mailed, that his draft board is going to leave
him in 2A status until November 21, at which time it will consider his case for
another six month’s deferment.
Helen and I left today for my visit to Site X and a week-long vacation for us
in the Smoky Mountains of Tennessee... Later, Helen and I took a train to
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Cincinnati, where in the evening we changed to another train for Knoxville,
Tennessee. Gatlinburg (and the Smokies) is only a short but scenic bus ride
from there. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.257)
1942-09-25 We took an early bus for Knoxville, dropped our bags at the Andrew
Johnson Hotel and boarded another bus for Clinton, a small town that lies
within a few miles of the farmlands that will be converted into Site X. Here we
got off for a visit to Norris Dam and sightseeing until another bus came along
to take us back to Knoxville where we spent the night in the Andrew Johnson
Hotel. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.260)
1942-09-30 Stoughton wrote a four-page letter. He is sending me 250 microcuries
of Pa233, and later some U232, that Gofman said I requested. He reports on
his difficulty in working up the target from a 500 microampere-hour run of
deuterons on thorium (to produce Pa232 and daughter U232). The big run on
thorium plus neutrons (to produce Pa233 and daughter U233) apparently has a
lower yield than expected; but the chemistry, which he describes in detail, went
satisfactorily; he expects to find about 8 to 10 micrograms of U233.
”As I told you,” he wrote, ”Fontana is now working on the uranium-thorium
separation with me. Since he wants to get as close to organic chemistry as
possible, he is now working on the ether extraction and will later work on
organic compounds of uranium and thorium as a means of separation. I am
putting all available time on inorganic methods and any other methods which
can be found. I believe several methods will work all right, but they all so far
involve removing the thorium from the uranium, except for the ether extraction
which does look somewhat promising. If any work has been done that you know
of on the effect of radiation on organic material (especially ether), I would like
to know about it, since the Pa233 will make the thorium very active.” (Seaborg,
1977, pg.272)
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1942-10-26 ”(1) Space should be left adjoining Pile II in which to place thorium
for the production of U233. An amount of U233 of the order of milligrams to
grams will be useful for the further study of the neutron and spontaneous fission
properties of U233. Likewise it is desirable to practice on the extraction of U233
from larger amounts of thorium than have been used so far. About one or two
tons of thorium compound should be sufficient for this purpose, and therefore
a sufficient amount of space to accommodate this amount of material will be
needed. It does not seem advisable at this time to try to devise arrangements
for placing the thorium within the pile; the placement of the thorium near
the edge of the pile should be sufficient to meet the requirements of these
experiments.” (Seaborg, 1977, pg.314)
1942-10-31 Our report, ”Production and Properties of U232” by Gofman and me,
was issued today as Report CN-332. This covers work that has been done at
Berkeley by Gofman during the last few months at my suggestion. He has found
that the bombardment of thorium with the 16 MeV deuterons in the Berkeley
60-inch cyclotron produces, in addition to the 27.4-day Pa233, the new isotope
Pa232. The Pa232 is produced by a (d,2n) reaction and decays with a half-life
of 1.6 days by the emission of beta particles and gamma rays. The Pa232 decays
to the alpha-emitting daughter U232 whose half-life of 30 years is estimated by
measuring its yield of alpha particles produced from the complete decay of a
sample of Pa232 whose absolute beta intensity was determined with the use of
a calibrated Lauritsen electroscope. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.322)
1942-11-03 During the last few weeks I have been worried about an aspect of a
nuclear weapon made of element 94 that might make it inoperable and have
discussed this thoroughly with Perlman. Suppose we purify 94-239 for a bomb,
but there is a minute trace of boron or other light element in it. Won’t the
alpha particles emitted by the 94 in its radioactive decay react with such light
elements to produce neutrons and thus trigger the bomb prematurely? If so,
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what about the great concern that Oppenheimer and the other theoreticians
have about the possibility that 94-239 has an unacceptable rate of spontaneous
fission? The more I have pondered the matter the more I have become convinced
of my conclusion. So I started making rough calculations. My calculations are
inescapable: if I am right, then 49 for a working bomb would have to be purified
from light elements beyond anyone’s imagination. I have checked my concern
with Teller and Manley, and they agree that the fate of the whole 49 project
hangs in the balance.
By the time I reached my office this morning I already had composed a letter
in my head to Oppenheimer which I dictated to Miss Smith (with a copy to
Arthur Compton):
”Dear Robert: ”There is one point that has been worrying me quite
a good deal since the discussion that we had in Berkeley the early
part of last nonth. This relates to the number of neutrons that it
is permissible to have present in the final 49 product in order not
to cause complications in its control. You have stated that it would
be ideal if the spontaneous fission rate were as long as 1019 years.
If this figure is a desirable limit, and if you cannot get around it
any other way, this creates a formidable chemical problem because
of the possibility of forming neutrons from the (α,n) reaction on
light element impurities. Since the alpha-emitting life of 49 is about
104 years, 1015 alphas must not produce an undesirable neutron.
Assuming that an element like boron, for example, has a cross section
for the (α,n) reaction of about 1 in 104 , this would mean that boron
must be absent in the final product to the extent of 1 part in 1011 .
”You can see why I am disturbed if this calculation is correct and
if you are actually limited by this requirement. Even if you can
stand 105 times as many neutrons as this, making the limits of light
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impurities which are permissible one part in about a million, the final
chemical purification is still a formidable problem. In fact, if these
requirements are going to be placed upon our chemical procedures, I
should like to know definitely about it as soon as possible since this
will require a great deal of development work along lines which so far
have never been attempted.
”I have discussed this matter somewhat with Dr.

Manley and

Dr. Teller and I believe that they also consider it a rather serious
problem.” (Seaborg, 1977, pg.325-326)
1942-11-09 All last week I was in suspense wondering what Oppenheimer’s response
to my letter would be. Today I received his reply. He also sent copies to Manley,
Teller and Compton. Because of its significance, I will quote in full:
”Dear Glenn: ”Thanks for your fine letter. The problem you raise
is not a new one, nor is it limited to the 49. I’ve thought about it
a little in connection with the 25-24, and it is probably time to get
possibilities clear.
”With the 25 alone matters would not be so bad: a concentration of
light impurities (B, Be, Al, C, N) of 10−4 would give us the more than
ideal 1019 years equivalent. If, as in our present set up, almost all the
24 goes along with the 25, then things are about 25 times worse. I
believe that we can probably get along with 1017 years equivalent if
we have to. Therefore I should say that the chemical problem with
the 24-25 mixture was hard but probably soluble. Do you agree in
this?
”With the 49, even allowing a factor 10 in your estimate of yield and
a factor 100 in our requirements, it still comes to a purity of about
10−8 . Is this hopeless?
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”It would be a help to know what you think on these points fairly
soon, since if your answers are in the negative it will mean not only
rather radical and I am afraid rather inefficient redesign, but also
the immediate prospect of some new production problems for other
materials.
”How bad is 23?
”Thanks again for your letter, and let me know what your ideas are
this chemistry are as soon as you can.
”With all good greetings,”
It is clear that we have a very serious problem in the purification of 49 and that
this is going to receive intensive top-level attention in the days immediately
ahead. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.337-338)
1942-11-24 ”New Isotopes.—Work on methods of separation of 94 is being continued. Development of design information for three of the most immediately
promising types of extraction process is being continued by the chemical
engineers, for handling one ton of metal per 24 hours. By bombardment of
thorium with deuterons at Berkeley, the new isotope Pa232 has been produced.
This decays with a half-life 1.6 days into U232, an alpha-emitter with halflife about 30 years. This U232 will be extremely useful for tracing very small
amounts of uranium, e.g., in the work of the health group. (Seaborg, 1977,
pg.371)
1942-11-25 The meeting turned to a discussion of the relative merits of heavy water
versus helium-cooled piles for the production plant. Later on I suggested that it
would be desirable to push production of U233 inasmuch as uranium metallurgy
is already understood and U233 could stand ten times as many impurities as
94-239; moreover, its nuclear properties are as well known. Its production rate
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is less than that of 94-239, but a heavy water pile would help decrease this
disadvantage. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.376)
1942-12-02 The Lewis investigative committee is back in Chicago following their
visit to Berkeley, presumably to inform Compton about the fate of the
Metallurgical Laboratory.

The first committee member I saw today was

Greenewalt. We met late this afternoon in the corridor of Eckhart Hall. As he
approached me, I could see from his demeanor he was bursting with good news.
The aura of cheerfulness and excitement that he carried with him and the way
he held out his hand in greeting told me that this signified more than just taking
pleasure in seeing me again. Then when I heard him say he had just come from
the West Stands, I understood the reason for his jubilation. Fermi has produced
a chain reaction—the pile is a success! Greenewalt said that Fermi, Whitaker,
Zinn and their crew started the experiment this morning. As the control rods
were cautiously withdrawn throughout the day a few inches at a tine, Fermi
would take the new meter readings, and using his slide rule, would calculate
the multiplication factor. Greenewalt said that he and Compton stood on the
balcony, alongside Fermi and most of his crew, watching the proceedings. Then
at 3:20 p.m., Fermi called for a few more centimeters. The pile became selfsustaining; in a few minutes the output of the chain reaction rose to one watt.
Fermi ordered the reaction stopped, and everyone was tremendously relieved
to see that the activity could be extinguished by shoving the rods back into
place. The reaction took place without requiring as much material as Fermi
earlier anticipated (and thus he was two weeks ahead of schedule), and it was
not necessary to use the balloon to exclude air from the pile. However, he did
use almost six tons of uranium metal, 50 tons of uranium oxide, and 400 tons
of graphite, nearly as much as predicted. (I learned later that Zinn, Anderson
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and their pile builders reached a point where they knew the pile would be selfsustaining very early this morning but did not proceed to this historic point,
leaving this dramatic act for a more convenient time later in the day.)
Of course we have no way of knowing if this is the first time a sustained chain
reaction has been achieved. The Germans may have beaten us to it. I wonder,
are they aware that U233 can be made from Th232 and 94-239 from U238 in
a chain-reacting pile and that either of these isotopes can be used in a fission
bomb? And if they have a pile that chain-reacts, would they use it to generate
power or to produce vast amounts of radioactivity as a military weapon? One
thing is certain; although Fermi has demonstrated that we now have a means
of manufacturing 94-239 in copious amounts, it is the responsibility of chemists
to show that the 94 can be extracted and purified to the degree required for a
working bomb. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.390-391)
1942-12-09 I wrote to Stoughton complimenting him and Fontana on the excellent
work with U233, as evidenced by a report they recently sent me. I said that the
information office may decide to issue all U233 reports in a special category. It
was Stoughton, along with Gofman and me, who demonstrated the fissionability
of U233 last February 2, almost a year ago. I informed Stoughton, ”I have made
considerable progress within the last few weeks in selling the authorities here on
the idea of producing and using U233 as an alternative to the use of 94-239 and
U235. The advantages are becoming more and more apparent to those who make
the decisions, and I think that there is no doubt that thorium will be placed
around some of the operating piles. For example, there will probably be placed
about a ton or two of thorium near pile number two (i.e., the approximately 10
MW pile) in order to further test the usefulness of U233.”
In my letter I said that there are a number of factors in the production and
use of U233 that I did not bring out in my report CF-268, ”Proposal for the
Production and Use of U233,” issued last September 18, and that I intend to
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write a supplementary report bringing out these facts as soon as I find time. I
told him that Brown had done some more work on the extraction of U233 using
hydrogen fluoride and fluorine, and perhaps we can soon issue all our reports
together. ”I should like to keep in close touch with your work on U233,” I
continued, ”and I will try from now on to keep you more closely informed on
the progress which I make in actually arranging for the manufacture and use
of this material. As you know, the use of U233 is a rather new idea (although
it shouldn’t be) to a number of the people who are running things, who are all
wound up in their considerations about the use of 94-239 and U235.” (Seaborg,
1977, pg.405)
1942-12-16 A report entitled ”U233 Production and Extraction” (No. CC-384) is
being issued covering the period to December 15, 1942, inaugurating a new
monthly series of reports summarizing progress of work on U233. This report
opens with a section ”General Considerations on the Production of U233”
written by me. Here I amplify the general considerations that I covered in
report CF-268 issued on September 18 of this year. I describe the methods
of production of U233 through the bombardment of Th232 by the neutrons
produced in a chain-reacting pile, its possible use as an alternate source of
energy for a nuclear weapon should the use of 94-239 or U235 prove to be
not feasible, and various methods of chemical separation of the U233 and
its immediate parent Pa233 from the neutron-irradiated Th232 and fission
products. Also included are a report by R. W. Stoughton of the Berkeley
Laboratory on ”Production of U233 by Use of Thorium in Conjunction with
the Uranium Pile,” a report by B. J. Fontana of the Berkeley Laboratory on
”Separation of Minute Amounts of Uranium from Large Quantities of Thorium
by Ether Extraction,” a report by Brown and Hill on ”Volatility Methods for
Isolating U233,” and a report by A. C. G. Mitchell of Indiana University on
plans to make measurements on the beta particles of Pa233. Stoughton at
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Berkeley is now working full time on the U233 problem while Fontana is devoting
some of his time to this problem but is phasing into other work on plutonium
chemistry. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.418-419)
1943-01-06 I had a long meeting with Stoughton to discuss his progress on the U233
program. I invited him to join my group at the Met Lab, on a permanent basis,
to lead the U233 work there; this work will be phased out at Berkeley, continued
and expanded at the Met Lab. Stoughton accepted my offer and will move to
Chicago within about a month. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.447-448)
1943-01-20 The report ”U233 Production and Extraction” for the month ending
January 15, 1943, has been issued with the report number CC-426. In this
report I have written a section entitled ”Production of Experimental Amounts
of U in Conjunction with Intermediate Power Chain-Reacting Structures” in
which I describe procedures for the production of U233 by irradiating thorium
in conjunction with a chain-reacting pile. I describe methods of extracting the
intermediate Pa233, separating it from uranium, and then allowing it to decay
in order to form pure U233 daughter; this method of isolation of U233 gets
around the problem of its dilution with any initial uranium impurity that is
present in the neutron-irradiated thorium. I describe volatility methods using
the volatile fluoride of Pa233 and also aqueous chemical methods for isolating
the Pa233. The method I describe is for the first production of pure U233 in
small amounts in conjunction with the piles that the Metallurgical Project has
under consideration. In the ultimate production units where large amounts of
U233 would be produced, the procedure may be to use uranium-free thorium
and to extract the U233 itself rather than the Pa233 intermediate from the
thorium. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.472)
1943-01-21 They asked me if I am still interested in irradiating some thorium in
the pile [the second pile at Argonne] to produce U233, and I replied there
isn’t sufficient time to prepare the extraction equipment. I suggested that the
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chemical extraction plant for 94-239 at Argonne might occupy a building 20
feet x 80 feet in area including a chemistry laboratory and a counter room each
20 feet x 20 feet. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.473)
1943-02-07 Ray Stoughton, John Gofman and Cliff Garner arrived in Chicago
from Berkeley; Ray is joining my section and the other two are visiting our
laboratory. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.512)
1943-02-08 Raymond W. Stoughton started work in Section C-I as a Research
Associate, coming from the University of California, Berkeley, where he worked
with me on the discovery of U233, the demonstration of its slow neutron
fissionability and the general problem of its production and chemical separation.
It is my intention that he carry on the U233 research here—in fact, be
in charge of it—but in view of the urgency of work on the adsorption
method for the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission
products, I am having him start on this problem. He will eventually
make his headquarters in Room 2 but will be helping Willard in Room 11 in
the interim. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.512)
1943-02-15 ”Report for Period Ending February 13, 1943.

U233 Production

and Extraction” (Report No. CN-454) is being issued. In this Stoughton
presents information on the two different methods under which a U233-thorium
separation may be made: (1) directly, after a few months of Pa233 decay
and (2) in two steps, the first separating the intermediate Pa233 from the
thorium immediately after bombardment, and the second separating U233
from the remaining Pa233 after sufficient decay of the latter. He reports on
experiments to attempt to increase the efficiency of some of the methods already
under consideration for U233-Th separation and to seek a satisfactory organic
precipitating agent. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.524-525)
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1943-02-16 The first memorandum to Whitaker proposed that space be left with the
pile at Site X for the irradiation of 50-100 pounds of thorium salt, which would
produce enough U233 to make possible further studies of its nuclear properties.
I suggested that slots be left in the center of the pile so as to allow for the
placing of four 1”-diameter tubes about 20 feet long to contain the thorium
salt. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.527)
1943-03-24 Stoughton submitted a four-page memorandum to me proposing experiments to be carried out for the purpose of testing various methods for
separations of Pa233 from thorium; U233 from thorium; and U233 from
Pa233.

It was divided into five sections: I. Volatility Methods, II. Wet

Methods, III. Ether Extraction for U233, Th and U233, Pa233 Separations, IV.
Ultramicrochemical Experiments, and V. Preparations of thorium compounds
for use in conjunction with a uranium pile. A final section was devoted to a
suggested order of conducting the experiments. He noted: ”The ether extraction
method is considered very important and it will undoubtedly be used in some
part of the extraction, decontamination, purification of U233; it was put in
Group III merely because it has already been pretty well investigated. In order
to accomplish the planned work in a few months time, at least three additional
men will be required.” (Seaborg, 1977, pg.599-600)
1943-03-30 I submitted a memorandum to Compton outlining the duties of the 20
men from the ”Chemistry of Final Products” section who will be at the Site X
laboratory. Besides assisting the semiworks people with development work and
trouble-shooting in the extraction plant, they will work on decontamination
studies since there will be sufficient fission products present to give final
answers on the extent of decontamination possible. There will also be some
microchemists to prepare samples of the progressively increasing amounts of
plutonium for shipment to Chicago and elsewhere.

other problems to be

handled will be (1) development of methods for extracting protoactinium and
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uranium-233 from the thorium salt to be irradiated in the pile; (2) to attempt
the extraction of 93-237 as a means of determining the yield of the (n,2n)
reaction in the operating pile and to obtain samples for chemical studies; (3)
the development of methods for separating plutonium from the UF6 tubes to
be operated in the pile. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.616)
1943-04-12 Stoughton told me that last Wednesday he made lead absorption
measurements on the gamma rays from the 27.4-day beta-emitting Pa233 using
different Geiger counters and slightly differing set-ups, each designed to avoid
the contributions of bremsstrahlung. He found by analysis of the absorption
curves the presence of two gamma rays of 0.4 and 1.5 MeV, respectively. Judging
from their intensity and the known large number of conversion electrons, he
estimates that in Pa233 there are probably two gamma ray transitions per
beta particle and about one-half gamma ray per beta particle emerges without
internal conversion. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.647)
1943-04-13 At the meeeting of Section C-I Extraction Group Research Associates
held in my office this evening, I reviewed the status of bombardments at St.
Louis, the status of plans for Sites X and W as they affect our Section, and the
properties and potential for use of U233. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.651)
1943-04-14 Paul A. Schulze started to work in Section C-I today as a Research
Assistant, coming from the University of Chicago where he has been working
on the OSRD uranium project directed by Professor Schlesinger. I plan to have
him work on the U233 problem in Room 2 as soon as I can get a group under
Stoughton started on this. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.651)
1943-04-19 Separation methods for extraction of U223 from thorium—Summaries
are given of methods considered for separation of U233 from thorium (wet
methods, volatility methods, ether extraction, etc.), separation of Pa233 from
thorium (MnO2 extraction, iodate concentration, wet fluoride) and separation
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of U233 from Pa233 (ether extraction, wet methods, volatility). (Seaborg, 1977,
pg.663)
1943-04-23 Leonard I. Katzin, who arrived yesterday, started work as a Research
Associate in Section C-I today, coming from the University of Rochester School
of Medicine, where he has been a research fellow in the Radiology Department.
He graduated from UCLA in chemistry, where I knew him as a fellow chemistry
student at the time of my attendance there. I am going to have him work with
Stoughton in Room 2 on the U233 problem. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.674-675)
1943-04-26 Gofman and Sheline had dinner with us this evening. At the Chemistry
Division seminar afterwards, Sheline described the present status of the Berkeley
research on the Sodium Uranyl Acetate Process, Gofman summarized their
investigations of 93 chemistry and fission products and Stoughton gave a status
report on our U233 program. Waldo Cohn played an amusing record which
is a sort of parody on the cyclotron. After the meeting I had a beer with
Ghiorso, Gofman, Sheline, Boyd and Coryell at Hanley’s, a beer joint on 55th
Street. (Seaborg, 1977, pg.678)
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Appendix C
Extracts from History of Met Lab
Section C-I, Volume 2
1943-05-26 Wigner called attention to some articles in the German scientific
literature on the diffusion length of neutrons and their adsorption indicating
that they were running neck and neck with us in 1941 and 1942 in their
investigation of these subjects. There was also some discussion of using thorium
in the pile shield in order to produce some uranium-233 as a second line of
defense should the use of plutonium-239 prove not to be feasible. (Seaborg,
1978, pg.32)
1943-05-31 The U233 production and extraction group now consists of Katzin,
Stoughton, Schulze, and Steahly. They have been working the last month
or so on the development of methods for separating the U233 that will be
produced by neutron bombardment of thorium in the pile at Site X. Since the
concentration of U233 in the neutron-bombarded thorium will not exceed about
one part in 107 , it is necessary to isolate the U233 in the form of its parent,
the Pa233 intermediate. They have developed methods for precipitating Pa233
from the dissolved neutron-bombarded thorium on manganese dioxide and also
on thorium iodate in a partial precipitation of thorium. The decision has been
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made to bombard the thorium in the pile at Site X in the form of thorium
carbonate because this compound dissolves quite readily in nitric acid and
should contain no elements other than thorium which have high neutron-capture
cross sections. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.38-39)
1943-06-01 I attended the regular Tuesday evening meeting of the extraction
group of our section.

Others present were Apple, Beaton, Brown, V. R.

Cooper Cunningham, Dreher, English, Fries, Ghiorso, Hindman, Jaffey, Katzin,
Orlemann, Peery, Perlman, Clifford Smith, Steahly, Thompson, Watters, and
Willard. Katzin and Steahly discussed the choice of a thorium compound for
bombardment in the pile at Site X. Present plans call for the use of thorium
carbonate which will be compressed into cans, with about 80 pounds to be
irradiated at one time. As the amount of U233 to be produced is small, it is
planned to separate the parent Pa233 from the thorium in order to obtain the
daughter u233 free from traces of ordinary uranium that may have been present
in the original thorium. Experiments now in progress show that MnO2 carries
90% of the Pa233 with only 1% of the thorium. The Pa233 concentrates in the
precipitate when thorium is partially precipitated as the iodate. This method
of concentration might work better at higher levels of Pa233 concentration than
does the MnO2 method. It is estimated that 4 or 5 mg of U233 may be formed
in 80 pounds of thorium carbonate by 10 days’ bombardment in the pile at Site
X. Brown discussed current experiments he and Bohlmann are performing at
Argonne to determine the feasibility of pumping UF6 . It is planned eventually
to circulate UF6 through a pipe inserted in the pile. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.44)
1943-06-08 Perlman sent a memo to Dr.

Stone indicating additional possible

hazards to personnel in the experimental work to be carried out by our section
at Clinton Laboratories. The major new hazards anticipated are radiation from
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neptunium-239 during the isolation of the plutonium and from protactinium233 during its separation from pile-irradiated thorium and the possibility of
burns from fluorine gas and fluorides. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.51)
1943-06-15 Compton also reported his suggestion to Conant that within six months
we should be giving emphasis to other aspects such as power production. Conant
agreed in principle but questioned the date. In a discussion with Compton and
Allison, Fermi indicated that probabilities are that U233 will be less useful
than Pu239. Five hundred micrograms of U233 would be enough for neutron
multiplication tests. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.56)
1943-06-19 The U233 production and extraction group, consisting of Katzin,
Stoughton, Schulze, and Steahly, has found that Pa233 can be volatilized by
hydrofluorination of neutron-bombarded thorium. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.59)
1943-06-26 ”Chemical Research—U233 Production and Extraction.

Report for

Month Ending June 21, 1943” (CC-739) is being issued and includes the
following report by Katzin, Schulze, Steahly, and Stoughton. The precipitation
of Pa233 with MnO2 , from a solution of thorium nitrate has been studied in
some detail and found satisfactory up to 36 gm Th(NO3 )4-4H2 O per 100 cc
solution. The concentration of Pa233 with respect to the manganese dioxide
carrier and the thorium precipitated with the carrier appears to be accomplished
quite well by either a series of MnO2 cycles or thorium iodate cycles. Volatility
methods for both the separation of Pa233 from the original thorium and for its
separation from MnO2 are now under investigation. After a study of its physical
characteristics, it has been decided that thorium carbonate will be the thorium
compound used in the pile at Site X. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.69)
1943-06-29 Tonight there was the regular Tuesday evening meeting of the Extraction
Group of my section attended by Apple, Brown, V. R. Cooper, Cunningham,
Davidson, Dean, Dreher, English, Ghiorso, Hindman, Katz, Morris, Peery,
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Potratz, Clifford Smith, Steahly, Stoughton, and Thompson. The meeting
consisted of a review of current work on extraction methods. Stoughton outlined
the work now being done on the effect of thorium to iodate ratio and total iodate
concentration on the carrying of protactinium by the partial precipitation of
thorium as the iodate. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.73)
1943-07-07 Whitaker mentioned it would probably be September 1 before the
Clinton pile starts up and that he would like to have some definite plans
and schedules on the materials that are to go into the pile. This brought
up the subject of U233 production. Allison said that Newson is planning
to put in enough thorium to make 1 milligram per day at 1,000 kW, and
Compton remarked that Site Y has requested 2 milligrams in addition to what
is needed here at Chicago. Compton then requested Allison to prepare a memo
in collaboration with Fermi on the amounts of U233 required. (Seaborg, 1978,
pg.84)
1943-07-17 Perlman sent a memorandum to Donald Hughes, Jr., Special Assistant
to Compton, commenting on a letter from Conant to Compton regarding
the relative amounts of gamma activity associated with the ”23” system as
compared with the ”49” system. Perlman gave the results of computations on
gamma activity associated with 250 grams of product (Pu239 or U233); these
show that, at moderate intervals of time after pile shutdown (6 days to 60 days),
the gamma activity of the two systems is comparable; at a shutdown time of
one year, the U233 system is considerably more favorable with a fission product
activity of 200 curies for U233 versus 10,000 curies for Pu239. At the earlier
time periods there is a considerable contribution from the 27-day Pa233 in the
”23” system. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.93)
1943-07-26 There was a Laboratory Council Information Meeting on chemistry at
9:30 am, attended by Allison, Boyd, Brewer, Burton, Chipman, Compton,
Conant, C. M. Cooper, Coryell, Davies, Doan, Fermi, Garrison, Gofman,
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Hilberry, Hughes, W. Johnson, Miles, Mulliken, Perlman, Potratz, Rubinson,
Stearns, Stone, Sugarman, Wigner, Willard, Smyth later, Spedding later, and
Johns even later. The presentation of the work of our Chemistry Section C-I was
as follows. Willard discussed reduction methods for plutonium, waste treatment
studies, the work of English, et al., on control analysis procedures and the new
alpha counter with magnetic deflector. Also cited was Cefola’s work indicating
possibility of a double salt of lanthanum and plutonium fluorides and the work
on adsorption processes using Catex-284. Perlman discussed the plans to
obtain U233 from the Clinton pile for the study of physical properties
of its production process. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.106)
1943-08-07 ”Chemical Research—U233 Production and Extraction, Report for
Month Ending August 7, 1943” (CC-887) was issued. Stoughton reported it
is now planned that the thorium will be irradiated in the Site X pile
in the form of the carbonate, with the extraction to be accomplished
by dissolving the thorium carbonate in nitric acid and removing
the intermediate Pa233 from this solution with manganese dioxide
precipitation. The Pa233 will then be allowed to stand in a suitable
medium until a large portion of it has decayed to U233 that will then
be extracted and purified. Experiments demonstrate that MnO2 carries
about 90% of the protactinium and less than one percent of tracer quantities of
uranium. The latter finding is important from the standpoint of separation of
the Pa233 from any natural uranium impurity in the thorium. (Seaborg, 1978,
pg.122-123)
1943-08-12 I held the regular evening meeting of the Council of Section C-I in my
office attended by Perlman, Brown, Cunningham, Willard, and Thompson. I
pointed out there will be three groups under Perlman at Site X—English, in
charge of electronics and extraction; Brown, in charge of dry methods and
also concentration; Stoughton, in charge of the U2 problem. There is now
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great pressure on the plutonium metal production work, and Manning will be
transferred from the extraction group to work with Kirk. It is evident that all
the groups of Section C-I must have more men. Cunningham will take over
Stoughton’s U233 sample. It is now planned that the pile at Site X will start
up on September 25 and by the first of November we should begin to get some
production of plutonium from Site X. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.127)
1943-08-18 Compton mentioned that the emphasis on U233 is reduced at present
because it would be impossible to produce military quantities of it before
1947. According to the present research program on U233, we will investigate
the nuclear characteristics of U233 and then stop, unless Pu239 proves
unsatisfactory as bomb material. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.134)
1943-08-24 I sent a memo to [Richard] Apple in the Technical Division about setting
up a semiworks group for U233 work. As background information I say that
in 1934 Amaldi, D’Agostino, Rasetti, and Segre published the first report of
production of a 24-minute radioactivity from the bombardment of thorium by
neutrons. This was later shown by Gofman, Stoughton, and me (Report A-192
and CC-126, published June 11, 1942) to be the first step of the chain:

23.5min

27.4days

120,000yr

β

β

α

Th232 (n, γ)Th233 −−−−→ Pa233 −−−−→ U233 −−−−−→
Our report stated that since U233 has a slow neutron fission cross section at
least as great as that of U235, it becomes important to consider it as a substitute
for the fissionable material which forms the basis of the present program.
A chemical program on preparation of U233 is now under way in my section,
the memo continues, with a staff of four under the leadership of Stoughton,
which will be continued under Perlman at Site X. The work has progressed
to the point where small-scale production at Site X is feasible. The process
depends on isolation of Pa233 from bombarded thorium carbonate by successive
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concentrations on manganese dioxide carrier. After the last concentration step,
the material will be allowed to decay for a period of one to several half-lives
(one to three months). It is then planned to precipitate the remaining Pa233
away from the U233 and purify the latter by appropriate means.
It should be pointed out, I write, that the reason for this primary isolation
of Pa233 is the natural uranium content of the thorium used. Especial care
must be taken to purify the Pa233 from uranium. The uranium impurity in
the thorium carbonate is equal to or larger than the U233 to be expected as
a product under Site X conditions. If we assume full rated power of the Site
X pile, a charge of 65 pounds of ThO(CO3 ), irradiated for ten days, should
contain about 4.5 mg of Pa233. If 2 mg of this can be recovered in the final
concentration step (very possibly an optimistic figure) and two half-lives allowed
for decay, 1.5 mg of U233 is available. Assuming 1 mg of this can be isolated in
pure form, we can see that 65 pounds of ThO(CO3 ) must be irradiated in the
pile for 10 days, Pa233 isolated, and two half-lives (8 weeks) of decay allowed
before it is possible to isolate 1 mg of U233. These are minimum conditions, as
the yield is probably optimistic.
I go on to say that inasmuch as present demands of experimental groups seem
to be at least one milligram U233 a month, a considerable amount of work
is entailed. In addition to the isolation of the product from the irradiated
material, there is the labor and time of preparing and treating approximately
800 1-inch pellets of carbonate and filling and sealing 200 aluminum cans
for each charge. There is also an important research program on volatility
methods, improvements on present methods, and development for operation
under other conditions, as at Site W. The manipulations of isolation themselves
are greatly complicated by the intense radioactivity of Pa233 itself (20 curies per
milligram) and, therefore, the necessity for remote control operations. Because
of these factors, I tell Apple, the chemical group as constituted at present cannot
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adequately handle the whole assignment unaided. We believe, however, that a
group of four or five persons to handle the semiworks portion of the aluminum
can preparation and the extraction procedure should be sufficient to do the
job. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.140-141)
1943-08-27 I received from Howe a summary of the arrangements for canning the
pressed thorium carbonate to be irradiated in the Clinton pile. After being filled
by Stoughton, the cans are to be sealed by the Aluminum Company of America
in New Kensington, Pennsylvania, by welding and spinning down of the ends
to simulate the slugs designed for the Clinton pile. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.146)
1943-09-02 Last month on the 16th Groves, in a letter to Compton, asked how
much of the isotope U233 is in existence. Today Compton replied, ”I can
say with certainty that until material is produced at X, there will be only
several micrograms of 23 available; 23 does not occur naturally and to date the
total amount, produced by cyclotron bombardment of thorium, is at most 15
micrograms. This 23 is not separated from the thorium as only tracer amounts
(hundredths of micrograms) have been used in preliminary development of
chemical methods of separation for use at X. A few micrograms could probably
be separated but this would be an upper limit.” (Seaborg, 1978, pg.154)
1943-09-08 A U233 Production Group, under Stoughton, to obtain milligram
amounts of pure U233 for determining physical constants and to develop
extraction methods for removing uranium from thorium and protactinium
from thorium and uranium (staff: Katzin, Schulze, Steahly, plus one or two
more). (Seaborg, 1978, pg.159)
1943-09-15 In Chicago it is the last day of work at the Met Lab for Ray Stoughton
and Paul Schulze. They are transferring to Clinton Laboratories and will report
to Riordan of the Clinton Laboratories in Knoxville tomorrow. (Seaborg, 1978,
pg.165)
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1943-09-20 Last Saturday Compton was at the Montreal Laboratory in Canada,
together with General Groves, Tolman, Smyth, and Wigner, to attend a meeting
for the ”Exchange of Information with the British.” Such an exchange was
sanctioned last month on August 19 when Roosevelt and Churchill signed the
so-called Quebec Agreement, ”Articles of Agreement Governing Collaboration
Between the Authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the Matter of Tube
Alloys.” The British code word ”Tube Alloys,” of course, stands for the uranium
project. Those representing the British at the Montreal meeting were Chadwick,
Halban, Placzek, and Newell; and there were informal discussions between the
Americans and Paneth, Auger, and Sir Edward Appleton, as well as other
research men.
At this meeting Halban pointed out that they have been concerned with the
relative merits of U233, U235, and Pu239.

Much of their work has been

aimed toward using U235 for producing U233 or Pu239. Compton mentioned
that Wigner has emphasized likewise the possible advantage of transforming
U235 into U233 or Pu239 as Halban suggests. Chadwick commented that his
”money is on the U235,” giving as his chief reason the probable occurrence
of spontaneous fission neutrons in the other isotopes. These he anticipated
from his experience (with which we Americans are unfamiliar) that neutrons
are present with radon in clean nickel tubes to the extent of about 0.001 the
number that are present in radon-beryllium mixtures. Compton and the other
Americans were skeptical regarding the applicability of this observation to the
presence of spontaneous fission neutrons with Pu239 but did not discuss the
point. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.171-172)
1943-09-23 A batch of thorium carbonate pellets was shipped to Stoughton at
Clinton Laboratories from New Kensington, Pennsylvania, where it was sent
for encasing in aluminum cans. The pellets will be used in the pile to generate
U233. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.182)
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1943-10-15 (b) Two hundred aluminum cans have been filled with compressed
thorium carbonate, taken to New Kensington for sealing, and shipped to Site
X to be placed in the pile for the purpose of U233 production. (Seaborg, 1978,
pg.209)
1943-10-19 The U233 group is working on handling 10-20 pound lots of thorium, in
preparation for processing the Th(CO3 )2 that is to be irradiated in the Site X
pile. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.212)
1943-10-28 Katzin wrote to Ray Stoughton in Oak Ridge, detailing the problems
being encountered in preparing 1,300 cans of pressed thorium carbonate—a job
that will require six to seven weeks. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.224)
1943-11-04 Stan and I are now staying at the Guest House in Oak Ridge. We
went out to the X-10 area this morning, where there was much excitement.
The reactor went critical for the first time at 5:07 a.m. Loading of the 1,248
channels with aluminum-encased uranium slugs started yesterday. Only 31
tons of uranium were required, which filled about half the channels. Whitaker
expects to use twice this much uranium in the next month or so to bring the
pile up to 1,000 kW, its design capacity. This is the world’s third pile to become
chain-reacting that we know of, the other two being the Chicago and Argonne
piles. It is planned that 5 tons of the irradiated uranium slugs will be removed
from the pile November 26. After cooling until December 9, the uranium will be
put through the Bismuth Phosphate Process in the Chemical Separations Plant
(200 area) followed by the concentration and isolation procedure that hopefully
will yield 10-40 milligrams of plutonium by January 15. A run-through of the
Chemical Separations Plant will start for the first time around November 24
when one ton of uranium metal from the Argonne pile will be processed for
approximately 10 milligrams of plutonium. (See Figure 17 and 18.) (Seaborg,
1978, pg.234)
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1943-11-08 On Wednesday Katzin sent Stoughton the current status of the pressing
and canning of the thorium carbonate. He mentioned that the operation has
been interrupted by a couple of emergencies that came up in the lab, but that
the work was finished yesterday.
The first meeting of the P-9 Information Committee took place last Wednesday
at 2:00 pm in Room 209, Eckhart Hall, with Wigner presiding. Others present
were Allison, Burton, Chapin, Creutz, Hiskey, Hogness, Huffman, Ohlinger,
Sugarman, Szilard, Vernon, Willard, Young, and Zinn. Wigner, speaking for
the P-9 Steering Committee, reviewed the general status of the P-9 program and
outlined in brief detail the events and directives that have led to the present
program. He read the directive from General Groves for the Military Policy
Committee that states ”that our efforts (should) not exceed the construction
of a low-powered heavy water pile for use as a general experimental tool and
the setting up of a group of scientists assisted by a small number of engineers
to study the general problems and to prepare the way in the event that it
should become necessary to carry on rapid development.” Wigner said that
the application of this directive is interpreted by the Steering Committee as
meaning a selection of suitable arrangements for a production pile should it
be needed, with the principal effort being concerned with the development of
the slurry pile. He mentioned that at the present time there are only two
groups working full time on the slurry pile: these are Vernon’s and Hiskey’s,
representing engineering and chemical research.
After Wigner spoke, each of the individuals on the Committee discussed his
function as far as the P-9 program is concerned. Willard, speaking for Section
C-I, said that our section is making an effort to adapt existing methods to
the extraction of plutonium produced in a slurry pile; Hogness asked us to
summarize this for him in a memorandum. Allison informed the Committee
his function is to serve as interim director of the P-9 Steering Committee until
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Smyth arrives from Princeton November 9 to take up his duties as Associate
Laboratory Director and as director of the P-9 Steering Committee; he plans to
spend alternate weeks in Chicago. Zinn stated that he is principally concerned
with the immediate construction of the heterogeneous P-9 experimental pile
to operate at 250 kW. Concrete for the shield is being poured at the present
time. It was decided that the next meeting of the P-9 Information Committee
is to take place at Argonne, November 10, and that Zinn will arrange for a bus
to leave that day at 11:30 am from Eckhart Hall for Information Committee
members. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.239)
1943-11-16 [Warren Johnson] also said that by this week 80 cans of thorium
carbonate will be in the Clinton pile and should yield about 1 mg of
U233. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.254)
1943-11-17 Compton gave his ”State of the Nation” summation. He stated that
the successful operation (better than expected) of the Clinton pile represents
another milestone. The improved international military situation emphasizes
the need to concentrate all possible effort toward bringing Hanford into
production at the earliest possible date. Because of the national scientific
manpower shortage, we must re-evaluate our program and transfer all possible
effort from alternatives which cannot be useful within a year to those which
have a high probability of such usefulness. The effect of this new emphasis on
current programs is: (1) The P-9 project. Build the heavy water heterogeneous
pile as a radiation tool, but discontinue work toward P-9 production units as
they cannot offer a real alternative to present Hanford plans. (2) Dry fluoride
work. A process adaptable to Hanford needs cannot be developed within the
year. Hence, the work will have to be dropped, although use for purification
and other purposes will be considered. (3) Uranium-233 studies. Without a
P-9 power plant it is not possible to make enough U233 to be useful; therefore,
this work should be discontinued for the present. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.258)
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1943-11-18 At the 8:30 a.m. Section Chiefs’ meeting in Franck’s office, Hughes,
Potratz, Franck, Sugarman, Burton, Hiskey, Manning, Allen, and I were
informed by Franck that at yesterday’s policy meeting the Project Council
decided to abandon U233 work and dry fluoride work for extraction and
decontamination. The P-9 program and adsorption and scouting work are to
come up for discussion later.
I discussed the forthcoming directive from Conant that, in view of manpower
shortage, attention be concentrated on ”mainline” work; I expressed the view
that since plans for production of U have gone this far, it would be very desirable
to do sufficient additional work to obtain a small quantity of pure U233 for
physical measurements. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.258, 261)
1943-11-23 I sent a memo to Whitaker at Clinton Laboratories about the proposed
curtailment of the U233 program. I gave the following information which may
warrant consideration in deciding upon the rate of deceleration of the work:
(1) There is valid reason to speculate that U233 may be the product
for which the Germans are striving in connection with their large
scale production of heavy water. Thus, it is important that we know
its fission cross section, spontaneous fission rate, and neutron yield
per fission. (2) Teller, who feels strongly that enough U233 should be
produced and separated to make the basic physical measurements at
Site Y, has stated that uranium containing only 10% U233 would be
adequate for these measurements. With this tolerance for natural
uranium it should be possible to extract and separate uranium
directly (rather than via its protactinium parent) from the thorium
being irradiated in the Clinton pile, a much easier task which would
involve only 12 man-months. (3) To stop the U233 work before
attaining the goal stated above would have a very bad effect on the
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morale of many of the chemists on the project since it would appear
to them as an unreasonable reversal of policy.
(Seaborg, 1978, pg.264)
1943-11-25 I ran into Leo Szilard today, and I mentioned to him my
concern that the capture of neutrons by Pu239 to form Pu240 might
lead to problems in the design of a plutonium weapon if the capture
cross section is appreciable and if Pu240 decays by spontaneous fission
at an appreciable rate. He expressed doubt that this constitutes a
problem.
Katzin wrote to Stoughton telling him that 250 cans of thorium carbonate
should go out for welding tomorrow. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.266-267)
1943-11-26 In a memo to Franck, Allison repeated the objectives of Compton’s
memorandum, but added a comment that for Section C-I, the U233 production
and recovery should be severely curtailed and that the present charge of thorium
carbonate in the Clinton pile should be left there until the U233 that forms can
be taken out as element 92 without being merely a small fraction of the material
already present as uranium. He questions my contention that as many as three
men will be needed during the four months (while the U233 is growing) to devise
methods for separating uranium from thorium.
Allison expressed the view in a letter to General Groves that much more rapid
progress in investigating enemy installations in Europe could be made if a
limited number of Met Lab personnel were allowed to have some inkling of what
Army Intelligence has discovered there. He suggested that, if we were allowed to
learn what was found by the party that raided the Rjukan Hydroelectric Plant
(heavy water) in Norway, or what information Professor Bohr has concerning
enemy activities in this field, we could draw conclusions which would not be
apparent except to experts in the field of our project.
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I received a copy of Stoughton’s November 24 memo to Warren Johnson at
Clinton that gives a proposed program for finishing the U-233 work with a
minimum number of man-days.

Stoughton proposes a two-step procedure

whereby (1) some of the thorium carbonate will be irradiated only long
enough to produce 10-100 micrograms of Pa233 that will be isolated through
Pa233 separation, thereby reducing the radiation hazard by a factor of 100.
This will provide sufficient material for specific activity measurements. (2)
Irradiate another quantity of carbonate to produce one or more mg Pa233
that will be allowed to decay for about 2 half-lives; the resulting U233 is then
to be separated, together with the natural uranium impurities, for physical
measurements. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.269)
1943-11-29 I sent Franck a description of the present status of the U233 program at
Site X, pointing out that we have placed 120 cans of thorium carbonate in the
pile, that 60 have been withdrawn for experimental purposes after 4 kW-days
of pile operation per average ton of uranium, and that 60 cans still remain in
the pile and have received about 120 kW-days of irradiation per ton of uranium.
I proposed that these 60 cans, plus an additional 38 cans on hand at Site X,
be left in the pile for a few months after it starts up again, thereby producing
about 1 ppm of U233 to be recovered by the direct method and not via the Pa
intermediate. I suggested that the three men (Stoughton, a research associate,
and a research assistant) be asked to work on the separation procedure as their
first objective during the time the carbonate is being irradiated and then if
they have any time left over, they might direct their efforts to other, mainline,
work. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.270)
1943-12-02 After Cunningham, Kirk, and others finished, I discussed the possible
formation of heavy isotopes in pile operation. It is my contention that the search
for U236 should be carried out again in view of the very recent news from Site
Y that the reaction U235 + n shows three sharp resonances. Inasmuch as
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U236 is probably an alpha emitter, the detection procedure should be to get
uranium from pile metal and to determine accurately the specific alpha activity.
It is also possible that resonance levels similar to those of U235 exist in the
case of 94-239; a rough calculation shows an estimated ratio of 10-2 for the
ratio 94-240/94-239 after 100 days operation in a future Site W pile. If this
calculation is correct and if the half-life of 94-240 were about 200 years, the
alpha emission from 94-240 would equal that from 94-239. A shorter half-life
would greatly complicate the purification problem, particularly if the half-life
were as short as six months, resulting in alpha particles with an energy of 7
MeV or greater which would make alpha,n reactions possible on O16 and N14.
Spontaneous fission decay of 94-240 could also cause problems. If 94-240 should
prove to be a beta emitter, then 95-240 would be formed that in all probability
would be an alpha emitter and hence complicate the purification problem. I
suggested it would be a desirable precaution to study the chemistry of element
95 with a view to separating it from plutonium if the need arises. To obtain
element 95 for chemical studies, cyclotron-produced deuteron bombardments of
plutonium should be tried. Another possibility which must be considered is the
occurrence of neutron reactions with 93-239 in the pile, which could also lead to
the production of 94-240. I feel that the foregoing discussion constitutes a strong
argument for continuation of the U233 work as insurance against unfavorable
reactions in the pile. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.276)
1943-12-03 Plans for December and January at Clinton Laboratories call for
dropping all work on the dry fluoride process and on the isolation of U233,
using the fifteen men thus released to step-up activities on the process flowsheet
(Bismuth Phosphate), and also on adsorption as an alternative extraction
method which may prove useful in some part of the mainline process. (Seaborg,
1978, pg.276)
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1943-12-08 In a discussion of the Met Lab program, Allison said that my section has
three men working on the U233 problem, and he proposed that the thorium in
the Clinton pile be left until appreciable amounts of U233 can be extracted, as
Oppenheimer and Teller desire. Compton agreed that this program is a Chicago
responsibility, whereupon Johnson said the cans should then be left in the pile
indefinitely. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.283)
1943-12-15 Compton informed Greenewalt and me of a directive he has just received
from General Groves.

Groves asks that the Metallurgical Laboratory halt

until further notice all work directed toward the development of a uranium233 process and that the Clinton Laboratories discontinue all work with the
chemistry of U233 until April 1 next year, when the position of this problem
may be reconsidered. Compton has now implemented this directive by sending a
letter to Allison and a memo to Whitaker. In order to make use of the materials
already prepared, he further instructs Whitaker to leave the capsules containing
thorium in the pile to accumulate U233; also, such additional capsules as may
be already prepared should be inserted in the pile if this procedure does not
interfere with its operation. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.289)
1943-12-18 Allison sent a memo to Compton referring to General Grove’s directive
that the U233 program should be postponed completely until further notice.
Allison admitted that he had been misinformed when he claimed at the Project
Council Policy Meeting that three men are working on this problem at the Met
Lab, that actually only one man (Katzin) was employed in canning thorium
for insertion in the pile. This will now be discontinued. He went on to say
that the other chemists who are working on this problem have been moved to
the Clinton Laboratories and the decision on their activities should be made by
Whitaker and Doan. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.296)
1943-12-20 Warren C. Johnson reported that at Site X the dry fluoride work was
terminated during the month, as has been the U233 program. Cans of thorium
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will be left in the pile until April, when some 15 mg of U will have been
produced. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.301)
1943-12-21 In a discussion of some of the chemical results obtained at Clinton,
Johnson mentioned that 40 one-half pound cans of thorium carbonate are in
the pile and that 50 more are to be added at the next shutdown. The yield will
be 15 mg U233 by next April, assuming 500 kW average power. The sample will
be 20% contaminated with natural uranium impurity. Johnson also mentioned
that the dry fluoride work has been stopped.
Someone showed me a copy of the current ”Newsweek.” After remarking about
the Nazi superiority to the Allies in certain kinds of technological development,
e.g., rocket-glider-bombs, the article states that ”there is the so-called German
secret weapon. The propaganda concerning it is not being discounted as usual in
Allied capitals, and last week the Nazis unofficially announced that it would be
used against Britain within fifteen days:” Some of us suspect this announcement
might herald the explosion of an atomic bomb!
There was a meeting of the administrative staff at which Munnecke, having
recently returned from Washington, reported that the draft deferment situation
is becoming difficult and that shortly an order will be issued cancelling
deferment for anyone not past his twenty-third birthday, except that such
deferment may be granted by the State or National Director of Selective Service.
The mood of the administration here is to stop hiring men who are under age
38. Stearns believes that we should do more toward the training of women to
replace men. It was suggested that a survey be made of the male employees
under age 23 because wholesale drafting of these employees could cause serious
damage to our scientific program. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.302-304)
1943-12-28 The ”Monthly Report on the Activities of the Chemical Division,
December 20, 1943” (MUC-JF-114) is being issued by Franck. Activities of
Section C-1 are reported as follows:
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U-233 manpower (this month) 1 (next month) 0 (priority) B-3 (lowest on the
list) (Seaborg, 1978, pg.322)
1944-01-08 Greagor, Kay, Warren Johnson, Hogness, and I met today as a Steering
Group. We discussed the distribution of manpower required to effectively work
on the problems assigned to Clinton and Chicago.

A proposal was made

concerning the transfer of personnel to meet manpower requirements. Seven
men from my section will be transferred to Clinton as soon as feasible. Four of
these men will go directly to the Separations Division at Clinton. The time for
the transfers will depend in part upon the reassignment of men from Perlman’s
group to the Separations Division and upon the procurement of additional
personnel elsewhere. Stoughton, Frank Steahly, and Paul Schulze are
slated for immediate transfer. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.339)
1944-01-20 I also reported that all our work on uranium-233 is being discontinued
except for that on the material now actually in the pile. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.379)
1944-01-27 I sent a rather long memorandum to Compton outlining the possible
utilization of uranium-233 by the enemy, in response to Compton’s request. I
give reasons why I think the Germans may be able to produce at least one
uranium-233 device in the near future. I suggest this possibility be considered
and be brought to the attention of our High Command in order that steps may
be taken to distribute governmental facilities of the Allied Powers in such a way
that a single device alone could not deal a fatal blow. It seems highly desirable
that we sustain enough effort on the uranium-233 problem in order that we
will be able to evaluate any developments the enemy may claim or employ. I
gave the following reasons why I think it probable that the Germans may be
preparing to use a U-233 device:
(a) ”We know that the Germans are making strenuous efforts to
continue heavy water production in Norway, and there seems to be
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no other possible use for this material other than a nuclear power
program. Likewise, we can infer that such efforts would not continue
unless they had in mind an overall heavy water production program
in other places as well as Norway, calculated to make or have made an
amount sufficient for their final objective within a reasonable length
of time.
(b) ”U233 can be separated from its parent thorium by relatively wellknown chemical processes. The isolation of U233 may be very simple
compared to that of Pu239 or U235. This is in part due to the fact
that essentially only one radioactive species (Pa233) is involved in the
separation. I believe that the Germans could handle this separation
problem in one of their large industrial chemical companies, who
in turn would isolate the U with only slight modifications in their
existing equipment.
(c) ”The tolerance for light element impurities (which must be
removed to prevent neutron production by the α, n reaction) is some
tenfold greater than that of Pu239. Furthermore such purification as
must be obtained can be tested with uranium, which, in contrast with
Pu239, would have been available for experiments during production
of the actual U233. Our own present knowledge of the purification
and metal production of uranium leads us to the practically certain
conclusion that this problem is rather easily solvable for U233. If we
should run into serious difficulties in the final processing of Pu239, it
is conceivable that the Germans might produce a final U233 device
before we produce one from Pu239 even if their program were not
very far along today.
(d) ”Raw materials for U233 production are probably available to
the Germans. Using a uranium-heavy water pile in conjunction with

229

thorium, it is quite probable that they would not need to meet the
high purity standards for these raw materials that we have been
required to meet for use in the uranium-graphite pile. It may even be
that they have not needed to make either uranium or thorium metal,
but can employ compounds of these elements in the system. The
construction of a heavy water pile and its operation and attendant
chemical extraction work for the preparation of the U233 device might
be carried out without requiring a serious drain on the manpower or
natural resources of the enemy.” (Seaborg, 1978, pg.398-399)
1944-02-07 Gofman and Sheline sent me a joint letter which arrived Saturday. They
were following up on a recent conversation with me at Oak Ridge in which I
mentioned the possibilities of positions at Site W. They asked for details of the
proposition such as type of work, rank or position, and salary. (Seaborg, 1978,
pg.416)
1944-02-14 I wrote Gofman answering in detail the many questions he and Sheline
raised in their February 1 letter about positions at Site W. Concerning their
query as to when they might start work at Hanford, I suggested to Gofman that
if he were one of Willard’s three to five supervisors directing research efforts,
the starting time would be in July. I also said that most of my answers apply
to Sheline as well as to him. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.428)
1944-02-29 Compton wrote that he is transmitting to General Groves and others in
the Army who are concerned, copies of my memorandum on the possibility of
the utilization of U233 by the enemy. Compton added that it is his own
judgment that such a U233 program probably would require more
time and industrial effort to develop a conclusion than the Pu239
program. Also, he does not see any strong reason to believe that the
Germans are actually engaged upon a program of U233 production.
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He does agree, however, that work on its investigation should be kept alive and
considers that my suggestion of encouraging the Canadians to follow this line
is well worth following up. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.456)
1944-03-23 A ”Status Report on U233 Program” has been written by Leonard
Katzin and was submitted for distribution as a Laboratory Report today. Part I
covers the discovery of U233, its properties and possible advantages over Pu239,
and the present status of its isolation. Part II is concerned with the preparation
of U233 and Part III summarizes the chemical extraction of U233 indirectly, in
which Pa 233 is the intermediate, and directly. (Seaborg, 1978, pg.501)
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Appendix D
Extracts from History of Met Lab
Section C-I, Volume 3
1944-05-08 My office received a memo to me from Allison on Friday asking if it
would be possible for us to send 10 pounds of thorium carbonate to Montreal for
use by Jules Gueron and A. G. Maddock. They are interested in the extraction
of U233 from thorium. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.8)
1944-05-17 At 8:00 a.m. I held a meeting in my office of the Council for our
section, attended by Albaugh, Baumbach, Cunningham, Davidson, Dawson,
Dreher, Ghiorso, Hindman, Katzin, Orlemann, Simpson, Thompson, Watt, and
Willard. I mentioned that the Argonne heavy water pile has been started with
considerably less heavy water than expected. I reported that Fermi, using
the one gram 94-239 sample we prepared for him, has found evidence for the
absorption of neutrons in 94-239 to form 94-240; thus the properties of 94-240
will be of critical importance. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.22)
The Project Council Policy Meeting was held at 9:00 a.m. in Room 209, Eckhart
Hall, attended by Allison, Chapman, Chipman, Compton, C. M. Cooper,
Eastman, Fermi, Greager, Hilberry, Jeffries, Johnson, Mulliken, Oppenheimer,
Spedding, Stearns, Stone, Szilard, Vernon, Warner, W. W. Watson, Whitaker,
232

and Wigner. In his ”State of the Nation” message, Compton gave the latest
information on the Hanford schedule: The first pile unit will be operating at
power in late August or early September. The first extraction plant is to be
completed September 1, with first actual operations November 1. Problems
still not completely solved include canning and film. Decontamination and
purification are still not completely in hand.
Fermi initiated an extensive discussion of the difficulty of jacketing slugs which
will withstand full power operation; the possibility of using long helium-filled
tubes as a substitute was considered. Fermi pointed out that although the P-9
pile at Argonne has been brought to criticality, it has not been operated at
power because of the lack of sufficient heavy water to cool it. This shortcoming
will be remedied in another month.
Compton mentioned that the basis for the interchange of information
with the Canadians is still under discussion. We are not at present
free to exchange information on 49 and its chemistry. Whitaker stated
that Clinton will be ready to test chemical separations with a full number of cells
about June 15, and this will be followed by tests of the Hanford process. The
last few groups of eight batches have given overall yields above 80%. Whitaker
also raised the question of what to do with the 20 lbs of thorium in the pile.
About 50 mg of U233 have been accumulated. Compton questioned whether it
would be necessary to push it out at all, to which Whitaker replied that it is
only a matter of gas pressure. Oppenheimer stated that he would be glad to
study the U233 if the chemistry can be handled. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.23)
1944-05-19 At 9:00 a.m. I attended a meeting at which Fermi reported on recent
values of nuclear constants of U235 and Pu239. Fermi has recently measured
the absorption cross section of Pu239 for thermal neutrons by the transmission
method. His absorber consisted of the mixture of one gram of plutonium oxide
and two grams of graphite powder sample which we prepared for him. His
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measured value is 950 barns. Fermi also reviewed the present status of the
branching ratio (neutron capture to fission) of U235 and Pu239. He has found
evidence pointing to a greater branching ratio in Pu239 than in U235. This
means 49 has a large n, γ cross section. He has measured the number of
neutrons emitted in fission per neutron captured to be slightly less for Pu239
than for U235; the number of neutrons emitted per fission is somewhat larger
for Pu239, being 2.8 as compared with 2.4. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.25-26)
1944-05-31 Willard and I visited the sites (100 areas) where the plutonium
production piles are under construction and the sites (200 areas) where the
plutonium chemical extraction plants are under construction (Figs. 2 and 3).
It is an awe-inspiring experience to see the thousands of workmen busily engaged
in the building of these complicated edifices. These are located in a vast expanse
of area (almost 500,000 acres in all) with the piles near the Columbia River for
cooling purposes and the extraction plants somewhat removed. To reach these
areas we drove over some of the flattest, most lonesome territory I have ever
seen.
For lunch we were taken into the Hanford Camp where the construction workers
live in rows of barracks, tents, and trailers stretched out in all directions. We
ate in the largest mess hall (Fig. 4) I have ever been in—a sea of faces all being
well-fed in shifts. We were told that there are some 40,000 residing at Hanford.
After lunch, Simon, who is serving as Hanford’s Mayor, took us on a tour of the
Hanford Camp. This included a visit to the jail, which was full of the motliest
aggregation of tough-looking characters that I have ever seen. We learned that
in order to find the large quantity of labor needed, it is necessary to hire ”off the
street,” so to speak, and they have a large turnover with a substantial element
of people of dubious character. We learned there was a murder last night and
that this is a rather common occurrence.
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After continuing our visits at the construction sites, which ran until quite late
in the afternoon, we started back to Richland with Simon in his automobile.
Being impatient with the secondary roads in the area (actually, there are no
other kind), he decided to take a shortcut straight across the desert. In a
particularly isolated area the wheels of Walter’s car got trapped in loose sand.
Fortunately, we discovered a water hole nearby, and Willard and I carried water
over to pack down the sand to create a little better traction. However, Walter
spun the wheels of his car before we had finished our compacting project, and he
impatiently dug the car in deeper and deeper. With a great deal of persuasion
and some restraint, John and I finally succeeded in slowing Walter down, and
we managed to get free and make our way back to town. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.41)
1944-06-03 The report, ”Metallurgical Laboratory Progress Report for April 1944,”
(MUC-SKA-665) was issued today. Items of special interest to me that are
included in the report of the Nuclear Physics Division are:
”The construction of the P-9 reacting pile is essentially complete. All the main
items of equipment are now on hand. The metal rods have been jacketed and
welded and are now being given the final test. It will be started as soon as
sufficient P-9 is on hand.
”The cross section for absorption of thermal neutrons by 49 has been found to
be 950 × 10−24 cm2 for neutrons of 2200 meters per second velocity. Assuming
the ratio between the fission cross sections of 49 and 25 to be 1.4 (as recently
measured at Y) and assuming further that the capture branching ratio is equal
for the two isotopes, one would find a cross section of about 900. There is,
therefore, some indication that a may be slightly larger for 49 than it is for 25,
although the difference is not outside of experimental error.
”The number of neutrons emitted by 49 and 25 has been compared. The ranges
of the two types of neutrons for slowing down in graphite are equal within
the experimental error. The number of neutrons emitted by 49 per neutron
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absorbed seems to be slightly less than the corresponding number for 25. A
direct comparison of the ν values for the two isotopes is in progress.
”A second attempt has been made in order to determine whether the activity
of a 25 sample irradiated at Clinton increases due to the formation of an alphaactive isotope. No evidence was found, and the result indicates that if 26 is
formed, its lifetime must be greater than 600,000 years.” (Seaborg, 1979, pg.5253)
1944-06-05 Steacie, Goldschmidt, Maddock, and Greenwood from the Montreal
Group arrived at the Met Lab for a visit and to participate in technical
cooperation discussions on P-9 problems. I joined Steacie, Goldschmidt, and
Maddock to discuss the chemistry of U233 and its separation from Th232.
Meetings are scheduled through Thursday of this week. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.56)
1944-06-08 A summary meeting was held with Montreal Laboratory representatives
following a series of conferences that took place while they have been here. The
agenda for these conferences covered (1) separation of U233, (2) irradiation of
materials at Site X, (3) protection of chemical operations and design of special
laboratories, (4) radiation chemistry, (5) chemistry of film formation in cooling
water, (6) liaison on analytical work, (7) corrosion chemistry, (8) chemistry of
the homogeneous experiment, (9) metallurgy, and (10) canning.
At the summary meeting I was requested to provide (a) the latest type of
alpha counter and FP-54 chamber, (b) two cans of thorium carbonate from the
material already irradiated at Site X, and (c) U232 tracer material, separated
or preferably in the form of a target. I was also asked to take up the question
of putting repurified thorium compounds into the Clinton pile for neutron
irradiation. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.8)
1944-07-04 Although this is Independence Day and was celebrated throughout the
city, work went on as usual at the Met Lab.
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At 10:30 a.m. I attended the Project Council Information Meeting on Nuclear
Physics. Zinn presented a terminal report on the construction of the P-9 pile
at Argonne. Start-up occurred on June 20 when 62 tons of satisfactory heavy
water had been accumulated. The pile is designed for operation at 250 kW but
has not yet been run above 190 kW. Preliminary measurements indicate that at
250 kW the neutron flux in the center of the pile will be 9 × 1011 n/cm2 /sec. By
way of comparison, the flux at the center of the Site X pile is 4 × 1011 n/cm2 /sec
at 1,700 kW.
The lattice dimension of oxides of the four heaviest elements show the following
regularity: ThO2 = 5.59; UO2 = 5.46; NpO2 = 5.42; PuO2 = 5.39. Thus the
crystal structure data give unambiguous evidence that the 5f shell is being filled
in the elements starting from thorium. In analogy to the early members of the
rare earths (lanthanides), these elements may be called thorides. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.120-121)
1944-07-05 Compton read a letter from General Groves concerning Project programs and personnel during the coming year. We are instructed to freeze
our present level of personnel and to consider possible reductions in personnel
that can be carried out without sacrificing effort on work believed to have
potential value in the present war. No discussion of reduction in staff should
at present be held with members of the Project in less responsible positions.
Compton explained that the freeze means that personnel numbers are not to
increase, but replacements for losses are in some cases allowable. He asked
that consideration be given to reductions in staff as work goes into a stand-by
basis—perhaps reductions between the limits of 25% to 75%. Timing will vary,
but we might expect the reductions to start about September of this year and
be completed by next January. There is no consideration of dropping effort on
jobs with war significance. Hogness mentioned the difficulty of keeping strong
men under stand-by situations. He also pointed out that the development of
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solvent extraction processes is one of our most important jobs, but there is some
question about it being useful in this war.
Smyth urged that peacetime planning be pressed in order to avoid drifting into
an untenable situation when, for instance, Germany collapses. Compton asked
that each Division Director prepare a suitable program and personnel plans for
longer-term work. He also agreed we must prepare a long-range program insofar
as it is feasible to do so.
Compton read another letter from Groves requesting recommendations for a
program in connection with the use of U233. Whitaker said that 60 slugs are
now out of the pile, containing perhaps 150 milligrams of U233. Two slugs
have been sent to Montreal. Fermi said that two or three milligrams of U233
are needed to get started and that Site Y has asked how they should go about
obtaining 1-2 mg. Compton said he believes that we should provide Site Y with
an estimated delivery date; the U233 work is still third priority class but now
near the top. He asked that Hogness review the situation in the Chemistry
Division and attempt to get a separation process going. If it turns out the
Project should extract U233 from the full 60 slugs, the logical place would be
Clinton Lab with the process development carried out at Chicago. Compton
will also investigate the possibility of the Montreal people agreeing to do the
extracting. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.124-125)
1944-07-07 Kay talked about progress at Hanford, emphasizing that the first
material to be processed at Hanford will run between 5 and 50 grams of
plutonium per ton of uranium.

The pile may operate at 30,000 kW in

September, 60,000 kW in October, and 120,000 kW in November. Building
200 T (first canyon) could start processing the first output of plutonium on
September 15—Kay thinks it will be a miracle if we make it. The Hanford
demonstration runs will be finished at Clinton on September 1, after which
Clinton will study means of increasing production. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.125)
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1944-07-10 Katzin commenced setting up for the extraction of U233 from thorium
carbonate cans irradiated in the Clinton pile. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.128)
1944-07-12 At 8:00 a.m. I held a meeting of the Council of Section C-I in my office...I
brought up a number of items: (a) Security violations must be eliminated. (b)
There has been a limited authorization for work along other lines, such as the
U233 work. In line with this, four periods of the work are now recognized: (1)
present, (b) stand-by, (3) transition, and (4) postwar. (c) A report is to be
prepared by the sub-section chiefs on what should be done in the period up
to October 1 (the stand-by period). This will be due July 24. These reports
should include an estimate of the manpower required. (d) Manpower is now
frozen. No new men can be added. Orlemann noted that the glass shop is the
worst bottleneck in getting our work done.
I expressed my opinion that the need for semiworks operation within the next
few months will be concerned with (f) the development of methods for the
extraction of U233 and Pa233 from thorium... (Seaborg, 1979, pg.130-131)
1944-07-15 Katzin has worked out the procedure for extracting U233 directly
from the Clinton pile-irradiated thorium carbonate, without preliminary Pa233
separation via MnO2 . Ether extraction will be used. The carbonate will be
dissolved, siphoned over in 100-ml portions to the extraction vessel, NH4NO3
added, followed by ether extraction. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.136)
1944-07-17 I gave a summary of my paper, ”Inferences Concerning the Electronic
Structure of 49 from Chemical and Physical Properties,” which I dictated last
Friday. I pointed out the probability that some sort of a transition group should
begin in the neighborhood of the elements in the seventh period (elements
89-94). After reviewing the chemical and physical properties of neptunium,
plutonium, thorium, and uranium, I suggested that:
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An attractive hypothesis is that this rare earth-like series begins with
Ac in the same sense that the ’lanthanide’ series begins with La.
On this basis, it might be termed the ’actinide’ series, and the first
5f electron might appear in Th. Thus, the ground state of Th might
have the structure 5f1 6d7s2 beyond the radon core. With an ’actinide’
series, U might have the electron configuration 5f3 6d7s2 . It is very
interesting to note that Kiess, Humphreys, and Laun in the recent
report A-1747, in which they give a preliminary description of the
analysis of the spectrum of neutral U atoms, come to the conclusion
that the electron configuration of the lowest state of U is 5f3 6d7s2
(with the term symbol 5 L6 ), which supports the above view.
I also speculated about the chemical properties of the series members which
we have not yet had an opportunity to study:

91 Pa,

element 96 (possible

configuration 5f7 6d1 7s1 ) and element 95 (possible configuration 5f7 7s2 ).
Spedding pointed out that while he agrees with me in the main, he thinks it
would be extremely dangerous to depend on the existence of any super rareearth group occurring, or that if such a group does appear that it would start
at the same element for the various valency numbers. In summary, he stated:
To sum up, due to the fact that the energy difference is rather small
between whether an electron goes into the 5f or 6d and that the
resonance effects are very large, the latter probably predominates
in determining which level occurs lowest.

Accordingly, any rule

which might be derived for a new rare earth type series starting at
actinium, thorium, or uranium would probably have more exceptions
than regularities, and these exceptions should become more marked
as the atomic number increases since the spectra becomes more
complicated. I would therefore predict that it would be difficult to
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make any simple set of rules as to the valency states of the ekauranium elements. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.141)
During the month of June the study of the heterogeneous heavy metal-light
water system proceeded rapidly with the theoretical section of the Nuclear
Physics Division at the Metallurgical Laboratory cooperating with experimental
physicists at Clinton Laboratories. Lattices were tested that proved to be so
close to the chain reacting condition that there is no doubt that with slight
and practicable modications, a chain reacting system can be set up.

The

heterogeneous heavy metal-heavy water pile, which was shown to be chain
reacting in May, has been modified during the month so that operation at
power in early July is anticipated,
During the month a development of great interest took place in that an
alteration of the isotopic constitution of an element by neutron absorption was
demonstrated. Samarium, which had been exposed in the Clinton pile, was
examined with the mass-spectroscope, and an increase of isotope 150 with a
corresponding decrease in 149 was found. This identified 149 as the high cross
section neutron absorber in samarium and has important consequences in the
pile poisoning problem.
It was shown that beryllium and thorium of commercial purity can be extruded
at commercial temperatures and pressures. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.144)
There was an evening meeting of the Project Advisory Board in Room
209, Eckhart Hall, called by Compton, preceded by a dinner at 6:00
p.m. The program was scheduled to discuss (a) postwar plans for
the Project as a guide for present changes in Project policy and
organization; (b) the importance of light water moderated units in
the overall Project program and the effect on transfers of associated
personnel required if the program is to be pushed.
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The meeting, however, concentrated on something that came up
which was much more immediate. Robert Oppenheimer, who
was attending the Board Meeting from Los Alamos, announced that E. Segre, O. Chamberlain, and G. W. Farwell
have found strong evidence for the existence of the plutonium isotope Pu240, which undergoes decay by spontaneous
fission! This was found in the neutron-irradiated Pu239 from the
Clinton pile that we had purified for them.
It should be noted that this disclosure came as a great shock to everyone.
However, over a year ago in my ”Report of Month Ending March 15, 1943,
Special Chemistry of 94,” (CK-514), I had written about the possibility of
an n, γ reaction on Pu239 giving the isotope Pu240. I had said that
a possible spontaneous fission decay of this isotope would seriously
impinge upon our ability to use Pu239 as intended.

Now it was

learned that indeed this reaction takes place; and that since the
neutron flux in the Hanford piles would be so high, Pu240 would be
produced in so great a relative abundance that the neutrons resulting
from its spontaneous fission would overshadow those from any α, n
reactions on impurities that might be present in Pu239.
Because of this new development, Site Y will now have to rethink how it will
proceed in the design of a plutonium bomb. Furthermore, it was decided at this
Board Meeting to demobilize Thomas’s staff which is handling the coordination
and general direction of the chemistry, purification, and final metallurgy of
Pu239 because the planned extreme purification of plutonium would be futile—
this could not prevent the emission of the unwanted neutrons. This meant that
there would be no further monthly meetings at the Met Lab on this aspect of
the chemical program. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.145)
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1944-07-19 After the Project Policy Meeting this morning, Hogness and Warner
came to my office to tell me that the purification program is no longer needed.
I was standing in the hall in front of my office as they approached. They said
that Compton had agreed I should be given the reason but that I was not to
tell others. I said they didn’t need to tell me the reason—I assumed the
spontaneous fission rate of Pu240 has been found to be so high as to
overshadow the neutrons from the α, n reaction. I went on to say that,
since no one has given me this information, I feel free to pass my interpretation
on to my men. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.147)
The Project Council Policy Meeting met at 9:30 a.m. in Room 209,
Eckhart Hall, attended by Allison, Chapman, Chipman, Compton,
C. M. Cooper, Dempster, Doan, Fermi, Franck, Greager, Hilberry,
Hogness, Jacobson, Jeffries, Johnson, A. V. Peterson, Spedding,
Szilard, Thomas, K. Tracy, Vernon, Warner, Whitaker, Wigner, and
Zinn.
Compton took up in more detail the decision reached at the meeting
of the Project Advisory Board Monday night, namely, that the need
for exceedingly high purity plutonium no longer exists and that the
present intensive work on purification can be dropped. Hogness asked
if it would be proper to inform others on our staffs that it is the
properties of plutonium that have made the change in emphasis
necessary; adding that he was ”thinking especially of Seaborg.”
Compton said he believed I should know.

The section chiefs at

Argonne also should know, he added, but it is highly essential to limit
the information to the smallest number of people. Fermi mentioned
the implications of such a finding must be known in order to plan
properly for the construction of new piles.
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Compton stated that there is still an urgent need for chemists on
war jobs both within and without our Project. He mentioned that a
committee is being formed of people who are not now working on this
Project to appraise future potentialities and develop plans which can
be acted upon by Congress.
At Compton’s request, consultant Zay Jeffries set forth his ideas
as to the future of atomic energy by reading a memorandum
he has prepared.

He likened the nuclear field to the electronics

field thirty years ago, predicting a bright future for both.

He

suggested the word ”nucleonics” as a name for the new nuclear
field. Among the possible postwar uses he identified were taggedatom experiments in scientific studies and industrial processes, related
need for electronic instrumentation, piles for manufacture of artificial
radioactive substances and power.

In the latter connection he

speculated on the use of piles in making desert or semi-arid land
productive. He discussed the possible use of nuclear detonations to
relieve geological faults and to form a sea-level opening across the
Isthmus of Panama. Jeffries suggested the following objectives:
”(a) The projects relating to 49 and 25 should be prosecuted by the
government, no matter when the war ends, to a point sufficient for
military appraisal.
(b) The development of the nucleonics industry by private enterprise
should be encouraged. The military by-products of the industrial
developments should be made available to the government, and the
use of government information patents should be made available to
industry so far as the military situation may permit.
(c) A suitable agency, with both government and non-government
representatives, should be established to guide and coordinate such
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nucleonics activities as may affect the military or other interests of
the government.”
After discussion of Jeffries’ presentation, Compton expressed the
Council’s desire that plans for a permanent organization be pressed
as rapidly and as specifically as possible.

He asked Jeffries to

organize a committee within the Project for preparation of a prospectus. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.149-150)
1944-07-21 Hogness asked Compton for help in obtaining information on naval
power units (e.g., submarines, destroyers, cruisers, and battleships) for the
informal Power Committee chaired by Allison. He said that Allison has asked
him to obtain such information as it would be useful for those Lab people who
are now giving thought and attention to the development of new sources of
power, such as nuclear. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.155)
1944-07-25 Hogness also states his belief that we are equipped with personnel
and facilities to carry out laboratory work on the extraction of U233, the
development work and large-scale extraction to be done at Clinton. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.159)
1944-07-26 At 8:00 a.m. I held a meeting of the Council of my section in my office...I
noted that since the purification sub-section is being disbanded, the following
reorganization is taking place: (c) Katzin has been placed in charge of the U233
work. His rank is that of Assistant Section Chief, and he will report directly to
me. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.161)
1944-07-28 Allison sent a memo to Compton transmitting a review of the Met Lab
activities in the four Divisions: Chemistry, Health, Physics, and Technical, as
anticipated for a period beginning about October of this year. The summarizing
comments are as follows:
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”The Hanford studies, which are the items of highest priority, will be almost
entirely laboratory-scale problems on process improvement.

We anticipate

that work on these problems at semiworks scale will be done at Clinton.
Alternate processes for Hanford, such as the promising solvent extraction
(hexone) method for plutonium recovery, will be carried to the semiworks state
at Chicago, however. Certain studies on the effect of pile radiations on materials
contemplated for Hanford, such as the current study of dichromate reduction,
will also be of highest priority.
”Probably next highest priority will be accorded studies of the basic chemistry of
plutonium and to methods of extraction of 23 studied on a laboratory scale. The
recent abandonment of attempts to reach high purity in our product
has, in my opinion, increased somewhat the interest in 23. This is
because we are now committed to only one method of final assembly; and if this
should fail, the military usefulness of our product is doubtful. Under these
conditions we would immediately give consideration to the conversion
of our product to 23. Work on extraction of a few milligrams of 23 to be
tested at the Argonne Laboratory will probably carry over into the post-October
period. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.163)
”In this same priority would be the preparation and chemical isolation (if
possible) of Pu240 and U236. We now know that the former will be a constituent
in our product, and the latter will be produced in our piles and in the final
gadget.

These atomic species in a pure state should be presented to the

physicists for study as soon as possible. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.164)
1944-07-31 Stan Thompson returned to Chicago at 8:20 a.m.
to Montreal, Canada.

from his trip

He told me that he spent considerable time with

Goldschmidt and Gueron discussing the work being carried on at the Montreal
laboratory. He described to me the procedure used there to extract the U233
from the two irradiated thorium carbonate slugs received from Clinton early in
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July—an ether extraction method similar to that used by Stoughton at Oak
Ridge. They obtained about 8 to 9 mg total uranium which may or may not
be fairly pure U233—analyses are not completed.
Although Thompson was not permitted to discuss plutonium work, they did
volunteer information about what they have accomplished. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.165)
Thompson is of the opinion that it would aid their microchemical work
considerably if our microchemists could spend a few days at the Montreal
Laboratory. He also suggested we send them some micro lusteroid cones. He
was told of plans for building a pile at Petawawa, which is about 110 miles
from Ottawa. This pile will be operated with approximately 13 tons of heavy
water and about 8 tons of uranium, the structure will be built of aluminum,
and the uranium slugs inserted in the channels so that water can flow between
the wall of the channel and the uranium cans. There will be a 1/8” aluminum
jacket on the cans. There will be extra holes in the pile for inserting thorium to
produce U233, which is central to their program. The quantity of thorium and
the form in which it is to be used have not been decided yet, although there is
considerable talk about using thorium metal. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.166)
1944-08-01 James Franck sent a letter to Vannevar Bush, Carnegie Institution in
Washington, D.C., pointing out the general feeling that exists throughout the
Project concerning the need for a peacetime atomic program that will continue
to supply the research necessary for both military and technical applications in
the postwar period. Planning is important and may require at least a year’s
effort after the war ends. Franck points out that one of the major difficulties
we face is the irreversible scattering of key men during the present production
and trouble-shooting period. Should the war suddenly stop, there is danger
of wholesale dissolution of projects and personnel before intelligent long-range
plans will have been formulated. Franck proposes that an interim organization
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under the Government be created to act as a buffer between the wartime military
program and a new peacetime organization with long-range goals. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.168)
1944-08-02 After regular hours, about 5:45 p.m., Katzin, Studier, and
Hagemann began the job of extracting U233 from two cans of thorium
carbonate that were irradiated for seven months in the Clinton pile.
They fished the first can out of its shipping container and deposited it in the
dissolver unit containing nitric acid. Following dissolution, ammonium nitrate
will be added to the thorium nitrate solution to a total nitrate normality of 8-9
N. The uranium will then be extracted from this solution using ether extraction
procedures.
The Purification Sub-section has been liquidated. A solvent extraction group,
with Lawroski as its group leader, has been organized under Katzin to work on
U233. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.169)
1944-08-09 Katzin and his co-workers have nearly completed the extraction of U233 from two cans of Clinton pile-irradiated thorium
carbonate. The extraction run was started one week ago and has proceeded
very well. Adequate planning and careful handling of materials have kept
radiation exposures and contamination problems to a minimum. (This fact
was given special notice by John Rose in last Saturday’s Health Division Liaison
Committee meeting.) It seems likely that at least 5 mg of U233 will be obtained
from the extraction run.
In view of this success and since we would like to have larger quantities of
U233 for experimentation, I sent a memo to Hogness requesting four more cans
of irradiated thorium carbonate similar to the type previously received from
Clinton. In addition I requested the irradiation of five cans of thorium carbonate
material that has been completely purified of natural uranium by Katzin. This
material is being canned and should be ready for shipment to Clinton within
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a few days. I asked Hogness to arrange for these cans to be irradiated for a
period of several months in a high flux position within the Clinton pile. When
processed, this material should provide us with U233 that is very free from
natural uranium impurities. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.181)
An Executive Session of the Project Council was held this morning... Compton
in his ”State of the Nation” opening gave some impressions gained during his
recent trip to Hanford and Los Alamos.
Compton then said that Groves would like a reviewing committee survey of new
ideas for improved piles. These survey results might determine the future course
of our Project. Compton asked if ideas could be ready by October 1. Spedding
suggested there should be an adequate group of individuals whose primary effort
would be to develop a clear picture of the future of nucleonics. Doan added
that the picture of future possibilities would not be complete unless all fields
of technical knowledge are covered, and Compton replied that the committee
under Jeffries is preparing to develop such a picture.
Allison stated that beryllium, bismuth, and thorium are materials which will
be important to our future. Whitaker said he would like some thorium metal
to replace the thorium carbonate in the Clinton pile. Szilard added that if
poisoning of the Hanford piles were done with about one ton of thorium metal,
this would be an excellent source for larger amounts of U233. Allison proposed
to authorize Spedding to produce a definite amount of thorium.
Whitaker announced that with the installation of two new fans for the air-cooled
graphite pile at Clinton, the power level has been increased to three times the
original design power level. One fan, however, was seriously damaged last night,
and the production power level is now down by about 25% to 30%. The results
in the Clinton extraction plant indicate the Hanford plants will operate with
yields above 80%. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.184-185)
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1944-08-12 Katzin, Studier, and Hagemann completed the extraction and purification of U233 from the two cans of thorium carbonate that were irradiated for
about seven months at Clinton. Preliminary indications are that about
6 mg of U233 have been isolated from the two cans. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.189)
1944-08-15 A revised organization chart and several recommended organizational
changes for my section were sent by Manning to Hogness. The number of subsections is reduced to two—namely, the Separation Processes Subsection and
the Basic Chemistry and Services Subsection. The group doing work on U233
is not included in either of the subsections. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.191)
Compton wrote to James B. Conant in Washington about the transfer of
nucleonics to postwar conditions. (In a footnote, Compton explains that the
word ”nucleonics” has recently become widely used throughout the Project to
designate the field of research, development, and application of atomic nuclear
reactions. It, according to Compton, comes from the word ”nucleon” which is
the name for the elemental particles in the atomic nucleus.)
Compton believes the most important applications of nucleonics will be for some
time in the area of military weapons; however, other applications will grow
rapidly such as radioactive material for medicine, agriculture, and scientific
purposes, and the use of atomic power especially for naval vessels and perhaps
for heating of cities. He suggests that the U.S. Engineers may be the best group
to continue its Project management role into the postwar period. But, in order
to provide for coordination of the various aspects of nucleonic work throughout
the nation, he suggests that a Committee (or an individual) reporting directly
to the President, be given the responsibility for overall supervision.

The

Committee would function in a way similar to the Military Policy Committee
and would see that appropriate controls are put into effect for regulating
nucleonic work.
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Compton suggests an immediate program to encourage universities, industries,
and private laboratories to undertake their own activities in nucleonic research.
This would include the transfer of technical information from the Project
to the public making available special materials. Authorization to use the
tools built under government contract for the production of tracers and other
useful materials would greatly aid medical and scientific developments. Public
education on the significance of nucleonics is urgently needed in order to prepare
for the postwar adjustment.
Regarding the future of the Metallurgical Project, Compton suggests a sharp
distinction be made between continuing military work including continued
support of the programs at Sites W and Y and the development of nuclear
weapons and non-military work such as nuclear physics and properties of
neutrons; fundamental chemistry of products and by-products; long-time
instrument developments; the preparation, properties, and application of
radioisotope tracer materials; scientific, medical, and industrial applications of
radioactive materials. Compton says it would appear appropriate to encourage
the University of Chicago to see that (non-military) scientific use be made
of the tools now in its charge. Compton concludes his letter by saying that
the problems associated with the interim period and postwar adjustments,
especially as applicable to the Metallurgical Project, will be the main subject
for discussion at the August 21 Advisory Committee Meeting. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.193-194)
1944-08-16 Katzin calculated, using alpha-particle counts by Hufford, that the
specific activity of the U233 extracted from the irradiated thorium carbonate
is 19,800 disintegrations per minute per microgram.

This figure, however,

is subject to revision, as the extent of natural uranium impurity is not yet
known. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.197)
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Allison sent a memo to Franck referring to statements made at the June 20
Project Information Meeting that, (a) a pile with solid moderator will inevitably
go bad, and (b) it is improbable that operation with graphite as a moderator can
go on for two years. G. D. Graves of du Pont has questioned these statements
and pointed out to Allison at a recent meeting that such statements, if left
to stand on the record, could seriously embarrass the Project unless they are
extremely well-founded in fact. Allison suggested that if similar considerations
come up at the Project Information Meeting on August 22 that the record
should be made clear as to exactly how large an extrapolation from our current
limited knowledge is involved. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.199)
1944-08-17 Leo Szilard wrote to Vannevar Bush in Washington, enclosing the text
of a personal letter he wishes to send to Lord Cherwell of the British Cabinet in
England, whom he knows well. The letter is for the purpose of bringing to the
very influential Cherwell’s attention some of the possible ways Germany might
produce atomic weapons. Szilard says in his letter to Bush,
The possible use of atomic bombs by the Germans is perhaps the
only factor that may reverse the present favorable trend of the war in
Europe. It would therefore seem very important to find the
industrial installations in Germany which are likely to be
used for this purpose and to destroy them. I believe that the
British efforts in this direction would be greatly intensified if Cherwell
took a personal interest in them.
Szilard’s letter to Lord Cherwell is six pages long. In one paragraph he states,
Private communications originating from Switzerland which reached
me two years ago indicated that the Germans knew by the middle
of 1942 how to make a chain reaction go and that Heisenberg, who
was in charge of that work had some conspicuous successes along this
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or the other parallel line of work during that year and consequently
was put in full charge of all the work (made director of the KaiserWilhelm Institute for Physics) late in 1942. This was about the time
of Stalingrad after which the Germans must have realized that they
may have to win this war by other than ordinary methods. Unless
I completely misjudge the psychology of the Germans, they
must have gone full scale into this work soon after Stalingrad
at the latest.
Further on in his letter Szilard remarks,
I am rather convinced that a properly organized effort of the British
Intelligence will lead to the discovery of industrial installations for
the manufacture of the relevant materials in Germany but when the
location of the German factories is discovered, it may be found that
we would have to pay an exceedingly high price for their destruction
by large-scale parachute invasion or other such methods. Some of us
might think that these factories have to be destroyed practically at
any price but in order that you should be in a position to advise the
War Cabinet how far to go in this respect you ought to have first-hand
knowledge of the action radius within which life will be destroyed if
a small atomic bomb is detonated above a city. Clearly you are the
only member of the Cabinet who can have convictions based on his
own computations rather than on official ’reports’ or other forms of
’hearsay’. If you check the calculations of others or make calculations
of your own you will have a firm conviction of your own and will
be able to arrive at a balanced recommendation and also be able
to assist the War Cabinet in reaching what may be a very difficult
decision. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.199-200)
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1944-08-19 Franck answered Allison’s letter of last Wednesday about the statements
made at the Project Information Meeting of June 20 regarding the expected
short operating life of a graphite-moderated pile. Franck points out that the
statements made at the meeting should not embarrass the Project as Graves
from du Pont implies they might, in that it was foreseen by Wigner right from
the Project’s beginning that a risk would be involved in the use of graphite as
a moderator. So far the experience with the Clinton pile shows that the risks
are not so great that a pile cannot be run long enough to turn out amounts
of plutonium exceedingly useful for the war effort. Franck points out, however,
that it is absolutely necessary to monitor the change in properties of the graphite
in piles at Hanford during their operation. It is impossible to predict the degree
of deterioration of pile graphite based only on an equivalent of three days of
operation of the Clinton pile at Hanford radiation levels. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.202)
1944-08-21 Katzin summarized for me the work his special group has completed
on the extraction of U233 from the two cans of thorium ”carbonate” that were
irradiated for about seven months in the Clinton pile. Each can contained about
164 grams of thorium and a small undetermined amount of natural uranium.
The initial extraction was quite successful. Approximately 6.5 mg of U233 were
extracted based on the half-life 120,000 years for U233. Initial measurements
(subject to correction) give a specific activity of 20 × 106 d/m per mg, which
corresponds to a half-life of 170,000 years. Gofman, Stoughton, and I estimated
the half-life of U233 to be 120,000 years in our original work on U233. Katzin
reports the range of U233 alpha particles, based on absorber foil measurements,
to be 3.35-3.40 cm in standard air. A more precise determination, however, is
expected using Jaffey’s differential alpha-particle range chamber. Preliminary
calculations using data from thermal neutron fission cross section measurements
give a U233/U235 cross section ratio of about 1.3, based on the value 120,000
years as the half-life for U233. The data are consistent with an isotopic purity of
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70% for the U233. A more accurate value for the ratio of neutron fission
cross sections, U233/U235 will be obtainable when a more precise
half-life value determination is made following a mass spectrographic
analysis of the isotopic composition of the sample. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.205)
1944-08-22 The successful separation of over 6 mg of U233 from Clinton-irradiated
thorium, described in Katzin’s memo to me yesterday, was reported. I said
that the question the half-life for U233 is still not settled but may be as
high as 170,000 years instead of our earlier determination of 120,000 years.
W.C. Johnson said that initial analyses show that there is about 0.05 ppm
natural uranium impurity in the starting thorium ”carbonate” leading about
10% natural uranium in the U233. (If this is correct, the half-life may be about
153,000 years.) (Seaborg, 1979, pg.209)
Spedding reported on the work at Ames relating to the production of cesium
and thorium metal. I asked how much thorium metal he is planning to make.
He replied that it could be produced on a large scale, but the quantity must be
decided by Washington. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.210)
1944-09-06 I attended the evening meeting of the Separations Process Subsection of
Section C-I at 7:45 p.m. In Room 209, Eckhart Hall. Hagemann told us about
the extraction of U233 from the third and fourth cans of thorium carbonate
irradiated by neutrons for several months in the Clinton pile. About 8.5 mg of
U233 were obtained. Specific activity determinations carried out by Hufford by
counting a weighed sample of oxide gave 23,000 d/min/microgram as the best
value for pure U233. I mentioned that the Montreal group has been obtaining
much lower values than this—perhaps impurities still present in their U233
account for these low values.
Hellman gave an account of the extraction of uranium and thorium into ether
from solutions of varying NH4NO3 , Th(NO3 )4, and HNO3 concentrations. Hyde
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reviewed the extraction of uranium and thorium by hexone; he has found that
thorium decay products are extracted by hexone to a greater extent than by
ether. Reinhardt spoke on the effect of lanthanum, calcium, and ammonium
nitrates as salting agents for extraction of plutonium into ether and hexone.
He has found that their effectiveness in both solvents is in the order named.
Van Winkle talked about the work being carried out on isolation of natural
Pa231 and Io230 from residues obtained from commercial uranium production.
He gave a summary of the existing knowledge of protactinium and ionium
chemistry. Separation and isolation of protactinium and ionium by means of
UF4 , which carries ionium but not protactinium, will be the next step in the
investigations. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.228-229)
1944-09-09 I received a copy of a September 8 memo from Dempster to Stearns
giving the results of a mass spectrographic assay to determine the ratio of the
isotope 233 to the isotope 238 in a sample of the 7.2 mg of uranium isolated
from the thorium carbonate irradiated by neutrons for several months in the
Clinton pile. His data indicate the percentage of U233 to be 85±1.5%
of the total uranium. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.232)
1944-09-13 Today the first uranium slugs are being loaded into the first production
reactor at Hanford—the 100E pile. Fermi is there to oversee and direct the
operation. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.235)
1944-09-18 Also on Thursday, Allison sent a memo to Mulliken of the chronology
of the Project. Thirty-six highlights are identified from January 1939 (chemical
evidence for fission by Hahn and Straussman announced by Bohr) to September
12, 1944 (loading of metal into first production pile at Hanford).

Other

highlights include:
 March 28, 1941. California group demonstrates that 49 is fissionable at

thermal energies.
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 February-March, 1944. Milligram and gram amounts of 49 from Site X are

available for experimentation.
 July, 1944. Spontaneous fission of plutonium-240 discovered at Site Y, and

purification program abandoned for plutonium. Ceiling placed on Met Lab
personnel. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.238-239)
I received a memo from Davidson giving a summary of existing data on the
thermodynamic properties of oxides and fluorides of uranium and plutonium
from uranium—again results are promising.
Burton reported work of Section C-II on the problem of sudden release of energy
accumulated in the pile of graphite by displacement of carbon atoms in the
crystal lattice. The possibility of annealing was mentioned. Sugarman reported
on fission product work in Section C-III and indicated that the distribution
curve of fission products for the heavy group from neutron-irradiated plutonium
appears to be identical to that from U235 except for distinctly higher yields at
the extreme heavy-weight end of the curve. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.241-242)
1944-09-20 I sent a memo to Hogness requesting that four more cans of the
irradiated thorium carbonate be shipped to us from Clinton as soon as possible.
The U233 to be extracted from it is needed mainly for our own experiments;
the previously extracted U233 is needed for use at Site Y and by Anderson at
Argonne. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.248)
1944-09-28 In Montreal. W. W. Watson, the Metallurgical Project representative
stationed in Montreal, and I visited the Montreal Project. Most of my discussions were with the chemists—Paneth, E. W. R. Steacie, Bert Goldschmidt, and
J. Gueron were present in practically all the discussion. The more important
topics I covered with them today are:
 Thorium metal vs. carbonate for irradiation (Sutton and Bewick).
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 Separation of U233 or Pa233 by adsorption (L. G. Cook, W. E. Grummitt,

and G. Wilkinson).
 Solvent extraction (Reid, L. Yaffe, Fitch, Russell, A. G. W. Cameron, and

Mungen).
 Organic complexes (A. G. Maddock, A. C. English, and Musgrave).
 Fluorine method (Maddock).
 Purification of U233 (Yaffe, English, and Cruikshank).

In the afternoon I gave a talk on the hazards connected with the alpha-particle
radiation from U233 and the gamma-radiation from Pa233 and made a few
suggestions on how these might be minimized. In the same talk I discussed the
latest measurements in Chicago on the specific activity, half-life, alpha-particle
range, etc., of U233. Also, I gave some speculations as to a probable decay
chain for U233 (the 4n+1 series) and also some speculations on the electronic
structure of elements 89-95, inclusive (i.e., my actinide concept). (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.257-258)
1944-09-29 In Montreal. I held further discussions with members of the Montreal
Project, covering the following:
 Extraction of protactinium from ores (H. G. Heal, Cook, and F. Morgan).
 Fission products of U233 (Yaffe, Wilkinson, and Grummitt).
 Barium branching ratio in U233 fission (Yaffe, Wilkinson, and Grummitt).
 Rare gas experiments - measurement of helium, krypton, and xenon (W.

J. Arrol).
 Fission chambers (Maddock, Miller, and B. Pontecorvo).

At 4:30 p.m. Watson and I met to review decisions with Arrol, Goldschmidt,
Gueron, Huffman, Maddock, Paneth, and Steacie. The more significant items
discussed were:
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Metal versus carbonate. I indicated that, for the immediate task of making one
gram of U233 per day with material around the outside of the pile, everything
is in favor of thorium carbonate.
Extraction of Pa233 versus U233. It was agreed the product should be separated
as U233—no point in separating as Pa233.
Elimination of protactinium by adsorption or precipitation. Direct separation
by adsorption is not practical. The precipitation method involving MnO2 is
fairly certain to work.
Solvent extraction. This is clearly the best method for extracting U233 from
thorium carbonate. Ether is probably the best solvent so far developed, but
work on other solvents should proceed.
Purification of U233. The details of how to purify U233 extremely well were
discussed. As soon as there is a sample of quite pure U233, the Montreal group
wants to measure the decay period. As soon as there is a sample absolutely
free from beta particles, the group will launch an investigation to find the
disintegration products and look for half-life periods and radiations of these
products.
Extraction of protactinium from ore and determination of valences. Montreal
chemists have been working with the most insoluble residues of Canadian
uranium ore in search of protactinium. I suggested the more soluble carbonate
fraction might better be used. I pointed out it will be especially interesting to
look for an oxidation state of 4 and possibly state 3 in the protactinium.
Fission products of U233. Montreal chemists would like to have the 10 mg of
the U233 they sent to Anderson at Chicago retained in Chicago and irradiated
by neutrons in one of the piles for at least a month. Then it should be sent to
Montreal for a study of the fission products of U233. I agreed to prepare the
sample for irradiation in a convenient form.
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Fission chambers. The Montreal group has measured the fission cross section
of U233 by using UF6 and BF gases in their fission chambers. The spontaneous
fission rate of U233 has been measured by Pontecorvo at equal to or less than
3 neutrons per minute per gram, this value obtained even with U238 impurity.
A discussion was held on the difference between the Montreal and Chicago
measurements of the fission cross section of U235, The Montreal value is 4.6
x 10-24 cm2 and the Chicago value is 3.9 x 10-24 cm2. There seems to be no
explanation for the discrepancy.
In a general discussion it was decided that for the present there should be
no division of work between Montreal and Chicago. Montreal will carry on
investigations of all problems connected with U233 production while we at
Chicago will consider only those problems which interest us. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.258-259)
1944-09-30 I visited Watson’s office and prepared notes on my discussions with
members of the Montreal Project on Thursday and Friday.
I boarded a train for Toronto and Chicago. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.259)
1944-10-02 Last Wednesday morning (9/27), a few minutes after midnight, marked
the first power run of a Hanford chain-reacting pile. Two weeks earlier, Fermi
had brought the production pile (100B) into criticality for the first time but
without water cooling. During this midnight run of about two hours, the
power level exceeded anything that had ever been attained in a pile before,
either at Oak Ridge or Argonne. But following the two-hour run, to everyone’s
consternation, the power level began to decline slowly and steadily of its own
account. By Wednesday evening the chain-reaction ceased completely. Then
early the next morning the chain-reaction started up spontaneously, and by
evening the power was up to its former high level. Soon the pile began shutting
itself down again. Many hypotheses were advanced, the most acceptable
being that the pile had generated some kind of poison to reduce the
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reactivity. If it were indeed a poison, then it would have to have a halflife of around 9.7 hours to fit the pile’s behavior pattern. The fission
product Xe135, with a half-life of 9.4 hours, was thus suspected. Zinn
at Argonne and Doan at Clinton Laboratories were immediately notified and
asked to run experiments to determine if a Xe135 effect on the operation of
the piles there could be detected. Zinn soon confirmed that the production of
Xe135 in the chain-reaction does have a poisoning effect. Now the question
arises, must the Hanford piles be modified if they are to produce Pu239 on a
grand scale? (Seaborg, 1979, pg.260)
Approximately 8 mg of U233 have been recovered from thorium carbonate
irradiated about seven months in the Clinton pile. The U233 was found to
be 85% pure upon analysis with a mass spectrograph. A corrected half-life
determination on the U233 sample gives a figure of 138,000 years. A corrected
cross section for U233 as compared with U235 (23:25) gives a ratio of 0.96
for thermal (paraffin-moderated) neutron fission. The +6 oxidation state of
neptunium has been identified by means of sodium neptunyl acetate. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.264)
”23 Group”, Group 9: Uranium-233 Separation. L. I. Katzin, Assistant Section
chief in charge of Group 9’s U-233 work. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.265)
Farrington Daniels sent Mulliken suggestions for several possible applications of
”nucleonics,” including high-temperature radiation chemistry, process radiation,
radioluminescence, and weather modification applications. He suggests the
development of a gas-cooled pile operating at temperatures up to 2000◦ C
to obtain good thermodynamic efficiency. The high temperature and heat
produced might be used to replace electric furnaces and might find other
applications for producing chemicals such as calcium carbide, nitric oxide,
phosphorus, and possibly even alcohols from carbon monoxide to provide
automobile fuel. The intense radiation available in a pile would make possible
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the consideration of photochemical reactions on a large scale—such as the
production of resinous materials from petroleum products and possibly even
carbohydrates. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.268)
The ionization from pile-produced materials might be used with an
electrostatic precipitator to remove dust and smoke.

Daniels also

suggests that intense radiation in the form of radioactive gases or particulates
could be dispersed in the air to dispel fog or possibly even to induce
rainfall. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.269)
1944-10-03 In addition to this meeting, I attended the Project Council Information
Meeting on Physics which met in Room 209, Eckhart Hall. Zinn described
the 105B Hanford pile start-up problems. The initial 9 MW start-up power
level at 0.00088 excess k fell off to 3.7 MW because of poisoning by a 9.4-hour
Xe135 (the daughter of 6.6-hour I135). With no slug or pile modifications,
this poisoning effect will limit the full operating power of the Hanford pile to
216 MW. A modification providing 1.85% excess k would completely override
the poisoning effect by destroying the Xe135 by neutron absorption and should
thus permit pile operation at any power level. The poisoning effect has not yet
been oberved at Clinton It may be caused by resonance in the thermal neutron
energy region.
H. L. Anderson reported on experiments concerning the thermal neutron (2200
meters per second) absorption cross section for plutonium in plutonium nitrate
dissolved in deuterium nitrate, heavy water solutions, that was determined to
be 1150 barns ± 3%. This result is in fair agreement with the value of 1050
barns obtained at Los Alamos. The fission cross section is 773 barns (alpha
= 0.49). The resonance cross section is found to peak at 6730 ± 240 barns.
Anderson also gave values of 650 barns and 535 barns, respectively,
for the thermal neutron absorption and fission cross sections of U233.
The cross section for U233 is higher than the cross section for U235, which in
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turn is higher than for Pu239, over the neutron energy range from 0.5 to 2900
ev.
”Chemical Research - Extraction and Properties of U233, Report for Period
Ending September 10, 1944,” (CS-2165), was issued today. A summary of the
contents is as follows. Studier, Hagemann, and Katzin have extracted 7.2 mg of
U233 from two cans of thorium carbonate irradiated seven months at Clinton.
The extracted material is 85% pure U233 with the rest being natural uranium.
Four cans are undergoing extraction by the same ether-extraction method used
for the first two cans.
Katzin, in cooperation with Dempster, Lapp, Crawford, Hufford, Jaffey, and
Weissbourd, has determined that the specific activity of pure U233 is close to
23,300 disintegrations per minute per microgram, corresponding to a half-life
of 146,000 years. The range of alpha particles for U233 has been determined
as 3.38 ± 0.01 cm in air. The fission cross section for cadmium-absorbable
neutrons slowed in paraffin is 1.1 times that of U235. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.271)
1944-10-04 The Project Council Policy Meeting for October was held today at
9:00 a.m. in Room 209, Eckhart Hall. In attendance were Allison, Bartky,
C. M. Cooper, Daniels, Dempster, Franck, Hamilton, Hogness, Howe, Jeffries,
Mulliken, A. V. Peterson, Spedding, Stearns, Stone, Szilard, Vernon, C.
J. Watson, W. W. Watson, Whitaker, Wigner, Wirth, and Zinn.

Allison

announced that Compton flew to Hanford yesterday and that up until yesterday
afternoon the Hanford 105B pile has operated twelve hours at 10 MW.
The xenon-poisoning phenomenon was discussed. Wigner estimated that the
maximum power that could be attained at full Hanford pile loading (2000 tubes)
for 1.2%, 1.8%, and 2.25% excess k would be 200 MW, 400 MW, and 800 MW,
respectively. It is possible that additional excess k can be had by making
changes in slug canning, removing thimbles, etc.
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Hogness said that Site Y would like the top people in Sugarman’s Section III,
but Allison recommended maintaining the present status until the pile poisoning
problem has been solved. Allison said the Met Lab has lost about 175 technical
people over the past two months with Chemistry being the big loser. Clinton
has lost about 150 technical employees, primarily to Hanford.
Questions concerning cooperation with England (”Evergreen”) were raised
by Allison, in particular, whether or not the U.S.A. should give England
information on the xenon poisoning phenomenon. W. W. Watson agreed there
are problems and cited our specific directions to exchange all information on
U233 chemistry but none on Pu239 chemistry, even though the ”Evergreen”
people obviously understand the relation of the U233 to the Pu239 chemistry
very well. He said all evidence points to England pushing vigorously ahead after
the war. Stearns noted that if England does emphasize nucleonics after
the war and we do not, the U.S.A. will be at a serious disadvantage.
He raised the question of whether we should wait for requests or
should volunteer information to England. Both Peterson and Zinn
spoke out in favor of volunteering needed information. Zinn said
England will have the finest research pile in the world within a few
years and we should keep on a good cooperative basis in order to
obtain information on their results. Cooper suggested that a copy of
the directive covering cooperation with ”Evergreen” be inserted in the minutes
of the Project Council Policy Meeting minutes.

However, because of the

wide circulation of the minutes, it was later decided to issue the directive,
including further restrictions by McKinley, on a smaller selected distribution
list. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.273)
1944-10-09 I wrote to Goldschmidt in Canada announcing that the report on our
recent U233 work has been issued under Report No. CC-2165. I make several
comments on the reported work, in addition to the points I made in my talk
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during my visit to the Montreal Project at the end of last month. I quote our
more accurate value for the half-life of U233, 146,000 years, based on our specific
activity of 23,300 d/min/pg. I mention the as-yet unidentified insoluble residue
we have observed when dissolving thorium metal in hydrochloric acid in light
of similar experiments performed at Montreal and described by Goldschmidt
during my visit there. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.276)
1944-10-10 Charles Cooper presented a discussion on ”New Goals for the Metallurgical Project” at the meeting of the Tolman Postwar Policy Committee
today. Cooper points to the possibility that our job may soon, if not already,
be completed with regard to assuring successful W operation. He asks, ”with
this prospect before us, is it not our immediate and major responsibility to
obtain agreement upon a continuing course of research which must be pressed if
the United States is to maintain the lead in the field which we presume it now
possesses?” Cooper summarizes the current Project status as follows:
By some two years of great effort under emergency conditions we have
arrived at a situation which may be summarized thus. A process
has been developed which very certainly will produce quantities
of 49 adequate for experimental purposes and probably sufficient
to meet situations immediately foreseen.

The present process is

very complicated and unduly expensive, both as to manpower
requirements and the materials which are involved. The present
approach is not adaptable to generation of power nor is
it designed to manufacture or recover effectively possible
byproducts of operation.

The product will be contaminated

with undesired isotopes which could possibly be eliminated if other
methods, as yet only sketchily developed, were to be employed. We
cannot be entirely certain until final trials have been made that the
product will be as useful as anticipated, and it may well develop that
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other elements or isotopes will turn out in the end to be much more
useful than the one we have prepared to manufacture.
In order that our country may be as well prepared as possible, it
would appear from the above that research should be pressed along
the following lines.
(1) All possible effort should be made to discover what material and
isotope is most promising for our present ultimate use.
(2) As soon as point (1) can be settled, the development of adequate
manufacturing facilities for the chosen substances should proceed.
(3) While the developments indicated under (1) and (2) above are
in progress, studies aimed at improving the country’s position with
respect to production of the present isotope and studies aimed at the
production of power and of reaction by-products should be vigorously
proposed.
Cooper points out that the development of usable electrical power
from nuclear reactions ”poses a problem much more difficult technically than the one which we have had to solve in connection with
our present manufacturing objectives.” Many of the problem areas are
identified such as high temperatures, corrosion resistance, the need for new
materials and alloys for fuel fabrication, structural purposes, and shielding. A
wide variety of engineering, scientific, and manufacturing organizations will be
required. The Met Lab has many of the facilities and scientific and engineering
personnel required, but Cooper points out it is not possible to attract or even
hold able persons in the Project because of the future being so uncertain.
He says unless the Project ”can be given a greater degree of certainty by a
new directive indicating clearly new objectives, it will hardly be possible to
maintain even our present working organization much beyond the first of the
year.” (Seaborg, 1979, pg.277-278)
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1944-10-12 Work of U233 Group
Extraction of U233. Four more cans of carbonate have been extracted (in
addition to the first two). There are approximately 4 mg of U233 per can.
(Hagemann, Studier)
Survey of Solvents for Extraction of U233. (Hyde, Wolf)
Methods of Concentration of U233 Following Extraction. (Hellman and Wolf)
Determination of Physical Constants for U233. The latest values of the specific
activity and corresponding half-life of pure U233 are 23,300 disintegrations per
minute per microgram and 146,000 years. The range of the alpha particles is 3.38
±0.01 cm at standard conditions. The fission cross section for neutrons slowed
by paraffin and absorbable by cadmium is 1.1 times that for U235. Checks on
material from the Montreal Laboratory corroborate the half-life determination.
(Instruments Group)
Methods of Dissolving Thorium Metal. (Katzin)
Analysis of Ore Samples for Protactinium. Isolation of Milligram Amounts of
Pa231 and Ionium. First steps toward isolation have been taken. (Van Winkle,
Sedlet) (Seaborg, 1979, pg.285)
1944-10-13 Technical Council Members received a memo from Stearns enclosing a
list of rules for the interchange of information between the Evergreen Area (the
Canadian-British group at Montreal) and the U.S.A. Project groups. Three of
these rules of concern to me are the following: (a) ”Information connected
with the transformation of thorium to element 23 and the separation
and measurement of the physical and chemical properties of thorium
and 23 will be freely interchanged.” (b) ”Information necessary for the
guarding of the health of the operators at the Montreal Plant will be exchanged.
Information concerning the toxic effects of either 49 or fission products will not
be included in this exchange.” and (c) ”Information concerning the chemistry
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of element 49, the method of separating 49 (including all engineering details),
and the purification together with the chemistry of the fission products will not
be transmitted until further instructions are issued.” (Seaborg, 1979, pg.286)
1944-10-16 Report MUC-GTS-1068 reviews the investigations conducted under
Contract OEMsr-206 related to measurement of the fission properties of U233,
Np237, and Np239. The discovery of U233 and measurements of its radioactive
properties and its slow neutron fission are described in Reports A-153 and A192. The discovery of Np237 and the demonstration that it does not undergo
fission with slow neutrons is covered in Report A-151. Contemplated work on
the fission properties of Np239 was never done. The work on the preparation
of U234 through the extraction of UX1 (reported in A-172), the search for
spontaneous fission in U234 (reported in A-268), and the measurement of the
fast neutron fission cross sections of Pu239 and U233 (reported in A-269) were
also done under Contract OEMsr-206. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.288)
1944-10-17 I presented the status of our U233, protactinium, thorium, and
neptunium work and future plans. The growth of Pa233 by alpha-particle decay
from Np237 has been observed and is being followed, I said. The U233-Th229
decay chain is being followed. I reported that the structure of NpO2 has been
identified with Zachariasen’s help and that neptunium in the +6 state is being
studied in the form of NaNpAc3. Np(III) cannot be extracted with hexone
and in this respect is analogous to Pu(III). I said that intensive work has been
started on the use of dibutyl carbitol for the extraction of thorium and uranium.
A black residue remains after dissolving thorium metal (from Ames) in HCl. Xray analysis shows the residue to consist of about two-thirds ThO2 and the
remainder thorium nitrate. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.292)
Sugarman, representing Section C-III, talked about the radioactive poisoning
effect discovered in the Hanford pile when the pile was first brought up to
a power level of 9 MW. The poisoning effect is caused by short-lived
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Te135 which decays to 6.6-hour iodine and eventually into 9.4-hour
Xe135; the latter probably has a high thermal neutron absorption
cross section. Xenon-135 normally decays to a 20-30-year cesium that becomes
stable barium. The yield of this fission chain is reported to be about 4.3%.
Johnson introduced the speakers from Clinton Laboratories. Elliott spoke about
the xenon poisoning problem also. His measurement on the half-life of I135
gives 6.9 hours instead of 6.6 hours. The fission yield was found to be 5.7%
instead of 4.3% for the chain beginning with tellurium. Sugarman suggested
the resulting difference may be due to a difference in counting techniques.
Problems concerning the accuracy of the physicists’ neutron flux values were
also discussed. Elliott also described experiments with neutron-bombarded LiF
to produce tritium. So far only helium has been found.
English described three problems being studied, two concerning the Hanford
process and one concerning U233. The two problems in the extraction step
are to study losses caused by complex formation and to study the action of
interfering agents such as hydrazine. Nitrite (NaNO2 ) is not a good reducing
agent for the Hanford process especially if much Pu(VI) is present in the process
solution. Oxalic acid seems fairly good. English said NaNO2 seems to kill the
effects of hydrazine: this is probably due to the NaNO2 acting as an oxidizing
agent. The work at Clinton on U233 is progressing. English reported results
of the dissolution of thorium metal with HNO3 and with HF in concentrated
HNO3 . Some residue remains and probably contains silicon. I cautioned English
that when one uses HF, a complex will be formed that will interfere with the
extraction process. English said HCl will also dissolve the thorium but this
is undesirable and causes increased corrosion problems. With regard to the
residue, Zachariasen asked Spedding how the thorium was melted. Spedding
said beryllium oxide crucibles were used (not nitride as Zachariasen had earlier
suspected). (Seaborg, 1979, pg.293)
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1944-10-18 Wigner said that the immediate progress at Los Alamos is not currently
limited by a lack of understanding about the theoretical physics of the bomb.
Compton remarked that since the loss of a large fraction of our Met Lab
experimental physicists to Site Y will so greatly weaken our ability to go
forward with new pile studies, effective utilization of theoretical physicists in
Chicago may not be possible. It would therefore seem desirable to transfer the
theoretical physicists to Site Y also. Franck and Mulliken felt differently about
the matter. Franck pointed out that Chicago needs a strong theoretical group
for consultation, and Mulliken said such a transfer would seriously hurt the
work on the preparation of Project records.
Compton reviewed the situation at Hanford and said that a week-long operation
of the 105B pile at about 30 MW showed no new surprises. Xenon production
in the pile is still the best explanation as to the cause of the poisoning effect.
Whitaker said the large new fan at Clinton has been repaired and the X-10 pile
is operating at 4 MW. He said careful measurements were made of about 7% of
the center pile materials irradiated for two months. This material was pushed
out and replaced with fresh material. An increase in reactivity was observed
that corresponded closely to the amount of xenon calculated to be present in
the old materials which had been pushed out. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.295-296)
1944-10-23 I read a memo Pye wrote to me reporting on his recent trip to
Clinton. He states that the amount of material (slugs) being processed in the
canyons per run has recently been increased from one-third ton to one-half ton.
Processing, using two decontamination cycles and a crossover cycle prior to
isolation, continues to be satisfactory. Eleven runs have been made involving
recycling experiments in order to build up the plutonium concentration in the
lanthanum fluoride-plutonium solution to a level where the Hanford isolation
procedure could be evaluated on a plant scale. The recycling procedure used
was to metathesize and dissolve the combined lanthanum fluoride-plutonium
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precipitates from two runs; precipitate the plutonium as the peroxide; dissolve
this in Room D; and with the supernatant added, recycle this entire solution
to the lanthanum fluoride-plutonium precipitation step as the lanthanum
precipitating agent in 204 Building. The Hanford isolation equipment has
been ”copied” at Clinton, and two isolation operations have been carried out
successfully in 204 Building under conditions which closely approximate Hanford
conditions.
Pye reports that Stoughton’s group is investigating methods for dissolving
thorium and ThO2 and has determined that a solution of 8 N HNO3 and 0.3 to
0.5 N HF [or 0.005 N (NH4)2SiF6 ] offers promise. Clinton Laboratories’ future
plans include the recovery of all U233 from the remaining cans of irradiated
Th(CO3 )2, the development of a method for obtaining irradiated materials in
the future on a continuing basis, and the development of procedures for isolating
very pure U233. The isolation procedure contemplated for the latter will consist
of immediate ether extraction of the irradiated thorium carbonate to remove
uranium and other impurities. The aqueous phase solution will be then aged
to permit the growth of U233 from its parent Pa233; the U233 will then be
removed in a pure state by a second ether extraction. A continuous ether
extraction system is planned for eventual use. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.304)
1944-11-01 I reviewed recent results on the physical constants of U233 it appears
that the fission cross section is about the same as for U235 (550 barns); the total
neutron absorption is only around 620 barns, giving a favorably small value for
the parameter alpha (0.12). The number of neutrons per fission is 1.07 times
the U235 value. The number of neutrons given off per neutron absorbed is 1.13
times the U235 value. These values are within the range to enable U233
to be made from thorium by a chain reaction on the U233 (i.e., to
make breeding possible)—extremely important because it may make
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it possible to be independent of uranium once a supply of U233 for
starting purposes is on hand. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.320)
A meeting of the Division Directors took place today. Some of the topics that
were considered are the following: (3) Allison states that Compton has issued
a directive requesting that the separation of U233 from 40 slugs of thorium
carbonate, irradiated at Site X, be done entirely at the Metallurgical Laboratory.
Provision for doing this should be made. The remaining slugs on hand at Site X
will be irradiated, and fifteen will be required for shipment to Montreal. Allison
requested that 25 mg of U233 be set aside for the use of Professor Koch at the
University of Illinois. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.320)
Hogness issued a summary of the manpower distribution in the Chemistry
Division (148 total). My section employs 73 men. The three research subsections or groups of Section C-I are divided in the following way.
Number of Men
Sept.
Oct.
Albaugh (Site W R. Thompson, extraction and de11
10
work, 26 men)
contamination
Pye, concentration and isolation
8
5
Gilbreath, process development
7
6
Lawroski, solvent extraction
4
4
Cunningham,
Simpson, high vacuum work
11
10
(Site Y work, 38
men)
Hindman, basic chemistry
10
10
Dawson, recovery
9
8
Ghiorso, instruments and physical
10
9
measurements
Katzin, 23 work
6
6
(Seaborg, 1979, pg.321)
1944-11-03 ”The 23 separated from the thorium carbonate from the X pile by
extraction with ether has shown 85% purity with respect to U238. The halflife has been set at 140,000 years, the alpha-particle range as 3.38 cm in air.
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Samples have been sent to both Y and Argonne for additional work.” (Seaborg,
1979, pg.323)
1944-11-06 About mid-morning I was visited in my office by W. P. Grove and A.
Paneth from the Montreal Project, who are here on a three-day visit. They were
accompanied by Captain Chapman of the Chicago Area Office. We first held
a general discussion on the radiation hazards connected with U233 work. In
answer to Grove’s question, I gave the opinion that the tolerance level for U233
in the lungs is something like 10 to 50 micrograms. I showed them a copy of
our ”mandatory product safety rules” that apply to any alpha-particle emitter.
We also discussed precautions in handling beta- and gamma-activity, and I
described our ”hot” laboratories. I mentioned our system of continuous cleaning
of laboratory desks, equipnent, floors, walls, and ceilings and our system of
changing to special laboratory shoes upon entering the building. We discussed
particularly our rule of handling plutonium only when working with gloves and
our rule that plutonium in any appreciable amount at all can be handled only in
hoods under forced draft. After this discussion, we went through Rooms 5 and
6 where the U233 work is done and Rooms 34, 35, and 37 where the plutonium
recovery work and other work is done. After lunch I again met in my office
with the visitors and Captain Chapman. Also present was Dr. Nickson who
described in detail our radiation monitoring system
A memorandum on secrecy (MUC-TRH-188) was sent to Compton, signed by
19 people who hold the rank of Division Director or above—leaders of the Met
Lab, Clinton Labs, and the Ames, and California Projects. The memorandum
gives three reasons for lifting to a certain extent, the Project secrecy restrictions:
(1) If the enemy has the weapon and uses it first, the lack of forewarning could
cause panic among our Allies. (2) Our unexpected use of the weapon could have
dangerous postwar effects stemming from the sudden, unanticipated conclusion
of the war and the lack of postwar plans which take account of the existence of
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this new weapon. (3) The enemy may be able to create division among the Allies
by pointing to the existence of big production plants in which are fabricated
weapons which they can contend are not designed for the present war.
The writers/cosigners advocate that a general statement be made to the public
concerning the existence of a new weapon and stating that work is going on in
this country for manufacturing it and that it is bound to affect the relations of
the nations in the future. They further advocate that, since these considerations
may transcend those of the military, active steps should be taken to have them
laid before the highest authorities of the land and before all those who will
advise on the specific conditions of postwar control. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.325)
1944-11-07 At 2:00 p.m.

I attended the Project Council Information Meeting

on Physics at which Zinn presented the followin nuclear constants for U233,
comparing them with the constants for Pu239 and U235:
(Seaborg, 1979, pg.326)
1944-11-08 With regard to U233 it was stated that, in order to evaluate Herbert
Anderson’s data obtained at Argonne, the specific activity of the samples he
used must be determined accurately; this will require about 800 micrograms of
oxide. It was mentioned that Site Y has detected Pu240 by mass spectrographic
analysis—the sample used had about 5 parts of Pu240 per 10,000 parts of Pu239
present.
The pile at Site W has been operating at 90,000 kW for the past two weeks. It
appears likely that the pile cannot be operated above 225,000 kW at the present
potential loading capacity. The present plan is to run until the concentration of
plutonium approaches 30 g/ton and then commence extraction of some of the
plutonium. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.327)
Allison reported that two directives have been received by Compton. First,
responsibility for waste recovery of uranium has been assigned to Clinton and
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responsibility for recovery of U233 has been assigned to the Met Lab. The
second directive is that Allison’s responsibilities at Chicago will end in one week
on the 15th and Stearns will take over. Allison is to go to Los Alamos. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.331)
1944-11-15 Katzin and Davidson held their first meeting with Wigner, Weinberg,
Ohlinger, and Young for the purpose of becoming oriented in the chemical problems involved in the design of conversion piles (U233-fueled, D2O-moderated
piles for the conversion of thorium to U233).
I attended an evening meeting of the Separation Process Subsection of my
section. Studier talked about gamma- and x-ray activity found to be associated
with pure U233 analogous to that previously reported to be associated with
94-239. Aluminum and lead absorption curves have been run on a 16-mg
sample purified by ether extraction and by BaSO4 and lanthanum fluoride
precipitations. Gamma-rays have been detected at 420, 230, and 150 kev energy,
also x-rays of 87, 19, and 14 kev. The presence of electrons, probably arising
from internal conversion of the gamma-rays, was demonstrated by magneticdeflection counting techniques. I offered a probable relationship between the
energies of the radiations and the quantum levels in the Th229 daughter atoms
which are involved.
Hyde reported some exploratory investigations of extraction of uranium and
thorium by cellosolves, esters, ketones, and diethyl ether (in connection with
U233 extraction studies). Hellman spoke on the effect of thorium, aluminum,
lanthanum, copper, manganese, and ammonium nitrates as salting agents
upon the extraction of uranium and thorium into ethyl ether. There is a
pronounced increase in uranium extraction at comparatively low aluminum
nitrate concentrations, indicating its value for preliminary extraction. He said
that NH4NO3 is indicated as a salting agent for final purification where the
amount of thorium extracted is an important factor.
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Katzin reported on the probable decay chain for the ”neptunium series,” of
which U233 is the third member. Based on preliminary experiments and by
analogy with the known series, he postulates the following decay chain:
Katzin then presented experimental evidence in support of that part of the
proposed decay chain following U233 and indicated the possibility of branching
decay leading to isotopes of elements 85 and 87. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.337-338)
1944-11-18 a. Katzin reports that cans nos. 7-10 of thorium carbonate have been
extracted, yielding about 4.5 mg of U233 per can. He also describes studies
of salting-out action of various nitrates on thorium and uranium, solvents for
uranium-thorium separation, the radiations from U233 and the determination
of the decay chain of U233. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.341-342)
The Jeffries Committee, appointed by Compton last July to prepare a report
on the future prospects of atomic energy, submitted to Compton its 65-page
report, ”Prospectus on Nucleonics.” Members of the committee are Fermi,
Franck, Hogness, Jeffries (Chairman), Mulliken (Secretary), R. Stone, and C.
A. Thomas. The report begins with a review of the history of nuclear science
and the principles of chain reacting piles.

With regard to the future

of nucleonics, it explores the question of whether there is enough
uranium to supply the power needs of the U.S. by nuclear reactors,
points to the use of thorium as a supplementary source of power
from fission, and describes the possibility of converting hydrogen
into helium to give a virtually unlimited source of energy. The report
identifies the possibility of nuclear generators as sources of power in deserts,
polar regions, on ships, or even in excursions into space.

It suggests the

production of new heavy elements—new neptunium isotopes or elements beyond
plutonium—that may be suitable for use in piles or other nuclear power devices.
The report looks forward to the production of radioactive isotopes in piles in
large quantities for use in tracer studies and for medical purposes. With regard
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to the nearer future of nucleonics the report explores: Physics. Nucleonics to
be the liveliest part of theoretical and experimental physics with applications
of radiation and radioactive tracers to other branches of physics. Chemistry.
Study of transuranic elements will be pursued; use of radiation in chemical
and physico-chemical processes (replacing catalysts or heat); use of tracers in
reaction kinetics - C14 for investigating the mechanism of organic reactions;
study of fluid flow. Biology and Medicine. Radioactive iodine in thyroid, tracer
elements in studying basic problems of animal and plant metabolism - study
of photosynthesis, use of radioisotopes in diagnosis. Metallurgy. Use of tracers
to study diffusion, inclusions, distribution of minor constituents. Engineering
and Construction. Problems of wear and lubrication (tracers); leak testing
with radioactive gases; tracers for tracing flow in sewers or dams; embodying
radioactive materials in paints and floor covering to eliminate static; radioactive
sources as substitutes for industrial and clinical x-ray machines; illumination by
mixing radioactive materials with luminescent material. Agriculture. Study of
poisons and micronutrients. Power. Limited amount of available uranium
precludes a widespread use of pile power for energy production in
competition with coal, oil, or falling water. However, the (by-product)
heat from piles built for plutonium production can be utilized for central heating
of large areas, thus freeing oil for premium uses. On the other hand, should
not conclude that the cost of pile power is necessarily going to be high as
compared with other power sources. Pile power may also be used for
transportation ”while pile-powered interplanetary ships still belong
to the realm of scientific day-dreaming, pile-powered battleships or
submarines have been considered as likely applications of nuclear
power in the relatively near future.” Explosives. Changing direction of
sea currents, destroying hurricanes, removing danger of earthquakes or volcanic
eruptions, blasting of waterways, e.g., Panama Canal. Impact of Nucleonics on
International Relations. Danger of a blitzkrieg. Need for central authority to
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exercise control over nuclear power—necessity for all nations to make every
effort to cooperate now in setting up an international administration with
police powers which can control the means of nuclear warfare. Control of
Materials. Should be possible to give considerable scope to free enterprise and
still have the government hold a tight rein on the important factors. Postwar
Organization of Nucleonics in America.

Nation must maintain its leading

position in nuclear research and nuclear industry. ”There should be government
supported nucleonics laboratories having ample facilities for both fundamental
and applied research.” Without a healthy development of a nuclear industry,
nucleonics research will be insufficient to guarantee the leading position of
this country. The report concludes with a statement of broad objectives: to
stimulate widespread research in nucleonics in the United States, to encourage
the development of a free nucleonics industry in the United States, to coordinate
the governmental activities in nucleonics with the scientific and industrial
developments in this field in such a way as to insure maximum national security,
to strive for the establishment of an efficient international supervision over all
military aspects of nucleonics.
Suggestions for the accomplishment of these objectives are given as follows:
(a) The projects relating to plutonium, U235, and perhaps U233 should be
prosecuted by the Government, no matter when the war ends, to a point
sufficient for military appraisal. (b) The development of the nucleonics industry
by private enterprise should be encouraged. The military by-products of the
industrial developments should be made available to the government, and
the use of government information and patents should be made available to
industry so far as the military situation may permit. (c) Scientific education
and research should be encouraged in existing university laboratories, and new
research laboratories for nucleonics with special facilities should be created at
universities. (d) A suitable agency, with both government and nongovernment
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representatives, should be established to guide and coordinate such nucleonics
activities as may affect the military or other interests of the nation.

(e)

Enlightenment of public opinion on the scope and significance of nucleonics
should start as soon as possible to bring about realization of the dangers for
world security caused by the new scientific and technical developments, and
to prepare for decisions which will have to be taken to meet this danger. (f)
Cooperation with friendly nations in all these problems—particularly the last
named one—should be given serious and prompt attention. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.341-343)
1944-11-20 In the evening I was the speaker at the first of the revised biweekly
Chemistry Division Monday meetings, held at 7:45 p.m. in Room 251, Ryerson
Hall. In the first of two talks on ”The Heavy Elements,” I discussed the nuclear
properties of elements from atomic number 80 to 96, with emphasis on elements
89 to 96. Aspects covered were characteristics of heavy nuclei, energetics of
radioactivity, systematics of type of radiation and half-life, neptunium series,
neutron fission in the ”Big Three” (U233, U235, and Pu239), and prospects
for useful nuclei other than the ”Big Three.” The talk included a description
of our recent work on the decay of the 4n + 1 series (see Fig. 29). This also
includes the 4n, 4n +2, and 4n+ 3 decay series and suggests the nomenclature of
classical radioactivity for the new 4n + 1 series. I included a description of the
recent observation by James and Ghiorso of an isotope of element 96 produced
by helium ion bombardment of Pu239 in the Berkeley 60-inch cyclotron. I said
this isotope, which has a halflife of a few months, decays by the emission of alpha
particles with range 4.6 cm in air, and exhibits chemistry characteristics of the
+3 oxidation state of a rare earth, may be 96242 produced by the reaction
Pu239(α, n)96-242. I also predicted that there is a good chance that Pu241,
produced by successive neutron capture in Pu239 [i.e., by Pu239(n, γ)Pu240
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and Pu240(n, γ)Pu241) may be a beta emitter, leading to the possibility of
observing the daughter isotope, 95-241. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.345)
1944-11-21 Figure 30. The four radioactive decay series. November 1944.
Uranium-233 Studies.

Finally, I reported on our systematic study of the

influence of salting-out agents on thorium and uranium solutions. I indicated
that best results are obtained with calcium nitrate, ammonium nitrate (the old
stand-by), and aluminum nitrate. I also mentioned our survey of solvents.
I described the gamma-rays and x-rays we have found for U233. (Here I showed
the slide [Fig. 291 of the four radioactive decay series that I had presented last
night at the first biweekly Chemistry Division meeting.) I stated that: ”The
new radioactive disintegration chain of which U233 is a member, has now been
almost completely identified. It starts with Np237, which is transformed by
alpha emission into Pa 233 which in turn gives U233 by beta emission. U233 is
converted by alpha emission into Th229 which has a half life of 103 -104 years.
From the growth of activity of isolated Th229, which has now been followed
for several weeks, it is clear that an element with a lifetime of at least several
months occurs in the disintegration chain below Th229. The alpha activity of
Th229 contains at least five different groups, which is consistent with
the assumption that the stable final product is Bi209. The daughter
element of Th229 is Ra225. The latter emits alpha particles (perhaps also betas)
and gives a short-lived emanation (86-221). In the figure, the ’neptunium series,’
which may also be called ’(4n+1)-series’ is represented tentatively alongside the
three old established series, the uranium-(4n+2), thorium-(4n), and actinium(4n+3) series.” (Seaborg, 1979, pg.348)
1944-11-22 Absorption cross section of U236. The cross section for the formation
of U237 from U236 appears to be less than 135 barns. Poison chain: The cross
section for Xe135 is of the order of 3 megabarns. The fission yield according to
Sugarman is about 5%. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.351)
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Compton asked that those present consider whether the work from here on
should continue to be organized around the immediate future or whether some
other objective should be followed. In the discussion of possible objectives that
followed, Jeffries pointed out that the objective of Chicago has been
achieved only in part since plutonium does not have all the desirable
properties that had been anticipated. The same apparently holds for
U235. Perhaps, then, the only way to provide adequate insurance
that the objective really be achieved would be to be ready to convert
Pu239 over to U233. This could provide a clear-cut objective.
Compton summarized the discussion, stating that (a) The primary Pu239
objective has reached the point where we should advise the Army that our
part of the 49 task is largely complete. (b) There is general agreement that a
large amount of work in utilization of nuclear energy is still before us, such as
hexone extraction process development and conversion of 49 and 25 to 23. A
discussion of pressing the work on U233 followed, and Compton indicated that
agreement by the Army to proceed with moving and setting equipment for a
metal fabrication laboratory would have to wait until after his meeting with
Colonel Nichols this week. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.352)
1944-11-23 Katzin and Davidson attended the second meeting on the design of
the homogeneous U233 pile, conferring with Wigner, Young, Weinberg, and at
times, Ohlinger and Szilard. Problems discussed included handling and cooling
the thorium absorbing blanket, production of water vapor and gases in the
reacting unit, mechanism of ridding of fission product gases, cooling of the
reacting solution, effect of heat and energy release on the materials, e.g., solvents
used for processing the highly concentrated fuel solution, without preliminary
cooling. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.353)
1944-11-24 ”The supply of several milligrams of pure U233, which has been made
available for the first time, has opened up a whole new field of exploration in
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radioactivity. It is now clear that U233 starts a decay chain leading to a whole
set of new isotopes of the heavy elements which have been missing gaps in the
isotopic chart. It is now possible with pile-produced U233 to fill in these gaps
and work has been started on determining the lives and properties of these new
isotopes.
”The sample of U233 purified in the Chemistry Division has been used at the
Argonne Laboratory for the determination of the cross section for neutrons and
the fission yield. Fission chains can be produced from U233 as well as from
U235 or Pu239, but the details will be given in reports from Argonne. Solvent
extraction methods are being perfected for the extraction and purification of
U233 from irradiated thorium.” (Seaborg, 1979, pg.355)
1944-11-27 Dempster and I talked by phone about the preparation of plutonium
samples to be used for mass spectrometer identification of Pu240 and also the
preparation of U233 samples to be used to determine their isotopic composition.
Daniels sent a memo to Stearns about the Chemistry Division progress outline
for November, summarizing work in Section C-I on (9) isolation of 18 more mg
of U233 from irradiated thorium, (10) radiations from U233 and its decay chain.
”Hexone extraction of U233 from thorium is satisfactory in the presence of an
excess of thorium and aluminum salts. Experiments are under way to find the
most suitable ketone. The new neptunium decay series is being filled in with
new isotopes which have become available as a by-product of the pile. For the
first time a decrease in elastic modulus has been observed in graphite which
has been subjected to long exposure in the pile. It is not known yet whether
this phenomenon, connected with the Wigner effect, is to be interpreted as
favorable or unfavorable. The latest measurements on the properties
of xenon connected with the poisoning of the pile are: yield—5.6
percent, cross section for slow neutrons—3.1 million barns, and halflife—9.2 hours. New developments in analytical techniques include the use
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of porous graphite electrodes for spectrographic analysis which act as wicks
to feed in solution at the proper rate, the application of the polarograph to
the determination of plutonium in uranium solutions, and the simplification of
analysis of zirconium and iron by extraction with organic solvents.” (Seaborg,
1979, pg.358-359)
1944-11-28 The discharge of the first uranium slugs from the Hanford pile was
completed today. The plutonium content is low because the uranium did not
receive full production-level irradiation. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.360)
”As material comes to the Hanford extraction plant, following pile irradiation
and ’cooling,’ it consists of cylinders of uranium metal encased in aluminum. In
each metric ton of uranium metal there are expected to be about 250 grams each
of plutonium and fission products. The radioactivity of the fission products,
after 100 days of irradiation at 2500 kW per ton and 40 days ’cooling,’ is
about 3.5 × 106 curies per ton of uranium. After 60 days cooling the activity
is about 2.5 × 105 curies, and further cooling has less and less effect. The
extraction problem thus becomes a double one—chemical extraction of 250
grams of plutonium from 1000 kg of uranium, and separation of plutonium
from fission activity. Accepting the value of 10 millicuries as the maximum
amount of beta and gamma radiation that may be worked with directly by
a chemist, with some shielding, ’decontamination’ from fission activity must
be accomplished by a factor of 2.5 − 3.5 × 107 for material cooled 40-60 days.
Furthermore, this extraction and decontamination must be performed entirely
by remote control, behind biologically adequate shielding (e.g., 8 feet or more
of concrete). (Seaborg, 1979, pg.361)
1944-11-29 Katzin gave a brief review of the work on the homogeneous U233 pile,
which is to consist of about a cubic meter of heavy water with 7 or 8 kilograms of
U233 in solution. Since the pile is to be run at 100,000 kW, the cooling
problem is severe, and since the power per unit volume is much higher
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than any other pile, the problem of poison by fission products is a
much more serious one. Apparently, the fission products will have to
be removed almost daily. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.365)
1944-11-30 ”During all this time a competent staff of personnel must be maintained
which is qualified and willing at a moment’s notice to devote its entire attention
to any unforeseen problems which may arise at the Hanford Engineer Works or
Y. To maintain such a staff intact with a sufficient degree of morale, it
is necessary that they work on some forward-thinking problem. Most
promising of the problems at the present time seems to be in the
field of (1) ’converter’ piles and ’breeder’ piles; (2) chemical procedures
for handling metal much faster than planned in the original flowsheet; (3) the
continued investigations of the effect of radiation on graphite.” (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.368-369)
1944-12-01 Hogness issued a summary of manpower distribution in the Chemistry
Division which shows that there are 157 people in the Division as of December
1, including 80 in my section. The groups under Albaugh, Cunningham, and
Katzin are divided as follows:
(Seaborg, 1979, pg.370)
1944-12-03 Also at Clinton, 15 cans of ThOCO3 , specially purified from uranium,
went into the pile in a position giving 1.4 times the average flux. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.371)
1944-12-04 The first production run of irradiated Hanford uranium slugs is scheduled to be received in the separation plant’s underwater storagee area today. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.371)
Compton asked Stearns for the following information to aid in
deciding whether or not to authorize an immediate program for the
production of 23 for possible use in the present war: ”(1) A feasible
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Number of Men
Oct.
Nov.
Albaugh (Site W R. Thompson, extraction and de- 10
9
work, 32 men)
contamination
Katz, concentration and isolation
5
3
Gilbreath, process development
8
6
Egan, semiworks
0
9
Lawroski, solvent extraction
4
4
Cunningham,
Simpson, high vacuum work
10
10
(Site Y work, 39
men)
Hindman, basic chemistry
10
10
Dawson, recovery
8
8
Ghiorso, instruments and physical
9
10
measurements
Katzin, 23 work
6
6
time schedule for the production of 23 in quantities of 400 grams
per day, assuming the availability of the required amounts of 25 or
49, (2) Additions to the research staff required for such a vast project, (3)
Assuming as an alternative that the program is to be carried out, but not for
immediate application in this war, what work should be done by the Met Lab
before June 30, 1946.” Compton mentioned that he has received a memo
from Clinton Labs with regard to future developments which includes
a proposal for construction of a small experimental 23 ”producer” at
Clinton as a part of a larger program toward 23 production.
At 7:45 p.m. I gave my second talk on ”The Heavy Elements” at the new
biweekly Monday evening Chemistry Division Meeting in Room 251, Ryerson
Laboratory. After recapitulating my November 20 talk on nuclear properties, I
completed that aspect by discussing the work of James, Morgan, and Ghiorso
on our possible observation of an isotope of 96 from Pu239 plus helium ions,
possible isotopes of 95 from Pu239 from deuterons, and our proposed look
for 95241 from Pu241 beta decay or, later, 95-243 from Pu243 beta decay
(the Pu241 and Pu243 to come from intense neutron irradiation of Pu239).
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I mentioned the U232 found in pile-produced U233 in the work of
Ghiorso, Katzin, Studier, and Hagemann. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.372)
1944-12-05 The first uranium slugs are to be charged into the second Hanford
plutonium manufacturing pile, the D pile, today.
At 10:30 a.m. I attended the Project Council Information Meeting on Physics.
Others present were Borst, H. Brown, Burton, Compton, C. M. Cooper,
Dancoff, Daniels, Darrow, Dempster, Estermann, Franck, Friedman, Goldsmith,
Greninger, Hamilton, Hill, Jesse, Langsdorf, Lapp, Lewis, Lichtenberger,
Manning, Maurer, Moon, Mulliken, Nordheim, Ohlinger, Rabinowitch, Seitz,
Shonka, Simpson, Spedding, Stearns, Stephenson, Stern, Sugarman, Szilard,
Wakefield, Watson, Wattenberg, Way, Weinberg, Whitaker, Wigner, Young,
Zachariasen, and Zinn. Some of the high points are as follows. Weinberg
presented the results of calculations on the properties of a pile run at high
temperature (2000◦ C) as envisioned in the ”pebble” pile suggested by Daniels.
The advantage to be gained by such a pile is the elimination of the 40
difficulty (production by neutron capture in 49) by the continuous distillation
of plutonium from the uranium carbide spheres. His calculations indicate the
prospects for such a pile are poor because of the loss in k at the elevated
temperatures. Young reported on his study of a design of a U233
”breeder,” i.e., a pile that would operate on U233 and breed more
U233 in a surrounding thorium shield than is consumed in the pile.
He concludes that it is a promising possibility but that some types of losses
may have been overlooked. There are many technical problems that have not
been investigated. Nordheim reported on a small pile designed for Site X, which
would be a 23 breeder or converter. He visualizes a pile using uranium enriched
by a factor of 12.5, moderated by heavy water with a graphite reflector, and
surrounded by thorium.
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At the end of the meeting Compton gave the following information he has just
received from Los Alamos; (a) neutrons per fission for U233 = 2.45±5%, which
is equal to the value previously obtained for U235; (b) the relative abundance
of 94-240 to 94-239 as measured in metal obtained from Site X is determined
by mass spectrograph to be 3.4 × 10−4 . (Seaborg, 1979, pg.373)
1944-12-06 On the subject of materials, I mentioned we have a pound of depleted
uranium in which there is a 25-fold depletion of U235. We also have about 20 mg
of ionium (20% ionium, 80% thorium mixture) from Berkeley that may contain
as much as one mg of protactinium; it was originally obtained from a process
for isolating UX1 from tons of uranium to make 10 micrograms of U234. It
has been decided that six cans of neutron-irradiated extra pure thorium (free of
uranium) will be brought up from Clinton on January 1. Forty cans of ordinary
thorium (irradiated) have come from Clinton for extraction—about 4 mg of
U233 per can.
I brought up the subject of working hours of the Met Lab academic personnel.
The Army has been examining attendance records and says that few people are
working the established 48-hour week. Only a few arrive at 8:30; by 9:00 a small
number more have come in. On the other hand, the signature sheets show that
relatively few check out after 6:00 p.m. or come back to work at night. This
laxity probably will result in a very strong request for our men to go to other
sites where manpower is badly needed. I also requested that no newspapers and
magazines be left lying about because the Army objects to the reading of these
on working time. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.374-375)
1944-12-08 At Clinton today, 14 additional cans of ThOCO3 , specially purified
from uranium, go into the pile in a position giving 0.3-0.4 times the average
flux. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.384)
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1944-12-12 At 9:45 a.m. I arrived in Pendleton, Oregon. I was met and then
continued by automobile to the Hanford Engineer Works. There has been much
construction at Hanford Village since my visit last May. During the afternoon
I made a tour of the pile and chemical separations areas. The one pile now
operating is running at a power level of 125,000 kW but is expected to go to
its rated level of 250,000 kW when all 2,000 tubes have been filled. Each pile
has 200 tons of metal instead of the originally planned 100 tons. It will take
200 days operation at 250,000 kW to attain 250 grams of plutonium per ton of
metal.
One canyon is finished and is running with tracer now.

The canyon is a

tremendous construction 860 feet long. Looking down at the control boards the
length of the canyon, one sees nothing but 860 feet of valves, meters, indicators,
controls—a fantastic sight. Everything is handled completely by remote control.
The insides of the cells cannot be seen except by means of a thoroughly shielded
periscope handled by an operator from an overhead crane. Each cell has three
staggered seven-foot concrete block covers (15 tons each) which can be removed
by an operator in a thoroughly shielded overhead cab. The periscope enables
the operator to use remote control wrenches and other tools to replace defective
equipment.
Slugs coming out of the pile glow red from the photons shooting out. (Their
temperature is, of course, much below red heat.) They are dropped into a deep
water channel and caught in big buckets which carry them into large lead coffins,
after which they are hauled out into the desert five or ten miles to cool.
The piles are in the 100 area and the extraction canyons in the 200 area. Both
run on a 24-hour schedule. Extraction and decontamination takes place in
Bldg. 221B. Concentration (the crossover step) takes place in Bldg. 224B, and
isolation of the product occurs in Bldg. 231. The Control Labs (Bldg. 222B)
are also in this area. The 300 area is near Richland—about 20 or 25 miles away
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from the 100 and 200 areas. This area contains the research building (No. 3706)
where John Willard and his group work: the test pile, the canning building, the
cold semiworks, etc. (see Figs. 36-47).
I had dinner at the Perlmans’ and then spent the night at the Richland transient
quarters. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.387)
1944-12-14 At an afternoon meeting of Division Directors in Eckhart Hall, Stearns
and Wigner reported that a letter has been received from Compton
asking if it is possible to make plans for converting 100 grams of
Pu239 into at least 70 grams of U233 per day. Wigner outlined the
sandwich pile which his Physics Division considers to be the most practical for
quick results. (Plutonium is sandwiched between thin aluminum sheets folded
in the form of a bellows and placed in a cylindrical tank two feet in diameter and
eight feet high. Ordinary water is forced through the bellows. Surrounding the
plutonium cylinder and the water cooling is a concentric cylinder of thorium
metal, oxide or oxide slurry.) The plutonium must be decontaminated from
fission products by a factor of 107 once every ten days to remove neutron poisons
and to make it possible to refabricate the plutonium; high yields of plutonium
(99.9%) are required to make the desired yields of U233 possible. A report to
Compton is to be written by January 6. Daniels was asked by Wigner to bring
back a report from the Chemistry Division on the feasibility of obtaining high
efficiencies (yields of the order of 99.9%) in purification and decontamination
by the solvent extraction method. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.399-400)
Katzin wrote a summary of the U233 work for my use at the Project Council
Chemistry Information Meeting on Tuesday. Topics covered are (1) Additional
information has been obtained on salting-out action of various nitrates on
thorium and uranium. Data obtained are in harmony with the interpretation
that high extraction of thorium into ether results in ”salting back” of the
uranium into the aqueous phase. The desirable combination of high salting of
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uranium and low salting of thorium into ether is shown most outstandingly by
calcium nitrate, by ammonium nitrate at high concentrations, and by aluminum
nitrate at low concentrations. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.400)
(2) Tests on solvents for use in the uranium-thorium separation have been
extended to the extraction on protactinium. It has been found that diisopropyl
ketone will extract protactinium to the extent of 50%. (3) Calculations and
analysis of data obtained on the 4n+1 decay chain indicate that as little as
10−8 parts of U232 formed by the n, 2n reaction on U233 or Pa233 may produce
sufficient amounts of radio-thorium and the subsequent members of the thorium
decay chain to complicate the experiments on the 4n+1 series. So far, it has
been learned that RdNp(Th229) probably has a half-life of several thousand
years and NpX (Ra225) has a half-life of about one month. (4) If a radiumthorium separation is made and the radium fraction set aside for several weeks,
the ThX and its daughter activities decay out leaving the presumably pure
neptunium series members. Experiments on material that has been handled in
this fashion have confirmed the presence of Pb209 (NpD) with the known halflife of 3.3 hours. Isolation of the bismuth fraction from the aged NpX has given
an alpha activity of approximately 45 minutes half-life. Although no accurate
alpha-particle range curve is available from which to determine the branching
ratio, there are definitely two differing ranges of alpha particles detectable,
one of which, no doubt, corresponds to NpC and possesses a very long range.
Unsuccessful attempts to isolate members of the series between NpX and NpC,
correlated with the rate of growth of NpC and NpD, indicate that all other
half-lives involved are probably shorter than ten minutes. No decision can be
made yet concerning possible branching at NpX and other points along the
chain. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.401)
1944-12-15 In the afternoon Manning, Katzin, and Davidson met with Daniels to
discuss the feasibility of obtaining high efficiencies in purification and
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decontamination operations required in connection with the converter
pile being designed for the conversion of 100 grams of plutonium per
day to U233 with a yield of at least 70 grams. It was concluded by
everyone that at the present state of solvent extraction development the best
efficiency would be about 95% for a decontamination factor of 102 making it
necessary to fabricate the plutonium by remote control, and that the required
yield of 99.9% and 107 decontamination is impossible. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.401)
1944-12-18 At 2:00 p.m. there was a meeting in Daniels’ office to discuss the
problems of the converter pile. Those present were C. M. Cooper, Daniels,
Davidson, English, Katzin, Maloney, Manning, and Tepe. All agreed that
the efficiency in chemical processing of plutonium that Wigner
hopes for, namely 99.9%, is impossible if decontamination is to be
107 . If decontamination of 100-fold is permitted, requiring remote control for
plutonium sandwich refabrication, a yield of 95% might be hoped for. Other
types of piles were discussed with English advocating the homogeneous heavy
water pile, Cooper the homogeneous pile using circulating water with plutonium
nitrate in solution, and Daniels the high temperature pebble pile using bismuth
as coolant. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.403)
1944-12-19 At 9:30 a.m. I attended the Project Council Information Meeting on
Chemistry in Room 209, Eckhart Hall. Others present were Arnold, Bartky,
Boyd, Burton, Cohn, Compton, Connick, Coryell, Daniels, Dempster, Doan,
English, Fred, Hilberry, Huffman, Jeffries, W. Johnson, Manning, Mulliken,
Nickson, Rabinowitch, Spedding, Stearns, Stone, Sugarman, Szilard, Turkevich,
Wakefield, Watters, Whitaker, Wigner, Zachariasen, and Zinn. I was first on
the program and reported on investigations of separation processes for Hanford,
on basic chemistry, and U233 as follows:
(3) U233 program—Katzin’s group has made preparations for the extraction of
37 cans of irradiated thorium carbonate shipped from Clinton, and 28 mg of
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U233 have so far been extracted. We have redetermined the half-life of U233,
based on the new isotopic composition of 96% U233 and 4% U238 measured
by Dempster (the old measurement was 86% U233).

The new value is

160,000 years. I presented the latest information on the neptunium decay
series. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.403-404)
I reviewed a memo (MUC-GTS-1201) prepared for Daniels on the pile proposed
by Wigner for converting Pu239 to U233.

In this memo I note that the

losses envisioned by Wigner in the operation of the pile are such that the 30%
operating margin is essentially completely used up in the physical losses caused
by neutron absorption by fission products, materials of construction, etc. A
complete 100% yield is necessary for all chemical procedures to stay within the
required 70% efficiency.
I include the following table, based on the assumptions that the converter will
run on a cycle in which either one-tenth or one-twentieth of the material must
be processed daily to eliminate neutron-absorbing fission products:
(Seaborg, 1979, pg.405)
I point out that an efficiency of 99.9% for a decontamination by a
factor of some 107 followed by refabrication of an aluminum sandwich
is totally impossible by any known process and probably also by any
conceivable process. It is the consensus that a process giving a 95% yield is
an optimistic possibility which means an efficiency of not better than 41% for
a 20-day cycle. This might involve a combination of precipitation and solvent
extraction procedures.
I suggest that if the decontamination requirement can be lowered to a factor of
100 (presuming it is feasible to have remote-control refabrication of the fuel), a
chemical yield of 98% is possible by a solvent extraction procedure alone. I also
mention, as an alternative possibility, a homogeneous reactor with
ordinary water that would require a minimum of decontamination
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(only to remove fission product poisons) and would avoid the holdup due to fuel fabrication operations; however, little is known about this
approach, and hence this could require the most research work.
With regard to the processing of the thorium blanket in Wigner’s converter
pile, I indicate the problems seem straightforward, although there would
be a delay in harvesting the uranium because of the need to await
the decay of the 27.4-day protactinium precursor. I suggest the use of
thorium metal as the best practical form.
I mention some of the heavy isotope problems that will arise in the operation
of a converter unit. Pu240 will be formed at the rate of 40 g/day if the rate of
fission of Pu239 is 100 g/day. If Pu240 has a low fission cross section (and a
low capture cross section), the average cross section of the plutonium in the pile
will decrease at a rate of 15 barns per day. If Pu240 has a capture cross section
of 10 barns, there may be 10 g of Pu241 in a unit after 100 days operation.
In summary, I say we favor the heterogeneous arrangement with refabrication by
remote control, in which case an ”individual” chemical cycle yield of 98% may
be possible, corresponding to an overall yield of some 55% U233 on a 20-day
cycle. Thorium metal seems to be the best material for the thorium absorption
blanket.
I indicate this summary was prepared at my direction by Katzin and Davidson. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.406)
1944-12-20 Daniels sent Wigner a memo about his conception of a high temperature
bismuth-cooled converter pile to be fueled with pellets of plutonium oxide spaced
in a lattice composed of pellets of beryllium oxide. The U233 is formed in an
outer shell through which thorium oxide powder is passed slowly.
At 4:00 p.m.

I attended a meeting on conversion piles under Wigner’s

chairmanship. Compton was also present. At Daniels’ request, I presented
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technical details of the chemistry involved in the processing of fuel from
Wigner’s sandwich pile. Wigner was disappointed in the low yields,
but we indicated such yields would be inevitable.

C. M. Cooper

described a heat exchanger which he has proposed for homogeneous water piles.
Greninger outlined his idea of sandwich fabrication. Daniels discussed the high
temperature bismuth-cooled pile.
At the conclusion of the meeting, there seemed to be the general
opinion that there is probably a good chance that a converter pile
can be made which will be certain to operate with an efficiency of
at least 50% for the conversion of Pu239 to U233. All effort must be
directed toward trying to make an attractive and practical case for this pile to
be presented by January 6.
The evening meeting of the Basic Chemistry, Recovery, and Instrument Groups
of my section, at 7:45 p.m. in Room 209, Eckhart Hall, was attended by Arnold,
Brody, Cunningham, Daniels, Dixon, Ghiorso, Hagemann, Hufford, Jaffey,
Katzin, Krueger, Larson, Manning, McLane, Morgan, Nickson, S. Peterson,
Phipps, Sedlet, Sheft, and me. I turned the meeting over to Cunningham to
preside as usual. Jaffey gave the first of a series of lectures to be presented
at these meetings to acquaint chemists with the essentials of nuclear physics.
His topic was the concept of nuclear cross sections. Near the end of Jaffey’s
lecture Katzin asked whether the unit of cross section referred to is a
barn or a barn door, to which I replied that the unit-is called a barn
because it is as large as a barn door in comparison with actual cross
sectional areas of nuclei. The term was originated by Fermi. I also
called attention to the fact that the series of lectures on the fundamentals of
nuclear physics begun by Jaffey will include concepts with which any chemist
having worked on the Project should be thoroughly familiar. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.408)
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Compton said that he recently discussed the U233 program with Tolman
and Conant and concluded that studies looking toward its production should
probably be the major effort of the Project, although not with the expectation
of use in this war. The development of nuclear power is longer term, not
for this war; hence plans can be delayed for a few months and need
not be ready by February 1, 1945. Compton stated that it is of the greatest
importance that we emphasize our need for fundamental scientific information
in our recommendations to the Army. He believes a general feeling exists
throughout the U.S. that war research has greatly advanced our knowledge
of fundamentals, whereas the actual case is quite different since most war
developments have been in the application of existing knowledge. Our duty
is to correct this impression. Wigner complained about the lack of liaison with
Site W and Y that has developed. Greninger agreed that information from Site
Y has dropped off since Cyril Smith ceased his visits to Chicago. Compton
agreed to have John Wheeler attend the February Physics Information meeting
to help bring us up-to-date on Site W activities. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.412)
1944-12-21 The isolation and purificiation of the 25 mg of U233 for Los Alamos is
now complete. The material has been shipped. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.412)
It should, of course, be possible to use essentially the same types of methods
to decontaminate U233 and U235 and mixtures of these isotopes with each
other and/or with Pu239 (in the presence or absence of U238) from the fission
products and from other isotopes formed when these (U233, U235, etc.) are
used for running chain reactions.
Daniels sent a memo to Wigner stating that I am preparing a more complete
report on the research on solvent extraction required in order to meet the new
drastic requirements for recovery and decontamination in connection with the
”sandwich” converter pile. Daniels quotes significant parts from my memo of
December 19, MUC-GTS-1201, as an interim report.
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In addition I conferred with Wigner about converter piles and
explained again the difficulty of achieving complete recovery of
plutonium and high decontamination. Wigner indicated he will think
about the matter. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.413)
1944-12-26 I wrote to Allison at Los Alamos describing the following samples we
have sent him. (1) 100 micrograms of 93-237. This material may contain
about 0.05% Pu239 by weight. It came from Clinton uranium at a level of
5 grams Pu239 per ton. (2) 25 milligrams of U233. The actual amount is
more than this because the new measurement by Dempster indicates that the
isotopic composition is 96% U233/4% U238 rather than 88% U233/12% U238
on which the original quantity was calculated. I point out the difficulties in his
suggestion that it might be feasible to measure the amount of U238 in our U233
by counting the UX beta particles. It would not be possible to do this directly,
without a chemical separation, because of the x-rays and gamma-rays arising
from the disintegration of the U233 itself; it might be barely feasible to look
for UX in the separated UX1 fraction containing Th229, although the Ra225
daughter of Th229 gives rise to the whole remainder of the 4n+1 series and
makes the measurement of UX1 difficult. (3) 107 disintegrations per minute of
a mixture which seems to be 50-50 by weight of Pu238 and Pu239 on the basis
of alpha-particle range measurements; the Pu239 probably was introduced into
this deuteron-produced Pu239 by contamination in the laboratory. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.423)
1944-12-27 Katzin mentioned the problems in separating the uranium, thorium, and
radium in the 4n+1 series. Thorium-229 unfortunately is carried on BaSO4 to
approximately 30%, so BaSO4 is not too good to use to precipitate the radium
out first. I suggested precipitating the thorium first, perhaps with zirconium
iodate or ceric iodate, following which the radium could be precipitated with
barium sulfate. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.424)
296

Extraction-Decontamination: Ader, Kelley, Ames, Post, and Hopkins (it was
indicated that Post, Kelley, and Ader were drafted from the laboratory and
are now in the Army with the expectation that they will be assigned back
here). These men are highly trained in radiochemistry, and will be needed
for any extraction-decontamination research for piles converting plutonium to
U233. Recovery: Fineman, Anderson, Britain, Asprey, and Stewart. These
men have a high degree of skill, are needed for the important ongoing program
of recovering, purifying, and preparing special forms of plutonium. Solvent
Extraction: Hausman and Schraidt. Shotgun Tests: Brownell, Lewis, and
Cressman (not C-I men). (Seaborg, 1979, pg.424-425)
I attended the evening meeting of the Separation Process Subsection of Section
C-I at 7:45 in Room 209, Eckhart Hall. Others present were Albaugh, Arnold,
Blaedel, Bradt, Cunningham, Daniels, Egan, Ghiorso, Gilbreath, Hagemann,
Hyde, Hyman, Jaffey, Jones, Katzin, Kraus, Larson, Manning, Morgan, S.
Peterson, Sheft, Walling, Winner, Wolf, and others.

Davidson discussed

the breeder and converter piles currently being proposed. The structure
which has been proposed for the so-called ”breeder pile” is of the
homogeneous type. A solution containing 3.5 kg U233 in 400 liters
of D2O (or possibly H2 O) would be continuously recycled through a
chamber surrounded by a thorium reflector or blanket (to produce
more U233 from Th232). Davidson pointed out that this type of
structure has some advantages from a chemical standpoint. While it
would be necessary to decontaminate the circulating U233 solution
either at intervals or continuously, the fact that the fission products
would be formed in a solution might simplify the chemical processing
problem.
Davidson mentioned that more serious consideration has been given to the
possibility of using the fission of Pu239 as the source of neutrons to form U233
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from Th232—this is a converter pile. The homogeneous type of pile has been
considered for this scheme also. Davidson described the alternative sandwichtype converter pile devised by Wigner. He detailed the chemical and other
problems in the use of the sandwich pile as described in my memo to Daniels
of December 19. He also stated that difficulties could arise from the
production of U232 in the U233. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.425)
1944-12-28 I completed a ten-page report (MUC-GTS-1218) entitled ”Conversion
of Pu239 to U233” and sent it to Hogness. It gives a more detailed presentation
of the chemical problems involved in the pile for converting Pu239 to U233 than
covered in my earlier memo to Daniels (MUC-GTS-1201 of December 12, 1944).
I begin by revealing the complications that will be introduced by
the nuclear side-reactions in relation to the problem of final chemical
purification of U233. I point out that if care is not taken to control small
amounts of heavy isotope impurities, the final material may have the same
limitations as the material (plutonium) whose deficiencies are being
remedied. At the time the material is worked up the thorium will contain
elements 90, 91, 92, and in some cases, 93 and 94. In addition to U233, there
will be produced as relatively stable long-lived isotopes, Pa231, U232, U234,
and, in the case where 94 is present, U235, Pu239, Pu240, and Pu241. Of
particular concern is the presence of U232 that has four short-lived
(hence long-range) alpha-particle decay products, which means that
the problem of purifying the material from light element impurities
assumes importance again as it originally did in the case of Pu239.
There is also the yet unanswered question of spontaneous fission in U232 or one
of its daughters. All of these factors make it seem extremely important that
the factor of possible fast neutron reaction (the source of U232) in the thorium
mass be minimized, including the possible necessity of processing the thorium
at shorter intervals than other considerations might dictate.
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In the area of chemical considerations, I point out that should a pile
containing thorium enriched with uranium be adopted, the chemists
would be confronted with the very interesting, although somewhat
staggering, problem of devising a means for separating elements 90,
91, 92, and 94 from each other and from fission products with a
decontamination factor of 107 —with all these separations done rapidly
and with high yields.
I then review the problems of chemical decontamination, assuming the sandwich
pile proposed by Wigner, with a 20-day operating cycle. I urge that for great
simplification of chemical processing, a decontamination factor of only 102
(rather than 107 ) be required, which would certainly justify the expenditure of a
great deal of effort to develop a remote control process for sandwich fabrication.
As a basis for estimating the manpower requirements for development of a
solvent extraction process that would give 98% plutonium recovery and 107
decontamination, I examine the following factors that would require laboratory
investigation: (1) Development of a method for complete dissolution of the
irradiated plutonium sandwich. (2) Selection of a solvent that would be stable
at the high radiation levels encountered. (3) Determination of distribution
coefficients for plutonium and fission product activities. (5) Study of feed and
subsequent process solutions for undesirable valence or state of aggregation of
plutonium. (6) Development of a method for final concentration of plutonium
solutions. (7) Determination of optimum recycle operations to obtain maximum
plutonium recovery. I also review the many possibilities for and the magnitude
of plutonium losses.
On the basis of a 50-50 probability of success I estimate that it would
require over 100 men and at least 6 months to develop a process
that would give 98% recovery with 107 decontamination. I bring up the
simpler problem of 102 decontamination, suggesting that a yield of 99% rather
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than 98% might be attained. In conclusion I briefly cover the problem of U233
separation from thorium and indicate the problem is much simpler; we have had
the benefit of experience in carrying out the separation on a laboratory scale in
Katzin’s group. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.426-427)
”An additional 25 mg of U233 has been extracted from eight cans of thorium
carbonate irradiated in the pile at X. This U233 has been purified and shipped
to Y. A continuous extraction process is being devised which should make it
possible to work up the remaining 29 cans containing U233 within the next few
weeks. It is expected that the remaining cans will yield about 130 mg of U233,
but after these have been worked up there is no further source of U233 in sight
at the present time. These experiments on the production of U233 constitute
important pioneering work for any later development of conversion piles.
”A fundamental study of the new neptunium decay chain was
reported last month. As a result of these studies it has been found
that some U232 is formed in the pile along with the U233 as a byproduct according to one or more of the following reactions:

U233 (n, 2n) → U232
Pa233 (n, 2n) → Pa233 → U233
Th232 (n, 2n) → Th231 → Pa231 (n, γ)Pa231 → U232

U232 has a short half-life (approximately 50 years) giving off alpha rays and
producing decay elements which fit into the natural thorium decay series. This
series includes several short-lived alpha-emitters. Among these alpha-emitters is
ThC’ which gives off alpha-rays of exceedingly high energy. This fact introduces
complications, in that the tolerance limits for some of the lighter elements may
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have to be made more exacting for the ultimate use. U233 appears to be
better than Pu239 and purification from light elements would seem
to be less exacting by a factor of ten or so. However, this advantage
may be completely nullified and, in fact, the situation may be worse
if appreciable amounts of U232 are present in the U233. The possibility
of high spontaneous fission rates for U232 and its decay products must also be
taken into account. These possibilities must be considered in designing piles for
converting plutonium into U233. It seems likely that the formation of U232 can
be sufficiently minimized by placing the thorium only at the outside of the pile
where there are no fast neutrons and by reducing the length of exposure before
the U233 is extracted from the thorium.” (Seaborg, 1979, pg.429)
1944-12-30 ”In the Chemistry Division, the column for product isolation by solvent
extraction has been successfully operated, and this method should prove to be
of great value if a 49 to 23 conversion program is undertaken. An additional 25
mg of U233 have been prepared and shipped.
”The main efforts of the Laboratory have been toward the preparation of (1)
a report to the Project Office on the feasibility of a conversion of 49
into 23 as a war-time insurance measure; (2) the preparation of a report
to the Project Office making recommendations for a research and development
program for the Laboratory from June 30, 1945, to the end of the war; and
(3) the preparation of final reports, looking toward the termination of the
present contract as of June 30, 1945.” All information on Section C-I in the
Chemistry Division portion of the report is derived from Report MUC-FD-39,
which was submitted to Stearns on Thursday. Total expenditures for the month
of December were $861,462. Personnel employed at the end of the month were
1,522 (581 technical), a net decrease of 44 during the month. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.430-431)
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1945-01-01 The six cans of thorium carbonate, specially purified from uranium,
were removed from the Clinton pile for shipment to Katzin here at the Met
Lab.
Hogness issued a summary of the manpower distribution in the Chemistry
Division as of January 1, 1945. It shows the following for my section accounted
for out of a total of 77 men:
Number of Men
Nov.
Dec.
Albaugh (Site W R. Thompson, extraction and de9
7
work, 30 men)
contamination
Katz, concentration and isolation
3
3
Gilbreath, process development
6
8
Egan, semiworks
9
0
Lawroski, solvent extraction
4
11
Cunningham,
Simpson, high vacuum work
10
9
(Site Y work, 37
men)
Hindman, basic chemistry
10
11
Dawson, recovery
8
6
Ghiorso, instruments and physical
10
10
measurements
Katzin, 23 work
6
7
(Seaborg, 1979, pg.432)
1945-01-03 At 8:00 a.m. I held a meeting of the Council of Section C-I in my office,
attended by Albaugh, Cunningham, Davidson, Egan, Ghiorso, Gilbreath, Jaffey,
Jones, Katzin, Kraus, Lawroski, Manning, Schaffner, Simpson, Stewart, and
Roy Thompson. I reviewed the activities of the last few weeks concerning the
calculations on technical extraction problems involved in the use of converter
piles. I mentioned that the problems are more complicated than at Hanford
since the necessary decontamination factor will be about 108 (at Site W it is
107 ) and about 2 kg of plutonium per day must be handled as compared with
1/4 kg per day per canyon at Site W. I also mentioned the high yields (98% to
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99%) required because of the repetitive nature of the decontamination process
and the fact that only the solvent extraction process can give such yields. A
further problem, not solvable by chemical processes, I went on, is that
for every 140 grams of Pu239 present there are 40 g of Pu240 formed
in addition to 100 g of fission products. If Pu240 will not fission with
slow neutrons, the result will be that in successive decontaminations
the dead isotope will be carried along, taking up valuable space, and
contributing nothing. It may even cause considerable trouble by the reaction
94-240(n, γ)94-241. This, in effect, would be a completely unremovable poison
although its effect may be somewhat mitigated since 94-241 is probably slow
neutron-fissionable. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.433-434)
I had a meeting with H. W. Koch, a research physicist at the University of
Illinois, and Dancoff regarding preparation of samples for neutron measurements
by Koch using the University of Illinois cyclotron as the neutron source.
The program calls for Cunningham to prepare the following samples for the
measurements: (1) a 62”x 62” ordinary uranium, 100 mg, on an aluminum
plate with a cellulose acetate cover by January 10; (2) same type of plate with
depleted U238 by January 17; (3) same type of plate with U233 by February
5 (Zinn may use the U233 first); (4) same type of plate with Pu239 (after
the U233 plate, unless we cannot get the U233 extracted by January 31).
Koch will be here to watch the preparation of the U233 or Pu239 plate about
February 1-5. We will send a man to the University of Illinois with the U233
plate to show their physicists how to handle it for the neutron cross section
measurements. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.434-435)
1945-01-04 III. U233 problem. (Most of the material listed here is covered by various
categories already included in the outline. The material is gathered together to
emphasize the magnitude of work related to this problem.)
A. Separation studies.
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III. A. 1. Continued study of solvent separation from thorium, protactinium,
and uranium from fission products.
2. Investigation of possible complexing agents to help in separations.
3. Investigation of solvents for sulfate and possibly chloride, as well as nitrate,
looking towards use in breeder.
4.

Continue work on theory of salting-out action in solvent extraction of

inorganic salts, for use in predicting behavior, agents, etc.
5. Concentration procedures in uranium extraction for a. Straight solvent. b.
Complex in solvent.
6. Precipitation procedures to separate a. Uranium from protactinium and
thorium. b. Uranium from protactinium alone. c. Protactinium from thorium
and/or uranium.
7. Development of selective carriers for uranium that do not carry thorium or
protactinium.
8. Work on ThF4 -UF6 methods for continuous removal of product.
9. Decontamination of highly active U233 solutions (from breeder piles).
10. Study types of fission products removable as volatile fluorides in terms of
poisons and competitors for neutrons.
B. Complete the characterization of the U233 decay chain (4n + 1 series),
including radioactive constants of daughter isotopes.
C. Nuclear properties.
1. U233
2. U233 decay products.
3. By-products which may be formed during production of U233, e.g., U232
and its decay products.
D. Basic chemistry of thorium, protactinium, and uranium in relation to
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1. Decontamination.
2. Purification
a. For satisfactory use in pile.
b. For final purification of U233 for use as weapons. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.439-440)
Volume 19, Production and Separation of U233. Seaborg, Editor; Katzin and
Stoughton, Associate Editors. Editorial Board: Seaborg, Katzin, Stoughton, a
Berkeley representative, and perhaps B. Goldschmidt as consultant. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.441)
1945-01-09 I also told Stoughton about the plan for him to be an associate editor
of the Proceedings of the Metallurgical Laboratory volume on ”Production and
Separation of U233” and suggested that he bring information on the samples
(of thorium carbonate being irradiated in the Clinton reactor) next week.
Stoughton continued the conversation with James and Katzin. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.447)
1945-01-10 Katzin summarized, by memo, information on U233 for my use at
the Project Council Information Meeting on Chemistry next Tuesday.

He

reports that 25 mg of U233 have been extracted from eight cans of irradiated
thorium carbonate, purified and sent to Site Y. A continuous batch extractor,
semi-automatic in operation, was used. There was some difficulty with the
appearance in the ether of an organic material which held uranium in the ether
phase.
The U233 on hand emits about one alpha particle in two thousand
that is from U232, corresponding to about one part of U232 in 107
of U233. The yield seems high in comparison with the expected n, 2n
yield in uranium and should be investigated because of the possible
bearing on the purity requirements of U233. The previously reported
data on the new specific activity of U233 based on the new determination of the
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isotopic ratio are restated. Studies on extraction of thorium and uranium by a
series of esters are summarized, showing the required large extraction of uranium
and low extraction of thorium. A detailed study of the protactinium extraction
by diisopropyl ketone shows a rather different mechanism for extraction of the
nitrate than in the case of uranium. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.449)
Katzin mentions that a program has been initiated on the study of slurries
of thorium oxide in anticipation of their possible use in U233 production
units. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.450)
1945-01-15 Compton wrote to Stearns to thank him for sending the report on the
feasibility of the 23 converter pile. The matter has been placed in the hands of
the Army with the statement that further active steps along this line will await
a request from them. Compton also mentioned that in discussing the
problem with Colonel Nichols, the impression has been gained that
it is unlikely that we shall receive a request to proceed further with
the 23 converter pile. Nichols has expressed himself, however, as actively
interested in a research and development program that would lead to the more
efficient use of uranium and thorium in producing a useful product. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.453)
1945-01-17 Compton announced that all program recommendations for next year
have been submitted to him. He finds that the proposals fall into two categories:
(1) essential products and services required by, e.g., Sites Y and W, and (2)
research and development. With regard to the latter, Compton said
that he was interested to find that three different laboratories have
proposed breeder piles for U233. He stated that while we have not
been authorized to carry out the program activities as proposed, the
indications are that the level of support will be relatively constant and
we will have a wide range for making decisions about their priority.
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There was a discussion of Compton’s proposal that the research and development budget be set at 50% of the essential products and services budget. No
conclusions were reached. The readjustment to a research laboratory and the
need for a scientific advisory committee to stimulate and correlate fundamental
research in the fields of nuclear physics and chemistry were also discussed.
Compton asked Smyth and Franck to get together and formulate a formal
statement on the need for a review group. That statement will be referred
to General Groves.
Compton reported on a discussion with Nichols at Clinton on the
possibilities of a U233 converter, based on the report prepared
early this month which describes the feasibility of such a converter.
Compton said that he told Nichols we prefer the breeder, whereupon
Nichols said he thinks it is more important that we go ahead on
the breeder than on the converter and to lay our plans along this
line. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.457)
1945-01-19 In a memo to Warner, I propose that the Editorial Committee for
Volume 19A of the Metallurgical Project Record, ”The Production and
Separation of U233,” consist of Warner, Katzin, Rollefson, Spedding, Stoughton,
and Seaborg (Chairman).

I ask that Bertrand Goldschmidt be appointed

consultant to the Editorial Committee.

I also give the tentative Table of

Contents of the Volume and authors of each of the eight chapters. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.460)
1945-01-24 Daniels said that Pa231 would be formed in a converter pile by an n, 2n
reaction on Th232. I estimated that perhaps 0.1% of the neutrons in the center
of the pile would be used up by an n, 2n reaction. Near the periphery, where
the neutrons are slow, the n, 2n reaction would not occur. This would still be
a better source of Pa231 than our present one. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.464)
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1945-01-25 Katzin talked about the status of the search for U232 in U233
produced by the neutron bombardment of pure thorium carbonate.
Hagemann described the work on the 4n+1 series, and Katzin gave the current
situation with respect to the search for ”neptunium emanation (Nn).”
It was decided that at the next meeting Ghiorso or Jaffey will discuss standard
beta-particle counting geometry. It was also decided that for the next meeting
we will schedule talks on (a) the search for x-rays from our 5 mg sample of U233,
(b) the search for x-rays from Pa 231, (c) absorption curves derived from counts
on Pa 233 beta particles, gammarays, and electrons, (d) Katzin’s work on the
4n+1 series, (e) Crawford’s work on Hanford neutron-irradiated plutonium.
Transfers of materials arranged at this meeting were (a) Kraus to give 5
micrograms of Pa 231 to Ghiorso for alpha particle energy measurements on his
pulse analyzer, (b) Katzin to give purified U233 to Jaffey and Crawford
to look for U232 on their differential alpha-particle range chamber,
(c) Hindman to give 0.4 mg of Np237 to Florin to look for 93236, (d) a sample
of Hanford neutron-irradiated plutonium prepared by O’Connor, Florin, and
Simpson to be given to Jaffey and Crawford to look for 94-240 using their
differential alpha-particle energy chamber. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.465)
1945-01-27 Wigner sent the following memo to Compton, with copies to the Reading
File:
Bits of news are reaching us occasionally about rumors at W
concerning the validity of the advice which this Laboratory gave
the Company operating W. The present letter is prompted by our
hearing two bits of news of this kind within two weeks. Rumors of
the kind referred to unintentionally impair not only the reputation of
the Laboratory but also that of the persons involved. It puts us into
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an awkward position since we follow secrecy regulations and hence
cannot contradict these rumors in the majority of cases.
The first rumor we heard about within two weeks was that, had the
Company followed our advice in connection with the number of tubes
at W, the production rate would have been even lower than it is
now. It is true that our original report (January 1943) called for 1700
tubes while the piles actually built contain 2004 tubes. This gives an
effect of 0.2% in the multiplication constant. However, the Company
intended to operate, and did operate for a long time against our oral
advice, with 1500 tubes. This gave a loss of 0.1% in the multiplication
constant as compared even with our original report. Furthermore, our
original report called for much longer slugs which would have given
not 0.2% but 0.7% rise in the multiplication constant. As late as
May 1944, MUC-GY-9 and CP-1729 called attention to the waste in
the multiplication constant occasioned by the unnecessarily thick end
caps. It is clear, therefore, that the rumor referred to is unfounded.
The second rumor which we heard within two weeks claimed that, had
the Company followed our advice concerning the number of safety
rods, it would have been very difficult to operate the pile.

The

exact opposite is true. The blueprints originally submitted by the
Company specified 19 safety rods and this number was increased at
our repeated insistence to 29 rods. Fortunately, we heard this rumor
from somebody whom we know to be cleared to receive information
on this point and we could set it right.
It is suggested that rumors of the above kind be officially discouraged
as long as the present secrecy restrictions prevent us from answering
them. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.469-470)
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1945-01-30 Jones requested that Furney arrange for the transfer of 1 mg U233 from
Katzin to Dempster for mass spectrographic analysis. He mentioned that the
sample is approximately 97% isotopically pure. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.473)
1945-01-31 ”Metallurgy Laboratory, Report for January 1945” was prepared by
the Laboratory Director’s office. The summary includes the following items of
interest:
”A report appraising the feasibility of converting 49 into 23 was completed
and transmitted to the Project Director, who in turn presented the report to
Col. Nichols. The Division Directors have prepared and submitted outlines
recommending plans for the work of the Laboratory beginning July 1, 1945.
The final reports will be submitted during the month of February.
1945-02-01 Ghiorso described the differential alpha energy chamber which can
be used on 94240, 94238/94239 mixtures, and U232/U233 mixtures; the
accompanying pulse selector circuit was explained.
Activities to be considered for scheduling at next week’s meeting are: (1)
Search for characteristic x-rays from a 50-mg sample of U233. (2) Search for
characteristic x-rays from Pa234 (and Pa233). (3) Beta, gamma, and conversion
electron absorption measurements on Pa233. (4) Katzin’s next run on the decay
products of U233 (the 4n+1 decay series).
I received a memo from Mulliken suggesting that, in connection with the
setting of editorial standards for the Metallurgical Project Record, there is
an opportunity to take a few steps forward in simplifying and improving
nomenclature in the field of nucleonics. He asked my reaction to the following
proposals.
1. Names of radioactive families. Thorium or (4n +0) family becomes ”One
or Tetron-one or Polytetron-one”; uranium or (4n +2) becomes ”Two or
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Tetron-two or Polytetron-two”; actinium or (4n +3) becomes ”Three or
Tetron-three or Polytetron-three.”
My first impression to most of these suggestions is not very favorable.
Jones sent Furney the adjusted figure for the U233 inventory (193.6 milligrams,
raised from 175.9 milligrams), based on the redetermination of the half-life from
146,000 years to 162,000 years.
The proposed program for the Metallurgical Project, 1945-46, is outlined in
broader form in the Proposed Budget part of the memorandum, (b), as follows:
1. Fundamental Research
(a) Basic laws of nuclear structure and mass-energy transformations.
(b) Nuclear properties and the physics, chemistry, and metallurgy of
fissionable isotopes, fission product isotopes, and artificial radioactive
isotopes.
(c) Nuclear properties and the physics, chemistry, and metallurgy of
structural materials.
(d) Interaction between radiation and matter and its effects on materials
and on physical and chemical processes.
(e) Fundamental studies in heat transfer, energy removal, energy utilization, and associated fields.
(f) Basic investigation of the detection of radiation and of elementary
particles.
(g) Studies of the mechanisms of toxic poisoning of biological systems.
(h) Investigation of the mechanisms of radiation damage to biological
systems.
(i) Use of radioactive materials for physical, chemical, metallurgical, and
biological ”tracer” research.
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(j) Fundamental chemical studies in connection with chemical processes.
2. Applied Research
(a) Construction and operation of high-neutron and radiation-flux density
piles of enriched ”breeder” type with its necessary chemical plant.
(b) Process design of new units and their associated chemical plants,
particularly process design of ”profit operation” ”breeder” plants.
(c) Consultation and process studies on power piles.
(d) Evaluation of present Project information with respect to new military
possibilities.
(e) Evaluation of industrial possibilities.
(f) Determination of tolerance dosage of toxic and radioactive materials.
(g) Determination of tolerance dosage for ”fast” and ”slow” neutron, beta,
gamma, and neutrino irradiations.
(h) Development of tests for incipient toxicological or radioactive materials
damage.
(i) Development of tests for incipient ”radiation” damage.
(j) Development of prophylactic and curative procedures.
Daniels issued a summary of the manpower distribution in the Chemistry
Division which shows the following for my section (78 men):
1945-02-03 In response to Farrington Daniels’ request, Davidson and Katzin
sent him their personal views on what they consider to be the
major initial chemical research problems to be solved in the design
of homogeneous, ”circulated,” D2O-moderated, converter or breeder
piles. The problems that they identify as being common to a majority of designs
and types of structures are: (1) recovery, decontamination, and recycling of
reacting material with extreme efficiency, (2) problems of the absorbing blanket,
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Number of Men
Dec.
Jan.
Albaugh (Site W R. Thompson, extraction and de7
6
work, 29 men)
contamination
Katz, concentration and isolation
3
0
Gilbreath, process development
8
8
Lawroski, solvent extraction
11
14
Cunningham,
Simpson, high vacuum work
6
9
(Site Y work, 38
men)
Hindman, basic chemistry
11
12
Dawson, recovery
6
6
Ghiorso, instruments and physical 10
10
measurements
Katzin, 23 work
8
8
(3) general mechanical problems of homogeneous structures, and (4) general
nuclear problems. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.488)
1945-02-05 The first delivery of plutonium to Los Alamos from Hanford was made
last Friday.
Today the second Hanford plutonium manufacturing pile (Pile D) reached its
rated power level. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.488)
1945-02-06 In a memo to Jaffey, Crawford evaluated an earlier proposal to
measure the half-life of U232 indirectly by observing the rate of emission of
alpha particles from such a sample over an extended period; the problem is
complicated by the presence of the thoron daughter which would diffuse out of
the sample and exit alpha particles under a geometry greater than the rest of
the emitters in the sample. Crawford presents calculations that show that the
method proposed to slow the diffusion of the thoron from the sample until it
decays cannot work reliably. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.490)
1945-02-07 In view of the increasing emphasis in our section on converter pile
problems involving 23, I then asked Katzin to describe some of the latest
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problems that have been considered. (Katzin and Davidson have been keeping
in touch with the physicists, especially Wigner, on these matters.) Katzin made
the following observations: (1) At the present time the sandwich structure
is not being considered very much because it is less efficient than other
types. The heavy-water homogeneous pile is being more thoroughly
considered. (2) In the heavy-water pile, the evolution of D2 and O2 gas is a
serious problem at the minimum planned power level of 100,000 kW. If nitrate
is used, the problem of nitrate stability enters. (3) Solvent extraction seems to
be the best process for removal of fission product poisons. (4) Other problems
include the possibility of insoluble compounds settling out as a result of the 100
grams per day production of fission products and the possibility that, in the
nitrate solution, the plutonium may polymerize and not solvent-extract.
Katzin also mentioned that other, non-homogeneous, types of structures are
being considered. They involve running a pile at higher neutron temperatures
to avoid too high a loss of neutrons in the materials of construction. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.492)
1945-02-08 At 8:30 a.m. the Heavy Isotopes Group met in my office and the meeting
was attended by Florin, Ghiorso, Hagemann, Hindman, Jaffey, James, Jones,
Katzin, Larson, Manning, McLane, Morgan, O’Connor, Studier, and me. La
Chapelle and Magnusson came in later. Studier gave a tentative flowsheet
for treating 26 mg of U233 (which has been decaying since November 18) in
order to isolate the various daughter fractions for the purpose of studying the
decay schemes. There was then a general discussion of the problem. O’Connor
describes his and other proposed work on the sample of Hanford neutronirradiated plutonium from Site Y sent to us for decontamination. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.493)
1945-02-13 Marian Pinckard was hired to work as a technician in Katzin’s U233
group. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.496)
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1945-02-16 The third Hanford plutonium manufacturing pile (Pile F) was charged
with uranium for the first time yesterday. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.501)
1945-02-17 Katzin summarized for me, by memo, the work of Group 9 for my use
at the Project Council Chemistry Information Meeting next Wednesday. He
gives the following information: About 600 micrograms of Pa231 have been
isolated from 6 kg of carbonate residues obtained from uranium extraction
procedures. About 150 micrograms of this have been purified and are being
used for basic chemical experiments. A larger-scale isolation from 15 kg of
carbonate residues, rather richer in protactinium, has been started. A 36-inch
countercurrent extraction column employing ether has been set in operation to
separate U233 from irradiated thorium. The column handles a can of thorium
carbonate (200 g) in five hours. About 15 cans have so far been extracted.
Reinvestigation of the usefulness of calcium and magnesium nitrates as salting
agents has indicated that these two salts are probably the best yet found for
uranium-thorium separation by ether procedures. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.503)
1945-02-20 At 8:30 a.m.

I attended the Project Council Physics Information

Meeting. Items of interest reported were: (7) Dempster said he has reanalyzed
the sample of U233 submitted by Katzin and finds it to contain 95.8% ± 0.4%
U233. (8) Evidence has been obtained at Site Y that neutrons are emitted
following fission but within 10−9 second after fission. (9) Weinberg reported
on breeder piles operating at higher neutron energies at which the
capture-to-fission ratio would vary from that observed with thermal
neutrons. (10) Seitz talked about the graphite stored-energy problem. There
appears to be some danger of an explosion due to local heating in the pile that
would bring about a rapid release of the stored energy, but there seems to be no
danger from this source until the stored energy in the graphite reaches a value
of 50 calories per gram. The graphite in the Hanford pile has now reached the
30 calorie per gram level and is still rising. It is hoped that it will level off
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because of self-healing before it reaches the 50-calorie level; if not, it perhaps
will be desirable to attempt to heal the pile by controlled heating. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.506-507)
1945-02-21 General Groves is in Chicago to discuss with Compton next year’s
research program as proposed for the Metallurgical Project.
In discussing the U233 work, I mentioned that 600 micrograms of Pa231 have
been isolated and 150 micrograms purified and used for study of the basic
chemistry of protactinium.

The continuous and automatic countercurrent

extraction column for the ether extraction of U233 from irradiated thorium was
described, as was the work on magnesium and calcium nitrates as salting-out
agents for the separation of uranium and thorium. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.508)
1945-02-22 Van Winkle reported that the extraction of Pa231 (0.5-1 mg) is nearly
finished; Larson has started a new extraction on 15 kg of carbonate residue.
Activities to be considered or scheduled at next week’s meeting are: (1) the
search for x-rays, by Ghiorso, in about 120 mg of U233; (2) the next extraction
of decay products from U233 (the neptunium series); (3) discussion of the results
of the Berkeley uranium plus alpha-particle bombardment; and (4) Jaffey to
report on the subject of Geiger counter coincidence corrections. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.510)
1945-02-23 Manning and I reported on the Physics and Chemistry Project Council
Information Meetings we attended on Tuesday and Wednesday. During the
review of what was said on cross section measurements, I interpolated some
predictions concerning the n, γ cross sections of the heavy elements and
suggested the following classification:
(Seaborg, 1979, pg.511)
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Report CC-2636, ”Chemical Research—Extraction and Properties of U233,
Report for Period Ending December 15, 1944,” was issued and contained the
following information:
Radiation spectrum of pure U233.

Studier has taken aluminum and lead

absorption curves on a 16-mg sample of U233. These indicate the presence
of gamma-rays of 130, 230, and 420 kev energy and an abundance of from one
to ten per million alpha particles. Lower energy radiations (90, 19, 14, and 8
kev) range in abundance from about two in 105 alpha particles to about one
in ten alpha particles. Magnet bending experiments have demonstrated the
presence of conversion electrons.
New half-life determination for U233.

Hyde, Hagemann, and Katzin have

carried out a new half-life determination in which the specific activity was
determined by an isotopic dilution alpha-particle counting method. The isotopic
ratio of the uranium sample was determined mass spectrographically by a
revised method in which the isotopic ratio (U233 to U238) was brought to
a value near unity. The isotopic purity of U233, according to these latest
measurements is about 97%, rather than 87.5%. The alpha-particle counting
results indicate a longer half-life (than hitherto assumed), namely, 162,000
years. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.513)
Determination of the decay chain of U233. Ghiorso, Hagemann, Katzin, and
Studier have tentatively established the following identifications of members
of the 4n+1 series: RdNp(Th229), an alpha emitter of probably several
thousand years half-life; NpX(Ra225), an alpha emitter of about one month
half-life; NpC(Bi213), an alpha emitter of about 44 minute halflife; NpD(Pb209), a beta emitter of 3.3-hour half-life, an activity which was
previously known.

When a sample of Ra225(NpX) is allowed to stand in

an alpha counter for several hours and then removed, the counter shows
signs of contamination.

This is undoubtedly due to active deposit from
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neptunium(Em221). Attempts to determine the half-life of the emanation by
following its growth in freshly purified NpX indicate that its half-life must be
quite short. It is not possible to state whether the emanation is alpha or beta
active. Attempts to isolate polonium or element 85 from solutions of NpX
have been unsuccessful, indicating that any isotopes of these elements that are
members of the chain are quite short-lived. The half-lives between NpX and
NpC seem considerably shorter than ten minutes.
Extraction of U233. Hagemann, Hellman, and Studier have found an unidentified organic compound that is either an impurity or some reaction product of
diethyl ether which complexes uranium and prevents its transfer from ether to
an aqueous phase. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.514)
1945-02-25 The third Hanford plutonium manufacturing pile (Pile F) was placed in
operation today. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.515)
1945-02-26 I received a letter written February 24 from Stoughton about his
participation in the reparation of Project Volume 19A, ”The Production and
Separation of U233,” and the corresponding collected papers volume (19B). He
suggests an additional topic for Volume 19B to the nine already decided upon,
”Production of (small amounts of) U233 by separation of Pa 233 from thorium
after a short neutron bombardment of the latter, followed by decay of the Pa233
to U233.” He also indicates that in view of his past and current work he could
be-co-author of volume 19B, chapters (1) ”Discovery of U233,” (4) ”Extraction
Theory,” (7) ”Chemistry of Protactinium,” and (10) the additional topic he has
suggested. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.515)
1945-02-27 I had a phone conversation with Stoughton at Site X about the ThOCO3
cans in the Clinton pile. He said 15 cans went into a good position (1.4 times
average flux) on November 10 for the Canadians, another 15 cans in a similarly
good position on December 3, and 14 cans in a poor position (0.3 to 0.4 times
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average flux) on December 8. Only these 44 cans out of 80 passed the heating
test at 230◦ C needed for the good position. Stoughton thinks only half of our
present 125 cans will past the test. He will make this test on all our cans in
order to have some ready (at least 15 are necessary for a whole replacement) in
case the Canadians call for five cans to get Pa233 (as Watson told Katzin). I
told Stoughton about the Canadians’ primary purpose to get Pa233 [preferred
material would be freshly discharged after three months irradiation] and that
we might get some of their more strongly irradiated cans provided we can keep
them supplied with Pa233.
Mulliken issued a ”Preliminary Outline of Metallurgical Project Record,”
listing the titles and editorial committee for each of the 20 technical volumes
and the four supplemental volumes: ”Project Handbook, Project History,
Patents Abstract, and the Index and List of C Reports.” I am listed as being
on the editorial committee for Volumes 9A and 9B, ”Fission Products and
Radiochemistry,” (editors Coryell and Sugarman) and as the co-editor (with
manning) of Volumes 14A and 14B, ”Chemistry of Transuranium Elements,”
and (with Katzin and Stoughton) Volumes 17A and 17B, ”Production and
Separation of U233.” The number designation of these and the other volumes
have been undergoing change, but have now, presumably, assumed their final
form. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.516)
1945-02-28 I wrote Whitaker about the irradiation of thorium for Evergreen and
the Metallurgical Project, passing on the information from Watson that the
Canadians, around the middle of March, intend to ask for four or five of
the thorium cans that have been in the Clinton pile since last November or
December. I point out that their interest is primarily in Pa233 and hence they
would prefer freshly-discharged material with three months of irradiation. I
suggested that since we have a large number of needs for U233, the remaining
10 or 11 cans from the particular stringer should be processed either here or at
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Clinton, and new cans be put in the pile later to supply the Evergreen people
with an additional source of Pa233 and to keep up a continuous manufacture
of U233 for the Metallurgical Project. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.517)
Manning sent a memo to Daniels listing the activities of Section C-I in two
categories—those directly related to the development of new piles and those
that are indirectly related to new piles. Under the first category are shown (1)
Study of the chemical and nuclear properties of heavy isotopes [7 men]. (2)
U233 and related problems [5 men]. (3) Extraction of protactinium from ores
and study of its chemistry [2 men]. (4) Decontamination of plutonium from its
fission products (2 men]. (5) Volatilization at high temperature of plutonium
and fission products from uranium carbide [1 man]. (6) Colloidal behavior
of plutonium and its fission products [1 man]. In the second category are
(1) Solvent extraction methods for separation and isolation of plutonium from
uranium and its fission products [17 men]. (2) Basic chemistry of plutonium [8
men]. (3) Basic chemistry of uranium (1 man]. (4) Maintenance of electronic
instruments [5 men]. (5) Recovery of laboratory plutonium for re-use (5 men].
(6) Chemistry of neptunium [4 men]. (7) Chemistry of actinium [1 man].
”Metallurgical Laboratory, Report for February 1945,” (MUC-JCS-209) was
issued. The summary section includes the statement, ”Most of the research
and development work of the Laboratory is exploratory work in
connection with breeder piles.

Consideration is being given to the

homogeneous thermal breeder and the heterogeneous resonance and high energy
breeder type of pile.” The activities of Section C-I described in the report
are excerpts of Reports CN-2688, ”Chemical Research - Separation Processes
for Plutonium,” and CN-2689, ”Chemical Research - Basic Chemistry of
Plutonium,” which will be issued sometime next week.
Compton received a registered letter from General Groves in Washington. I
think it was somewhat of a blow to Compton, for this is what Groves wrote:
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I have given careful consideration to your proposed research program
for the year 1946 which we discussed during my last visit to Chicago.
Since the basic consideration for any work performed under the
direction of the Manhattan District must be winning the present
war, it is necessary that the efforts of the District not be
diverted in any way to post-war problems. The Military Policy
Committee has concurred in these views. The Committee is also
of the opinion it should not assume responsibility for the post-war
period.
I am in complete agreement with the recommendation that some
commercial firm be found to take over the responsibility for the
operation of the Clinton Laboratories. As you point out, they must
be continued in operation for the production of vital materials and to
carry on research development essential to the solution of recurring
problems.
The work at the University of Chicago and at the Argonne must be
restricted to three items:
a. The solution of problems involved in the operation of the Hanford
Engineer Works.
b. The carrying of such work as may be desirable for the benefit of
the Los Alamos project.
c. Such research as is necessary to determine the value of
thorium including the possibilities of its use practically.
The work under paragraph c above must be confined to research
and not extended to extensive developmental engineering until our
knowledge of the problems involved is much greater than it is now or
can be in the months to come.
(Seaborg, 1979, pg.518-519)
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In answer to Post’s question as to how much Pu240 could be tolerated in purified
plutonium for Los Alamos, I said they have no choice in the matter;
whatever is produced must be tolerated. I added that on the basis of the
original purification program only about 0.001% could have been tolerated on
account of its neutron emission. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.521)
1945-03-01 The following activities are scheduled: (a) the next run on 23 decay
products will be made Monday, March 12; (b) a check run will be made for
U233 gamma-rays and x-rays on 60 mg of U233; (c) La Chapelle will prepare
a sample of 100 micrograms of Np237 for Zinn; (d) a run will be made on the
Np237(n, γ) reaction with cadmium on Thursday, March 8 or Monday, March
12.
Jones sent transfer forms to Furney for 61.5 mg of U233 as oxide to Site Y.
Jones indicates that the material is ready for shipment. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.522)
The summary of the manpower distribution for the Chemistry Division that
Hogness issued today shows the following for my section:
(Seaborg, 1979, pg.523)
1945-03-02 General Groves and Conant are in Chicago.
I received a March 1 memo from Dempster giving the result of the mass
spectrometer comparison of the abundance of U238 in the 23 sample kept for this
purpose. He finds a value for U233 of 95.8±0.5 percent. This is in agreement
with two earlier approximate values. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.523)
1945-03-03 I read a copy of a March 2 memo from Daniels to Wigner summarizing
the present research program in the Chemistry Division related to homogeneous
water piles, listing the following investigations and manpower involved: (1)
Chemical and nuclear properties of heavy isotopes - 7 men. (2) U233 - 4 men.
(3) Decontamination of plutonium in absence of uranium - 3 men. (4) Colloidal
behavior - 2 men. (5) Fission products - 4 men. (6) Decomposition of aqueous
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solutions by radiation - 6 men. (7) Solvent extraction applied to high energy
piles - 4 men. (8) Protactinium - 2 men. Total, 32 men. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.523)
1945-03-06 I say we have sent 61.5 mg of isotope U233 that is 95.5% U233 and
4.5% U238 (thus 2.8 mg U238).

I discuss our lans to take another more

careful look at the possibility that the Th229 daughter of U233 undergoes
decay by beta-particle branching; at that time we should have more to say
about his interest in the possibility of analysis for U233 content in these
samples by means of beta-particle counting.

I suggest we may have

a better solution to this problem through some Clinton neutronbombarded thorium carbonate that was completely purified of its
natural uranium impurity before bombardment. We are now ready
to extract the U233 and will make an accurate determination of its
half-life. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.528)
1945-03-07 At 8:30 a.m. I held a meeting in my office of the Council of Section
C-I, attended by Albaugh, Cunningham, Davidson, Egan, Ghiorso, Gilbreath,
Hindman, Jaffey, Jones, Katzin, Lawroski, Manning, Simpson, Stewart, and
Roy Thompson. I opened the meeting with a reminder of the three instruments
meetings scheduled for later today. I announced that Zinn, Dancoff, et
al., have found eta for U233 (neutrons emitted in fission per neutron
absorbed) to be greater than 2.3 and the n, γ cross section is probably
less than 10 barns. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.531)
I received a copy of a memo from Zachariasen to Mulliken suggesting that
neither the term ”thoride series” or ”actinide series” be adopted for general
use in the Project publications. He argues that it is impossible to state at this
time that the term ”thoride series” may not become justifiable since, so far,
valence state observations do not extend beyond plutonium. At the same time,
he considers as inappropriate my term ”actinide series” (I first proposed this at
the July 17 meeting with C. A. Thomas on ”Final Purification and Metallurgy
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of Product,” and stated it on page 55 of the report of that meeting, CK-1968),
for thorium is certainly not actinium-like. He does concede, however, that if
there are nine elements following plutonium, all of which are trivalent (and
not all of them tetravalent), there would be some justification for the use of
”actinides” even though there is a gap in the series at thorium.
Captain Chapman requested of the District Engineer, Oak Ridge, six grams
of U235 containing not more than 25% U238. He indicates that one gram is
desired for the purposes I listed in my memo to Stearns last Saturday. The
other five grams are desired for cross section measurements and other neutron
work by the physicists, including use as a comparison standard for measuring
neutrons emitted per thermal neutron absorbed by the isotope U233. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.532)
1945-03-08 At 8:30 a.m. I held a meeting in my office of the Heavy Isotopes
Group, attended by Florin, Ghiorso, Hindman, Jaffey, James, Jones, Katzin, La
Chapelle, Larson, Magnusson, Manning, McLane, Morgan, O’Connor, Studier,
Van Winkle, and later Cunningham.

James described his compilation of

information on energies, Auger electron yield, etc., and L- and K- x-rays of heavy
elements; and Florin talked about his progress on working up the uranium plus
He 4 target (sample TotB, Berkeley bombardment). Work on x-rays of U233,
Pu23 , and Np237 was discussed.
The following activities are scheduled: (a) Studier-Ghiorso run on x- and
gamma-rays from 60 mg sample of U233, (b) a run about Monday, March 19,
on U233 decay products, (c) La Chapelle to prepare a 100 microgram sample
of Np237 for Zinn, (d) the Np237(n, γ) run with cadmium cut-off will be made
next Monday. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.534)
1945-03-09 The third plutonium production pile (F) at Hanford reached its rated
power yesterday. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.534)
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Compton received a March 6 letter from Latimer indicating he will be very
glad to receive the 1 mg of U233 that I told Connick we could transfer to the
Berkeley project. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.535)
1945-03-10 Dempster wrote a memo to Stearns about some aspects of the future
program of the Met Lab that should be pursued because of their obvious military
importance. Stating that they represent examples of the content of such a
program he lists the following:
(1) What are the possibilities of a small country developing breeder piles that
could make that country an international menace in 25 years from the
present time?
(2) What are the possibilities of small piles operating in various neutron
velocity ranges as power sources suitable for special purposes?
(3) Is there any possibility of finding new methods of enriching naturally
occurring isotopes that could be developed and used secretly by a foreign
power or private organization?
(4) What methods can be used to detect unauthorized use or international
traffic in special materials or secret activities in various parts of the
world leading to the accumulation of ”products” in the hands of aggressor
nations? (Seaborg, 1979, pg.535)
The first meeting of the Laboratory Steering Committee took place in the
afternoon.

Those present included Bartky, Compton, Daniels, Dempster,

Franck, Greninger, Hilberry, Stearns, Stone, Szilard, Wigner, and Zinn. At
the meeting Wigner summarized the present knowledge concerning the various
breeder piles. Szilard spoke about his concern that the first bomb that we
detonate may start a race in atomic armaments between us and other nations,
in particular, Russia. He believes that for the safety of this nation it is necessary
for us, within the next couple of years, to produce ten times as much fissionable
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material as is now planned (i.e., ten tons instead of one ton) in order to insure an
agreement with Russia to prevent its future use in war. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.536)
1945-03-12 Szilard prepared a draft memorandum (MUC-LS-61) on the importance
of the U.S. drawing up a program for the production of ten tons of ”heavy
elements” within the next few years (ten times the planned amount),
in order to convince the Russians that we are so advanced in the field
of atomic weapons that no other nation has a chance to catch up to
us. Szilard feels that such evidence of superiority is our best chance to convince
the Russians that they should agree to a system of joint control by the U.S.,
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union on the manufacture of ”heavy elements”
everywhere in the world. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.536-537)
1945-03-13 In a memo to Stearns, Daniels comments on the Steering Committee
meeting of last Saturday afternoon. He urges that we begin thinking in terms
of piles of a million kW in spite of the serious engineering difficulties involved.
He suggests that a series of lectures on piles to which the section chiefs and a
few others are invited will be helpful. He agrees with Szilard on the importance
of making available, within two years, ten times as much fissionable material as
has been contemplated. He then urges an actual demonstration of a hightemperature pile for the generation of power as a means of increasing our
prestige with the public and our support by the government. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.537)
1945-03-14 I asked for a report on the present situation on Pa231. Katzin responded
that we have 1 mg in the laboratory in a few hundred milliliters of solution and
three additional batches containing 1 mg each that have gone through the first
step of the semiworks isolation procedure.
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Hilberry asked Stearns to arrange the transfer of the one mg of U233 to Latimer
in Berkeley, provided it is possible from Stearns’ point of view. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.538)
1945-03-15 At 8:30 a.m. I held a meeting in my office of the Heavy Isotopes Group,
attended by Florin, Ghiorso, Hindman, James, Katzin, Larson, Manning,
McLane, Morgan, O’Connor, Van Winkle, and later Magnusson.

Florin

described his progress in working up sample TaB (uranium plus 40 Mev alpha
particles, Berkeley cyclotron bombardment), and Studier described his work on
x- and gamma-rays of U233.
Activities schedules were (a) further work by Studier-Ghiorso on U233 x-rays;
(b) a run on U233 decay products about Monday, March 26; (c) James to
work on the plutonium plus alpha particles Berkeley target (sample 49aB) to
be received next week); (d) a practice run next Wednesday to look for 94241. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.540)
1945-03-17 Presentation schedule:
April 21

Chemical Problems

April 28
May 12
May 26
June 9
May 21

The Heavy Water Breeder Pile
The 1 to 100 ev Breeder Pile
The High Temperature Breeder Pile
The Fast Fission Breeder Pile
Uranium and Thorium

G. T. Seaborg or W. M.
Manning
E. P. Wigner or H. S. Brown
E. P. Wigner
L. Szilard
Z. Jeffries

(Seaborg, 1979, pg.543)
1945-03-20 (5) Dancoff reported measurements of eta of U233 by comparison with U235; a value of 2.48±7% was obtained. Langsdorf plans to
determine eta of U233 by a method similar to the danger coefficient method.
Katzin wrote a summary of the work of Group 9, Section C-I, for my use
at the Project Council Chemistry Information Meeting tomorrow. He states
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that: (1) Extractions are in progress on 60 kg of carbonate residues which
may yield as much as 5 mg of Pa 231. (2) The 36-inch extraction column was
used to complete the extraction of 23 cans of irradiated thorium ”carbonate.”
The product was specially purified and a portion used by Zinn for
measurements of fission constants which indicate great promise for
U233 ”breeding.” (3) Electron microscope studies have been made of thoria
particles in connection with slurry studies. (4) A flowsheet has been drawn
up for solvent separation of uranium, protactinium, and thorium; it may prove
possible to use a single solvent, diisopropyl ketone. (5) Thermodynamic data
are being used to develop a theory for the mechanism of immiscible solvent
extraction of uranium from nitrate solutions. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.547)
A special meeting of the Project Policy Council was held in Room 209, Eckhart
Hall, from 5:05 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., attended by Chapman, Chipman, Compton,
Daniels, Dempster, Doan, Eastman, Greninger, Hamilton, Harrell, Hilberry,
Howe, W. C. Johnson, McKinley, Mulliken, Smyth, Spedding, Stearns, Stone,
Tracy, W. Watson, Whitaker, Wigner, Wirth, Zinn, and later Franck. Compton
explained that they were called together because of developments with regard to
the future programs that have come up in the last few weeks. He then proceeded
to read a memorandum (MUC-AC-2633) he has written to the Directors of the
Argonne, Clinton, and Metallurgical Laboratories.
The memo states that the entire Metallurgical Project faces heavy
cutbacks with the Laboratory at Chicago due for the greatest loss—a
cut of 80% by July 1 of this year. Compton stated that the general order
of preference in keeping staff is (1) retain men for certain top priority jobs at
Site Y; (2) Met Lab will have first right to retain their own men; (3) Clinton
Labs, with only a slightly curtailed budget, will be next in line for taking Met
Lab personnel; (4) men remaining available after Clinton and Met Lab needs

328

have been taken care of can be transferred to other DSM projects. After that
they will be available to other war projects.
Compton said that he is not too unhappy at this way of doing things as a strong
group will be maintained at Clinton until the close of the war, Chicago will be
able to retain certain key personnel, and Argonne can be kept operating. He
explained that the Military Policy Committee and the OSRD have taken the
position that the future is the responsibility of some other group. The War
Department has been requested by Bush and Groves to set up a committee to
consider our program, but this committee will not be able to take any action
which will change the position we are now in. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.548)
1945-03-21 I gave the status of extraction of U233 from irradiated thorium and
mentioned the 60 mg we turned over to Zinn for the cross section determinations
reported by Dancoff at yesterday’s Physics meeting.
Items of interest presented by other speakers are: (1) Perlman reported that the
results of the chemical process at Hanford are very successful with production
yields equaling or exceeding those obtained in small-scale experiments. Overall
yield at present is 90% with prospects for improvement by another 2%. Total
decontamination is 8 × 107 ; this is well in excess of the value of 107 that was
the original aim.

(5) English gave a report on the problem of the

composition of converter and breeder homogeneous pile solutions.
The requirements are minimum neutron absorption, stability of solution, and
reasonable solubility of plutonium. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.550)
At 7:45 p.m. in Room 209, Eckhart Hall, I attended a meeting of the U233
Group (Group 9). Others present were Albaugh, Ames, Asprey, Blaedel, Bradt,
Cunningham, Davidson, Dixon, Fineman, Fields, Ghiorso, Gilbreath, Greenlee,
Hagemann, Hausman, Hellman, Hindman, Hyde, Hyman, Jaffey, Jones, Katzin,
Krueger, La Chapelle, Larson, Manning, Morgan, Phipps, Post, Reinhardt,
Robinson, Sedlet, Seifert, Schaffner, Sheft, Simpson, Stewart, Studier, R.
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Thompson, Van Winkle, Westrum, Winner, Wolf, and others. I announced
the meeting tonight will be taken over by the U233 group.

I then called

on Katzin to conduct the meeting. He began by reviewing the methods for
obtaining cross sections and fission constants for fissionable isotopes, illustrating
the discussion by describing the measurements made on U233, including (a) the
experimental determination of the U233 absorption cross section by the use of
matched absorption cells, one containing pure DNO3 and the other a solution
of U233 in DNO3 , and (b) the measurement of the fission cross section by
comparing the number of fissions obtained from a known weight of U233 (thin
film) placed in a neutron beam with the number of fissions observed for a known
weight of U235 placed in the same beam. When one uses the results of these
two measurements, a value for eta of 2.49 for U233 is obtained.
Studier described some results on the measurement of the electromagnetic
radiations of U233 using material that was purified by six successive ether
extractions, one peroxide precipitation, and one uranyl acetate precipitation.
The purified material amounted to 125 mg of which 60 mg were used for the
measurements. Absorption curves were run on a modified Geiger counter, using
copper, aluminum, and lead absorbers; these suggest 250, 60, 17, 12, and 8 kev
components.
Hagemann described the construction and operation of the oneinch diameter,
sixty-inch long ether extraction column being used for the isolation of U233
from dissolved, irradiated thorium carbonate slugs.

Hellman presented a

thermodynamic evaluation of the extraction of uranium into ether. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.551)
1945-03-22 Hawkins wrote to J.O. Pyle, Director of our Security Division, about
the possibility that on V-E Day, celebration or civil commotion may endanger
the security of the Metallurgical Laboratory. Additional guards are to be on
duty at the Laboratory. He recommends that the guards be instructed that
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”any member of the Metallurgical Laboratory who becomes objectionable while
at work, or who comes to work in an unfit condition,” should be removed or
prevented access to the premises. He expects that undesirable conduct may
arise due to indulgence in alcohol.
English, who is visiting from Clinton Labs, and I conferred about the data from
Stoughton on our sample irradiations. All samples that have been irradiated
since Stoughton took over the supervision are receiving in the range of 65-90%
of maximum flux; the maximum is 2.3 times the average flux. Shapiro has found
that the maximum neutron flux is 3 to 4 x 105 neutron/sec per watt [determined
by gold monitors and by the reaction Pu(n,f)Ba]. For the production of U233
and the uranium carbide samples, the flux is 80% of the maximum 3 x 105
nv/watt; this will apply to most future samples. For relative monitoring, silver
wire is used (1 inch long, 10 mil diameter). (Seaborg, 1979, pg.553)
1945-03-23 At 8:30 a.m. I held a special meeting in my office of the Council of
Section C-I which was attended by Albaugh, Cunningham, Davidson, Egan,
Ghiorso, Gilbreath, Hindman, Jaffey, Jones, Katzin, Lawroski, Manning,
Simpson, Stewart, and R. C. Thompson. I opened the meeting by announcing
the night number of the telephone in my office has been changed to Butterfield
1405. I explained this is a prelude to what I am going to say next, which is
worse. I then announced that the Met Lab staff is to be cut by 80%
on July 1. I said that the War Department is afraid to authorize any
more money for any program not directly involved in fabricating the
final device. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.553)
1945-03-25 General Groves made a brief stop at the Lab today between train
connections. He, Captain Chapman, Captain McKinley, Daniels, and I had
a fifteen minute conference in my office. Groves wanted to know why we
have not shipped 100 mg, rather than 60 mg of U233, to Site Y.
We explained that this was all we were asked to ship. We pointed
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out that we could get a larger supply and would plan to do so if he
desires. Groves explained that he had to know the value of eta with
high precision in order to make a proper decision. Zinn has reported
it as being between 2.5 and 2.3, but he needs a more precise value.
We explained that one difficulty is that we do not have any highly enriched
U235 with which to make a direct comparison. He suggested that we prepare
larger amounts of U233 for use at Argonne or Los Alamos to measure its fission
properties in order to check the work of Zinn. He also asked us to find out from
Zinn the best accuracy attainable at Argonne and to give him an answer by
telephone tomorrow morning. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.556)
1945-03-26 Early in the morning Daniels and I conferred with Zinn about what
can be done to meet General Groves’ request for a more accurate value of eta
for U233. I said we could prepare within a week, 55 additional milligrams
from several laboratory sources. Furthermore, the total present stock could be
increased by working up the 15 cans of thorium carbonate now in the Clinton
pile, each of which contains 5 mg; this could be done within two weeks after
they are delivered to us. For accurate measurements, in addition to lumping
all the U233 together, it will also be necessary to make available to Argonne a
minimum of 200 mg of highest purity U235. We then went to McKinley’s office
where Zinn talked with Groves by telephone. Groves seems to think it would be
best to have the work done at Argonne. He suggests it would be advisable for
Zinn and another person, probably me, to go to Site Y for a conference regarding
the best means of obtaining quickly an accurate value of eta. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.557)
1945-03-27 Zinn, Daniels, and I sent a confirming memo to McKinley about
yesterday’s discussions with McKinley and with General Groves about the steps
to be taken to make more precise measurements of the nuclear constants of
U233. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.557)
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1945-03-28 On the matter of manpower distribution, I said that the personnel shifts
I gave last week will take place as planned except that a demand from Groves
for U233 will shift Hagemann from writing reports to extracting U233 from 15
more thorium cans. I mentioned that it will probably be about two weeks before
final decisions can be made on just what will happen to the Project. I added
that Warren Johnson will be here from Oak Ridge next week to interview those
people who might be available to go to Clinton; nothing has been heard from
Los Alamos or Y-12. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.558)
Daniels asked how long it would take to determine for sure whether or not Pu240
is fissionable with slow neutrons. In response I indicated that a new uranium
alpha-particle bombardment now in progress at Berkeley should provide the key
to this question. The results of the bombardment should be available in six to
eight weeks.
Following Daniels’ comment on the tremendous importance of knowledge of the
fissionability of Pu240 to the design and successful operation of breeder piles, I
predicted that Pu241 will undergo a slow neutron fission and pointed out also
that in the series of analogous nuclei, 91-231, 93-237, 95-241, it is known that
the first two do not undergo slow neutron fission. In the case of 95-241, however,
though the even number of neutrons in the nucleus is unfavorable toward
fissionability, the high charge-to-mass ratio might be sufficient to cause this
nucleus to undergo slow neutron fission. I emphasized that 94-241 is analogous
to 92-235 and is again therefore likely to undergo slow neutron fission. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.560)
Ghiorso suggested that as these ”new babies” are uncovered, I should provide
cigars for the section.

Davidson said that a big celebration should follow

the identification of element 100. I said that I would gladly sponsor such a
celebration. Katzin remarked about the probable difficulty of separating the
last three or four members of the actinide series. I countered with a statement
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that element 97 should follow cerium quantitatively—i.e., it should have +3
and +4 oxidation states. Katzin asked whether or not europium would carry
element 98, to which I replied that element 98 probably would not be chemically
analogous to europium and I tabulated the rare earth and actinide series as
follows:
La
Ac

Ce
Th

Pr Nd
Pa U

61 Sm
Np Pu

Eu
95

Gd
96

Tb
97

I added that the resemblance between elements in the same vertical column is
most marked with the general exception that the members of the actinide series,
due to larger ionic radius, are more easily oxidized to higher oxidation states
than the corresponding rare earths. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.561)
1945-03-29 The following activities are scheduled: (1) Jaffey and O. Van Winkle to make runs on U233 decay products and on Pa231(n, γ)Pa232 this
week. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.561)
Zinn called me about a teletype he received from Site Y, stating the
half-life of U233 to be 167,000 years. The 61-mg sample of U233 will be
returned here from Site Y tomorrow morning. Fermi made his measurements at
Site Y on pressed U233 oxide powder in the form of a plaque. He determined
the neutron absorption cross section to be 560 barns (compared with
513) and the fission cross section to be 475 barns.
Daniels, Hilberry, and I conferred about arrangements to get the 15 cans of
irradiated thorium carbonate from Clinton so we can start as soon as possible
to get the additional U233 to meet General Groves demand for a more accurate
neutron absorption cross section. Since Captain McKinley has not yet made
arrangements to get the 15 cans of neutron-irradiated thorium carbonate from
Clinton, Hilberry phoned Whitaker and asked that the cans be shipped at once.
We have started to assemble all of the U233 available in our section. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.562)
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1945-03-30 Daniels called me about a call from Tom Jones that the 15 thorium
carbonate cans pushed from the pile this morning are exceedlingly hot and he
wondered if they could be handled by the technicians for immediate shipment
to us. I assured Daniels that the material will cool very quickly. I also conferred
with Dr. Rose in the Health Division and convinced him that we are prepared
to handle the hot material as soon as it gets here. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.564)
1945-04-02 Group 9 - 23 Work
Leonard I. Katzin - Assistant Section Chief
French T. Hagemann - Research Associate
Nison N. Hellman - Research Associate
Raymond G. Larson - Research Associate
Martin H. Studier - Research Associate
Michael Wolf - Research Associate
Earl K. Hyde - Research Associate
Quentin Van Winkle - Research Assistant
Marian Pinckard - Technician

No group assignment - Protactinium Work
Roy C. Thompson - Research Associate
Eugene Hausman - Research Assistant [SED] (half-time)
Bernard B. Brody - Research Assistant
John G. Malm - Research Assistant (Seaborg, 1979, pg.567)
Number of Men Feb. Mar. Albaugh Thompson, extraction and 6 6 (Separation
decontamination Processes, Gilbreath, process development 7 7 27 men)
Lawroski, solvent extraction 13 12
Cunningham Simpson, high vacuum work 9 9 (Basic Chemistry, Hindman, basic
chemistry 11 11 36 men) Stewart, recovery 6 6 Ghiorso, instruments & physical
9 9 measurements
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Katzin 23 work 7 7 (23 Work, 8 men)
Administration Seaborg, Manning, Jones, 6 6 Albaugh, Cunningham, and
Katzin 74 73
Word has reached us that construction of the Hanford Engineer Works is
completed and it is now engaged in total operation. Yields of plutonium in
the March runs in the 200-T Area continue to be very satisfactory. The losses
in the canyon (221 Building) average about 3%, in the crossover cycle (224
Building), about 4%, with an overall decontamination factor of about 3.4 × 107 .
The plutonium peroxide isolation procedure in the 231 Building has operated
very satisfactorily. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.568)
1945-04-03 Fifteen cans of irradiated thorium carbonate were received from Clinton
Labs to be processed here on an urgent basis in order to recover the U233 for
the measurements General Groves wants. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.568)
1945-04-09 Daniels had a conference with me and other members of our section to
go over the schedule for the production of U233. Including the hoped-for 70
mg in the material now being recovered from the 15 cans of irradiated thorium
carbonate received from Clinton last Tuesday, we expect we can complete the
delivery of 200 mg this coming Thursday. This is ahead of the tight schedule
promised General Groves two weeks ago. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.574)
1945-04-11 At 8:30 a.m. I held a meeting in my office of the Council of Section
C-I, attended by Albaugh, Cunningham, Davidson, Egan, Ghiorso, Gilbreath,
Hindman, Jaffey, Jones, Katzin, Lawroski, Manning, Simpson, Stewart, and R.
C. Thompson. I opened the meeting by giving a list of reports and
notebooks we cannot trace. I then announced that we will have to
turn our entire stock of U233 into various forms for Zinn to enable
him to determine eta for General Groves before April 26, the date
of the San Francisco conference. On the future of the Plutonium Project
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research program, I emphasized the importance of this determination by stating
that everyone in Section C-I must be available for helping on it. Since a portion
might be in metallic form, Florin will practice the HF dry fluoride method for
making the UF4 needed for metal production. I added that the possibility of
making wet UF4 should not be overlooked as there is the possibility that the
dry method may cause some loss of material. This, of course, is something
that cannot be allowed to happen. I suggested Howland might be a good man
for making the wet UF4 . I said that Fried and Westrum would work on the
actual production of the metal. Depleted U238 oxide is to be used for practice
runs since if we do get metal from these runs, Zinn probably can use it as a
blank. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.576)
Katzin: (1) Isolation of pure Th229 and weighing [determination of half-life].
(2) Cooperation in the measurement of the slow neutron fission cross section
of Th229. (3) Determine the n, γ cross section of Pa233. This is a toughy.
(4) Isolation of Pa231 and chemistry of protactinium. (5) Continue work on
neptunium (4n+1) decay series. (6) Investigate transmutation produced upon
bombarding U233 with alpha particles and deuterons. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.577)
Van Winkle made a partial report on work he and Jaffey have done on an
absorption curve on a very pure gamma-ray from Pa232 formed from neutron
capture by Pa231. Ad-libbing until Jaffey arrived, I reviewed the purpose of
the measurement of the cross section for the reaction Pa231(n, γ)Pa232. The
thorium scheme [Th232(n,2n)Th231 -¿ Pa 231] is analogous to the U238(n,2n)
scheme, even to close agreement in half lives and energies. It is Jaffey’s problem
to establish even further analogy by measuring the neutron absorption cross
section on Pa231 which differs in mass from Np237 by exactly six.
Jaffey apologized for being late, explaining that he lost a factor of 100 in a
calculation he was making for this meeting and had to redo all of them. He
presented the equations and calculation used to arrive at the neutron cross
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section for Pa231 of 290 barns. He said that, as in the case of Np237, this
cross section might account for all the U232 formed, which experimentally is
found to have about the same activity ratio to U233 as the Pu238 has to the
Pu239. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.578)
1945-04-12 We completed the isolation of the 200 mg of U233 today and
turned it over to Zinn for measurement of eta at the request of
General Groves.
President Roosevelt died at Hot Springs, Georgia, at 3:35 this afternoon. I first
learned of this tragic event from Howard Lange who came by to tell me after
hearing the news on his radio. All of our people are in a state of shock. The
major radio stations turned their attention to this news for the remainder of the
afternoon and throughout the evening. President Harry S. Truman was sworn
into office about six o’clock (EST) this evening. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.580)
1945-04-13 In a memo to Compton on the significance of power piles in the research
program, Daniels gives the opinion that it is unnecessary to regard power piles
as limited to the distant future and that it will be possible to run a battleship
or light a city with power generated by a pile within a year or two, or as
soon as fifty or more kilograms of plutonium become, available as a starting
material. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.580)
1945-04-16 Katzin wrote a summary of the work of Group 9, Section C-I, for my
use at the Project Council Chemistry Information Meeting. It contains the
following information:
The 36-inch counterflow extraction column has been rebuilt to give three times
as great flow rates and used to process 20 additional cans of material which
were irradiated at Site X at the 4000 kW level for several months. In addition,
six cans of material from an earlier irradiation have been extracted, all within
about one week. The activity level of each ”hot” can was some 40-50 curies of
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Pa233 beta-particle activity, with approximately half that amount of gammaray activity.
The U233 obtained from the series of extractions, together with other material
on hand, was prepared for measurements of physical constants of U233 by Zinn.
The work included purification and determination of accurate specific activities,
as well as making fission foils, making oxide powder for powder experiments and
loading the cells and making solutions in ”deuterium nitrate” for experiments
with the velocity selector apparatus. Similar preparations were made of highly
enriched U235 and highly depleted U238.
Solvents other than heptyl alcohol found suitable for protactinium extraction
are normal octyl alcohol and 2-ethyl hexyl alcohol. Experiments show that
the slow neutron capture cross section for Pa231 is very high, around
290 barns, indicating that thorium used for production of U233 must
be very free of Pa231 in order to avoid the formation of excessive
amounts of U232. It reaffirms the possibility of forming U232 in even
pure thorium, if there are sufficient fast neutrons present to produce
Pa231 via the n,2n reaction on thorium. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.584)
1945-04-17 (5) Zinn reported on the continued work on cross sections at the
resonance peaks of some of the rare earths. He discussed the measurements
on the value eta for U using the 200 mg our group has isolated. A value of
2.35 for eta was reported to Groves. (7) Zachariasen spoke about the effect
of irradiation on Hanford pile graphite. (8) Lewis discussed fission product
analysis by means of the mass spectrometer. This offers a powerful means of
making mass assignments. (9) Weinberg reported on calculations related
to plutonium piles that use neutrons of intermediate energy.

He

believes eta becomes 2.7 at just about 0.4 ev. Under such conditions,
breeder operation is possible. (10) Friedman discussed the problem of U234
accumulation in U233 breeder piles. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.586)
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1945-04-18 I mentioned our unsuccessful search for short-lived beta-particle emitting isotopes of plutonium, the Pa231 cross section work, oxidation-reduction
potentials of Np III/IV and V/VI, plutonium chemistry studies of PuOBr
and our chemical extractions that have provided 200 mg of U233 for Zinn’s
”thick solution” experiments and will provide an additional 100 mg so that
Langsdorf will have 300 mg for his pile poisoning experiments to determine
directly eta. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.587)
Items of interest presented by other speakers were as follows: (4) English spoke
on the solubility of uranium and plutonium salts for homogeneous
piles. Stoughton’s calculations on the Pa233 n, γ cross section were
also reviewed. (8) Burton discussed the graphite problem in operating piles.
It has been found that an energy storage amounting to 80 cal/g could be
removed by heating to 1000◦ C, whereas the total energy storage was 102 cal/g.
He said Zachariasen has found a 1% increase in lattice spacing of irradiated
graphite. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.587-588)
At 7:45 p.m. in Room 209, Eckhart Hall, I attended a meeting of Sub-section 1 of
our section: The meeting was devoted to a description of the high temperature
pile proposed by Daniels and intended primarily as a power source. Daniels
described the structure to us as a perforated cylindrical refractory block, about
5’7” in diameter and 5’7” high, fabricated out of a homogeneous mixture of
99.6% BeO and 0.4% UO2 (the latter being the oxide of U233) surrounded by
a thorium blanket. The best coolants would appear to be steam or bismuth.
The unit would require 30 kg of U233 to start and would operate at 100,000
kW and at a temperature perhaps as high as 2000◦ C and burn some 100 gm of
U233 per day. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.588)
1945-04-21 In the afternoon there was a Group Leaders’ meeting on New Piles
in Room 251, Ryerson Laboratory, at which Katzin and Blaedel spoke on
the use of solvent extraction to purify the fissionable fuel material from
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poisonous fission products on a repetitive basis in high intensity piles. Katzin
reviewed the problems of purification of the pile and blanket materials
in U233 converter or breeder piles, and Blaedel described the
purification of plutonium fuels from homogeneous or heterogeneous
pile systems. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.591)
1945-04-25 I commented that the Army will get us 5 mg of protactinium at $100 per
mg. This is pretty cheap. It should arrive in two days, and Katzin will have two
days to analyze it. Katzin said that most of one barrel of our own protactinium
material has been through the semiworks and is now being worked up in the lab.
This should yield 4 to 6 milligrams. Roy Thompson stated that the semiworks
should finish the two remaining batches in less than two months. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.593)
1945-04-26 Hindman reviewed his run on the specific activity of 90 gt and 35
gt plutonium which is nearly finished. Hagemann described his work on the
U233 decay products. There is evidence that the 30-day half-life alpha-particle
emitter is due to actinium, which is followed by two alpha particles with a
5-minute half-life, then by a 40-minute half-life, then by a 40-minute alpha
particle. The 5-minute alpha-particle half-life seems to be due to an emanation.
Peterson described his work on the chemical fractionation of actinium and rare
earths.
Stearns sent authorization to Hogness for the transfer of 2 mg of 50% U233 to
the Area Engineer for shipment to Y-12. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.597)
1945-04-27 I sent a memo to Hogness stating that my U233 group has been
operating almost exclusively as a service group since resumption of the U233
program last year. I point out the desirability of our keeping, over a period
of time, a substantial fraction of the U233 supply to enable us to undertake
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a program of chemical research which has barely gotten underway. (Seaborg,
1979, pg.598)
1945-04-29 Mussolini has been killed in Milan, the birthplace of Italian fascism. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.600)
1945-04-30 Hitler committed suicide today. (Seaborg, 1979, pg.600)
Stoughton, who is in Chicago, and I conferred about the thorium carbonate
cans. I learned that: (1) Only 3 out of 25 of our thorium carbonate cans passed
the heat test of four days at 230◦ C. All 125 cans passed for 5-6 days at 175◦ C.
These three plus three others went into the ”Montreal” stringer (best position:
center) about a month ago and are probably still in. (2) About 100 cans went in
last week in a position about one-third of the maximum flux—a nearly average
position. (3) The maximum flux is 1.5 times the average (according to the
chemists), or 2.4 times the average (according to the physicists). (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.601)
Captain J. H. McKinley, Area Engineer’s Office, issued the following instructions
for SED men today:
1. All enlisted men are advised that upon announcement of the capitulation of
Germany, no celebration will be held at this installation and no time off will be
granted therefore.
2.

You are further advised that higher authority has directed that upon

announcement of the capitulation of Germany, all military personnel are to
remain off the streets of towns and cities, and out of public places to the extent
possible. However all are expected to be on the job as usual. These restrictions
to go into effect upon announcement of the capitulation of Germany and to
remain in effect until contramanded by orders. Orders lifting restrictions will be
issued immediately where circumstances warrant such action. This is necessary
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to avoid being involved unwillingly or otherwise in any situation which might
result from celebrations which may occur among the civilian population.
3. All are cautioned that you are expected to set an example of sobriety and
industry and to foster a ”stay-on-the-job” attitude. Any willful deviation from
the policy as set forth above will result in disciplinary action. (Seaborg, 1979,
pg.601-602)
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Appendix E
Extracts from History of Met Lab
Section C-I, Volume 4
1945-05-02 Katzin made a few introductory remarks on our recent ”mass production” program for U233. In spite of the magnitude of the task involved,
the deadline was met and the material delivered for physical measurements.
Katzin noted that the determination of eta by the physicists using this
material has resulted in conflicting values. The earlier value of 2.5 has
not been confirmed, and the present best estimate seems to be 2.35.
This is about the same value as was determined in the first rough measurement,
and Katzin said that this illustrates again the action of the ”Ghiorso principle,”
to wit, ”the value obtained in a preliminary rough measurement will always
turn out to be the best value.” (Seaborg, 1980, pg.7)
1945-05-05 I talked at the afternoon meeting of group leaders in Room 251, Ryerson
Laboratory, concluding the discussion of the effect of heavy isotopes on the
operation and products of converter and breeder piles, which I had begun at
the last Saturday’s meeting. I considered two types of piles: (1) those operating
on enriched U235, and (2) those operating on U233. With regard to the U235
pile, I pointed out that all the reactions occur that were described last week for
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the plutonium-fueled pile. In the later stages of the reactions, Pu238 is produced
faster in a U235-U238 mixture than in a pile containing Pu239 and no U238;
assuming that the pile is operated until the Pu240 produced is 20 percent of
the Pu239, the alpha activity from the Pu238 is equal to about 10 percent of
the alpha activity of the Pu239 and the alpha activity due to Pu240 is nearly
equal to the alpha activity due to the Pu239. I mentioned that Pu238 would
also be produced even faster in later stages of operation from the U236 formed
by the n, γ reaction on U235. The formation of Pu236 was also discussed.
In considering the breeder pile operating on U233 to produce more U233 from
thorium, I discussed the production of U234 from U233 and Pa233. I mentioned
the importance of measuring the cross section for the reaction Pa233(n, γ)Pa234
in order to determine the efficiency loss in eta from the U234 decay product of
Pa234. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.10-11)
1945-05-08 Today is V-E Day. Germany surrendered unconditionally today at
2:41 a.m. French time in the red Reims schoolhouse—General Eisenhower’s
headquarters. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.13)
1945-05-14 Katzin sent me a summary of the work of Group 9, Section C-I for my
use at the Project Council Chemistry Information Meeting of May 16, 1945.
It covers the following topics: (1) The neutron capture cross section of ionium
by the reaction Th230(n, γ)Th231 was determined by irradiation of a sample
of ionium (prepared at Berkeley) in the thermal column of the Argonne pile.
(2) A redetermination of the radiations from Pa233 disproves the existence of a
gamma-ray of 1.5 Mev making up as much as 2 percent of the radiation. Present
evidence is that there is a maximum of 0.1 percent of any such hard radiation.
(3) Measurements on a sample of 85 percent U235 disclosed a gamma-ray of 170
kev energy whose abundance is very high and most likely is due to the U234
present at 0.5 percent by weight. (4) A new procedure has been worked out
for the recovery of Pa231 from uranium residues (using the precipitate of the
345

carbonate neutralization step). The first step is treatment with strong caustic
to remove the soluble silica which previously caused trouble. (Seaborg, 1980,
pg.21)
1945-05-15 (4) Spedding said he has used U232-U238 mixtures and has obtained a
15 percent separation in one pass. (I remarked that he was probably separating
uranium from the U232 descendants which are alpha-emitters and present in
rather large amounts.) (5) Maurer discussed the heat transfer problem in the
breeder and converter piles. (6) Soodak reported on considerations about the
breeder piles and discussed the possibility of using very high energy neutrons to
take advantage of the increase in eta. (10) Zinn discussed Langsdorf’s method
for measuring eta by its swing effect. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.23)
1945-05-16 I also discussed in some detail our U233 work, recalling that about six
months ago a decay scheme was suggested which included a gaseous emanation
of mass number 221 (after the first alpha emitters). I explained that we have
returned to the study after interruptions caused by other work and have now
found evidence that Ra225 emits beta rays (rather than alpha rays as previously
postulated); the following chain of intermediates is now suggested between
Ra225 and Bi213.

225
88 Ra

β

α

α

α

10d

5m

<1m

−−→ 89 Ac225 −−→ 87221 −→ 85217 −−→ (83 Bi)213
26d

I mentioned that the identification of elements 87 and 85 in this decay series
is made somewhat uncertain by the fact that the 5-minute alpha activity can
be volatilized from the LaF3-covered counting plate by heating to red heat
(this helped to mislead us earlier into believing that a gaseous emanation was
formed). (Seaborg, 1980, pg.25)
I next introduced Jaffey who gave the results of a neutron bombardment of
ionium. The sample, which was 25 percent Th230 and 75 percent Th232, was
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bombarded alongside a sample of ordinary thorium and two gold monitors. The
cross section of ionium was calculated to be 88 barns. I suggested the possibility
of measuring the ratio of U233 to Pa231 formed in bombarding such a sample,
saying it would be desirable to put a milligram of this ionium-thorium mixture
in the Clinton pile for an extended bombardment. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.27)
1945-05-19 I sent Joe Hamilton, at his request, a description of our best method
for separating protactinium from thorium, uranium, and fission products. I
also tell him that we have prepared a solution of about three micrograms of
Pa231 for him which we will send as soon as we learn the mechanism for doing
so. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.30-31)
1945-05-23 At 7:45 pm in Room 209, Eckhart Hall, I attended a meeting of the U233
Group. Others present were Ader, Asprey, Egan, Florin, Ghiorso, Gilbreath,
Hagemann, Hindman, Hyde, Jaffey, Jones, Katzin, Larson, Manning, Morgan,
Peterson, Phipps, Reinhardt, Simpson, Stewart, Studier, Roy Thompson, Van
Winkle, and others. I opened the meeting and turned it over to Katzin to
preside.
Studier, the first speaker, reported on absorption studies of the radiations from
enriched U235 and from Pa233. In the U235 sample he has found a 170 keV
gamma-ray of yield exceeding the number of alpha disintegrations of U235
present in the sample. It is suggested that the gamma-ray may originate with
the U234 present which has a much higher specific activity. The examination of
the Pa233 sample did not show the 1.5 MeV component that had been reported
by Stoughton. There seems to be at least seven components, in addition to the
alpha-ray component, in the radiation spectrum of U233.
Hagemann discussed some further work on the decay products of U233, first
reviewing the work of six months ago which resulted in a tentative scheme
involving alpha decay of Ra225 to an alpha-emitting emanation. Work was
discontinued to allow time for a new sample of U233 to decay and improve the
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carrying chemistry involved. The pressure of other more urgent assignments
prevented resumption of the work until very recently. A few weeks ago word
was received that the Montreal group had found Ra225 to be a beta-emitter.
The resulting Ac225 decayed by successive alpha emissions through 87-221 and
85-213. At that time work was resumed here and resulted in confirmation of
the following:
(paste decay chain picture here, page 34)
Hagemann then described the experimental procedure followed to isolate the
decay products and measure the yields. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.33-34)
1945-05-28 I also received and read Farrington Daniels’ response to Mulliken’s
request. He generally favors publication for reasons such as more rapid advances
in nucleonics and showing the American public that there is an absolute
necessity for the elimination of war. He does say, however, that if an
armament race appears inevitable, we should change our policies and
keep secret details on how to build a pile or a weapon, use such secret
information as a bargaining power to force international cooperation
and control, and recognize that we need, under such circumstances, a vigorous
research program. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.37)
1945-05-29 As a result of Mulliken’s request, Nickson wrote a memo to Jacobson
today in which he states:
Therefore it seems to me that one of the most important functions
at hand is the education of the general public to the fact that the
era of atomic power is at hand. Further, the implications of this fact
must become general knowledge. If the public, as a whole, is not
entirely conversant with the broad implications of the field of nuclear
physics, it seems reasonably certain that the public will not accept
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any organization which attempts to take into account the implications
of these facts. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.38)
1945-06-06 I brought up the subject of recommendations on the scientific, political,
and social future of our project in atomic power, pointing out that I am on
a Committee on Social and Political Implications.

After summarizing the

general statement prepared by the local committee about the political aspects
of atomic power, I asked the opinions of the men about the following possible
alternatives in the use of the atomic bomb: (1) not use the weapon in this war
but simply announce at the end of the war that we have it; (2) tell the world
immediately that we have it and give a demonstration at which representatives
of all countries, including Japan, are invited to see it; (3) make bombs as fast
as possible and use them on Japan. I added that the committee’s opinion is to
follow the second procedure.
In the discussion which followed, one man said he would like to see no. 3 used
on the basis that we should treat it as just another weapon. I asked if there
was not a certain moral aspect that we must consider. If we are the first
to use the weapon and then want to build up a world organization
that would never allow its use again, our position would be very much
weakened. I also mentioned that it might be important to give a demonstration
from the point of view of keeping our allies’ good will; this would be particularly
important in the case of Russia who is our most likely future antagonist in view
of Russia’s great future potentialities as an industrial power.
The division of opinion of the people present was mostly between the possibilities
of no.

2 and no.

3.

Most people agreed that a strong international

organization is ncesssary but that some precaution must be taken to prevent
capturing the whole available supply of fissionable material by that organization.
Some expressed pessimism to the possibility of forming a sufficiently strong
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organization to control the problem, but everyone agreed that it was essential
to make the effort. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.51-52)
1945-06-07 Hagemann described Th229 and Th228 from the U233-U232 mixture. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.54)
1945-06-08 In fulfillment of my responsibilities as a member of the Program Committee to prepare recommendations for use for the scientific panel advising the
Interim Committee, I prepared and sent to Zinn and Cole a ten-page summary
of the chemical aspects of postwar research and industrial development. My
proposed program encompasses eight areas (1) general investigation of the heavy
elements, (2) pile investigations, (3) isotope separation, (4) military uses, (5)
methods of analysis and instruments, (6) use of tracers, (7) applications of
fissionable material to useful atomic power and other purposes, (8) fundamental
chemistry.
With regard to (1), I propose preparation of all conceivable heavy isotopes
by bombarding the following elements with positive ions such as protons,
deuterons, etc.: Th230, Th232, Pa231, U233, U234, U235, U236, U238, Pu239,
Pu240, 95-241, etc. I also suggest preparation of all conceivable heavy isotopes
by intense neutron bombardment in piles of such elements as Pu239, Pu240,
Pu241, Np237, 95-241, 96-241, 96-242. I call for determination of nuclear
properties of individual isotopes and the basic chemical and physical properties
of elements 89 to 96. I also ask for the development of natural sources—new
and more efficient means for extraction of uranium and thorium from ores, the
recovery of radium, protactinium, ionium, actinium, mesothorium, etc., from
ores, and a search for new isotopes of transuranic elements in nature. Under
”pile investigations,” I cover construction and operation of piles, converter piles,
breeder piles, and other new piles.

Under ”isotope separation,” I propose

chemical development connected with the electromagnetic method, the diffusion
method, and the thermal diffusion method. I also suggest the isotopic separation
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of elements other than uranium using the electromagnetic method, and propose
the investigation of new methods for the separation of U235 including solvent
extraction and adsorption methods, competing chemical reactions, fractional
electrolysis, and centrifuge methods. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.55)
1945-06-11 The report of the Committee on Political and Social Problems [Franck
(chairman), Hughes, Nickson, Rabinowitch, Seaborg, Stearns, and Szilard] is
being issued today. It consists of I. Preamble, II. Prospects of Armament Race,
III. Prospects of Agreement, and IV. Methods of International Control. I believe
that it is a significant report, and I quote the Summary:
The development of nuclear power not only constitutes an important
addition to the technological and military power of the United States
but also creates grave political and economic problems for the future
of this country.
Nuclear bombs cannot possibly remain a ”secret weapon”
at the exclusive disposal of this country for more than a
few years. The scientific facts on which their construction is based
are well known to scientists of other countries. Unless an effective
international control of nuclear explosives is instituted, a race for
nuclear armaments is certain to ensue following the first revelation
of our possession of nuclear weapons to the world. Within ten years
other countries may have bombs, each of which, weighing less than a
ton, could destroy an urban area of more than ten square miles. In
the war to such an armaments race is likely to lead, the United States,
with its agglomeration of population and industry in comparatively
few metropolitan districts, will be at a disadvantage compared to
nations whose population and industry are scattered over large areas.
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We believe that these considerations make the use of nuclear
bombs for an early unannounced attack on Japan inadvisable. If the United States were to be the first to release this
new means of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, she would
sacrifice public support throughout the world, precipitate the race for
armaments, and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international
agreement on the future control of such weapons.
Much more favorable conditions for the eventual achievement of
such an agreement could be created if nuclear bombs were first
revealed to the world by a demonstration in an appropriately selected
uninhabited area.
In case chances for the establishment of an effective international
control of nuclear weapons should have to be considered slight at the
present time, then not only the use of these weapons against Japan,
but even their early demonstration, may be contrary to the interests
of this country. A postponement of such a demonstration will have
in this case the advantage of delaying the beginning of the nuclear
armaments race as long as possible. If, during the time gained, ample
support can be made available for further development of the field
in this country, the postponement will substantially increase the lead
which we have established during the present war, and our position in
an armament race or in any later attempt at international agreement
would thus be strengthened.
On the other hand, if no adequate public support for the development of nucleonics will be available without a demonstration, the
postponement of the latter may be deemed inadvisable, because
enough information might leak out to cause other nations to start
the armament race, in which we would then be at a disadvantage.
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There is also the possibility that the distrust of other nations may
be aroused if they know that we are conducting a development under
cover of secrecy, and that this will make it more difficult eventually
to reach an agreement with them.
If the government should decide in favor of an early demonstration
of nuclear weapons, it will then have the possibility of taking into
account the public opinion of this country and of the other nations
before deciding whether these weapons should be used in the war
against Japan. In this way, other nations may assume a share of
responsibility for such a fateful decision.
To sum up, we urge that the use of nuclear bombs in this war be
considered as a problem of long-range national policy rather than
of military expediency, and that this policy be directed primarily to
the achievement of an agreement permitting an effective international
control of the means of nuclear warfare.
The vital importance of such a control for our country is obvious from
the fact that the only effective alternative method of protecting this
country appears to be a dispersal of our major cities and essential
industries. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.57-59)
1945-06-13 I sent Ernest Lawrence at Berkeley my opinions and suggestions on the
course to be taken for nuclear weapons in the immediate future and on the
question of the postwar future for nucleonics. I indicate that the opinions I
express are shared almost unanimously by the people associated with me in
Section C-I of the Chemistry Division here. My major points are:
(1) The basic facts concerning the successful release of nuclear energy
and its immense destructive possibilities should be made public very
soon, both to the general public and to scientific channels. I propose
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withholding only information with respect to the actual detailed
designs of the major manufacturing installations.
(2) With respect to use in the present war, we propose not to use the
weapon on Japan without warning but to demonstrate the weapon in
the presence of all leading countries including Japan.
(3) On postwar control, I indicate we favor free research in nucleonics
throughout the world and control through an international organization. Probably the best method of control lies in the control of
the raw materials. Perhaps the only method of maintaining these
controls would involve world-wide pooling to form a stockpile of
fissionable material to be used by the international organization for
policing purposes. I mention that, as suggested by Szilard,
perhaps control could be effected by denaturization, i.e.,
by mixing it with suitable isotopes to spoil its use for
explosive purposes without interfering too much with its use
for research purposes such as power pile developments.
(4) With respect to the organization of postwar research in nucleonics
in this country, I state that it would be a good idea to establish,
with government aid, about four large research laboratories at four
of the major universities. These laboratories should form a sort of
a foundation for the country’s research program and should include
men who are able and willing to advise outlying laboratories as to
the research program. The outlying laboratories might consist of
government laboratories working on the more practical aspects of the
field, and also regular university and industrial laboratories supported
by government contracts or grants-in-aid. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.62)
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1945-06-16 I received and read the final report dated June 11 of the Research
Program Committee (Daniels, Wigner, Seaborg, Jacobson, Cole, Howe, Zinn).
The introduction reads:
”The field of nucleonics has reached the stage where it is fairly clear
as to what should be the next immediate steps. The section of this
report dealing with the social and political problems indicates several
choices which face the nation concerning the future of this field. It
is believed that irrespective of the choice made and irrespective of
whether or not the point of view is one which envisages an armament
race or is one which happily contemplates a peaceful development, the
immediate problem is unaltered. The time scale, however, on which
the work is carried out will be very much affected by the realities of
international policies.
”The quantity production of fissionable isotope is now realized only
at the expense of a raw material which is not at all abundant in
our country and exists in rather limited quantities in the world as a
whole. At the present rate of destruction of this material it cannot
be imagined that a wide-spread use of fissionable isotope will be
permitted. The wasteful utilization of this raw material is forced
upon us by the necessities of war, but the advisability of continuing
present methods of production far into the future even for military
needs can be doubted. It follows that research directed towards a
more efficient utilization of the primary material is the main problem
of the nucleonics program.
”If a sizeable percentage of the isotope uranium-238 could
be burned and if, in addition, useful fissionable isotope could
be realized from thorium, then the whole future of the
development would be on much more secure grounds. It
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is of paramount interest, therefore, that the fundamental research
necessary to the design and construction of ”breeder” piles be undertaken vigorously. It is only by demonstrating the practicability of
the ”breeder” principle that a sufficiently ample supply of fissionable
material can be produced to permit the nucleonics program to proceed
on the scale indicated by the benefits to be derived. It is also necessary
that research and development leading to the useful utilization of the
power from nuclear burning be vigorously supported. The ultimate
goal here would be to operate machines which produce useful power
and which at the same time produce as much or more fissionable
isotope than is consumed. Under these circumstances no real limit
could exist to the application of nucleonics to all phases of our
scientific and industrial life.
”The accomplishment of the goal set in the previous paragraph is not
possible without an extensive program for basic research in physics,
chemistry, and metallurgy. The present state of the art is such that
new designs of reactor units invariably suggest situations about which
no information is available. For the long term development of the field
the research in the basic sciences will be of more importance than any
immediate pile design or engineering. It is possible that the real future
of atomic power does not involve the burning of uranium but rather
other elements at the light end of the periodic table. Progress in this
direction can only come if all possible freedom and support is given
for investigations concerning the nucleus.” (Seaborg, 1980, pg.65-66)
1945-06-19 At 9:00 am I attended a Chicago conference on new piles. The following
talks were given: (1) Eugene Wigner on the fast neutron uranium-plutonium
breeder, (2) Nordheim on the heavy water-thorium-U233 breeder, (3) Weinberg
on resonance neutron uranium-Pu239 breeder, moderated by such coolants as
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fluorocarbons, (4) Fermi on the uranium-Pu239 fast breeder system, (5) Soodak
on the uranium-Pu239 fast breeder system, (6) Daniels on a version of his high
temperature pile. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.68-69)
1945-06-25 Stoughton is here from Clinton and will stay until June 29. (Seaborg,
1980, pg.75)
1945-06-27 I explained that we have to keep records on Section C-I’s material.
Katzin, who takes care of the U233 and thorium, should give Stewart a record
of the U233; Hindman will inventory the neptunium; Gilbreath will handle
uranium; Roy Thompson will keep track of the protactinium; Stewart will
maintain records for the Q material (depleted uranium), U235, and special
tracers. I added that Stewart will be authorized to send materials out for
bombardment. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.77)
Stearns issued a memo to Division Directors and Section Chiefs
stating that letters, reports, and documents containing the numerical
values of nu and eta for U233 will be classified ”secret” but will
be handled in the same manner as if they were classified ”top
secret” when transmitted from one site to another. Numerical values
of the nuclear physical constrants of thorium and U233 and their
relative importance, as compared with other elements, are to be made
available only to those persons who are directly concerned with their
application. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.79)
1945-06-30 I prepared an account of the discovery and early study of U233 for the
use of William L. Laurence of the New York Times who has been brought into
the Project by General Groves to represent the news media. (Seaborg, 1980,
pg.83)
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1945-07-02 I received a letter dated June 27, from Hamilton in Berkeley.

He

enclosed a day-by-day log of the bombardments of uranium metal targets with
helium ions.
He also told me the U238 as U3O8 went on that afternoon (June 27) and if
everything goes well, the U235 target would be put on sometime Friday, June
29, and the thorium target on Monday morning, July 2. The three samples
will then be put aboard the streamliner Monday afternoon (today), and are
scheduled to arrive in Chicago on Wednesday morning. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.86)
1945-07-03 Ghiorso reported on the fission cross section for Th229. He told us that
Hagemann has given him about 5,000 counts of Th229 and that the number
of fissions in the sample corresponds to 5 c/m of U233 impurity. He indicated
that, if there is no impurity, the fission cross section of Th229 is only 1/10 that
of U233. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.90)
1945-07-07 I received a letter from Bill Watson in Montreal, who asked for
additional information about the 10 mg sample of U233 we prepared for
irradiation at Site X for Goldschmidt last January. I asked Katzin to look
into the matter. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.98)
1945-07-09 Report CS-3072, Chemistry Division, ”Summary Report for June, 1945”
was issued today. The material on Section C-I has been covered in meetings
held during the month and includes such work as reducing agents for the Redox
process, the Berkeley helium ion bombardment of natural uranium, the alpha
decay of Pu241, the chemistry of neptunium, of plutonium, of thorium, and of
actinium. The report also includes a report on U233. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.100101)
1945-07-10 Hyde reported that he is preparing to handle two targets that should
arrive soon—one is the thorium plus deuteron bombardment and the other a
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target of U233 plus helium ions. In the U233 bombardment, he intends to look
for such things as Np233, Np234, Pu234, Pu235, and Pu236.
Studier said that the bulk of the U233 has now been thoroughly purified and
set aside for decay. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.102)
Katzin supplied me with some information to use in my reply to Bill Watson’s
questions. I say that the weight of isotope 23 in the sample, determined by
radio-assay, was about 11.0 mg and we estimate the isotope purity to be 96
percent. The actual weight of the sample was 14.56 mg. I also say we claim no
great accuracy. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.103)
1945-07-12 Katzin, Studier, Manning, Cunningham, and I met to discuss the U233
for the Koch-Dancoff Experiment. Studier will clean up approximately 30 mg
just returned from Zinn sometime before August 10. On approximately August
10, he will take 80 mg from the 280 mg (set up for decay) and extract the Th229
and clean it up and give approximately 110 mg to Cunningham or Manning to
have Scott or Britain make the plate for Koch. Manning will arrange to have
that plate delivered to Koch or Dancoff. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.106-107)
1945-07-13 Doan called me from Clinton Labs to ask whether he should request our
thorium carbonate cans. I told him to request ”about 100 cans.” He will try to
put as many as possible in the pile. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.107)
I sent an estimate of our requirements for thorium to Daniels for the period
from the present until December 1946. I ask for 500 pounds of metal and 100
pounds of oxide. This assumes that we will irradiate the metal at Site W to
produce gram amounts of U233. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.108)
1945-07-16 At 5:30 a.m. mountain time, the first explosion of an atomic bomb
occurred at Alamogordo, New Mexico, about 100 miles south of Albuquerque.
Later I read the account of this event that Joe Kennedy wrote in his diary:
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We got to the site around 3:00 a.m., and took our position roughly 20
miles north (?) of the spot. It had been raining, and was completely
overcast, in spite of Jack Hubbard’s prediction to Parsons (Sunday
morning) that it positively would be clear overhead in the North and
South directions. We didn’t know whether they would fire; Bradbury
who was to meet us was there, but didn’t know he was to meet us; the
radios didn’t work except one in an MP car down the road. Finally we
learned by MP radio that the shot would be delayed (due to weather)
for perhaps one or two hours. Various ones tried to sleep on the
ground, etc. CAT, Laurence, and I tried in the sedan, but L. snored
awfully.
Don aroused us at about 5:00 a.m., saying the shot would be within
five minutes or not that day. Feynman had managed to get one plane,
but not the ground station, on our radio. From it we finally guessed
that 5:30 a.m. was the zero time. The plane gave signals at 10 minute
and at 2 (?), also colored rockets were shot by soldiers at our camp
but no one knew the code! A siren could be faintly heard, but again
the code was not known.
At zero, I fortunately was facing exactly in the right direction, and
with my eyes well-shielded with the dark glass. A brilliant yellowish
spurt of fire was first seen, about 1000 feet, in a direction just
clockwise of exact vertical, where it mushroomed at the top. At
the time of this mushrooming, the total brightness seemed greatest.
The ball formed rapidly, grew (in a matter of seconds) to one roughly
1000-2000 feet in diameter, and became increasingly less brilliant. At
this time, with the ball looking like flame from burning oil, I removed
by dark glass. Before this, while the ball was forming and rising,
I looked to the side around the dark glass and the ground and hill
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appeared as well illuminated as in mid-morning. Likewise, I viewed
the sky above. The overcast of stratocumulus (?) clouds were pink
on the underside and well illuminated, as at sunrise.
The red and black fireball grew rapidly to several times its size, and
rose continuously, reaching about 14,000 feet in about 100 seconds.
As it grew, it changed quickly from red and black flames to a mass
of white, billowy smoke interspersed and surrounded (to an extent of
about 1000 feet beyond the borders of the smoke) by a purple-blue
glow, like the low pressure discharge in air in color, and reminding
me of the blue glow around hot Po samples but on a much larger
scale. As tens of seconds went by, the blue glow diminished and the
white smoke cloud became more the prominent feature, until, when
the blast wave took me by surprise at about 100 seconds, the blue
glow was practically gone.
It was at this time well before sunrise, yet light enough for smoke
to be easily visible. It formed a column, not entirely vertical, much
narrower at the bottom than at the top, which was dome shaped
(from the ball shape of the fireball). Soon after the blast and the end
of the blue glow, the dome penetrated the thin cloud haze (at about
17,000 feet), and continued visible above the haze. It appeared to be
drifting rapidly northeast (?) at the top. It was perhaps ten minutes
later that we began to gather in the cars and buses, and everyone of
the party was away shortly before 6:00 a.m.
Some high spots of the trip: (1) the rough ”McKee workmen”
appearance of the people in the party; (2) the rest stops along the
road; (3) Teller, Bethe, and Thomas at about two minutes, applying
sunburn lotion to their faces, with Teller saying ”100 to 1 it’s not
needed, but what do we know?”; (4) the utter silence of the explosion
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until the sound wave reached us; (5) the quiet echoing of the sound
in the mountains, audible for about five minutes; (6) the usual guess
afterwards of 3-8 kilotons.
We got back to L.A. in the early afternoon, very much worn
out. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.109-111)
At 7:45 p.m. Katzin spoke on the U233 problem at the Chemistry Seminar in
Room 251, Ryerson Laboratory. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.112)
1945-07-17 The Chicago Sun, Tuesday, July 17, 1945, reports on page 3:
SHELL DUMP EXPLODES
Alamogordo, New Mexico, July 16 - (UP) - A magazine containing
high explosives, gas and other shells blew up at the Army base here
today with a pyrotechnic display visible 200 miles away. No one was
injured. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.112)
Katzin suggested that I discuss the importance of measuring the cross
section for the absorption of neutrons by Pa233 to form Pa234. This
loss may block the U233 pile if the reaction has a cross section as high
as about 500 barns. We hope to settle this question by putting a sample of
10 mg of thorium in a Hanford pile for 30 days, then work up the sample within
five days. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.114)
I notified Hamilton that we are sending some U233 and ionium which we would
like to have bombarded with helium ions—about 50 to 100 microampere-hours
on each. I tell him that the U233 sample (GTS-104) contains 15.7 mg of U233
and has an isotopic purity of about 95 percent. The ionium sample consists
of about 7.8 mg of Th230; the combined weight of the thorium and ionium
dioxides is 35.5 mg. The samples are going by courier via Site Y and should
arrive in Berkeley Thursday night. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.114-115)
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I point out, in a memo to Daniels, that one of the secondary reactions
in the thorium blanket of a breeder pile is the absorption of a neutron
by Pa233 to form Pa234.

The cross section for this reaction is

unknown and, if it should be as large as 500 barns, a breeder reactor
of this type might not be feasible. I propose to measure this cross section by
irradiating 10 g of thorium in one of the Hanford piles in a position of maximum
neutron flux for 30 days. The sample should then be shipped to us as soon as
possible so that the uranium fraction can be separated from the undecayed
Pa233 at the earliest possible moment. This will keep the ratio U234/U233 at
a maximum and make it possible to detect the U234 in the presence of U233.
Hilberry prepared a 24-page document of the suggestions to the Interim
Committee for postwar organization. This document was the culmination of
panel discussions with scientific personnel of the DSM projects. The report
proposed the establishment of a Commission to be called the Commission on
Atomic Energy, or possibly the National Nucleonics Commission, and would
be a full-time working unit resembling an industry’s executive committee. The
Commission should consist of five or seven men appointed by the President
for five or seven-year terms, with the appointments receiving Congressional
approval. Of the five or seven men, two or three should be scientists, two or
three should be a representative of the military authorities. The report also
proposed an advisory panel of twelve members appointed by the President for
six-year terms. Five would be scientists, three would be military, and four
would be public representatives. The panel would advise the Commission on
all matters of major policy, on budgets, on the appointment of a director,
and on the appointment of divisional and special advisory panels. The report
visualized the work of the Commission as being grouped in four divisions under
a Director appointed by the Commission: (1) administration, (2) scientific and
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technical research and development, (3) social, political, and economic research,
(4) industrial operations.
It was proposed that the research program be carried out by personnel at
established universities or industrial laboratories through government grants
or contracts.

Regional cooperative laboratories should be encouraged, by

government aid, for major tasks. The report recommended that industrial
development be carried out in industrial laboratories and by the creation of two
government-operated development laboratories. Military development should
utilize the present ordnance laboratories. A laboratory under military and
Commission control should be established. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.115-116)
1945-07-21 I read a letter I received today from Paneth in Montreal about the
naming of the 4n + 1 series. He notes that I seem inclined to call the whole
series after its longest living member so far known, the Neptunium series. He
hopes that the name remains. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.120)
In other work a description is given of the preparation of thorium oxycarbonate
with less than 0.01 ppm of uranium, starting with commercial thorium nitrate.
Directions are given, using ceric oxidimetry for the determination of small
amounts of uranium present in large amounts of aluminum powder. Details are
given of the preparations for a long-irradiation experiment for the measurement
of the neutron capture cross section of ionium. On the basis of interrupted
studies, information and predictions are given for the properties of thoria
slurries. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.122)
1945-07-25 In Oak Ridge. I again attended the meeting on breeder piles; Weinberg
reported on the Clinton pilot breeder, and Shapiro discussed the catalyst
problems. Later reports included English’s on the chemistry of reactor solutions,
Nordheim’s on controls, Coryell’s on the physical chemistry of pile solutions,
Wollan’s on absorption coefficients, Ward’s on circulation and cooling, Lyon’s
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on removal of gaseous fission products, and Peterson’s on the removal of nongaseous fission products from U235. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.124)
1945-07-26 On Tuesday while I was in Oak Ridge, Groups 1 and 3 met at 8:28
am in the New Chemistry conference room. Asprey, Cunningham, Florin,
Fried, Ghiorso, Hindman, Hopkins, Hyde, Jaffey, James, Katzin, Magnusson,
Manning, O’Connor, Perlman, Peterson, Robinson, Scott, Simpson, Stewart,
R. Thompson, S. Thompson, Van Winkle, Weissbourd and Westrum attended.
Manning opened the meeting by announcing that three Berkeley deuteron
bombardments arrived yesterday: thorium, U235, and U238. He also mentioned
that Farmer’s No. 3 has arrived, but the sample probably will not be worked
on until next Monday. Perlman estimated that Farmer’s No. 3 has 7 to 8
percent of Pu240 and should be good material for helium ion and deuteron
bombardments. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.124-125)
Studier talked about the present status of work on the 4n+1 series. He noted
that the half-life for Ac225 is expected to be as low as 10 days, perhaps even
lower. He also talked about the half-life values for Bi213. The counts originally
believed to be from emanation are counts arising from atomic recoil. (Seaborg,
1980, pg.124)
1945-07-27 The Allies issued an ultimatum to Japan for its unconditional surrender. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.128)
1945-07-30 Japanese Premier Suzuki scorned as unworthy of official notice the allied
Potsdam surrender ultimatum, according to this morning’s paper. (Seaborg,
1980, pg.131)
1945-08-01 Eugene P. Wigner left the Met Lab to join Princeton University. (Seaborg,
1980, pg.136)
I asked Daniels, by memo, to arrange for the neutron irradiation of 1 mg of
Np237 in one of the Hanford piles in a position of maximum of neutron flux for
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a period of 90 days. Such a neutron irradiation is important because substantial
quantities of the isotope are produced in any converter pile operating on U235
and in breeder piles operating on U233. It is, therefore, important to study
all the isotopes formed under very strong neutron irradiation of Np237. The
irradiation will give us a method to produce pure Pu238 for study of its fission
properties. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.137)
1945-08-04 Perlman sent a memo to Daniels stating the production of about 10
grams of U233 in any of the Hanford units is entirely feasible and should not
upset operations as currently carried out there. He says that the preparations
required for the bombardment are the processing of over 80 kg of thorium metal
free to the extent of 1 ppm of uranium, the determination of an adequate method
for canning the thorium, and the carrying out of the operation.
The U.S. and Great Britain have agreed at Potsdam on new blows to speed the
surrender of the Japanese in the Pacific, according to reports in this morning’s
paper. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.142)
1945-08-05 The top headline in today’s Sun reads ”B-29s Doom 12 More Cities.”
Fleets of superfortresses scattered ”Evacuate or Die” leaflets over twelve
Japanese cities early today.

MacArthur is set to head a huge invasion of

Japan from Okinawa, the smaller Ryukyus, and the Philippines. (Seaborg, 1980,
pg.142)
1945-08-06 At 11:00 a.m., Eastern time, ratio stations began broadcasting the
following statement by the President of the United States:
Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on
Hiroshima, an important Japanese army base. That bomb had more
power than 20,000 tons of T.N.T. It had more than two thousand
times the blast power of the British ”Grand Slam” which is the largest
bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare.
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The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have
been repaid many fold. And the end is not yet. With this bomb we
have now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to
supplement the growing of our armed forces. In their present form
these bombs are now in production and even more powerful forms are
in development.
It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the
universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been
loosed against those who brought war to the Far East.
Before 1939, it was the accepted belief of scientists that it was
theoretically possible to release atomic energy. But no one knew any
practical method of doing it. By 1942, however, we knew that the
Germans were working feverishly to find a new way to add atomic
energy to the other engines of war with which they hoped to enslave
the world. But they failed. We may be grateful to Providence that
the Germans got the V-1’s and the V-2’s late and in limited quantities
and even more grateful that they did not get the atomic bomb at all.
The battle of the laboratories held fateful risks for us as well as the
battles of the air, land, and sea, and we have now won the battle of
the laboratories as we have won the other battles.
Beginning in 1940, before Pearl Harbor, scientific knowledge useful
in war was pooled between the United States and Great Britain,
and many priceless helps to our victories have come from that
arrangement. Under that general policy the research on the atomic
bomb was begun. With American and British scientists working
together we entered the race of discovery against the Germans.
The United States had available the large number of scientists
of distinction in the many needed areas of knowledge.
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It has

the tremendous industrial and financial resources necessary for the
project and they could be devoted to it without undue impairment of
other vital war work. In the United States the laboratory work and
the production plants, on which a substantial start had already been
made, would be out of reach of enemy bombing, while at that time
Britain was exposed to constant air attack and was still threatened
with the possibility of invasion. For these reasons Prime Minister
Churchill and President Roosevelt agreed that it was wise to carry on
the project here. We now have two great plants and many lesser works
devoted to the production of atomic power. Employment during peak
construction numbered 125,000 and over 65,000 individuals are even
now engaged in operating the plants. Many have worked there for two
and a half years. Few know what they have been producing. They
see great quantities of material going in and they see nothing coming
out of these plants, for the physical size of the explosive charge is
exceedingly small. We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest
scientific gamble in history—and won.
But the greatest marvel is not the size of the enterprise, its secrecy, nor
its cost, but the achievement of scientific brains in putting together
infinitely complex pieces of knowledge held by many men in different
fields of science into a workable plan. And hardly less marvelous
has been the capacity of industry to design, and of labor to operate,
the machines and methods to do things never done before so that the
brain child of many minds came forth in physical shape and performed
as it was supposed to do. Both science and industry worked under the
direction of the United States Army, which achieved a unique success
in managing so diverse a problem in the advancement of knowledge in
an amazingly short time. It is doubtful if such another combination
could be got together in the world. What has been done is the greatest
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achievement of organized science in history. It was done under high
pressure and without failure.
We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above
ground in any city.

We shall destroy their docks, their

factories, and their communications.

Let there be no

mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan’s power to make
war.
It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the
ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly
rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms
they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which
has never been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will
follow sea and land forces in such numbers and power as they have
not yet seen and with the fighting skill of which they are already well
aware.
The Secretary of War, who has kept in personal touch with all phases
of the project, will immediately make public a statement giving
further details.
His statement will give facts concerning the sites at Oak Ridge near
Knoxville, Tennessee, and at Richland near Pasco, Washington, and
an installation near Santa Fe, New Mexico, Although the workers at
the sites have been making materials to be used in producing the
greatest destructive force in history they have not themselves been in
danger beyond that of many other occupations, for the utmost care
has been taken of their safety.
The fact that we can release atomic energy ushers in a new era in
man’s understanding of nature’s forces. Atomic energy may in the
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future supplement the power that now comes from coal, oil, and falling
water, but at present it cannot be produced on a basis to compete
with them commercially. Before that comes there must be a long
period of intensive research.
It has never been the habit of the scientists of this country or the
policy of this Government to withhold from the world scientific
knowledge.

Normally, therefore, everything about the work with

atomic energy would be made public.
But under present circumstances it is not intended to divulge the
technical processes of production or all the military applications,
pending further examination of possible methods of protecting us and
the rest of the world from the danger of sudden destruction.
I shall recommend that the Congress of the United States consider
promptly the establishment of an appropriate commission to control
the production and use of atomic power within the United States. I
shall give further consideration and make further recommendations
to the Congress as to how atomic power can become a powerful and
forceful influence towards the maintenance of world peace.
During the afternoon a more detailed statement was released by the Secretary
of War describing how the War Department had brought the bomb project to
fruition and had made a start on planning for the future.
Enroute to Berkeley on the ”City of San Francisco.” The dropping of the atomic
bomb was announced in newspaper headlines in papers that the passengers
picked up at stops enroute. There was great excitement, and I had some
difficulty keeping my counsel during the many conversations I heard in the
club car and elsewhere, When the train stopped in Ogden, Utah, at 6:30 p.m.,
mountain time, I too, bought a newspaper announcing the event. (Seaborg,
1980, pg.143-145)
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1945-08-07 At 8:50 a.m. I arrived in Berkeley on the ”City of San Francisco.”
During the day I had meetings with Lawrence and others. We discussed the
great newspaper interest over the Hiroshima atomic bomb. The papers are
replete with articles on the atomic bomb, how and where it was developed,
Churchill made a statement on the importance of the bomb, indicating that
the course of the war would have been altered had the Germans produced this
weapon. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.145-146)
Under Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, issued the following statement to
the men and women of the Manhattan District Project:
Today the whole world knows the secret which you have helped us
keep for many months. I am pleased to be able to add that the
warlords of Japan now know its effects better even than we ourselves.
The atomic bomb which you have helped to develop with high
devotion to patriotic duty is the most devastating military weapon
that any country has ever been able to turn against its enemy. No
one of you has worked on the entire project or known the whole story.
Each of you has done his own job and kept his own secret, and so today
I speak for a grateful nation when I say congratulations and thank
you all. I hope you will continue to keep the secrets you have kept so
well. The need for security and for continued effort is fully as great
now as it ever was. We are proud of every one of you. (Seaborg, 1980,
pg.156)
1945-08-08 Today’s headlines are still devoted to the Hiroshima bomb. Four square
miles of the city were destroyed. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.146)
1945-08-09 A plutonium bomb was dropped on Nagasaki shortly before 11:00 a.m.
Japanese time, August 9 (yesterday our time). The announcement was the top
headline in this morning’s paper here. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.146)
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The Soviets have declared war on Japan and have made their first attack on
the eastern border of Manchuria. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.147)
1945-08-10 President Truman warned the Japanese that they will suffer decimation
and destruction if they do not surrender. Japanese radio claims that they have
similar weapons and will retaliate. Smoke and dust is still covering Nagasaki,
according to today’s paper. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.147)
Daniels and Branch issued the following notice to all employees of the
Metallurgical Laboratory.
Despite the fact that the surrender terms of the Japanese may
be accepted, it is necessary that all of us keep in mind that the
Metallurgical Laboratory still has important and significant work to
do.
The Manhattan District has requested that all employees remain at
work as usual.
In the interest of future peace it is more important than ever
that security regulations be maintained regarding the disclosure of
scientific information.
The Metallurgical Laboratory has not yet been authorized to release
any information or publicity. Announcement of V-J Day must not
be construed as authority to release such information. We will be
notified officially when such releases are possible.
In view of our solemn responsibilities and the fine spirit evidenced by
the employees of the Metallurgical Laboratory there is no doubt of
your full and whole-hearted cooperation. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.157-158)
1945-08-11 Today’s paper is full of hope for peace. It also reports that 30 percent
of Nagasaki was destroyed. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.148)
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1945-08-12 ”Hirohito Can Stay On, But Only as Puppet” says this morning’s
headline. Peace in the Pacific grows closer as the Japanese were given a final
chance of surrendering and keeping the Emperor, with occupation forces under
an American supreme commander. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.148)
1945-08-13 The war is still going on. American and British pilots bombed Tokyo
again this morning. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.148)
The British Information Services issued a 22-page news release entitled ”Britain
and the Atomic Bomb.” The statement includes historical background, descriptions of the organization of the work in the UK and the scope of the research
programs undertaken, the decision to transfer to Canada one section of the work
which became a joint Anglo-CanadianU.S. enterprise, and the participation of
British scientists in the work at Berkeley, Oak Ridge, and Los Alamos. (Seaborg,
1980, pg.158)
1945-08-14 Throughout the country crowds are in the streets to celebrate the end
of the war. Thousands of people jammed into Lafayette Square in Washington,
D.C., chanting, ”We want Truman,” until he and Mrs. Truman appeared on
the White House steps and the President spoke to the crowd. (Seaborg, 1980,
pg.148)
1945-08-15 ”Great War Ends!” is today’s banner headline. The Emperor of Japan
said that the ”atom bomb” caused them to give up. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.149)
The University of Chicago received the following telegram from General Groves
today:
Official declaration of cessation of hostilities with Japan does not in
any way alter security limitations on release of information on the
atomic bomb project. Security restrictions imposed in my telegram
of six August continue to apply. The President in his broadcast of nine
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August emphasized the necessity in the interest of national safety for
controlling release of information on this revolutionary development.
Loose talk and idle speculation by persons now or formerly connected
with the Project jeopardizes the security of the nation and must
be controlled. I am again asking you personally to continue your
complete cooperation through my office by your entire organization
and by each of your subcontractors in the maintenance of national
security. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.161-162)
1945-08-17 The University of Chicago issued a 12-page news release describing the
University’s role in the work which culminated in the release of atomic power.
(Reference numbers in right hand margin of the release refer to chapter and
paragraph of the official War Department report, The Smyth Report.) The
Met Lab personnel identified by name were Compton, Fermi, Allison, Franck,
Warren Johnson, Hogness, Seaborg, and Stone. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.163)
1945-08-18 The Japanese surrender delegation has been selected and will fly to
Manila tomorrow. Also in today’s paper appeared pictures of the bomb test at
Alamogordo. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.149)
1945-08-20 Daniels requested for us the following Hanford irradiations from Compton: (1) neutron irradiation of 1 mg of Np237 for 90 days, (2) irradiation of
10 grams of thorium for 30 days in order to obtain material for measuring the
neutron-capture cross section of Pa233, (3) production of gram amounts of U233
by irradiation of 80 kg of pure thorium metal to be obtained from Spedding at
Ames. The latter irradiation would be for about three months. (Seaborg, 1980,
pg.163-164)
1945-08-21 Manning asked about the plans for the ionium plus neutrons. Jaffey
explained the idea was to determine the neutron capture cross sections of
ionium and thorium relative to U238, but they are waiting for the Pa233 to
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decay. They plan to take a pulse analyzer curve to determine the ratios of
alpha activities. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.149)
1945-08-22 The formal surrender of the Japanese will take place on August 31 and
will be formally signed on a U.S. battleship in Tokyo. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.152)
The scientific program on ”Power Possibilities” was held during the afternoon.
The speakers were Metcalf (Patent Possibilities), Daniels (Preliminary Design
for a High-Temperature Oxide Pile), Willard (Progress Report on HighTemperature Piles), Goldberger (Calculations of Critical Size of BeO HighTemperature Piles), Ohlinger (Engineering Features of Nuclear Power), and
Gale Young (Turbine Power Plants).
The Policy Meeting of the Project Council was held at 9:20 a.m.

in

Room 209, Eckhart Hall. It was attended by Bartky, Chapman, Chipman,
Compton, Daniels, Dempster, Doan, Hamilton, Harrell, Hilberry, Hogness,
Howe, Jacobson, Jeffries, Johnson, Leverett, McKinley, Murphy, Nordheim,
Spedding, Stone, Szilard, Thomas, Tracy, Warner, Watson, Whitaker, Wirth,
and Zinn. Compton opened the meeting by saying he knew that all those present
are glad to see that eight days after the first bomb was dropped, the war was
at an end, indicating that, in spite of the great loss of life, it was a saving in
the end.
There was a discussion of the statement from the President to General Groves
to hold everything in publishing information. As a result those on the Project
have been asked not to give any information at all. Warren Johnson asked if
it is necessary to get permission from Washington to disclose anything that
is in the Smyth Report and was told by Compton that technically it is not
necessary, but we are likely to get into trouble if we do not. Compton then said
that Truman has ordered no more information be disclosed. Zinn remarked,
”It’s more important than who gets the credit and who does not. If people are
going to get the correct information they have to get it from the right people.
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Washington is really cutting off the right source of information which would
educate the public.”
Thomas, Watson, and Jeffries argued for patience, Thomas suggesting that if
the situation is not clarified in two weeks they should take their troubles to the
Panel through Compton. Jeffries felt the release of the Smyth Report was more
than many of us had any right to expect from the standpoint of the amount
of information that was given out. He went on to observe that the Smyth
Report deals very little with future development. This led Compton to state
there is a strong feeling in the group that the American public should have an
opportunity to know as soon as possible from those who are informed on the
scientific aspects about their own feelings concerning the future implications of
this Project and to make this group free in expressing themselves as American
citizens on the implications of the work in which we have been involved.
During the discussion of the release of scientific information Hogness said he
felt impelled to speak for the chemists—there was not proper credit given to
them in the Smyth Report.
Szilard said the group is not really clamoring for the release of scientific
information and added that he thought they all feel the Smyth Report went
far too far. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.166-167)
1945-08-25 Farrington Daniels announced that 150 copies of the Smyth Report have
been shipped to the Metallurgical Project. Daniels states, ”The statements in
the Smyth Report continue to be the limit of disclosure which we are permitted
to make.” (Seaborg, 1980, pg.169)
1945-08-28 A meeting was held during the evening to discuss Rabinowitch’s report
on political implications and postwar plans. Rabinowitch listed eight possible
comments on the atomic bomb crisis for discussion: (1) Solution is needed, and
it ought to be the correct one. (2) Do not reveal the secret. (3) Let’s corner the
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raw materials. (4) A defense is sure to be found. (6) Let’s scatter our cities or
dig underground. (7) If you smash our cities, we smash yours. (8) Let’s prohibit
atomic warfare. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.170)
1945-09-05 Perlman sent Captain Chapman information on the preparation for a
special irradiation of thorium at Hanford. Spedding will prepare the thorium
metal in the form of a billet; and Foote will supervise the extrusion into bar
stock which can then be machined and canned. The canning will be done at
Hanford. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.178)
1945-09-11 I also transmitted a proposed program of chemical research in connection with the production of U233, under the following headings, which will
utilize the services of 115 men: (1) Small-scale Production in Present Type
Natural Uranium Piles, highest priority, 15 men; (2) Large-scale Production in
Converter Piles Using Enriched U235 or Plutonium as Fuels, highest priority,
100 men; (3) U233 Breeder Piles, medium priority. This problem will follow
No. 2 above and the men can be shifted as necessary. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.184)
Hamilton and I then talked about the fact that the yield of U232 from thorium
plus deuterons bombardment is about twice as great at 22 MeV as at 20
MeV. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.185)
1945-09-12 I met with A. T. Cape of Coast Reductions, Inc., 2 W. 45th Street,
New York, New York, in New Chem. Cape told me that one of the men in his
company found the thorium-uranium mineral in which we are interested in 1937
in the black sand of the beach at Monterey, California. The mineral consists of
60 percent ThO2 , 20 percent U3O8, and 20 percent SiO2 ; the deposit extends
from Monterey north to San Francisco. Cape gave me a sample that has a
density of 7.4. He said that his company owns 10,000 feet of beach right at
Monterey Bay from which they have taken out 50,000 tons of this black sand
for roofing paper. Cape said that he works at Ohio State University. His home
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address is 40 W. Dominion Blvd., Columbus, Ohio; Jefferson 2166. (Seaborg,
1980, pg.186)
1945-09-15 I phoned E.O. Lawrence at Berkeley and told about the thoriumuranium ore deposit at Monterey Bay. We talked about my impending move to
the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley. He mentioned he will stop in Chicago
on a United Airlines flight due to arrive at 11:13 am Tuesday morning, and I
said that I would meet him at the airport. We agreed this would give us time
to talk about the move of my colleagues and me to Berkeley. He will then take
a train to Washington or New York about 3:30 pm. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.190)
1945-09-25 I telephoned Captain Chapman in the Area Engineer’s Office to give
him all the essential information on the source of thorium at Monterey Bay as
described to me by Cape. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.206)
1945-10-01 A. T. Cape called me from Columbus, Ohio. He told me that they
have analyzed the thorium ore from the Monterey Bay area with the following
results: ThO2 - 70.40 percent, U3O8 - 11.18 percent, SiO2 - 18.22 percent. Cape
wants to know whether we have any interest in this ore. People are considering
purchasing the surrounding land, and this may make it difficult to buy the
critical area later on. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.211)
1945-10-02 I then asked Hamilton to tell Lawrence that Cape has called to inquire
whether we might have any possible interest in the thorium ore from Monterey
Bay. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.216)
1945-10-03 President Truman sent the following message to the Senate today:
Almost two months have passed since the atomic bomb was used
against Japan. That bomb did not win the war, but it certainly
shortened the war. We know that it saved lives of untold thousands
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of American and Allied soldiers who would otherwise have been killed
in battle.
The discovery of the means of releasing the atomic energy began a
new era in the history of civilization. The scientific and industrial
knowledge on which this discovery rests does not relate merely to
another weapon. It may some day prove to be more revolutionary in
the development of human society than the invention of the wheel,
use of metals, or the steam or internal combustion engine.
Never in history has society been confronted with a power so full
of potential danger and at the same time so full of promise for the
peace of the world. I think I express the faith of the American people
when I say that we can use the knowledge we have won, not for the
devastation of war, but for the future welfare of humanity.
To accomplish that objective we must proceed along two fronts—the
domestic and the international.
The first and most urgent step is the determination of our domestic
policy for the control, use, and development of atomic energy within
the United States.
We cannot postpone decisions in this field. The enormous investment
which we made to produce the bomb has given us the two vast
industrial plants in Washington and Tennessee, and the many
associated works throughout the country. It has brought together
a vast organization of scientists, executives, industrial engineers, and
skilled workers—a national asset of inestimable value.
The powers which the Congress wisely gave to the Government to
wage war were adequate to permit the creation and development
of this enterprise as a war project.

Now that our enemies have

surrendered, we should take immediate action to provide for the
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future use of this huge investment in brains and plant. I am informed
that many of the people on whom depend the continued successful
operation of the plants and the further development of atomic
knowledge, are getting ready to return to their normal pursuits. In
many cases these people are considering leaving the project largely
because of uncertainty concerning future national policy in this field.
Prompt action to establish national policy will go a long way toward
keeping a strong organization intact.
It is equally necessary to direct future research and to establish control
of the basic raw materials essential to the development of this power
whether it is to be used for purposes of peace or war. Atomic force in
ignorant or evil hands could inflict untold disaster upon the Nation
and the world. Society cannot hope even to protect itself—much less
to realize the benefits of the discovery—unless prompt action is taken
to guard against the hazards of misuse.
I therefore urge, as a first measure in a program of utilizing
our knowledge for the benefit of society, that the Congress enact
legislation to fix a policy with respect to our existing plants, and
to control all sources of atomic energy and all activities connected
with its development and use in the United States.
The legislation should give jurisdiction for these purposes to an
Atomic Energy Commission with members appointed by the President with the advise and consent of the Senate.
The Congress should lay down the basic principles for all the activities
of the Commission, the objectives of which should be the promotion of
the national welfare, securing the national defense, safeguarding world
peace, and the acquisition of further knowledge concerning atomic
energy.

380

The people of the United States know that the overwhelming power
we have developed in this war is due in large measure to American
science and American industry consisting of management and labor.
We believe that our science and industry owe their strength to the
spirit of free inquiry and the spirit of free enterprise that characterize
our country. The Commission, therefore, in carrying out its functions
should interfere as little as possible with private research and private
enterprise, and should use, as much as possible, existing institutions
and agencies. The observance of this policy is our best guaranty of
maintaining the pre-eminence in science and industry upon which our
national well-being depends.
All land and mineral deposits owned by the United States which
constitute sources of atomic energy, and all stockpiles of materials
from which such energy may be derived, and all plants or other
property of the United States connected with its development and
use should be transferred to the supervision and control of the
Commission.
The Commission should be authorized to acquire at a fair price, by
purchase or by condemnation, any minerals or other materials, which
are not already owned by the United States.
The power to purchase should include real and personal property
outside the limits of the United States.
The Commission should also be authorized to conduct all necessary
research, experimentation, and operations for the further development
and use of atomic energy for military, industrial, scientific, or medical
purposes. In these activities it should, of course, use existing private
and public institutions and agencies to the fullest practicable extent.
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Under appropriate safeguards, the Commission should also be permitted to license any property available to the Commission for research,
development, and exploitation in the field of atomic energy. Among
other things such licensing should be conditioned, of course, upon a
policy of widespread distribution of peacetime products on equitable
terms which will prevent monopoly.
In order to establish effective control and security, it should be
declared unlawful to produce or use the substances comprising the
sources of atomic energy or to import or export them except under
conditions prescribed by the Commission.
Finally, the Commission should be authorized to establish security
regulations governing the handling of all information, material, and
equipment under its jurisdiction.

Suitable penalties should be

prescribed for violating the security regulations of the Commission
or any of the other terms of the act.
The measures which I have suggested may seem drastic and farreaching. But the discovery with which we are dealing involves forces
of nature too dangerous to fit into any of our usual concepts.
The other phase of the problem is the question of the international
control and development of this newly-discovered energy.
In international relations as in domestic affairs, the release of atomic
energy constitutes a new force too revolutionary to consider in the
framework of old ideas. We can no longer rely on the slow progress
of time to develop a program of control among nations. Civilization
demands that we shall reach at the earliest possible date a satisfactory
arrangement for the control of this discovery in order that it may
become a powerful and forceful influence toward the maintenance of
world peace instead of an instrument of destruction.
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Scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the
essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery is based
is already widely known. There is also substantial agreement that
foreign research can come abreast of our present theoretical knowledge
in time.
The hope of civilization lies in international arrangements looking, if
possible, to the renunciation of the use and development of the atomic
bomb, and directing and encouraging the use of atomic energy and
all future scientific information toward peaceful and humanitarian
ends. The difficulties in working out such arrangements are great.
The alternative to overcoming these difficulties, however, may be a
desperate armament race which might well end in disaster. Discussion
of the international problem cannot be safely delayed until the United
Nations organization is functioning and in a position adequately to
deal with it.
I therefore propose to initiate discussion, first with our associates
in this discovery, Great Britain and Canada, and then with other
nations, in an effort to effect agreement on the conditions under which
cooperation might replace rivalry in the field of atomic power.
I desire to emphasize that these discussions will not be concerned
with disclosures relating to the manufacturing process leading to the
production of the atomic bomb itself. They will constitute an effort
to work arrangements covering the terms under which international
collaboration and exchange of scientific information might safely
proceed.
The outcome of the discussions will be reported to the Congress as
soon as possible and any resulting agreements requiring congressional
action will be submitted to the Congress.
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But regardless of the course of discussion in the international field, I
believe it is essential that legislation along the lines I have indicated
be adopted as promptly as possible to insure the necessary research
in, and development and control of, the production and use of atomic
energy. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.216-220)
1945-10-12 I answered the letter I received from Latimer yesterday, enclosing a
copy of a statement on the history of U233 which I prepared earlier for another
purpose. I tell him the basic patents on the use and on the preparation of
U233 have been prepared and applied for in the names of Seaborg, Gofman,
and Stoughton. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.227)
1945-10-16 I suggested that Katzin, Studier, Hyde, and Hagemann begin thinking
about the apparatus and other preparations needed for handling the thorium
that will be shipped from Hanford between November 6 and November 13. I
then asked about plans for fluoride work. Florin said he would like to try
to prepare protactinium fluoride after first making trial runs with tantalum.
The program will be to study PuF6 , fluorides of protactinium, and fluorides of
neptunium.
Peterson announced that he has sent the sample of radium to Clinton for neutron
irradiation. I pointed out that this is a feasible way of making pure actinium.
Pile bombardment of ionium-thorium mixtures should be an easy method of
preparing pure protactinium.
The first session of the two-day meeting on new piles began at 9:00 am
in Room 209, Eckhart Hall.
meeting.

I arrived late after the adjournment of our

Others present were Aebersold, Allen, Brown, Burton, Captain

Chapman, Cole, Connick, Dancoff, Daniels, Dempster, English, Foote, Franck,
F. Friedman, Goldberger, Hogness, Huffman, Hughes, Hutchison, Jesse, W.
Johnson, Lapp, Leverett, Lauletta, Manning, Ohlinger, Perlman, Rabinowitch,
Rubinson, Soodak, Spedding, Urey, Way, Willard, Wollan, G. Young, Zener,
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Zinn, and Zirkle. Soodak of Clinton began the meeting with the results of
further pile calculations on their pile which is to consist of U235 salt dissolved
in heavy water, surrounded by a heavy water reflector, by a row of thorium
rods, and finally by a cylindrical graphite reflector. Critical experiments are
now being planned.
English spoke on the composition of homogeneous pile solutions at 90 degC.
NaHCO3 solutions are favored at present.
Burton discussed bubbling problems in homogeneous piles—they want no
bubbles. The answer seems to be in the use of catalysts and operation at a
higher temperature—80 or 90 deg C.
Leverett reported on the present state of homogeneous pile technology, saying
that the catalyst problem is holding up planning. They have found that sodium
silicate suppresses corrosion.
M.D. Peterson then talked about the semiworks experiments on the treatment
of pile solutions. They are considering hexone for recovery of the uranium.
Stripping with water or evaporation (if a volatile solvent is used) are other
possibilities for removal of the uranium from the organic extract. Little work
has been done on recovery of U233 from thorium. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.232-234)
1945-10-17 The thorium plus helium ions target (Berkeley bombardment 10a)
arrived.
The morning session of the New Piles Meeting devoted to the Argonne Program
was held at 9:00 am in Room 209, Eckhart Hall.

Dancoff spoke on the

use of sodium as coolant in a fast pile. The problem of power dissipation
appears tremendous but not impossible, according to Dancoff. The pile will be
equivalent to five Hanford piles in the rate of fission and to eight Hanford piles
in the rate of production of new plutonium.
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Hughes talked about cross sections for fast neutrons; this is a new method based
on the utilization of fission neutrons.
M. L. Goldberger gave some calculations of resonance piles; these are at a less
precise stage than those of Soodak for fast piles. For Pu239, the value of eta,
which is 2.05 for thermal neutrons, rises to as much as 2.95 for neutrons of
several keV energy. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.234-235)
1945-10-22 I received a letter from Ray Stoughton in which he describes a number
of samples of ours now in the Clinton pile. Stoughton says the people in charge
of the pile want to know what we want done with them. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.239)
1945-10-23 I mentioned the letter I received from Ray Stoughton yesterday; we
decided to request the plutonium fluoride, the U oxide, and the thorium
carbonate. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.240)
I sent a proposal to Daniels that the 30-year alpha-emitting U232 would be
admirably suited for use in connection with the trigger mechanism of the bomb,
in place of the short-lived (140 day) polonium. I discuss the feasibility of its
production by neutron bombardment of Pa231 that could be obtained as a byproduct by extraction and recovery from the uranium during the processing of
uranium ores. I say that Pa also could be produced by neutron bombardment
of Th230, also found in uranium ores, but in an abundance 60 times that of
Pa231.
Finally I point out that the production of large amounts of Np237 would
permit the production of another useful alpha emitter, Pu238, through neutron
bombardment of the Np237, and that, in the future high energy piles, the
transplutonium isotopes, especially isotopes of element 96, will be produced in
such amounts that they might be used for this and other purposes. (Seaborg,
1980, pg.242)
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1945-10-29 Last Wednesday (October 24) Manning answered the letter I received
last Monday from Stoughton. Manning suggested, at Stoughton’s convenience,
that the following items be removed from the Clinton pile and sent to us: (1)
46 mg product fluoride, (2) 5 mg 23 oxide plus 5 g natural uranium as oxide,
and (3) 50 g ThOCO3 .
Manning wrote to Hamilton on Saturday to tell him that we are sending a sample of U233 for a short bombardment with deuterons (Berkeley bombardment
8b) before Hamilton changes over to helium ions. A courier is scheduled to leave
here by plane Tuesday and should deliver the sample by Wednesday, October
31. Manning indicates the material for bombardment 12a (protactinium plus
helium ions) will probably be delivered at the same time.
Also on Saturday Farrington Daniels issued a memorandum to academic
personnel.

He quoted the following statement from Robert P. Patterson,

Secretary of War.
Public discussion of great issues such as the dissemination and
regulation of knowledge of atomic science is one of the basic principles
on which democratic government is founded. In it all citizens have
a right to participate. American scientists in particular, because of
their knowledge of the technical matters involved and because of their
comprehension of the full social significance of the achievement, can
contribute powerfully to it. Security, of course, still requires that
nothing beyond the specific subject matter contained in the Smyth
Report be brought into discussion, and the use of due care that
matters outside the content of this report and still under security
regulations be not inadvertently encroached upon. With this sole
restriction, however, which applies to all citizens, our scientists should
feel that it is proper for them as citizens to join actively in public
consideration of this question.
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Daniels infers from this recent statement that it is not necessary to submit for
review those manuscripts which are concerned exclusively with political and
social discussions.
Daniels also says that the organization known as the ”Atomic Scientists of
Chicago” has done important service in educating the public to the implications
of the atomic bomb and the need for international cooperation and control.
He would like to make an informal suggestion to the effect that use of the
name of this association in press releases should be used sparingly, particularly
when non-technical information is involved, in order that the influence of the
organization may remain effective.
He then states the Metallurgical Laboratory has important scientific work to do
for the welfare of the nation and meetings, which are not directly connected with
the Metallurgical Laboratory should, in general, be carried out in the evenings
and on Sundays. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.246-247)
1945-11-05 Daniels sent Colonel Nichols a request for the loan of 25-40 kilograms
of enriched U235 and the authorization to build a Chemistry Division proposed
experimental high-temperature pile at Argonne. He refers to the initial research
on two other pile types (the homogeneous, heavy-water pile proposed by Clinton,
and the all-metal, fast-fission pile proposed by Argonne) and suggests that work
be pushed vigorously on these two types in addition to our proposed hightemperature pile. Our pile will use beryllium oxide and enriched uranium oxide
(containing 20 percent of U235). Daniels makes the point that this design
appears promising for a quick demonstration of the practical utilization of power
with the minimum investment, while at the same time giving experience in the
conversion of thorium into U233. Daniels expresses the need for new reactors
as follows:
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”We are now in competition with other nations in the field of
nucleonics, and we must develop actively all possible piles, particularly enriched piles. Tests of breeder piles are necessary from a
military standpoint, and there is a public demand for power piles
and peacetime applications of nuclear energy. To obtain full public
support we believe that a power pile should be demonstrated at the
earliest possible moment.” (Seaborg, 1980, pg.262)
1945-11-10 A reply arrived from Stoughton about our request (Manning to Stoughton,
October 24) for removal of our samples from the Clinton pile. Stoughton says
the samples will be sent in about a week. He includes irradiation data on each
sample. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.270)
1945-11-15 I attended a meeting on Pile Evaluation held at the Metallurgical
Laboratory today. Nordheim spoke about the importance of breeder
reactors in meeting the future pile requirements of the U.S. Fermi
also underlined the future significance of breeder reactors. He said
that he thinks many 1,000 kW reactors would be better to have than
a few very large reactors. He thinks that thermal reactors will be
better for the production of electric power while fast breeders may
be best for the production of plutonium.
Zinn gave a description of power reactors and breeder reactors. He included
among the latter, fast breeder reactors with metal coolants such as bismuth,
mercury, and lead.

Zinn pointed out that these have the highest fast

neutron absorption cross section and indicated that perhaps sodium or sodium
potassium alloy might be the best possibilities for use as a coolant. He sketched
a 2,000 kW unit that might start with U235 but eventually switch over to Pu239.
Willard described a high temperature pile in which beryllium oxide would be
mixed with fissionable material in a steam-cooled system surrounded by thorium
rods.
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Weinberg talked about the heavy-water cooled reactor working on the thoriumU233 cycle.
Fermi indicated that he thinks that the decisions as to the best course of action
should be delayed. He said that the possibility of generating electricity
by nuclear power looks good and that breeding is clearly a possibility.
He believes that the production of radioactive substances will be one of the most
important things; this will be so even if nuclear power becomes an important
source of energy. He pointed out that biological tracers such as C14 will be
very important and should have free distribution. He considers this as a duty
of this project to science and this nation. He suggested that an announcement
should be made very soon that such isotopes will be available. (Seaborg, 1980,
pg.281-282)
1945-11-20 I attended an 8:28 am meeting of Groups 1 and 3 of Section C-I
in the New Chemistry conference room. Also present were Asprey, Britain,
Cunningham, Florin, Ghiorso, Hagemann, Hindman, Hopkins, Hyde, Jaffey,
James, Katzin, Kohman, Magnusson, Manning, O’Connor, Osborne, Peterson,
Robinson, Sedlet, Simpson, Stewart, R. Thompson, S. Thompson, Van Winkle,
and Westrum. I reported that ten grams of thorium were bombarded with
neutrons in the Hanford pile for 16 days and then flown to Chicago. The
purpose was to extract the uranium as soon as possible after the pile exposure
and determine the ratio of U233 to U234 from which the capture cross section
of Pa233 can be calculated. Hagemann said the thorium metal was dissolved
in HNO3 and the solution salted with Ca(NO3 )2 from which the uranium was
extracted with ether. The yield was 310 micrograms if it is assumed to be pure
U233. Samples of this material will be made to run pulse analysis, fission, and
mass spectrometry measurements. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.286-287)
1945-12-15 Helen and I had lunch at the Wrigley Building with John Dunn, the
Chicago announcer of the Watson Davis ”Adventures in Science” radio program.
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At 1:15 pm, following a short rehearsal, I was introduced to the CBS radio
audience as the guest scientist on the program. Following comments by Watson
Davis by wire from Washington, I was interviewed on the direct broadcast from
Chicago.
Announcer: You certainly have been discovering a lot of the fundamental stuff
of the universe, Dr. Seaborg, and the writers of chemistry texts are going to
have quite a time keeping up with you.
Seaborg: Here is something else. There has always been a question as to what
kind of family these heavy elements were going to form. We think we have pretty
good evidence that the elements with atomic numbers larger than 88 actually
form a new series like the rare earths that the chemists know about. And thus
the elements actinium, thorium, and protactinium of atomic numbers 89, 90,
and 91 are the first elements in this new rare-earth-like series which corresponds
very much to the series of elements that begins with lanthanum, which is farther
down in the scale of atomic numbers. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.331-334)
1945-12-18 Perlman and I visited the Ottawa Laboratory of the National Research
Council during the morning. We had meetings and discussions with Goldschmidt, Mungen, Cook, Steacie, Gueron, and Mills. George Weil, the U.S.
representative to the Canadian Nuclear Energy Program, also attended. We
primarily discussed the proposed process change for the 23 separation process
involving the removal of the MnO2 precipitation step and a change in the
extraction solvent.
Mungen described his work on the separation of U233 and Pa233 from
thorium and later showed us the separation process plant equipment set up
in Ottawa. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.337-338)
1945-12-19 Stewart received a call from Rodin about Stewart’s request on December
13, that five cans of thorium carbonate (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) be removed from the
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pile. Stewart had said that we had assumed that the cans had already been
removed, but he recently learned the cans were still in the pile. Rodin reassured
Stewart that the cans had been removed in October and will be shipped to us
as soon as possible.
A thank-you letter arrived for me from Watson Davis for my radio performance
on his program. He would like a ”pre-release” statement about the naming of
elements 95 and 96. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.341)
1945-12-29 I sent Daniels an additional memo (MUC-GTS-2115) about the use of
U232 and other material in weapons components (see memo MUC-GTS-2038,
October 23, 1945). The District Engineer’s Office pointed out that the neutron
background arising from the Be(gamma,n) reaction is 50 times higher than the
present initiator and might cause predetonation. In addition, the gas phase
of thoron in the decay chain might cause problems. I suggest to Daniels that
another material other than beryllium, such as boron, lithium, C-13, or fluorine,
might be considered for use with U232. I feel that the gas phase problem could
be taken care of through proper gadget design.
I stress that the point that the potentialities for the use of Pa231 as a source
of U232 appear sufficiently great so that steps should be taken to arrange for
its recovery in the uranium processing procedures. It is equally important to
recover Th230. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.351)
I answered a letter dated December 18 from Walter Yust of Encyclopedia
Britannica. He asks that I prepare articles on uranium, thorium, artificial
radioactivity, protactinium, plutonium, neptunium, and actinium. I agreed
to do this and say that the fall of 1946 would be a practical deadline. (Seaborg,
1980, pg.352)
1946-01-03 I also called Farrington Daniels to discuss the results of Daniels’
telephone conversation with Hood Worthington about the provision of materials
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and their irradiations in the Hanford reactors. Daniels said that they talked
about the problems associated with loading Hanford reactors with thorium to
product U233. Worthington told him that fuel slugs will be available later which
should have 800 g of plutonium per ton. We must supply shipping containers
for these slugs. Daniels said that Worthington also discussed the progress on
samples being irradiated for us. These include sample CW-4 and a number of
milligrams of Np237 and of U233. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.358)
1946-01-12 I wired P. Gerald Kruger suggesting that he consider Stoughton,
Friedlander, and Duffield as candidates for the radiochemistry position at the
University of Illinois. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.375)
1946-01-15 Groups 1 and 3 met at 8:28 am in New Chem conference room. Ray
Stoughton from Clinton Laboratories and Eugene Huffman from Berkeley, who
are visiting the Met Lab, attended the meeting in addition to the following
individuals from Section C-I: Ames, Anderson, Britain, Florin, Ghiorso,
Hagemann, Hindman, Hyde, Jaffey, James, Katzin, Magnusson, Manning,
Osborne, Peterson, Scott, Sedlet, Simpson, Stewart, Studier, Templeton, R.
Thompson, S. Thompson, Van Winkle, and Westrum. Stewart reported on the
shipment of materials. He said that Osborne should receive the neptunium
from the Hanford pile irradiation around January 20. The Pa231 sample from
Clinton should also arrive about the same time; and R. Thompson, Van Winkle,
and Osborne will handle the sample. The purpose of the work is to obtain U232
for fission measurements. The U233 and U238 targets from Berkeley should be
here this week. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.380)
Hagemann announced that the isolation of U233 from thorium slugs is almost
complete. Although the purity of the product is still not known, he estimates
that 8.5 mg of U233 should be obtained per slug.
Hyde said he has started experiments to determine the neutron absorption cross
section of ionium. A mixture of Th230 and Th232 was irradiated in the Clinton
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pile. After a period of time to permit the Pa233 to decay to non-detectable
levels, the ratio of Pa231 to U233 will be measured. Uranium-232 is also present
from the second order reaction on Pa231 so that a value for the capture cross
section for Pa231 will also be obtainable. Jaffey pointed out that the half-life
for U232 is still uncertain and will lead to uncertainties in the cross section
values. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.381)
1946-01-29 Hagemann talked about the recent neutron-induced fission measurements carried out on pure U233 and a sample of U233 which contains some
U234. He stated that previous measurements on these two samples resulted in
a lower fission rate for the pure U233 sample than was observed for the U233U234 mixture. The most recent measurements made last week, however, show
that the fission rate for the pure U233 sample is now somewhat larger than the
fission rate for the U233-U234 mixuture. Katzin conjectured that this latest
result would probably correspond to 0.5 percent to 1 percent of U234 in U233
and would give a cross section for neutron capture by Pa233 of 100 barns ± 50
percent. The actual calculations have not been made. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.412)
1946-02-05 James said that he has nothing new on the half-life of U232 from the
experiment in which it was milked from Pu236. He has prepared a sample to
look for U232 in a uranium fraction separated without U233 tracer. The ratio
of U232 to U233 in the previous sample indicated a half-life for U232 of 65
years. However, a small amount of U232 coming through the chemistry from
the original cyclotron-bombarded U235 could cause a big effect. (Seaborg, 1980,
pg.417)
1946-02-22 Yesterday while I was in Peoria, Stewart sent Chapman a memo saying
that he is sending Chapman, Hagemann’s design for lead shields to be used
for the shipment of 60-80 kg samples of thorium irradiated in the Hanford pile.
Hood Worthington asked for the design of these shields. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.464)
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1946-03-07 In Chicago the extensive report, ”Feasibility and Methods of Inspection
of World for Plutonium and Other Power Reactors, and for Chemical Processing
Plants Associated with Reactors,” which L. I. Katzin has been editing is being
submitted today.
This report was prepared for the Committee on Technical Phases of Inspection
and Control of Atomic Energy by L. B. Borst, H. S. Brown, C. V. Cannon,
W. E. Cohn, C. D. Coryell, S. G. English, J. R. Gilbreath, H. Hyman, A.
H. Jaffey, L. I. Katzin, D. E. Koshland, Jr., R. N. Lyon, D. R. Miller, K. Z.
Morgan, M. D. Peterson, D. Saxon, R. Scalettar, G. T. Seaborg, H. Soodak,
R. W. Stoughton, A. Wattenberg, and A. Weinberg. The appendices were
prepared by W. Blaedel, J. R. Gilbreath, H. Hyman, A. H. Jaffey, and L. I.
Katzin. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.491)
In the section on ”Problems of fissionable material control at the pile” (Section
IIB), the report states: We inquire into the possibilities of denaturing fissionable
species. There are two ways: One is based on the fact that a uranium bomb is
impossible to construct unless the light isotope is present to at least 15 percent.
The other is based on the fact that a plutonium bomb is very difficult to make
if the Pu content exceeds, say 5 percent. We can therefore tentatively establish
the following code:
1. It is unlawful to possess uranium in which the U235 or U233
content exceeds, say 25 percent. (The figure 25 percent is deemed safe
since 15 percent would give an infinitely large bomb—25 percent would still
require a bomb of impractical size.)
2. It is unlawful to possess plutonium in which the Pu240 content is less than
5 percent or in which the spontaneous neutron background is less than
that corresponding to this amount of Pu .
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How could this code be implemented, and what bearing would its enactment
have on the future development of nuclear power? (Seaborg, 1980, pg.496)
1946-03-25 A letter arrived from Iz this morning asking about Berkeley needs for
23 for six months. He suggests 100 mg. He then goes on to mention the
present Hanford irradiation of thorium, saying that if it is bombarded for 100
days, it will produce U233 at somewhere between 400-900 gt level. He would
like to consider whether this high a level is desirable for the various uses to
which the U233 is to be put; particularly, he questions the sizable amount of
U232 alpha activity that would be present. Iz then asks about the amount of
neutron-bombarded thorium we should request. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.526)
1946-03-29 In the Chicago Times today there was a report by Howard W. Blakeslee
on the AAAS meeting in St. Louis. He says in part,
The big fact on which scientists rely to prevent surprise atomic
attacks—namely, that all atomic energy is limited strictly to two
natural metals, without even a slight prospect of extension—came
out here today at the meeting of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science.
The metals are uranium and thorium, both scarce and controllable at
mines and in power houses, so that scientists believe no nation will
be able to prepare for an atomic attack without automatically giving
the world advance warning of 18 months to several years.
These facts came from a plan for international control of atomic
energy issued simultaneously last night in Washington and St. Louis.
Here the plan was explained by Dr.

Charles A. Thomas, Vice

President of the Monsanto Chemical Company, himself a member
of the plan committee and an atomic bomb expert.
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Uranium makes both bombs and power. It also makes a new
metal, plutonium, for bombs and power. Uranium converts
thorium into a new form of explosive uranium. Uranium
alone is the base and no other chemical in creation now
appears to yield atomic energy.
Important also is denaturation that renders the metals non-explosive,
but leaves them useful for power. Denaturation is what happens when
an egg is hard boiled. The metals are not boiled; they are denatured
by adding a secret chemical element. But, Dr. Thomas said, there is
no doubt that ”boiling” them will take a long time and large plants.
The proposal is to give an international atomic development authority
three controls over: (1) all mining of uranium and thorium, (2) all
plants making the metals, (3) inspection of large peacetime power
plants (because these could be secretly modified to make bomb
materials)... (Seaborg, 1980, pg.541-542)
1946-04-09 The State Department released the following report of our meeting at
the War Department on the problem of denaturing:
The possibility of denaturing atomic explosives has been brought to
public attention in a recent report released by the State Department
on the international control of atomic energy. Because, for security
reasons, the technical facts could not be made public, there has
been some public misunderstanding of what denaturing is, and of
the degree of safety that it could afford. We have thought it desirable
to add a few comments on these points.
The report released by the State Department proposes that all
dangerous activities in the field of atomic energy be carried out by
an international authority and that operations which by nature of
the plant, the material, the ease of inspection and control, are safe,
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be licensed for private or national exploitation. The report points
out that the possibility of denaturing explosive materials so that they
”do not readily lend themselves to the making of atomic explosives”
may contribute to the range of licensable activities, and to the overall
flexibility of the proposed control. The report does not contend nor
is it in fact true that a system of control based solely on denaturing
could provide adequate safety.
As the report states, all atomic explosives are based on the raw
materials, uranium and thorium. In every case the usefulness of the
material as an atomic explosive depends to some extent on different
properties than those which determine its usefulness for peacetime
application.
possible.

The existence of these differences makes denaturing

In every case denaturing is accomplished by adding to

the explosive an isotope, which has the same chemical properties.
These isotopes cannot be separated by ordinary chemical means. The
separation requires plants of the same general type as the plants
at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, though not of the same magnitude. The
construction of such plants and the use of such plants to process
enough material for a significant number of atomic bombs would
probably require not less than one nor more than three years. Even
if such plants are in existence and ready to operate some months
must elapse before bomb production is significant, but unless there is
reasonable assurance that such plants do not exist it would be unwise
to rely on denaturing to insure an interval as much as a year.
For the various atomic explosives the denaturing has a different effect
on the explosive properties of the material. In some cases, denaturing
will not completely preclude making atomic weapons but will reduce
their effectiveness by a large factor. The effect of the denaturant is
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also different in the peaceful application of the material. Further
technical information will be required, as will also a much more
complete experience of the peacetime uses of atomic energy and its
economics, before precise estimates of the value of denaturing can
be formulated. But it seems to us most probably that within the
framework of the proposal advanced in the State Department report
denaturing will play a helpful part.
In conclusion we desire to emphasize two points, both of which have
been challenged in public discussion. (1) Without uranium as a raw
material there is no foreseeable method of releasing atomic energy.
With uranium, thorium can also be used. (2) Denaturing, though
valuable in adding to the flexibility of a system of controls, cannot of
itself eliminate the dangers of atomic warfare.
L. W. Alvarez
A. H. Compton
G. T. Seaborg
R. F. Bacher
Farrington Daniels
F. H. Spedding
M. Benedict
J. R. Oppenheimer
C. A. Thomas
H. A. Bethe
J. R. Ruhoff
W. H. Zinn

(Seaborg, 1980, pg.547-548)
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1946-05-03 Today the Chicago Sun carried its big supplement, ”The Atomic
Future,” by Howard W. Blakeslee. It is 25 pages long and shows where uranium
and thorium are mined, gives a glossary of the languages, and discusses the
future peaceful uses of atomic energy. Blakeslee says, ”Harnessing the atom
ranks with the greatest discoveries of man.” He writes of the risks to their
careers taken by scientists who worked on the atomic bomb and of the risks
President Roosevelt took in this matter. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.593)
1946-05-15 Manning said that there are also some 80 pounds of thorium being
irradiated in the Hanford pile to produce large quantities of U233 and we
may want to work up some of these slugs here. He then said that any further
expression of opinions should be turned in within the next few days to permit
him tentatively to schedule manpower distribution. He noted that now is the
time to make suggestions for special provisions to be made in the new chemical
building at Argonne since plans for its construction are still in the formative
stage. (Seaborg, 1980, pg.607)
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Appendix F
MUC-LAO-17: Notes on Meeting
of April 26, 1944
9:00 - 10:30, 209-Eckhart
Present: Fermi, Allison, Szilard, Wigner, Weinberg, Seitz, Morrison, Cooper,
Vernon, Tolman, Watson, Ohlinger
The first speaker in today’s meeting was Mr. Fermi. His remarks follow.
It was assumed for today’s discussion that the aim of the chain reaction would be
the production of power.
The first type of pile assumed for this purpose was a permanent large pile of about
the Hanford size (but not the Hanford type necessarily) for production of energy in
the neighborhood of 106 kilowatts. The arrangement suggested was one in which one
large mother plant would produce 49 for consumption in a series of smaller plants.
In the mother plant, the energy produced would be used to reduce the cost of the 49
produced. (Mr. Fermi mentioned that he viewed the use of this power for the heating
of cities with sympathy). There may be non-technical objections to this arrangement,
for example, the shipment of 49 to the smaller consuming plants offers the serious
hazard of its falling into the wrong hands, but these were to be omitted from this
discussion.
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The fundamental aim in the mother plant would be to get the maximum possible
yield, with full utilization of the metal as the goal. If a solution to such a proposal can
be found, then the schemes for isotope separation are not of great interest. If such a
solution is not possible, then the schemes for isotope separation should undoubtedly
be investigated further.
In the following discussion of full metal utilization, the isotopes 28 and 49 will be
referred to as 8 and 9, respectively. In the reaction cycle suppose that one fission of
9 and ψ fissions of 8 take place in a single cycle of generation. Then the production
of neutrons will be ν9 + ψν8 . Some neutrons are lost in the moderator, coolant, etc.
Let L = the number lost and α = the number used in producing 40-10. Then the
excess of neutrons available for absorption by 8 to produce 9 will be

(1 − L)(ν9 + ψν8 )
and the production of 9 per cycle will be

(1 − L)(ν9 + ψν8 ) − 1 − α − ψ
The term 1 + α represents the destruction of 9. Therefore, the ratio of production
of 9 to its destruction, which we will call γ, will be
P
γ=
= (1 − L)
1+α



ν9
ν8
+ψ
1+α
1+α


−1−

ψ
1+α

To utilize all the metal, γ obviously must be greater than 1. If γ is only very
little greater than 1, the chain reaction would keep going with maximum economy
of fissionable materials and would continue to go on until all the metal were used,
but the value of such a pile would not be great and it would only be good for, say,
hardening materials (the Wigner effect) or possibly (though less desirable) heating
cities. The effective ν9 , is around 2.1 to 2.2.
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Assume first a Hanford type pile with an equivalent amount of 49 substituted
for the 25, i.e., in the early stages, 25 would be burned to produce 49 which would
gradually improve its condition. The earlier estimate of 1.9 for the ratio of the
fission cross section of 49 to that of 25 has been more recently estimated by Y as
1.4. The ratio of absorption cross section for 49 to that of 25 is around 1.5. With
these conditions, ν9 is about 10% higher than it was previously thought to be. (The
actual values of ν and ν-effective are not really known so the discussion can only show
ranges). The situation then in a pile of Hanford design and lattice would be for a
ν-effective (which will be referred to hereafter as µ) of 2 to 2.2, γ will be from 0.8 to
0.98. In the latter case, the pile is close to a balanced situation but not quite there.
To adjust such a pile without drastic changes of design, large diameter slugs or more
metal could be used to improve the thermal utilization and increase ψ. However,
over-sized lumps increase the difficulty of cooling since the annular type cooling is
badly limited in power production by the metal temperature.
The second type pile considered for the production of power was the P-9 moderated
pile. For a µ of 2 to 2.2, γ would be 0.93 to 1.13. These values do not necessarily
represent the optimum but are merely indicative of what can be done with P-9 piles
and one with such a γ of 10 to 15% may or may not be an operable plant. The practical
difference between continuous and discontinuous P-9 plants is not large in this respect
since the loss by absorption for the coolant and its tubes practically compensates
for the less efficient reproduction in slurry piles. One might hope to improve the
situation by capturing the escaping neutrons in a reflector but the absorption in the
pile container is an Important problem.
Another type of pile to consider is one with very little or no moderator (fast chain
reacting type). From the nuclear point of view this is very desirable and is simple in
principle but, practically, it involves serious problems in removing the heat. Ignoring
the cooling, and considering only the nuclear point of view, this type pile may be of
either one of two forms:
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In Fig.

A, a small spherical core of 49, say, 10 cm in diameter, would be

surrounded by a sphere of 28 or normal tubealloy about 40 to 60 cm in diameter.
This arrangement is good from a γ standpoint and one might expect a γ of 1.3 to
1.4, because L can be made small since the fast neutrons from the 49 get into the 28
readily. (Mr. Allison pointed out that if 25 is not considered for the surroundings
here, thorium might be used). The pile shown in Fig. A only requires a few kilograms
of 49. To utilize more 49 it would be possible to construct units like A with multiple
49 cores spherical or cylindrical in shape.
Fig. B represents a homogeneous sphere of 28 with 49 uniformly distributed
throughout the mass, the whole surrounded by a reflector of pure 28 to catch
the leakage neutrons. In this arrangement about 70% of the neutrons get into 28
immediately to produce fast fission. Assuming a mixture of 49 and 28 in which X
represents the percentage of 49, critical conditions (i.e., where the chain reaction
continues if the pile is of infinite size) would be reached with about 5% of 49 in the
mixture (X = 0.049). For values of µ of 2 to 2.2, γ would be 1.37 to 1.57. As the
pile size is decreased, the following results would be obtained. They are calculated
without reflector.
Adding a reflector would decrease the critical radius of the active sphere by about
10 cm and improve very considerably the value of γ since the reflector would utilize
the neutrons escaping from the active core. Taking the case of the 70 cm sphere
above, this represents about 1.5 m3 or say 30 tons of the mixture. Therefore, 6% or
about 2 tons of 49 would be required to keep this machine running. Thus a plant of
this type requires a large quantity of 49 for operation although this is not sufficient
reason for discarding this type of pile as a possibility.
The serious objection to these fast chain piles is the removal of the heat. Since
practically all the heat is produced in the 49 (about 70 to 80%), piles like those in
Fig. A are harder to cool since it is mainly the tiny core which must be cooled while
in Fig. B the whole mass is to be cooled.
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As another possibility, a compromise enriched pile might be designed which would
have enough moderator to reduce the percentage of enrichment required to keep
the chain reaction going. But not as large an amount would be required for the
conventional optimum conditions.
Mr. Fermi suggested that at a later meeting he would consider the question of
how to use the 49.
Mr. Szilard was the second speaker and proposed approaching the problem from
a different viewpoint,—that of assuming more optimistic values of the constants so
as to indicate other potentialities. He pointed out that the fast reaction is preferable
to the slow chain reaction for producing 49 from tubealloy and that this is probably
more true if we assume more pessimistic values for ν or µ. Before discussing these
values of the constants, sketches of a possible design were distributed and described
briefly. These sketches are attached hereto.
The sketches show two different arrangements.

In sketch A, the enriched

tubealloy,(enriched to where the chain reaction will go) and natural tubealloy would
be distributed in the form of rods in a cylindrical pile, in which the enriched material
would be in the center portion of the rods lying within a circular area in the center
of the pile. Part of the rods, located within three circular areas around the center
(as indicated in Fig. 1) would be arranged so the cylindrical bundles could each
be rotated about its axis. In each of the rotating bundles, part of the rods would
be natural tubealloy and the balance of natural tubealloy with the center section
enriched.
In the beginning, the enriched material in the three:bundles would all face the
center of the pile and lie within a cylinder whose axis would coincide with the
axis of the pile and whose cylindrical surface would pass through the three axes
of the revolving bundles. By means of this arrangement, as the multiplication factor
increased with the continued operation of the pile, the enriched material could be
rotated away from the center of the pile and the natural tubealloy brought towards
the center where it in turn would be enriched. In the center of the pile would be
405

a single tube for introducing mercury, liquid bimuth, or some other absorbing or
slowing material for controlling the pile. The coolant for this type pile would be a
bismuth-lead alloy and would flow downward through the pile between the static and
rotating rods. The possibility of using liquid sodium in place of bismuth-lead should
also be looked into. The volumetric heat cabacity of the liquid sodium is about the
same as that of the bismuth-lead alloy but its density would be 10 times less, so
that the pressure drop would be about 1/10 that for the bismuth-lead alloy or the
velocity about 3 times larger for equal pressure drop. In the scheme just described,
the following approximate conditions would obtain: (1) the bismuth-lead alloy would
occupy about 1/3 of the enriched core and would pass through the pile at a velocity
of about 15 meters per sec; (2) with 1/2 cm diameter rods raised to 700◦ C metal
temperature at the center of the central rod and with 150◦ C temperature increase in
the coolant, about 250,000 kW will be removed. The pumping power for the coolant
will consume about 5% of the power produced.
In the alternative scheme B, control of the pile would be obtained by means of a
nest of tubes for the mercury or other controlling medium arranged as in Figs. 3A
and 3B and 4A and 4B. The metal rods would all be stationary and vertical (nos.
12, 13 and 14 in Fig. 3A) and would be about 1/2 to 1 cm in diameter by about 2
meters long.
In both designs, the enriched core would be about 1/2 to 1 meter in diameter
by about the same height. The balance of the material around the core would be
ordinary tubealloy of the same rod size. The total diameter and the height of the pile
would be about 2 meters.
The objective of such a pile must be to produce as much extra 49 as invested.
It is assumed that the production will be double the original investment. For every
atom of 49 disintegrated, two atoms of 49 could be produced. Part of these will be
produced in the enriched core and part in the surrounding natural tubealloy. Some
of the production in the core will tend to leak out into the natural tubealloy and this
leakage must be kept within certain limits. Then k will increase over a period of time.
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As the chain-reaction goes on, the multiplication factor k will then increase so that
the controls must provide for this as well as the normal operating control of the pile.
In the slow chain reaction, 49 captures neutrons in radiative not fission capture
to produce a new element which we will call super plutonium or 40-10. It is assumed
there is a 50% chance that this new element will be fissionable. If it is not fissionable,
it is assumed there is 50% chance that it will be formed only in negligible quantity
in the capture of fast neutrons. Thus, there is a 75% chance in a fast chain reaction
that we may use ν and not µ in getting the production balance (µ = 2.2 neutrons per
neutron absorbed, ν25 = 2.2 × 1.175 = 2.6 neutrons produced per neutron absorbed).
As the energy of the neutrons increases from thermal to fission energies, it is assumed
there is no decrease in ν. The main argument in favor of the fast chain reaction is
that if a fission neutron is released in tubealloy, it causes fission in the 28 to produce
1.2 neutrons (fast effect). If all the neutrons are captured, the overall balance would
be that for every atom of 49 destroyed, two atoms of 49 would be produced. One
goes back into the chain reaction, the other replaces the 49 destroyed, providing a
net gain in 49.
In experiments in which a Ra-B neutron source was surrounded by 28, measurements indicated a 5.3% increase in the number of neutrons and that 63% of the
neutrons remained above the fission threshold. This means that the increase in the
number of neutrons for an infinite sphere would be 5.3/(1 - 0.63) or 19.5%. If the
fission cross section is taken at 0.35 and the inelastic cross section at 2.7 for a ν28 of
2.2 to 2.6  will vary from 1.18 to 1.245.
Referring to the value above of ν25 of 2.6, if we were to use the more optimistic
results reported by Y (that ν49 is 20% larger than ν25 ) then ν49 equals 3.1 neutrons
produced per neutron absorbed. If we are less optimistic and assume ν49 -effective =
2.5 but use the 19.5% increase indicated by the experiment mentioned above, we have
three neutrons produced in a mixture of 28 and 49 for one atom of 49 destroyed.
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It has been suggested that one of the subjects for one of the meetings soon to
be held would be a review of the availability of the metal producing ores and other
sources of tubealloy. This is to be given by Mr. P. Morrison.
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Appendix G
MUC-LAO-18: Notes on Meeting
of April 28, 1944
9:00 - 10:30, 209-Eckhart
Present:

Fermi, Allison, Wigner, Smyth, Szilard, Morrison, Watson, Feld,

Hogness, Young, Gleinberg, Creutz, Cooper, Vernon, Ohlinger
The first speaker was Mr. P. Morrison; his comments follow: If we view the chain
reaction merely as a source of unspecialized energy it goes directly into competition
with many existing large scale prime movers and fuel sources. Economics are then
paramount. It is Mr. Morrison’s opinion that we should not move in that direction
for some time to come, but should attempt to exploit the particular properties of the
chain reaction as a concentrated source of a highly special form of energy. Power
simply as kW hours should appear at most as a by-product.
The following data was gathered from the Bureau of Mines bulletins and other
sources and correlated by Mr. Morrison.
In 1941 the average yearly power produced by the major sources was as follows:
The first item covers mostly government ana private utilities and private industrial
power developments. Of the power produced from the second fuel source about 40%
was from gasoline in all its uses. Of the power produced from coal, about 19%
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was used in public utilities, about 10% for coke and chemical uses, about 20% for
railroad transportation, and the balance, of about 60% for other miscellaneous uses
including domestic, and industrial fuels. Of the above total figures for the world
power production, the U.S. consumed about 35% of the coal-produced power and
about 66% of the petroleum-produced power.
Cost figures for the above power, while not on a strictly comparative basis, are
interesting. The figures below are all per megawatt hour.
The first item is based on the cost of the power at Boulder Dam at the bus-bar face
on a guaranteed consumption continuously throughout the 24 hour day and includes
the cost of the original equipment, maintenance, etc. The figure for the coal-steam
plant is based on the fuel cost only and does not include the equipment, maintenance,
etc. As Mr. Szilard pointed out, these two cannot be compared and, as Mr. Fermi
observed, it is the 80 ¢figure of the coal-steam plants with which we must compete
in the production of power.
As Mr. Morrison noted in a recent memorandum, the approximate abundance of
tubealloy and thorium in the top crust (5 to 8 km thick) of the earth is as follows:
Tubealloy: 4 ± 2 ppm (found mostly in granite and does not include sands, etc.)
Thorium: 12 ± 4 ppm (found mostly in sedimentary rocks)
The most efficient gold extraction plant yet constructed has been able to dig the
rock, crash it, treat it, etc. to recover the gold for about $7.00 per ton. Crushing
rock requires about 100 kW hours per ton when the rock is reduced to particles of
about 1 mm3 in size. Therefore, Mr. Morrison estimates that we could afford to
work the rock for power (based on using the 25, not the 28), if necessary, providing
the abundance of the tubealloy was not less than 5 to 10 ppm. It has been estimated
that there are about 1014 - 1015 tons of natural tubealloy to be found in rock in the
earth’s crust and about 108 tons in sea water (the concentration in sea water is about
10−9 gms of tubealloy per gm of water).
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The richest occurences of natural tubealloy in the world are at the following
locations. All figures are very rough estimates based on incomplete and often reluctant
surveys by the producers. All tonnage figures are tons of tubealloy and not ore.
A similar table of the distribution of thorium throughout the world follows. This
is found almost entirely in monazite sand having about 5 to 11% thorium content:
If we were to use the entire U.S. and Canadian resources of tubealloy (10,000 tons)
using a γ of 0.9 and utilizing only the 25 and not the 28, we would have an equivalent
replacement factor of only nine months for the total power consumption of the U.S.
or about ten years for the hydropower.
The second speaker was Mr.

Szilard who continued his discussion from the

previous meeting. He recapped first the three possibilities as he saw them:
1. Unseparated tubealloy — 49 production
2. Enriched tubealloy — 49 production
(a) slow chain reaction
(b) fast chain reaction
3. Enriched tubealloy — no 49 production
On the basis of Morrison’s report, Mr. Szilard felt that the tubealloy should be
utilized more efficiently, i.e., using the 28 and not just the 25. However, since the
power production indicated in item (3) above is a long term proposition, he did not
intend to discuss this phase at great length at this time.
In item (1) above, heat is only a byproduct and not the primary object.
Concerning item (2), Szilard proposed answering the question if an amount A of
49 were invested, how long would it be until 2A of 49 were obtained. In a fast
chain reaction, if two tons of enriched ore containing 10% of 49 were used in the core
surrounded by 28 at the rate of 125,000 kW, then 2A of 49 would be produced in
4-1/2 years. In order to have any practical significance, this time should not be very
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much larger and the readjustment of the material should be easy during the time of
operation.
Considering first the slow chain reaction: assume a η49 (neutrons emitted in
fission/neutrons absorbed) equal to 2.0 - 2.2. Szilard struck out the latter figure
when Fermi stated that the η49 is probably lower than η25 . With η = 2, just as
much 49 is being produced as is being destroyed. In a slow chain reaction this might
be improved by using the fission of 28 mixed with 49 but this is not very effective
in a slow chain reaction because even from large lumps embedded for instance, in
graphite, many neutrons escape, are slowed down, and do not produce fission, Since
the super-plutonium (40-10) formed might be fissionable, there is, say, a fifty-fifty
chance that we can improve η to a ηeff = 2.5.
Considering the fast chain reaction, the situation is more favorable. With a low
concentration of 49 in the mixture with 28, experiments have shown that  might be
raised to 1.2. In addition, there is a high energy tail producing an (n, 2n) reaction
which may give a 2.5% increase in η (based on observations of Turkevich).
(The value η has been defined as the number of neutrons produced/number
absorbed in 49. Szilard uses ν0 defined as the number of neutrons produced/number
of fissionable atoms used up.).
In a fast chain reaction, even if 40-10 is not fissionable, Szilard felt that it is
probably true that the branching ratio for 40-10 moves in a favorable direction, or
that ν0 may be taken as ν0 = 2.5. He felt strongly that there is a very good chance
that Pu-240 is either fissionable in the thermal region or at least that the branching
patio can be counted upon to decrease by a factor of 3 as one goes from thermal
energies to, say, 1 MeV. (Fermi pointed out that the branching ratio of 49 is greater
than that for 25.)
The arguments for this belief is in part based on the rule of thumb (∆M/M) (2∆Z/Z) (see also Morrison in Project Handbook, Chapter IV B 1.1) which gives
a rough indication of the fission threshold and is partly based on the belief that,
with increasing neutron energy, the time required for fission decreases whereas the
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time required for radiative capture remains constant. Szilard therefore assures that,
in a mixture of 238 and Plutonium, ν0 = 1.2 × 2.5 = 3.0 neutrons emitted per
thermally fissionable atom destroyed aad this would mean that there is a net gain of
one thermally fissionable atom per similar atom destroyed.
Referring to item (3), Szilard emphasized one possibility, the burning of Plutonium
in a slow reaction and absorbing the neutrons by bismuth to give Polonium. Of the
heat dissipated when Plutonium is destroyed to give Polonium, only about 3% would
be stored in the Polonium. However, this energy will be available for use free of γ
radiation and could be used for driving airplanes, etc.
In the discussion following, Fermi questioned the estimated value of ν0 = 2.5 on
the ground that it might be too optimistic and pointed out that there is a long range
future in developing the full utilization of 28 and thorium.
Wigner questioned the feasibility of the rotating disc arrangement described at the
previous meeting on the ground of poisoning and questioned the 4-1/2 year investment
return. He felt this would probably be more newly 10 to 20 years by which time, as
Mr. Morrison suggested, we may be burning water.
After discussion, Szilard expressed his view that item 2a is of more immediate
concern than 2b.
Mr.

Morrison suggested that more work should be done on the nuclear

development of thorium because of its greater availability and also suggested
experiments to obtain ν23 and other useful constants.
Mr. Ohlinger explained very briefly an outlined program, of which a copy is
attached hereto. This program for consideration of future trends in the laboratory
work, is a compilation of the independent results of the ”homework” requested at
an earlier meeting.

It has been assembled to give a majority concensus of the

classification of possibilities.
In general, the outline is first divided into three main groups based on the use
to which a pile would be put. Thereafter, the potentialities are subdivided for easy

413

consideration. An open discussion of this outline will occur at the next meeting on
Friday, May 5th.
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I. POWER PRODUCTION (49, 25, or 23 consumed)
A. Purpose of power (in order to determine following)
1. Physical size and mobility
a. Large stationary piles (slow chain reacting or group of fast chain
reacting) such as for central stations
b. Medium mobile (or stationary) piles (slow chain reacting or group of
fast chain reacting) such as for boats or locomotives
c. Small mobile piles (fast chain reacting) such as for planes or cars
2. Power output range, e.g.
a. over 106 kW
b. between 103 - 106 kW
c. less than 103 kW
B. Utilization of Energy
1. Direct.
a. Electrical removal (including thermocouple type)
b. Working fluid absorbing heat directly
 Direct liquid vaporization in pile to operate turbine, etc.
 Gas cooling with or without gas turbine
 Endothermic chemical reactions, e.g., 2H2 O -¿ O2 + 2H2

2. Indirect Energy removed by circulating
a. the metal
b. the moderator (if any)
c. the coolant
II. ISOTOPE PRODUCTION (49 or 23 produced)
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(Since its purpose is well defined and there are no limitations on size, lack of
mobility and power produced, except by the operating potentialities of the design
chosen, these factors are not outlined here.)
A. 49 Production
1. Slow chain reaction (thermal neutrons) using normal U
a. Homogeneous piles moderated with
 P-9
 P-9 + H2 O

b. Heterogeneous piles moderated with
 Graphite - improvement in operation and utilization of present piles

(X and W) and design new improved piles
 P-9 - also require a separation process to recover P-9
 P-9 + H2 O - also require a separation process to recover P-9
 Be
 BeO

c. Cooling accomplished by moving
 the metal (UF6 , molten U, solutions)
 the moderator (P-9, P-9 + H2 O)
 a separate coolant (H2 O, P-9, liquid Bi or Bi-Pb alloy, diphenyl)

2. Enriched piles (enriched with 49 or 25)
a. Slow chain reaction as outlined above
b. Fast chain reaction as outlined below
3. Fast chain reactions (no moderator)
a. Homogeneous piles
b. Heterogeneous piles
c. Cooling accomplished by
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 Liquid Bi as coolant
 Liquid Na as coolant
 Using U molten and moving it

B. 23 Production
1. Reflectors
Comment: If power produced in making 49 can be used practically, this
constitutes another case, – a combination of I and II.
III. RADIATION SOURCE (High levels of intensity)
(Since the purpose is well defined and size, mobility and power produced are
not criteria, they are not outlined here. However, such a pile must be flexible
with the ability to reach high levels of intensity and expose materials or take
measurements with ease. Flux and not total power important here. Most
suitable of piles defined in II to be chosen as experimental machine. Routine
metal removal is not important.)
PROBLEMS COMMON TO ALL PILLS (or a large number of them)
1. Shielding
2. Reflectors
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Appendix H
MUC-LAO-19: Notes on Meeting
of May 5, 1944
9:00 - 10:30, 209-Eckhart
Present: Allison, Szilard, Wigner, Weinberg, Morrison, Creutz, Vernon; Young,
Watson, Ohlinger
Please note a correction in the notes of the last meeting, Friday, April 28th. On
page 2 at the top, the cost of the energy from TNT should read $200.00 per megawatt
hour instead of $2.00.
Mr. Morrison started the discussion by noting the above correction and adding,
at the request of Mr. Wigner, a rough figure for the cost of energy obtained from
tubealloy on a comparative basis. Assuming a cost of $2.00 per pound for tubealloy
and assuming that all the 25 is used, the cost of energy (not mechanical power) would
be about $0.02 per megawatt hour. Mr. Morrison noted that the least expensive
horsepower (based on first cost) for a prime mover is an airplane engine, and the most
expensive is the old fashioned steam locomotive. Mr. Morrison also transmitted the
following information from Mr. Z. Jeffries. At the request of the WPB but with only
limited resources, the U.S. Geological Survey has been carrying on a research into
the abundance of various materials found in pegmatites. Among the many materials
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to be surveyed were tubealloy and thorium. This survey is to be published in one
or two months and copies will undoubtedly be obtained by the laboratory. By word
of mouth, Mr. Jeffries did obtain the following advance information based on the
preliminary results, — a large number of granite bodies were found to contain up to
100 ppm of tubealloy and a small number up to 1,000 ppm.
Mr. Ohlinger carried on the discussion from this point with a review of the outline
appended to the notes for the last meeting. A general discussion followed, of which
the highlights follow.
Mr. Szilard pointed out that in our discussions we must not overlook the peace
time uses of this power. We can only hold the advantage we have obtained in our
development of this process in America if its peace time use is well developed.
Following this vein of thought; Mr. Wigner said that very little has been said
about this phase of the subject but that he had one or two suggestions to offer. By
subjecting the tubealloy bearing granite mentioned by Mr. Jeffries to a bombardment
of neutrons, it might be possible to obtain a mechanical dissolution or porosity such
that nitric acid could readily penetrate the granite to dissolve out more tubealloy.
Another possibility is a polymerization of hydrocarbons to produce synthetic rubber.
Mr. Allison suggested that in projects where the transporation of fuel is a major
problem, such as an exploration of the South Pole or other distant objectives, a small
unit would be very useful. He also repeated the previous suggestion for heating entire
cities since it would also eliminate the terrific nuisance of the usual smoke pall.
Mr. Wigner observed that the age of technical problems is past. The only obvious
needs are probably large scale heating and fuels. Mr. Szilard felt that if there are
no present needs, then new needs should be created. Mr. Morrison suggested stellar
travel.
Mr. Ohlinger brought the discussion back to the outline with the suggestion that
the subject of the direct utilization of energy by electrical removal (IB1a in the outline)
should be dismissed from our thinking for the most part. He mentioned that little has
been forthcoming on this subject outside of the suggestions which accompanied Mr.
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Wigner’s ”homework”. One of these suggestions was to use the active material in the
form of an extremely thin wire surrounded by a metallic tube, with the interspaces
evacuated. The fission products would assume a considerable charge before leaving
the thin wire and by virtue of their kinetic energy would he able to reach the tube
surrounding the wire even if it had a considerable positive charge. For a reasonable
utilization, the potential difference between the tube and wire would have to be of
the order of magnitude of 5,000,000 volts and one could obtain a current of about 50
amperes if the system were run at 500,000 kW. The wire and pipe would have to be
cooled and, although, this is, in a way, the most direct utilization of the energy of
fission, it obviously gets into great technical difficulties, is not very efficient, and does
not furnish the power in a very suitable form, so it is noted only as a curiosity. The
second suggestion was Mr. R. Williamson’s idea to extract the heat from a pile by
using the Peltier effect to convert the energy directly to electrical energy. However,
the thermoelectric constants of tubealloy are not known and one can estimate that the
amount of power obtainable from a pile like that at W would only be of the order of
5,000 kW. One arrangement for accomplishing this would be to have every tubealloy
rod be one electrode of the thermocouple and the graphite the other. The pile would
be run at low power level with reasonably good efficiency despite the heating loss.
Another arrangement would be to subdivide the tubealloy rod into short sections,
cooling one end of each. The cooled end would then form the cold junction, the hot
end, the hot junction. However, utilization of power in such a system is much poorer.
Mr. Szilard asked for the efficiency of such a pile. Mr. Watson suggested that it
would probably not exceed 1% although Mr. Wigner was of the opinion that this
figure was too low. Mr. Szilard thought the subject could bear further investigation,
but Mr. Wigner pointed out that by high temperature operation (700◦ C) it is possible
to obtain efficiencies up to around 65% and so, as long as we would just be making
kilowatt hours, we should abandon all ”crazy schemes” and think seriously about high
temperature operation. ”Goldbergs” are not attractive for power production and Mr.
Allison thought it would be much easier to develop the high temperature operation.
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Items IB1b (2) and (3) in which the working fluid absorbs the heat of reaction
for direct utilization of the energy offered more interesting possibilities according to
Messrs. Wigner, Morrison and Vernon. Mr. Wigner noted one difficulty with the
endothermic chemical reactions, — the gases which have these reactions usually react
chemically with the pile materials.
Mr. Szilard stated that when the supply of petroleum is exhausted, it might be
possible to break down the CO2 molecule and hydrogenate the carbon atom to make
synthetic hydrocarbons for gasoline, etc. Mr. Morrison suggested an alternate of
breaking down the H2 O molecule and carbonizing the hydrogen atom.
Mr. Ohlinger suggested that in order to speed up the discussions at these meetings
and avoid wasting the time of the entire group with detailed discussions of schemes
which do not hold much promise for next year’s program of research work for the
laboratory, assignments should be made of individual pile types for investigation
and group discussion outside of the regular meetings. The individual assigned any
particular type would make it a point to investigate the advantages and disadvantages
of that type as thoroughly as possible and discuss these and any design details with
other members of the group who would be likely to have constructive information on
the subject. Thereby, the problem would be well investigated prior to the meeting at
which it would either be presented in concise form for discussion as a likely problem
for investigation, theoretically or experimentally or both, or else indicated as an
unpromising project which should not be considered at this time. Problems common
to several designs could then be correlated for an experimental program and the more
promising of the designs brought forth by these investigations outside of the regular
scheduled meetings could be discussed by the group as a whole before being turned
over to the various divisions for their detailed development. This proposed policy was
accepted by all and the following assignments made.
Mr. Wigner will lead the investigation into the possibility of power producing
piles utilizing the energy directly by endothermic chemical reactions [Item IB1b (3)].
Mr. Vernon will do the same for gas cooling [Item IB1b (2)]. In order to give them
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time to prepare these assignments, it was suggested that Mr. Young speak at the
next meeting on Wednesday, May 10th on ”Suggested Improvements for a Hanford
Type Pile” and on Friday, May 12th, Mr. Weinberg on ”Conversion Units”.
Mr. Wigner will lead the investigation into the possibility of power producing
piles utilizing the energy directly by endothermic chemical reactions [Item IB1b (3)].
Mr. Vernon will do the same for gas cooling [Item IB1b (2)]. In order to give them
time to prepare these assignments, it was suggested that Mr. Young speak at the
next meeting on Wednesday, May 10th on ”Suggested Improvements for a Hanford
Type Pile” and on Friday, May 12th, Mr. Weinberg on ”Conversion Units”.
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Appendix I
MUC-LAO-30: Notes on Meeting
of July 6, 1944
9:00 - 10:30, Eckhart-209
Present: Messrs. Seitz, Hogness, Allison, Szilard, Young, Vernon, Weinberg,
Smyth, Cooper, Creutz and Ohlinger
Mr. Seitz presented a very interesting report on his visit to the General Electric
Company at Schenectady to discuss turbine systems and in particular, the new
mercury turbine and mercury-vapor processes.
This subject is of interest to us because, first, the mercury ”topping” system is
the most modern and efficient power production system in use today and, second, it
presents something new and different in power production—the use of liquid metal at
high temperatures. The latter is of particular interest to us because of its application
to certain of the potential pile designs involving the use of liquid metal at high
temperatures.
The mercury-vapor process is based on the fact that to increase thermodynamic
efficiency, one should obtain the maximum possible working temperature or rather the
maximum possible differential temperature. The mercury system which is a ”topping”
system would operate between two temperatures T1 and T2 to produce about 1/3 to
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1/2 of the total power while the steam system would operate between temperatures T2
and T3 to produce the balance of the power, about 2/3 to 1/2. Most of the mercuryvapor systems in use now, have the temperature T2 established according to the top
temperature available in their existing steam system, with the mercury system added
to bring the top temperature up to T1 . The engineers at Schenectady would much
prefer to lower the value of T2 and recommend that new systems which are designed
provide for a lower T2 in order to give a better overall efficiency.
The mercury-vapor process is a binary system for producing power from fuel
with greater thermal economy than is possible with the steam cycle alone. The
mercury cycle can also be considered as a steam producer in which, for a given
amount of fuel, nearly as much steam is produced as in a steam cycle and, in addition,
the by-product power from the mercury turbine generator is obtained at nearly the
mechanical equivalent of the thermal energy. The advantage of the mercury over the
water system is that one obtains as high temperature with mercury vapor as with
water vapor at only 1/10 the pressure. One disadvantage of the mercury system
is that the weight and volume of mercury required is larger than that of the water
required in a water system. In a water system operated at about 950◦ F, the entropy
per pound is 1.546 BTU/◦ F/lb and the volume of vapor per pound is 0.3538, while in
a mercury system operating at about 1050 to 1100◦ F, the entropy is 0.1193 and the
volume per pound is 0.3998. From this we see that a mercury system requires about
ten times the working volume of a water system.
The present mercury units are designed to.produce about 20,000 kW in the
mercury system alone and one unit uses about 400,000 pounds of mercury. At the
present market cost of mercury of around $2.00 per pound, this means an outlay of
nearly $1,000,000 for mercury for one unit. The known world deposits of mercury
are large and with a production no greater than the present top yearly production,
as much as 1,000,000 kW in combined mercury-steam plants could be installed each
year. Whereas these binary units might be installed on large ships, at present they
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do not look very practical for smaller power requirements of a mobile nature such as
trains, etc.
Although the figure above shows the utilization of 20 pounds of mercury per kW,
the engineers at Schenectady believe that a minima of 8.25 pounds of mercury/kW
can ultimately be achieved. They have set up as a basis of comparison of efficiencies
a figure based on the total overall efficiency from the heat contained in the coal to
the power at the busbar. On this basis, the maximum theoretical efficiency which
can be obtained according to the first law of thermodynamics is 3,413 BTU/hr/kW.
The best overall efficiency obtained to date in any of the mercury-steam combination
units is 9,175 BTU/hr/kW. The best overall efficiency obtained from an all steam
unit is 10,039 BTU/hr/kW. This means the all steam power plant has an efficiency of
about 33% compared to the first law efficiency noted above while the binary system
has an efficiency of about 37% or 4% gain over the all steam plant. The operating
temperatures for a typical binary unit are: 1050◦ F for the mercury or T1 (this is
saturation temperature) and 925◦ F for the water or T2 (this included the superheat).
Thus the thermodynamic efficiency computed from the temperatures or the second
law efficiency would be about 65%.
The drawing attached illustrates diagrammatically the mercury-vapor process for
the production of power. Referring to the drawing, mercury is vaporized in a boiler
at comparatively low pressure and passed through a mercury turbine which drives a
generator. The vapor from the turbine is exhausted to a condenser boiler where its
latent heat is transferred to water which vaporizes at any desired pressure. The steam
formed in the condenser boiler is superheated in coils located in the gas passages of
the mercury boiler and is then used in steam turbines or for process work.
The top limit to the temperature T1 at present is set by the tubes in the fire
box. These are actually located in the hot coal gases immediately above the fire bed
and have temperatures on the outside surface of around 1200◦ F and on the inside
of around 1075◦ F. Under these operating conditions, it is obvious that the tubes
are easily attacked by the gases and slags in the fire box and must have high creep
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strength as well as stainless properties. The best alloys found to date for these tubes
are the Sicromo series having about 1% each of silicon, chromium and molybdenum
with the balance iron. When better alloys are found, T1 can be raised above 1075◦ F
and the efficiency improved. However, in our type of power production units, we do
not require a furnace and so we can better the value of T1 .
Mercury, as the material for the liquid metal portion of this binary system, is a
good material for this purpose because it dissolves very few metals used in commercial
high temperature practices. In fact, the solubility of all metals in mercury is less than
one part in 104 . One problem, however, with the use of mercury was the difficulty in
obtaining good wetting of the boiler tubes by the mercury. This is especially necessary
in the fire box and condenser boiler to obtain good heat transfer. It was finally found
that by adding 0.5 ppm of titanium and 10 ppm of magnesium as wetting agents,
good heat transfer coefficients could be realized. These wetting agents are probably
effective because they are both good oxygen getters, taking it away from the mercury
and the iron. Mercury probably tends to wear away the iron oxide while the titanium
and magnesium, in taking the oxygen away from the mercury and iron, help the
mercury in cleaning off the scale and keep the tubes clean and easy to wet. When
starting up a unit, it takes about ten minutes before wetting occurs but from that
time on, no further trouble is encountered if about one pound per month of titanium
and possibly a very small amount per year of magnesium is added. Unfortunately,
a small amount of air (about 1 cu ft per hr) leaks into the mercury turbine at the
condensing or low pressure end. This probably accounts for the necessity for the extra
titanium.
In an all steam power plant, an entire corps of chemists is required for constant
water analysis and treating to avoid scaling while the mercury system is practically
self-maintaining except for the small addition of titanium. Therefore, in addition
to the increased efficiency, the mercury system offers a tremendous reduction in
maintenance costs.
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One great worry in a mercury system is the possibility of leaks in view of the
high mercury costs. In the many operating years credited to mercury-vapor binary
systems, only one leak has occurred. This was brought about as a result of the
following process: powdered coal was fed into the top of the fire box while ashes
produced therefrom fell into the bottom of the furnace and were swept out by streams
of water. In the case of the single leak, water splashed up and caused steam which
attacked the tubes with a resulting loss of about one ton of mercury through the leak.
Despite all premonitions, the mercury turbines have caused no trouble and have
operated very successfully without pitting or erosion. The careful design of the turbine
to produce impact incidence of the mercury with the turbine blades at a safe angle
instead of perpendicular appears to be the secret for the successful erosion resistance
of these turbines. They are made with high carbon steel parts instead of stainless
steel as employed in steam turbines. However, at present, the steam turbine is more
efficient than the mercury turbine based on the overall transfer of kinetic energy in
the gas to mechanical energy from the turbine. For a steam turbine the efficiency is
about 85% as compared to only 73% for the mercury turbine. The latter figure is
lower probably because of the tendency of the mercury to condense in the turbine.
Of the heat produced in the furnace, only about 15% is lost to the stack. The
operating pressure for the mercury system is around 125 pounds per sq.in and for the
water system around 1,250 pounds per sq. in.
To consider the application of this information to our problem of designing a new
high temperature pile, we must consider the possibility of a metallic alloy of uranium
or plutonium which can be used molten through a pile which would replace the fire box
in the above process. There are only two systems giving a eutectic with uranium (and
presumably plutonium) with low enough melting points to be practical. These are
the iron-uranium (or plutonium) alloys and the nickel-uranium (or plutonium) alloys.
The latter eutectic melts below 750◦ C and has about 40 atomic percent nickel. The
difficulty with the first named eutectic is that iron dissolves everything which can
possibly be used for the tubes.
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Very little is known about the mercury-uranium alloys which are pyrophoric. More
data should be obtained on the phase diagrams of this alloy and further information
obtained on the nickel-uranium alloys. Of course, the pile need not be operated with
the active metal in molten form circulating through the pile but may have another
metal in liquid form as the coolant with the uranium or enriched material stationary
within the moderator. An example of this type is Mr. Szilard’s bismuth cooled pile.
Another problem in using a uranium eutectic is that the fission products will
be contaminating the liquid metal constantly. At Hanford, this may take only a few
hours. While most of the fission products are good elements and might help as wetting
agents, iodine and the alkaline metals might interfere with the cleansing action.
In the discussion that followed, Mr. Allison pointed out the possibilities of a
bismuth-uranium (or plutonium) eutectic instead of mercury-uranium. The question
was also brought up as to the relation between wetting and heat transfer and it was
pointed out that wetting was very important on a rough surface and less important on
a smooth surface. Mr. Ohlinger questioned the supposed reduction in maintenance in
the binary system and Mr. Seitz agreed that there was no reduction in maintenance in
the present units where the mercury system has been added simply as a ”topping” unit
on an existing steam plant but that any newly designed unit where the temperature
T2 can be reduced, it is to be expected that maintenance will be reduced accordingly.
Mr. Vernon concluded the discussion period with a brief discourse on a high
temperature gas cooled pile in which the hot gases would replace the coal gases
in the furnace in the binary system, the active metal would be located throughout
the moderator in lumps either of uranium carbide or molten uranium contained in
crucibles, say, of beryllium oxide. The furnace in the binary system would then
become essentially a heat exchanger for absorbing the heat carried off by the cooling
gas through the pile. Mr. Cooper’s objection to this scheme was the high gas pressure
that would probably be necessary in order to get sufficient heat capacity in the cooling
gas (probably around 10 atmospheres). Mr. Weinberg’s objection was that such a
pile would be exceedingly large because of the high temperature operation and the
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use of the carbide. In fact, he felt that it would be much larger even than the original
helium-cooled graphite-moderated plant. Mr. Hogness objected to the large amount
of power that would be used up in recirculating the gas because of the low heat
capacity of helium.
At subsequent meetings, Mr. Wigner will discuss his ”pulsating” pile and those
utilizing endothermic chemical reactions and lir. Szilard will discuss his seed piles.
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Appendix J
MUC-WHZ-FF-169: Importance of
24 for Thermal Breeders, April 15,
1945
The recent experiments on the properties of 23 indicate capture of neutrons in 23
leading to the formation 24. That is to say, α23 6= 0. It is therefore desirable to
consider the effect of 24 on the problems of a 23 breeder. If the 24 and 25 which is
produced are kept in the reacting unit indefinitely while the 23 is replenished from
the production in thorium, the amount of 23 produced in thorium per destruction of
23 in the reactor is (in equilibrium) not the usually quoted result:
(1a) η23 − 1−losses to moderators and structural materials, but this result plus
α23
α23
(η24 − 1) +
1 + α23
1 + α23



σf 24
1−
σa24



The relative number of 24 to 23 present is

N24 /N23

σa23
=
σa24

and the 25 is present as
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α23
1 + α23



(η25 − 1)

N25 /N23

σa23
=
σa25



α23
1 + α23



σf 24
1−
σa24

The lower η23 proves to be, the more important for the breeder the terms in (1b)
become. It is quite possible, on the basis of our present knowledge, that they may
increase the rate at which the 23 supply may be accumulated by a factor of 1-1/2 to
2 times that predicted from (1a) alone.
The great significance for 23 breeders of the terms (1b) makes it appear advisable
to add to the program of measurements at the Argonne Laboratory a series of
determinations of the properties of 24 — σf 24 , σa24 , η24 , ν24 . For this purpose it is
necessary to obtain samples containing 24 in moderately high concentration, the
higher the better.
Another possibility is that 24 may be considered as a valuable isotope for fast
reactions. In this case instead of accumulating pure 23 it would be possible to
accumulate a mixture of 23, 24 and 25. The pure 23 produced in the thorium would
be fed back into the breeder, and the gain taken out from the reactor region where
23, 24 and 25 would be extracted. In this system (at equilibrium) the total amount
of 23, 24 and 25 per destruction of 23 is also η23 − 1 − losses +

α23
f (23, 24, 25)
1+α23

where f (23, 24, 25) ≈ 1 and depends on the properties and 23, 24, 25. Whether


σ 24
f (23) = η24 − 1 + 1 − σfa24
(η25 − 1), which is the corresponding function taken from
(1b), is bigger or smaller than f(23,24,25) depends on the details of the properties
of all the elements. For example, however, if σa24 = σf 24 and η24 = 1.5, f(23,24,25)
is very close to 1 but f(23) = 0.5. That is to say, in this case the possible 23 + 24
production is significantly greater than the possible 23 production. The possibility of
mixed 23 and 24 production makes it again important to find out about the properties
of 24 not only in the thermal region but also for fast reaction.
The measurements of the properties of 24 which are suggested here are exceedingly
difficult with the amounts and concentrations currently available. Probably only
the fission cross-section can be known until there are larger quantities and higher
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concentrations. In measuring the absorption cross-section at the present time the
experimental inaccuracies are of the same magnitude as the result to be expected.
Other measurements seem to be even less promising. The main purpose of this note
is to point out the importance of obtaining good samples of 24 for future work. η23
does not tell the whole story of the thermal breeder. Eventually the thermal breeder
may stand or fall according to the properties of 24.
F.L. Friedman
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Appendix K
MUC-EPW-134: Preliminary
Calculations on a Breeder with
Circulating Uranium, May 17, 1945
E.P. Wigner, A.M. Weinberg and G. Young
The following constitutes our present ideas on the breeder which, no need to say,
are very preliminary and which we hope will undergo considerable changes before
they will crystallize. Under ordinary conditions we would not report on work which
is still as much in flux as the present one is. However, we had to shift our attention,
at least temporarily, to another subject and we want to record for this reason the
results obtained so far.
A. General Considerations.—The breeder is an arrangement in which 23 undergoes
fission and the neutrons produced thereby are absorbed by thorium. When this
thorium decays it produces again 23 via Pa. Since the η of 23 is, according
to Anderson and May, 2.37 the net increase in the k number of neutrons per 23
destroyed is 1.37. If all these neutrons ware absorbed in thorium, we would obtain
1.37 23 atoms per 23 destroyed. It is well to remember, however, that if only as
many as 15% of the 2.37 neutrons emitted are lost by escape from the system or
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parasitic absorption by other materials or otherwise, the efficiency of the breeder
goes down to 1 and no increase in the amount of 23 results.
Another point that is important is the power to product ratio of such a breeder.
Let us assume that the total losses in neutrons amount to only 7-1/2%. In this
case 1.19 atoms of 23 are produced per 23 atom destroyed. Thus the net gain in
23 is 0.19 atoms per 23 atoms destroyed or per 0.89 atoms 23 undergoing fission.
As a result, the power output per net production is about five times greater than
in the conventional piles.
During wartime it might possibly be more important to operate the systems to
be described as converters of 49 to 23. In this case the above considerations do
not hold necessarily and the efficiency does not have the paramount importance
which it will be given in the following pages. If we disregard this fact, the main
importance of the breeders is that they eventually permit the utilization of all
the natural thorium. If one wants to make use of the full amount of energy one
will have to construct a system in which the power generated by the breeder is
utilized, i.e., in which the breeder acts not only as a producer of 23 but also as
a power source. This will demand high temperature operation of the breeder. If
only the energy of the 23 produced by the breeder is utilized, the energy of at
least 1/1.19 ≈ 84% of the Th is wasted if we adopt the numbers of the preceding
example.
An enumeration of the losses follows:
1. Delayed neutrons which may be released outside the pile.
2. Absorption by materials present in the chain reacting part, such as the
moderator and anion in case of solution, Bi and tubing in case of a second
system to be described below.
3. Absorption by fission and corrosion products in pile.
4. Absorption by tank.
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5. Escape in wrong direction.
6. Absorption by 24 formed.
7. Absorption by Pa.
8. Absorption by fission and corrosion products in reflector.
9. Absorption by moderator and coolant in reflector.
10. Escape from reflectors, particularly of neutrons formed by fission in reflector.
11. Losses in chemical separations.
It may be well to introduce, at this point, the notion of the efficiency of the
breeder. This is the net gain in the number of 23 atoms per 23 atoms destroyed.
In the ideal case, it is 37%, in the example discussed above only 19%.
It will be seen in the next section that the arrangements which we think are most
promising consist of essentially two parts: a chain reacting unit containing the 23
(the ”pile”) and a reflector containing all or most of the thorium. If all the thorium
is contained in the reflector only 1/2.37 = 42% of the neutrons will be absorbed
in the pile and 58% will be absorbed in the reflector. Hence a relative neutron
loss ` inside the pile entails the loss of the fraction 0.42` of all the neutrons. A
relative neutron loss in the reflector gives a loss of the fraction 0.58` of all the
neutrons. The loss in ”efficiency” caused by some impurity which absorbs in the
pile 0.01 times as many neutrons as the 23 is 1%, the loss in efficiency caused by
an impurity which absorbs in the reflector 1% of all the escape neutrons is 1.37%.
A loss of 1% of all the neutrons entails a loss of 2.37% in the efficiency. All losses
must be subtracted from the original 37% efficiency.
The present report assumes that the active material in the pile is 23 because only
this is known to have an considerably in excess of 2. It is worth noting, however,
that 49 is an equally or even more suitable material for the same purpose if 40 is
slow neutron fissionable. According to Miss K. Way’s calculations, this should be
the case. Assuming that the properties of 40 are the same as those of 49—which
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is perhaps a somewhat optimistic assumption—the number of fissionable atoms
formed per 49 consumed is η + (α − 1)/α = 2.05 + 0.33 = 2.38, i.e., just the same
as for 23. In spite of this, under the above assumption, 49 would be a somewhat
more suitable material for the breeder than 23 because of its larger total cross
section which would reduce the amounts needed and the concentrations necessary
by the ratio of the cross sections, i.e. 630/1050 = 0.6. Furthermore, a loss of p
percent of all the neutrons would reduce the efficiency in the case of Pu only to
η(1 − p) − 1 − 1/α = 0.35 − 2.05p while the same loss would give, in the case of
23, an efficiency of η(1 − p) − 2 = 0.37 − 2.37p. This calculation assumes that
24 is not slow neutron fissionable. The possibility of using 49 is presented also
because there may be a certain experimental error in the η of 23, as determined
by Anderson and May.
B. Brief Description of the Arrangements Considered.—The general arrangement
which at present appears most attractive consists of a relatively small pile proper
which contains heavy water as moderator and all the 23 that is added to the
system. The heavy water and the 23 are circulated to the outside of the system,
cooled, stripped of the fission and decomposition gases and freed of the fission
products outside. The chain reacting part is surrounded by the reflector. This
also consists essentially of heavy water and contains most or all of the thorium. To
give an idea we include a sketch at this point, although the detailed calculations
will follow later on. The chain reacting unit has a volume of about 400 liters and
contains of the order of 3 kg of 23. The thickness of the reflector is about 50 cm
and contains about equal weights of thorium and heavy water. The pile is to be
operated at 100,000 to 200,000 kW.
The first possibility (Fig. 1) envisages the uranium dissolved in the heavy water
in the form of a salt, such as the nitrate, sulphate or fluoride. This solution is
pumped into the pile through the neck which is on the bottom side and leaves
the pile through the neck on the top side. The circulation rate is about 500 liters
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per second. The solution enters a heat exchanger and a degasser after it left the
pile, whence it re-enters the pile again. The pile is surrounded by the thorium
which is in the form of a slurry containing about one gram of ThO2 per cm3 of
heavy water. If the wall of the tank separating the uranium solution from the
thorium slurry is of a low absorbing material such as Be, Pb, Bi, or perhaps Cb,
the neutron absorption of the tank may be sufficiently low. If, however, the tank
has to be made out of a more absorbing material it may be necessary to back this
up with a higher concentration of thorium, possibly in the form of small spheres
(”beebees”), in order to reduce the thermal neutron intensity in that region.
The second arrangement shown (Fig. 2) contains the uranium dissolved in Bi,
about 1 gm to 25 cm3 . This bismuth is circulated in suitable tubes and is cooled
and freed of fission gases outside the pile. The shape of the pile is so chosen that
the neutron escape at the ends shall be about 1% of the total neutron escape
because this part of the neutrons will be lost. It may be possible to achieve
the same purpose by another shape of the pile more similar to that in Fig. 1.
This would involve, however, a more complicated inner structure of the pile, The
tubes containing the bismuth are surrounded by heavy water which also has to
be recirculated, degassed and cooled outside the pile.
The interest in UF6 as a pile material has been raised on this project by H. Brown
and we are indebted to him for a discussion on both this and other problems. UF6
could be used instead of metallic U in the pile of Fig. 2. The Bi would be replaced
in this case by a fluorocarbon.
The first arrangement is much simpler than the second one and has a very much
greater production rate, but the power which it furnishes cannot be well utilized
because the temperature at which the pile can be operated is quite restricted.
The greatest unsolved problem is that of the degassing of the heavy water without
increasing the holdup outside the pile unduly. The second system is much more
complicated and involves many serious problems among which we believe that a
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suitable choice of the pipes and the separation of the fission products from the Bi
solution is most serious. Its production rate is much lower than that of the first pile
but it furnishes the energy at a sufficiently high temperature for purposes of power
production. If UF6 is used in a fluorocarbon instead of U in Bi, the complications
are much decreased but so would be the temperature of operation. The problems
of chemical separation would be greatly alleviated but one would have to cope with
the effects of radiation on the fluorocarbons. According to arguments presented
by Burton and Franck, one may expect a somewhat more favorable situation in
case of unsaturated ringlike structures, if these are sufficiently stable chemically,
than in case of saturated fluorocarbons.
C. Reasons for the Arrangements Discussed.—The piles as described above assume
pumping of the uranium solution by some suitable pump. Instead of this the
solution can be pushed alternately into and out of the pile and cooled and degassed
while it is outside (pulsating pile).
The most definite reason for using the 23 in solution is the need for eliminating
the Xe-135. If we assume that altogether 5 kg of 23 are in the system and that
it operates at 100,000 kW, 100 gm of 23 undergoes fission every day, the amount
of Xe produced per day is 3.3 gm. If this were permitted to remain in the system
as long as one day its cross section would be five times greater than that of all
23 present, In order to reduce this cross section to 1% of the cross section of the
23, one has to eliminate the Xe formed every 5 minutes. This is possible only if
the Xe can be flushed out of the system at frequent intervals and eliminates the
possibility of using the 23 in a solid form. If the Xe is flushed out at very frequent
intervals one gains an additional substantial elimination of other fission products
which might otherwise poison the pile.
The above conclusion that the 23 must be used in a non-solid form is not absolute.
The maximum loss of efficiency if all the Xe-135 is left in the pile is 5.8% and
although the permissible loss must be well below 37% a loss of 5.8% could be
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tolerated if all the other losses can be kept at a minimum. However, circulating the
23 has many other advantages; particularly from the point of view of heat transfer
and it is not evident that using it in a solid form will facilitate the elimination of
the other losses. We feel, therefore, that the conclusion to use the 23 in a non-solid
form is a valid one. The only other possibility to eliminate the Xe-135 loss which
we realized is to operate in such a way that practically all neutrons be absorbed
at higher energies (by resonance absorption) before they reach such energies at
which the Xe-135 cross section is large.
The Xe-135 could be removed from the 23 inside the pile by letting a gas bubble
through the liquid which contains the 23. This might be a practical possibility
if the 23 is dissolved in Bi. We felt, however, that such an arrangement would
introduce unnecessary complications and since it has great advantages to remove
the 23 from the pile periodically for cooling and for separating the other fission
products, we decided against it. This fixed one of the most important properties
of the piles which were described above, that of circulating the 23 to the outside
of the pile. Such a circulation of course increases the amount of 23 necessary for
the pile but greatly facilitates the energy transfer from the 23 to the outside.
It will be seen that considerable difficulty is caused by the need of inserting a tank
between pile proper and reflector because the tank is likely to absorb neutrons. It
would be advantageous, therefore to place the thorium, or at least most of it, to
the inside of the pile. This would result in the use of a synthetic ”natural uranium”
which would give a pile with a very small multiplication factor, an arrangement
which would greatly help in decreasing the neutron losses. There is no question
that there is great merit in this point of view. If we reduce the multiplication
constant (which is nearly 2.37 in the pile as described above) to 1.05, only 5%
of all the neutrons escape from the pile proper and only these have a chance of
being absorbed by the tank. However, the diameter of the pile will be increased
in this way to about 3 m and its volume to 14 m3. The amount of 23 required for
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the pile proper would be of the order of 70 kg under these conditions. In order
to keep the amount of 23 needed for the pile at a relatively low levels we have
decided therefore to separate the chain reacting part from the reflector where the
production of the 23 takes place. It might be advisable to add some thorium to
the pile proper but this should be kept at such a level that the multiplication
constant does not decrease below about 1.5. If this is done the absorption by
the thorium within the pile proper will be about 60% of the absorption of the 23
and its amount in the pile will be about 60 times the amount of the 23. Such
an arrangement has the advantage that the number of neutrons which have to
leave the pile is reduced by a factor of almost 3 and the losses in the tank and
outside will be diminished by the same factor. If the pile proper contains the 23
in a solution in heavy water we have decided against this possibility because the
thorium could be present only in the form of a slurry which would aggravate the
pumping problems and the problems of chemical separation.
The next question is the question of the moderator. In this respect we believe that
the choice of heavy water is rather unique. If we want the number of neutrons
absorbed in the moderator to be only 1% of the neutrons absorbed by the 23, the
volume g of the different moderators associated with 1 gm of 23 is given in the
following table:
Among these C is undesirable because the radius of the pile would amount to
about 60 cm, assuming a multiplication constant of 2.37 and a migration area
corresponding to the age alone (i.e.

assuming zero diffusion length for the

thermals). Such a pile would contain far too much 23. Water is undesirable
because the size of the pile would become too small so that one would run into
heat extraction difficulties. If the 23 is in the pile as short a time as 1/10 sec
and if one wants a power output of 100,000 kW for 5 kg 23, the temperature
increase is the water would amount to 20,000 x 1/10/33 = 600◦ C. Be in itself is
not much more suitable than graphite and Bi cannot be seriously considered as a
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moderator. This leaves D2 O as a rather unique choice. On the other hand, it is
possible for the pile to contain substantial amounts of Bi and Be, in addition to
the D2 O which has to do the bulk of the moderation.
Heavy water as a moderator gives considerable leeway for the concentration in
which 23 can be used. The importance of this is the following: If we use a high
concentration of 23 only a relatively small fraction of all the neutrons will reach
thermal energies and many of them will be absorbed at resonance above thermal
energies. There is not much reason to believe that the η is absolutely constant
even in the very small energy region which extends from ordinary thermal energies
to about 1 volt and if it should turn out that η increases with increasing energy
it may constitute a considerable advantage to go to high concentrations and high
resonance absorption. On the other hand, if it should turn out that η decreases
with increasing energy of the neutrons, it would be best to keep the concentration
of 23 in heavy water as low as possible. This question will be taken up again in
section D.
It is well known that if the uranium is dissolved in water the fission causes a very
large amount of disintegration. We estimate from data of Burton and Allen (Γ =
0.25) that such a pile operating at 100,000 kW would give 220 liters NTP hydrogen
oxygen mixture per second. While the gases have the desirable effect that they
carry with themselves the Xe and some other fission products when they leave the
liquid, the disengagement of such amounts of gas causes considerable trouble even
if it is done at relatively high pressures. There is considerable advantage therefore
to have the 23 separated from the heavy water which can be done most simply by
dissolving it in Bi and keeping the Bi separated from the heavy water by tubes
of a non-absorbing material or thorium. This leads us to the two systems which
we have considered most seriously and which will be described more closely in the
next section.
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There is one other remark that ought to be made in this connection. At the
concentrations or 23 which reduce the loss due to absorption by the moderator to
the order of 1% a considerable number of neutrons will be absorbed before they
reach thermal energies. If both the moderator and the 23 obeyed the 1/v law this
would not change the ratio of the neutrons absorbed by the moderator. There
is considerable indication, however, that the absorption of the 23 at resonance
energies is considerably greater than would correspond to the tail of the 1/v
absorption extrapolated from thermal energies. Mr. Dancoff estimates on the
R
basis of experiments carried out in the Argonne Laboratory that the σa dE/E
is at least twice greater than it would be if 23 followed the 1/v law. As a result,
the fraction of neutrons which are absorbed by the moderator will be about half
as great for the neutrons absorbed at resonance than for the neutrons absorbed
at thermal energies. Another effect which this resonance absorption has comes
in in the calculation of the Laplacian which is increased by this effect. Since the
R
ratio of the actual σdE/E to the value which is obtained by extrapolating the
1/v law is not known the calculations will be carried out under three different
assumptions, viz, that that ratio is α = 1, 2, 4.
D. Critical Size.—The critical sizes for pure fissionable material have been calculated
by Christy and Wheeler (CP-499), by Weinberg, and more recently these
calculations have been extended by Nordheim.
It turns out that the two group theory and the three group theory both give results
which are substantially below those given by Fermi’s theory. The results of the
three group theory are just about midway between those of the two group theory
and the Fermi theory. Plass calculated the corrections to the Fermi theory and
in the case of heavy water they turned out to be quite negligible, as was already
indicated by Weinberg’s work.
Our calculation includes the effect of the resonance absorption for which the
R
σdE/E was estimated in the following way. The value of σa was taken to be
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√
(98α)/ E which gives for α = 1 the correct value for thermal energy. However,
three values of α were used, viz., α = 1, 2, 4, as explained before, The integration
was extended from 2kT to ∞ giving 900α. Evidently these assumptions are quite
arbitrary but should give the right order of magnitude. The average energy of the
neutrons in the pile will no doubt be considerably higher than 0.05 eV, but the
slowing down just above the thermal region will be considerably slower than the
formula for the resonance absorption implies. These two effects give corrections
of opposite sign, The following table gives the probability for escaping resonance
for g = 100, 200, 300, 400 cm3 heavy water per gram 23.
The Laplacians L were then calculated by Mr. Wilkins on the basis of the formula
developed by Messrs. Friedman and Weinberg

ks

χt2
χt2 − L


+ kf = exp(−Lτ )

and his calculation will be given in more detail elsewhere. In this, ks + kf = k
is the multiplication constant; ks is the number of neutrons produced per slow
neutron absorbed, multiplied with the fraction p of neutrons which are thermal
when absorbed; kf is the number of neutrons produced per fast neutron absorbed,
multiplied with the probability 1 − p of resonance absorption. In our case ks =
pf ηs ≈ pη; kf = (1 − p)ηf .The results with Fermi’s theory are given in
It was assumed in the calculation that the age τ of fission neutrons in heavy
water is 115 cm2 , the diffusion mean free path 2.4 cm. This gave 50, 100, 150 and
200 cm2 for the square of the thermal diffusion length 1/χt2 for the four different
g. The radii R of a bare critical sphere are also given in Table III. According
to calculations of Mrs. Monk and Mr. Friedman, which also will be reported
elsewhere, it seems reasonable to subtract 8 cm from the radius in case of a ThO2
slurry reflector. This gives the amounts of 23 necessary for the pile which are
given in Table III in kg.
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The advantage of using a high concentration lies in the smaller losses of neutrons
to the moderator, etc. On the other hand, a low concentration of 23 would give
increased bulk to the system and thus facilitates a higher production rate. If
α should be large there is an increased advantage in using high concentrations
because the neutron losses to the moderator are further reduced by the resonance
absorption. It is seen from Table III that the holdup of 23 within the pile is quite
small. There is of course a holdup outside the pile.
If it should be necessary to use the cylindrical arrangement given in Fig. 2, the
height of the cylinder will have to be chosen in such a way that the escape toward
the two ends of the cylinder be about 1%. This gives the following equation for
the height H of the cylinder in terms of its radius R
π2
1
=
2
H
100



2.405
R

2

Calculating the volume from this equation it appeari that it is 4.3 times greater
than the volume of the sphere considered in Table III. This would necessitate a
four times greater holdup in 23 which can be reduced, however, by reducing the
diameter of the tubes containing the 23 solution toward the two ends of the pile.
The lattice spacing is not a critical quantity in the second arrangement. Of
course, the total amounts of heavy water, beryllium, and solvent must be kept in
such limits as can be obtained from Table I. In addition, one will not want the
neutron density in the moderator to exceed substantially the neutron density in
the solution. If χr0 < 1, the neutron density at the tube will be less than 10%
higher than the average neutron density in the tube. Since χ = 0.2 for both the Bi
and the fluorocarbon solution of Table I, this only gives r0 < 5 cm. The ratio of
the neutron density difference between surface of cell and surface of tube, divided
by the density at the tube is
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N σao r02
2D



rs2
rs 1
ln −
2
2
rs − r0 r0 2



In this N σao = 0.048/cm for the solutions of Table I, D = 0.8 cm is one third of
the diffusion mean free path, rs is the cell radius. The above ratio will be under
the conditions of Table I, smaller than 0.1 if r0 ¡ 3.5 cm.
E. Holdup Outside the Pile.—The holdup outside the pile depends to a large extent
on the diameter of the tubes in which the solution passes through the heat
exchanger, the temperature difference between coolant and the temperature of
the 23 solution, holdup in the pumps and, particularly in case of the arrangement
of Fig. 1, on the time necessary for degassing. No calculations are available on
these points at present but one can estimate that the solution will spend about
2 sec outside the pile before it re-enters it. Under this assumption the power
output depends solely on the holdup and the temperature difference by which the
solution is cooled down. It is given by

P =

Cs T
kW
t kgr holdup

In this Cs is the heat capacity of the solvent per gram of 23 dissolved in it (cf.
Table I), t is the time of holdup outside the pile, and T the temperature difference
between the solution as it leaves and re-enters the pile. In case of pile of Fig. 1, t
= 2 sec, T = 50◦ C, g = 100, this gives P = 10,000 kW/kg, g = 200, P = 20,000
kW/kg.
One may consider flashing the liquid in order to achieve some cooling by
evaporation as well as elimination of the fission gases. Messrs. Newel and Ginns
proposed in some other connection to let the solution flow down on the inside of a
cooled tube in a thin sheet and one could maintain sufficiently low pressure inside
the tubes to permit evaporation and release of the bulk of the decomposition gases.
These would carry the Xe and some other fission products with themselves and also
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a considerable amount of heat in the form of heat of vaporization. The advantage
of this arrangement is that it unites the elimination of the decomposition gases
with some cooling and also that the pressure drop in such a system is quite small.
Considerations have not progressed sufficiently to know how large the saving in
the holdup would be if this arrangement is used.
A possibility which might be applied to the arrangement of Fig. 2 is that of
pulsating it. This avoids the holdup in the pump and also the need of pumping
the radioactive solution. Figures for the theoretical efficiency of this cooling are
given in Table IV in kW per gm holdup outside the pile. It was assumed that
the temperature difference between coolant and 23 solution of the pile is 50◦ and
that the temperature difference between the coolant and the tube of the heat
exchanger is made negligible by vigorous circulation of the coolant and finning of
the heat exchanger tubes. The pressure difference between the active pile and the
end of the tubes alternates between 0.6 and -0.6 atmospheres in such a way as
to give a velocity of 700 cm/sec in the tubes. The holdup in the degasser is not
taken into account in the figures in Table IV.
The figures given for the power assume that the pressure adjustment at the end
of the tubes can be carried out instantaneously. The bracketed figures assume an
adjustment time of 0.1 sec. It was further assumed that the tubes can be entirely
emptied on the ”in” cycle. Assuming that the meniscus has to stay at least 10 cm
away from the pile tank further reduces the power holdup by 20% to 5% for tube
lengths of 50 cm to 200 cm. The advantage of longer tubes is, obviously, that they
permit a greater total production, although with a somewhat decreasing efficiency.
The advantage of wide tubes is the same and a greater mechanical simplicity.
F. Estimate of the Losses—It will be seen that, on the whole, the losses from the
different sources enumerated under A become smaller as the production rate of
the pile is diminished. It appears quite natural that the losses in a pile with a high
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power output are greater than if all attention can be given to a greater efficiency.
We proceed with the discussion of the eleven separate points given under A.
(1) The number of delayed neutrons is about 0.8% in 25, Although its amount
is not known for 23, Anderson found indications that it is greater for this
element. As pointed out under section A, a loss of 1% of neutrons decreases
the efficiency by 2.37%. Since all the delayed periods, except perhaps the
first one, are long compared with the time of uninterrupted sojourn of the
23 within the pile, the number of delayed neutrons emitted outside the pile
will be equal to the holdup outside the pile divided by the total amount of
23 present. From this point of view it is indeed advantageous to have a large
pile and a very small holdup outside.
The flash cooling system may form an exception under this rule be cause it
may be possible to arrange it in such a way that most of the neutrons still
would be utilized. Similarly it may be possible to achieve this at least partially
in the pulsating system. In spite of this there will be a loss of efficiency from
delayed neutrons in every system in which the uranium is circulated at the
outside. This constitutes a rather serious drawback of these systems since the
loss in efficiency from this source is not very much smaller than that caused
by the Xe-135 would be.
(2) The absorption by the moderator has been discussed in detail before. It will
amount to about 1% for the pile of Fig. 1 and one will be quite lucky if it is
as little as 2% in the second case. However, in the first case the absorption
by the anion also has to be taken into consideration. If the uranium is used
in the form of a nitrate the nitrogen of the nitrate alone will give a loss of
1/2%. In addition to this it appears likely that further nitric acid has to be
added to the system in order to keep the uranium in solution in spite of the
presence of the hydrogen peroxide. The situation would be very much better
if N-15 were available for use both in the nitrate and the nitric acid.
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The reason that we gave the nitrate precedence over other salts is that we
expect it to reduce the corrosion of the walls and also because it does not give
products under radiation which may gum the system. The sulfate which has
negligible absorption may precipitate sulphur although it is not clear that this
cannot be avoided by the addition of peroxide. The parasitic absorption of the
fluoride, the use of which was proposed by Allen, is also negligible but there is
a strong opinion (Hiskey) that it will be difficult to avoid precipitation of the
peroxide at such concentrations of the hydrofluoric acid which are tolerable
from the point of view of corrosion. If the uranium is used in the form of a
solution in Bi or fluorocarbons it may be necessary to eliminate the products
of nuclear reactions of these substances along with the fission products.
(3) The estimate of the poison by the fission products is probably the most
difficult at present. According to Miss Way only the Sm is a serious poison
among the stable fission products. Inasmuch as the yield of this is probably
1.6% its elimination is very important and may demand an average interval of
one day between purifications. In order that this be permissible, it is necessary
that the purification be carried out with a loss of about 0.1% of the 23.
The above applies to the stable fission products. There may be, however,
numerous radioactive fission products (in addition to the Xe-135) which have
large cross sections. Their effect has been estimated by Miss Way on the
basis of a statistics of the cross sections and she finds that those with an odd
number of neutrons are most dangerous. All elements may give substantial
contributions, the lifetime of which is an hour or more Only those with a
lifetime of more than a day have been surveyed to date and Miss Way estimates
that they may cause a loss in efficiency of 3.5% if the purification is carried
out once a day. If this is done it is unlikely that the corrosion products will
contribute much to the poisoning.
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Probably the most efficient way of eliminating the fission products is by the
solvent extraction method. We are much indebted to Mr. Tepe for discussing
this system with us. The solvent extraction method would permit a continuous
operation and cause a holdup of only about one hour in the column. As a
result it would appear that such a purification increases the amount of 23
required by only about 4%. However, it is likely that it will be impossible to
use the solution of uranium in heavy water directly in the column because the
deuterium will exchange with the hydrogen of the solvent. For this reason it
will be necessary to separate first the uranium salt from the heavy water which
may be a more time consuming operation than the operation of the column
itself and consequently increase the holdup more than the fission product
separation itself does.
If the uranium is used in a solution in Bi the problem of chemical separation
is even graver. Although many methods were discussed no really promising
one turned up so far. One must remember that after the chemical separation
has been carried out the uranium must presumably be reduced again to the
metallic form. It is unlikely that this operation can be carried out with as
small a loss as would be necessary for the successful operation of the breeder.
This is the most serious drawback of the Bi system that has turned up yet. On
the other hand; if the uranium is dissolved as a hexafluoride in fluorocarbons
the problem of separation may be much smaller. As pointed out by Brown
and Anderson, distillation may lead to the goal and the extraction column also
could be used because reconversion to the fluoride can probably be handled
with relatively great efficiency.
The Xe-135 occupies a particular position. Let us first consider the case
in which the uranium is dissolved in heavy water. In this case there is a
considerable amount of water decomposition and the hydrogen and oxygen
generated must be eliminated from the system every second. Even so, the
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equilibrium pressure of H2 and O2 will amount to a dozen atmospheres.
During the degassing the hydrogen and oxygen will leave the water either
in form of bubbles or through the surface. In both cases the fraction of Xe
eliminated will be just about as great as the fraction of hydrogen and oxygen
eliminated because the solubility of Xe is only insignificantly higher than the
solubility of hydrogen and oxygen and because the diffusion of Xe to the
surfaces will not be much slower than the diffusion of the oxygen. As a result,
the amount of Xe will be reduced by a factor of the order of 1/2 every second
and the amount present will be that generated during a few seconds only.
Since it is necessary to eliminate the Xe only about every couple of minutes,
it is evident that the need of elimination of the hydrogen and oxygen will
cause in this system an about 100 times better elimination of the Xe than is
necessary. Even if it should prove feasible to reduce the gas evolution to 1/10
or even 1/30 by introducing some suitable catalyzer into the system which
recombines most of the hydrogen and oxygen in the water the elimination of
the Xe would be quite satisfactory.
For a quantitative assessment of the problem let us assume that the mean
life of the 23 in the pile is t̄. This is the amount of 23 present, divided by
the consumption rate and is for 100,000 kW power rate of the order of 6
kg/100 gm/day = 60 days. Assuming a fission yield of 5% for the Xe-135,
the production rate of Xe-135 will be 0.05 N/t̄ where N is the number of 23
atoms. The total number of Xe-135 atoms in the system will be 0.05 N te /t̄
where te is the average time after which the Xe is eliminated. The poisoning
due to this amount is N te σXe /t̄N σu and this will be less than 1% if

te < 0.2

σu
t̄ = 4 × 10−5 t̄
σXe

For t̄ = 60 days this gives te ≈ 3 min.
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The situation is somewhat different if the uranium is dissolved in bismuth
or a fluorocarbon. In the former case at least it will be necessary to sweep
out the Xe by bubbling some gas through the bismuth periodically. This
has to be done, as pointed out before, every five minutes at least and will
cause some additional holdup, the magnitude of which will depend on the
size of the bubbles sweeping through the liquid and the area over which the
solution is spread out during this operation. It does not appear, however,
that the increase in holdup necessitated by this operation will go beyond a
few percent.
(4) The absorption by the tank is principally determined by the material of the
tank. If this absorption is low it will be quite possible to have the slurry of
thorium which is outside the tank in immediate contact with the tank, Mr.
Friedman and Mrs. Monk have calculated this effect. In the region of interest,
their results can be approximated by the formula
σat `t
√
σas τ
for the fraction of neutrons entering the reflector which are absorbed by the
tank. In this, σat is the absorption cross section of the tank per cm3 , `t the
thickness of the tank, σas the absorption cross section of the slurry per cm3 ,
r= 115 cm2 is the ”age” in the reflectors. We assume a slurry which contains
1 gr Th per cm3 which gives σas = 0.016.
The loss of efficiency is obtained by multiplying the above expression by 1.37.
It is only 1% for 1.5 mm thick Al tank (σat = 0.014) and correspondingly less
for a tank out of lead or beryllium or for some backing of the aluminum made
out of beryllium.
If the tank has to be made out of a strongly absorbing material, it will be
necessary to back it up with a layer of thorium in a more highly concentrated
form (cf. Fig. 3). Beebees of metallic thorium which are cooled by heavy
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water circulated through them may be a suitable form. This arrangement has
two effects: first the thorium reduces the density of the thermal neutrons in
the neighborhood of the tank to such a level that the ratio of the thermal
neutrons which are absorbed by the tank to the number of thermal neutrons
which leave the pile toward the reflector is given by the formula
r

3σb
σat `t
σab

In this σb is the scattering cross section in the backing per cm3 of the backing,
σab is the absorption cross section of it, again per cm3 . One calculates that
if the backing consists of 80% metallic Th and 20 volume percent of heavy
water (σab = 0.13, σb = 0.33) the absorption of thermal neutrons by a 1.2
mm steel tank (σat = 0.22) would give a loss in efficiency of about 1.5% if
one assumes that 1/2 of all neutrons escape as thermal. A reinforcing of the
tank by a few mm aluminum would hardly add anything to this. Behind the
backing there must be of course further heavy water containing thorium to
slow down and absorb the neutrons which leave the tank at higher energies.
It is easy to see, along the same lines as used in the argument by Friedman
and Monk, that the fraction
√
χb σat `t τ
χb σas Chχb `b + χs σab Shχb `b
of these neutrons will be absorbed by the tank. In this formula, as before, s
and b refer to slurry and backing, σa , χ, and ` are absorption cross section per
cm3 , reciprocal diffusion length and thickness of the corresponding region. For
the above backing, containing 80 volume percent Th, 20 D2 O, χb ˜0.35, and
the above slurry, containing 1 gr/cm3 Th χs = 0.14, As a result, if the backing
has a thickness of about 5 or 6 cm the absorption of these neutrons is also
quite small (¡ 1/2%). Evidently the introduction of the backing will somewhat
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reduce the efficiency of the reflector. However, the 8 cm thickness which was
used in the previous calculations already takes this effect into consideration.
Another point that might be mentioned is that the resonance absorption given
in Table II also will serve to reduce the losses due to the tank by the factors
given in that Table.
(5) The shape of the tank as given in Fig. 1 or 2 is already designed to reduce
the escape from the tank in the directions in which there is no reflector and
it is sufficient to repeat that the extremely elongated shape given in Fig. 2
may not be necessary if the tubes toward the two ends of the tank are made
thinner than at the center, thus reducing the multiplication constant in that
region. This will, of course, cause a slight increase in the diameter of the tank
but will still very substantially reduce the amount of uranium in the pile,
(6) The effect of the absorption by the 24 can be considered under the assumption
that the 24 itself is not fissionable. In this case every atom 24 will eventually be
transformed into 25 so that in equilibrium there appears to be a loss of 12% in
efficiency due to the absorption by the 24 because in equilibrium, 0.12 as many
neutrons are absorbed by 24 than by the 23. Of course if the cross section
of the 24 is very small this equilibrium will be reached only after a very long
time and until this happens the loss in efficiency is correspondingly smaller.
However, even when equilibrium has been reached the loss in efficiency will
be very much smaller than the 12% quoted because the absorption leads to
a fissionable element 25 and the loss in efficiency is caused only by the fact
that the 25 has a smaller η than the 23. When the absorption of 25 has come
to an equilibrium one can consider the total effect in the following way. A
25 is formed by the absorption of two neutrons from the 24 and gives η25
new neutrons. If we denote, as in Section A, the fraction of neutrons which
survive all losses by 1 - p, the loss due to the absorption of 24 will be given
at equilibrium by (2)(0.12) - (0.12)η25 (1 - p) = (0.25p) - 0.01. One sees that
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this absorption will not cause a considerable decrease in efficiency. Strictly
speaking, one should further consider the formation of 26 from the 25, but
this evidently will not cause any major effect.
(7) The absorption by the Pa is a more serious effect. This element is, according
to Miss Way, probably not fissionable and will therefore cause a loss in two
ways. First of all, by the neutrons which it absorbs and second by forming
an element of a relatively short half-life which decays into 24 instead of the
fissionable 23. For this reason it will be necessay to keep the absorption by
the Pa at a minimum. This can be done by extracting the Pa at sufficiently
frequent intervals so as to reduce the absorption of neutrons by this element
to about 1/2% of the absorption by the thorium. This will be relatively easy
if the absorption cross section of Pa is of the same order as the absorption of
the thorium and if all the thorium can be used in the form of a slurry, since
for a power output of 100,000 kW only about 120 gms of Pa are formed per
day and since the mean life of Pa is 40 days, there will be, in steady state, 4.8
kg Pa in the reflector. Since the total amount of Th in the reflector is more
than a ton, it will be sufficient to extract the Pa only n times a month if its
cross section is n times that of the thorium. However, if it is necessary to use
part of the thorium in form of a backing of the tank, a considerable fraction
(about 25%) of all of the neutrons will be absorbed by the first few cm of
this backing. As a result, the Pa accumulates in this part of the thorium
much more rapidly than in the bulk of it and the purification would have to
be undertaken more frequently. This is especially disconcerting because the
removal and replacement of this backing is a somewhat awkward problem.
(8) Relatively frequent purification of the thorium seems also indicated by the
accumulation of fission and corrosion products. The frequency of the need
of this purification can be estimated in the following way: The absorption
cross section of thorium is just about 100 times smaller than the absorption
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cross section of the 23. Therefore, if we divide the amount of thorium in the
reflector by 100 times the amount of 23 in the pile, we obtain the number by
which the cross section of the thorium in the reflector is larger than the cross
section of 23 in the pile. This number is at least 4 to 5. On the other hand,
the amount of fission in the reflector will be less than 1% of the amount of
fission in the pile if all the thorium is distributed uniformly in the reflector.
The relative poisoning of the reflector by the fission products will be about
400 times smaller than the poisoning of the pile and a correspondingly less
frequent purification would be quite sufficient for the elimination of the fission
products. It is seen from this that the need for purifying the thorium of the
reflector will arise mainly from the absorption by the Pa, the absorption by
the corrosion products, if any, and to reduce the holdup of 23 within the
reflector. This last factor will demand a purification of at least once a month
because after this time there will be about 3 kg of 23 in the reflector. Of
course a more frequent purification maybe demanded either because of the
absorption of the Pa or the absorption by the corrosion products but we shall
see that this does not seem to be the case. The above discussion assumes that
the thorium is uniformly distributed within the reflector but the situation is
not very different if a backing of the tank is needed.
(9) As mentioned before, the absorption cross section of thorium is just about
100 times smaller than the absorption cross section of 23. Therefore, if we
want to reduce the losses due to the moderator in the reflector to 1% of all the
neutrons absorbed in the reflector—this will give a loss of 1.37% in efficiency—
the volumes associated with 1 gm of thorium are 100 times smaller than the
figures given in the fourth column of Table I. It appears from this that only
D2 O can serve as a carrier of the thorium in the reflector. Using the thorium
in form of a slurry has the further advantage that a frequent mixing of the
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whole amount of thorium can be achieved and it will not be necessary to
remove parts of the thorium at more frequent intervals.
(10) There are three causes for losses of neutrons from the reflector: The first one
is the escape of neutrons toward the ends of the pile in case the arrangement
of Fig. 2 is used. This, however, will be a very small quantity if the loss
from the pile in the same directions is also very small. The escape of neutrons
perpendicular to the main surface of the pile is governed by the tail of the
slowing down density of neutrons. If one could adopt for this tail the Gaussian
expression it would be sufficient to use such a thickness `s that `2s /4τ = 4
√
which would give `s = 4 τ = 45 cm. Actually it may be safer to surround
the reflector by a second reflector which may be out of graphite. In this case
one can reduce the thickness of the reflector which contains the thorium to
about 38 cm.
This figure is arrived at in the following way.

The number of neutrons

absorbed in the reflector divided by the number of neutrons entering the
graphite reflector is approximately
4
√
3

r

σag
σg

In this, σag /σg is the ratio of absorption and scattering cross section in C.
This formula assumes that all the neutrons entering the graphite are thermal
which is a slightly pessimistic assumption. The fraction of neutrons entering
the graphite reflector is given by
√
Z
3`s σs0 ∞
3 τ σs0
exp(−`s2 /4τ )
2
√ exp(−`s2 /4τ ) − √
√
exp(−y
dy)
+
2 π
2 π `s /2√τ
4 πτ σas
σs0 ≈ 0.4/cm is an average fast neutron cross section of the slurry per cm3 .
The first two terms refer to the fast neutrons entering the graphite, the last
term to the slow neutrons entering it. The length, 38 cm, is so chosen as to
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reduce the total number of neutrons escaping from the system to less than
0.5% of all neutrons entering the thorium reflector. The above calculation
should be somewhat improved to take into account the neutrons generated
by fission in thorium. However, the number of these neutrons is quite small,
less than 1% of all the neutrons, and the probability of their escape remains
small even if they are found somewhat to the inside of the thorium reflector.
(11) The losses in chemical separation should really be considered in conjunction
with the poisoning problem. Evidently the smaller the losses the chemical
separation involves, the more frequently it is worth while to carry out such a
separation. The figures given under (3) were not calculated but estimated on
the assumption that the loss of 23 during a chemical cycle amounts to 0.1%
The total loss in efficiency therefore can be estimated as follows:
It is unnecessary to remark that these figures give, in the best case, an orientation
and that the chances are that they are optimistic.

The losses which were

enumerated are probably all present and it is unlikely that they are greatly
overestimated in the systems considered. However, there may be other losses
which we failed to recognize. In spite of this, it appears, at present, that the
efficiency losses can well be held below the 37% figure which is the margin if
Anderson and May’s η for 23 proves accurate.
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